Author: Karakhanian Suren

Arayik Harutyunyan on new appointment of former head of General Staff Intelligence Directorate: I presented this as interesting information

Karakhanian Suren
Arminfo, Armenia
Dec 20 2018

ArmInfo. On December 20, in an  interview with journalists, Acting Minister of Education and Science  Arayik Harutyunyan addressed to the statements he had made in the  past about the new adviser to the Acting Prime Minister Nikol  Pashinyan Arshak Karapetyan after his appointment as a military  attache at the Armenian Embassy in Russia.

“If you watched the video  in full, then I thought it was not strange (appointment ed.), I found  it strange that someone was not punished because of the April events.  I presented it as interesting information, “said Harutyunyan. To note  that he doesn’t see any contradictions between the statements he made  in the past about Arshak Karapetyan and his current appointment,  Harutyunyan stressed that the Acting Prime Minister addressed this  issue yesterday.  According to him, Arayik Harutyunyan is satisfied  with these clarifications.

According to the Acting head of the Ministry of Education and  Science, in fact, in the video, he literally said: “There is  interesting information, the head of the intelligence department, who  was sent to the island during the April war, was again appointed  military attache at the Armenian Embassy in Russia, the information  is very interesting. It is very strange that after the April events,  someone was not punished and was not brought to justice.  Earlier it  was reported that appeared in social networks video, in which the  current acting. Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan and Acting  Education and Science Minister Arayik Harutyunyan is talking about  Arshak Karapetyan, believing that he was a fiasco during the April  war.

To recall, by the decree of former President Serzh Sargsyan of April  26, 2016, immediately after the four- day war in Nagorno-Karabakh,  Deputy Minister of Defense – Head of the Logistics Department Alik  Mirzabekyan, Head of the General Staff Arshak Karapetyan’s  Intelligence Department and Head of Troops Communications – Head of  Communications and Automated Control Systems Department Komitas  Muradyan were dismissed from their posts. There were no official  comments on the reasons for the reshuffle. But Armenian experts  explained the resignation by the authorities’ desire to mitigate the  discontent that followed the four-day war. So, after the hostilities  in early April 2016, much was said that the material and technical  support of the Armenian army was extremely unsatisfactory: according  to some information, sometimes even there was not enough ammunition.  It was also said that the offensive, which was prepared by the Armed  Forces of Azerbaijan, was not identified on time. However, already in  February 2018 he was appointed military attache at the Armenian  Embassy in Russia

Yesterday appeal to the appointment of Arshak Karapetyan as advisor  to the head of government; the Acting Prime Minister said that the  secret material about the April war is not a word about the lack of  intelligence materials. Answering the question that the same  Karapetyan, in accordance with secret order 0038, was also involved  in the events of March 1, 2008, Pashinyan noted that, in accordance  with this order, a very large part of the SC was involved in these  events: “Now we don’t can separate this part from the sun? ” However,  he stressed that all those whom the investigation finds guilty will  be punished to the fullest extent of the law. Touching upon the  accusations of his comrades-in-arms, now ministers made before the  revolution to the past authorities that Karapetyan after the April  war could not be appointed military attache in the Armenian  diplomatic department in Russia, Pashinyan stressed that all  statements made by his colleagues and himself were before the  revolution, are not a sentence. At the same time, Pashinyan  questioned the justice of Karapetyan’s dismissal after the April  events. “I read hundreds of pages of secret materials about the April  war, and, in fact, I can say that we didn’t have a shortage of  intelligence materials. We have a lot of questions about the April  war that should be answered and, as far as possible, should be  presented to the society “, – Pashinyan assured, stressing that many  knew about the accumulation of Azerbaijani troops around the  perimeter of the front line until the April war:” But I will refrain  from assessing. “

Sports: Armenian playmaker won Kazakhstan Premier League’s Goal of the Season award

Karakhanian Suren
Panorama, Armenia
Dec 15 2018

Armenian national football team and Aktobe forward Marcos Pizzelli has won Kazakhstan’s Premier League goal of the season for his superb individual strike against Shakhter Karagandy. In the match of the 16th tour of the Premiere League.

The interception in the middle of the pitch in the 52nd minute was followed by a Pizzelli lovely shot from outside the area, bending the ball inside the far post. the match ended with a Aktobe win 2-0.

’s-Goal-of-the-Season-award/2048574

Facilitating dialogue: EU-funded NGOs and the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict

Karakhanian Suren
States News Service
December 12, 2018 Wednesday

FACILITATING DIALOGUE: EU-FUNDED NGOS AND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT


The following information was released by NGO Monitor:

Executive Summary

The following report examines the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in EU-funded peacebuilding efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). The evidence points to a lack of oversight and a general inadequacy in addressing challenges in the region. Most pertinently, the severely restricted access to the region is not taken into account.

The EU’s main NGO programme in the region, European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK), is fraught with conflicts of interest. A number of EPNK implementing NGOs were commissioned to recommend policy interventions in NK prior to the programme’s commencement. Five years into EPNK’s implementation, the same NGOs were consulted by the EU regarding the programme’s continuation- which was subsequently renewed for a third phase.

One of EPNK’s programme partners, London Information Network on Conflict and State Building (LINKS), has no available financial reports for three of the years that it received programme funding. Furthermore, LINKS has a clear financial dependence on EPNK funds, which amounts to over 85% on average of the organisation’s budget. Of this, over 50% was paid to the organisation’s sole employee in consultation and travel fees, or owed to him in debt. Further, due to forced liquidation in 2013, LINKS did not legally exist for seven months during which it reportedly received EU funds.

Activities conducted within the EPNK programme have poor outreach to relevant audiences and, to a large extent, fail to meet the stated objectives of increasing grassroots engagement and facilitating an independent civil society network. The social media initiatives and online networks are not sufficiently promoted and have achieved little to no visibility.

It is unknown whether these findings reflect unintended consequences, abuse of trust on behalf of one or more of the parties, or political backscratching. It appears, however, that the EU’s existing mechanisms for engagement with NGOs fall short in terms of due diligence and oversight.

Introduction

The following report examines the involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in EU-funded peacebuilding efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) in order to gain a better understanding of the challenges and structural issues related to the use of NGOs as peacebuilding agents.

As stated by the European External Action Service (EEAS), “Peace building and conflict prevention are at the heart of EEAS action. The EU aims to ‘promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’and to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security.'” 1 The EU is a major supporter of peacebuilding efforts across the globe, including in conflict and post-conflict societies and unrecognised territories, many of which involve international and local NGOs as primary implementers.

The main EU initiative on the NK conflict is the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK) a peacebuilding programme led by a consortium of five European NGOs. According to its website, it is a “unique initiative, funded by the European Union that seeks to positively impact the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process.” 2 Its five member NGOs Conciliation Resources, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), International Alert, Kvinna till Kvinna, and London Information Network on Conflict and State Building (LINKS) “work with local partners in the South Caucasus on a wide range of peacebuilding activities to contribute to lasting peace in the region.” 3 After two subsequent funding phases (2010-2011, 2012-2015), EPNK was renewed for a third phase (sometimes referred to as EPNK III), with a budget of 4.7 million for 2016- 2019. EPNK is funded through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP, previously called the Instrument for Stability). 4

In January 2017, the EU launched an additional NGO program targeting the region, “Peacebuilding through Capacity Enhancement and Civic Engagement” (PeaCE). According to the EU, “The action proposes peace-building initiatives separate, yet complementary to those proposed by EPNK III and aims to broaden participation of local civil society actors and grassroots in peace-building activities, including across the divide” (emphasis added). 5 The NGOs implementing the PeaCE programme include Eurasia Partnership Foundation in Armenia (EPF-Armenia), Eurasia Partnership Foundation in Azerbaijan (EPF-Azerbaijan) through Caucasus Research Resource Centre in Georgia (CRRC-Georgia), and EPNK consortium member International Alert. PeaCE’s duration is 36 months, with a budget of 1,860,000. 6

The findings detailed in this report are based on online research and field work carried out in 2017 and early 2018. Interviews were conducted with four local activists from NK involved in EU-funded projects; two representatives of de-facto NK authorities; regional coordinators for the South Caucasus of EPNK consortium members CMI, Conciliation Resources, International Alert and Kvinna till Kvinna; and two EEAS representatives responsible for the South Caucasus. Due to restricted access and limited resources, it was not possible to interview Azerbaijani participants. All interviewees chose to remain anonymous.

The first section of this report provides a general historical background to the conflict, with an emphasis on challenges related to peacebuilding and civil society. The following sections detail issues about EPNK’s initiation and overall activities, highlighting concerns related to conflicts of interest and a lack of oversight, as well as the programme’s apparent failure to meet its objectives. The report then highlights one of the EPNK consortium members, LINKS, and its considerable financial dependence on EPNK funds. The report ends with a review of the activities conducted by the NGOs within the EU programmes.

I. Historical Background

Though its origins can be traced to as far back as 2,000 years ago, the current dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh first emerged in the 1980s, when the largely Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) raised demands to no longer be under the rule of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. The resulting tensions escalated into a fully-fledged war between the newly formed states of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992. A ceasefire was achieved only in 1994, after Armenian troops took hold of the majority of the NKAO, along with a number of surrounding provinces. Despite numerous international mediation efforts, violence erupted again in April 2016 with a series of military clashes, concluded by a ceasefire after four days.

A major hindrance to peace in the region is an almost complete lack of engagement and/or dialogue across the divide. Exacerbating this issue, access to the region is severely obstructed due to issues related to territory recognition, inherently limiting any peacebuilding or mediation efforts.

As stated by the Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Romania, Azerbaijan deems any visit of a foreign citizen in NK as well as “any kind of political, economic, financial, cultural and etc. interaction with (sic) illegal regime established there” a “direct and crude violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” 7 Consequently, internationals who visit NK are added to a “list of ‘persona non grata’ whose entry to the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan is banned.” Irrespectively, Azerbaijan reportedly bans all entry of Armenians to the country, including non-Armenian citizens of Armenian descent. 8

The issue of access is amply demonstrated by the difficulty of demining large areas in NK. The only agency currently engaged in mine clearance in NK is the UK-based HALO Trust. As stated by the HALO Trust, “Nagorno Karabakh’s unrecognized status prevents many governments from funding humanitarian activities in the territory and HALO receives no funding from the Armenian Government. Until recently, our only major donor in Karabakh was the US Government, through USAID, but its funding is restricted to land within the Soviet boundary of the autonomous oblast of Nagorno Karabakh.” 9

Attesting to the need to facilitate dialogue, mutual hostility between the parties to the conflict is firmly embedded in public opinion. A 2012 survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Centre found that 63% of Armenians saw Azerbaijan as the “biggest enemy of Armenia,” and 91% of Azerbaijanis saw Armenia as the “biggest enemy of Azerbaijan.” 10

Opinion surveys conducted by the EU in 2017 indicate that the EU is well-positioned to initiate dialogue that would enjoy legitimacy on both sides. Pro-EU sentiments are rising in both countries, with 47% of Azerbaijanis and 48% of Armenians having a positive image of the EU. In addition, 51% of Azerbaijanis trust the EU, as do 76% of Armenians; in both countries, trust of the EU surpasses that of other international organisations, including the UN and NATO. 11

According to an in-depth analysis of EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan commissioned by the European Parliament (EP), Azerbaijani civil society supports and expects EU involvement in the resolution of the conflict. In addition, Russia’s current prominence in the region has reportedly elicited Azerbaijani reservations towards existing mediation efforts, such as those by OSCE Minsk Group. As identified by the EP study, Russia “has been using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a means of pressure on Azerbaijan and thus forces the incumbent authorities to manoeuvre between the EU and Moscow.” 12

II. Initiation and Renewal of EPNK Conflict of Interest?

A year prior to EPNK’s commencement, a number of the NGOs (that would later form the EPNK consortium) were commissioned by the EU to provide policy recommendations on EU mediation and peacebuilding efforts. As will be discussed, the resulting EU-funded publications appear to recommend their authors as ideal implementers.

Five years into the EPNK’s implementation, an EU-funded NGO network of which all EPNK NGOs but one are members was similarly consulted by the EU regarding the programme’s continuation which was subsequently renewed for a third phase.

The commissioning of NGOs in this manner first, to help shape policies, then to implement their own recommendations, and finally to assess their own performance constitutes a conflict of interest and raises questions as to the manner in which EPNK is monitored and scrutinised by the EU.

EU-Funded Publications

In 2009, the EU funded two publications issued jointly by the CMI and the Initiative for Peacebuilding (IfP) “a consortium led by International Alert and funded by the European Commission” (emphasis added). No longer active, IfP’s aim was “to develop and harness international knowledge and expertise in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to ensure that all stakeholders, including EU institutions, can access strong independent analysis in order to facilitate better informed and more evidence-based policy decisions” (emphasis added). 13 In addition to International Alert, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) was also a member of this consortium. With the exception of LINKS, all EPNK NGOs are members of EPLO, and were thus direct or indirect members of IfP.

The first publication, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Lessons from the mediation efforts” (published March 2009), identifies “the question of recognition” as a main obstacle to peacebuilding and argues that “the European Union can actively support initiatives from NGOs and civil society actors that can facilitate dialogue without conferring official recognition” (emphasis added). 14

Despite identifying practical limitations derived from the issue of recognition first and foremost lack of access to the contested region as crucial factors, the analysis fails to take them into account. Accordingly, the publication does not specify in what manner NGOs would be able to “facilitate dialogue,” what actors such a dialogue would involve, or how this could amount to meaningful change. As shown in subsequent sections of this report, these limitations would significantly impede the range, intensity, and effectiveness of EPNK activities.

The second publication, “Engaging the EU in Mediation and Dialogue” (published in May 2009), similarly concludes that “While official mediators struggle with the dilemma of the involvement of non-recognised/de facto parties in negotiations without overtly legitimising their claims, non-governmental institutions can circumvent the issue of recognition by providing all parties concerned with the avenues for participation” (p. 14, emphasis added). It adds that “Informal mediation by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and faith-based organisations indeed holds an important place in international peace mediation,” arguing that “Proactive and regular outreach to these actors can help the EU draw on their expertise and experience more consistently for its own mediation efforts” (emphasis added). 15

On the basis of these assumptions, the publication recommends to “Tailor EU financial and policy tools such as the Stability Instrument and the PbP [Peacebuilding Partnership], but also the EIDHR [The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights] as well as official development assistance through instruments such as the Development Cooperation Instrument to improve linkages between governmental and non-governmental actors involved in different mediation efforts” (p. 22, emphases added). The publication further recommends the EU to “Work actively with specialised NGOs working in the field of mediation either based in the EU and (sic) in conflict affected countries” (p. 22) an apt description of the NGO authors of the publication.

Launch of EU-Funded Programme

In 2010, shortly after the release of these publications, International Alert, CMI, and two other EPLO member NGOs received an initial budget of 2,000,000 from the EU’s Instrument for Stability (now Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace) for peacebuilding activities in NK (2010-2011). 16 For EPNK’s second phase, spanning just less than three years (2012-2015), this amount was tripled (6,000,000). 17

In May 2015, towards the end of the second phase, EPLO was “requested to organise a meeting in the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) with representatives of peacebuilding civil society organisations (CSOs) working in the region,” in light of the EU’s commitment to “continuing its support to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process.” As stated in the concept note for the meeting, its outcome would “feed into the design of future EU assistance to this process.” 18 CSDN is co-financed and co-manged by the European Commission.

Thus, EPLO member NGOs that had received EU funding for designated activities via EPNK were also consulted to determine how and whether these activities should continue, through a different EU-funded platform.

According to the EU’s Financial Transparency System (FTS), EPNK was renewed for a third phase (EPNK 3), receiving a 4,732,120 grant in 2016. 19 According to the EPNK website, the third phase of EPNK will last from May 2016-April 2019 with a total budget of 4,732,708. 20

III. Engaging Local Civil Society?

As stated on its website, EPNK’s goals consist of (emphases added throughout):

“Increasing people’s participation in a peaceful resolution of the conflict, especially marginalised groups;”

“Building confidence and trust between all sides of the conflict through increased contact between people;”

“Encouraging fresh analysis and new ideas that challenge existing thinking on the conflict and seek to promote peace;”

“Encouraging civil society to play an active part in the dialogue with policymakers at national and international levels on how to transform the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a peaceful way.” 21

The consortium purports to pursue these goals, among other means, by “Creating an independent civil society framework for European non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to engage with the Karabakh conflict” and “build(ing) relationships and confidence across the conflict divide” (emphasis added). 22

Echoing the policy recommendations reviewed in Section II, EPNK does not directly address the lack of access to the region as an impediment to these professed goals. Beyond limiting the scope of activity in NK itself, ongoing travel bans render it virtually impossible to bring Armenians and Azerbaijanis together in either country. None of the involved organisations suggests strategies to overcome this obvious hurdle or addresses it in any way.

Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of activities supported and conducted within the framework of EPNK do not take place in the affected region and involve only a limited engagement with local actors.

The Regional Grants Initiative (RGI), established as part of the EPNK’s second phase in order to “provide a flexible mechanism for funding new activities in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,” illustrates this shortcoming. According to EPNK’s website, RGI funded “five projects receiving a maximum of 20,000 Euros implemented between March and November 2014,” with a total budget of 100,000. Details are provided on only four of these projects, three of which took place in Georgia. 23 Thus, the RGI utilised only one-sixtieth of the total EPNK Phase II budget (6,000,000) for supporting local civil society, for a handful of projects involving a minuscule segment of the local population. There is no information regarding a similar initiative in the programme’s third phase (2016-2019).

Likewise, as of February 2018, EPNK’s “Project highlights” boasts seven projects from 2017-2018. These projects took place in Oxford, Brussels, Vienna, Minsk, and London. 24 Some of the activities, such as an academic conference on the South Caucasus in Oxford and a European Parliament event on “confidence-building measures,” featured international experts and panelists, but did not involve grassroots participation. 25 Others included only small groups of local professionals “journalists,” “young researchers,” or “experts from think tanks and civil society groups.” 26

Indeed, local NGO officials and EPNK partners on the ground expressed their conviction in interviews that local civil society, democratic institutions, and the peace process as a whole could vastly benefit from increased funding for activities in the region that directly involve the local population. Other civil society activists pointed out that engagement and active interaction with the local population has been lacking throughout the course of EPNK, and that therefore fomenting an independent civil society network was far from successful. The trainings and trips organized under the auspices of the EPNK programme involved only a small number of people, inherently limiting the scope of dialogue between civil society actors from conflicting sides. Moreover, those activities that were carried out were not sufficiently communicated to wider audiences within affected societies.

A March 2018 academic paper on NGO peacebuilding programs in NK, asserts “serious discrepancies in funding” in the region, citing indications that “some organizations have a monopoly: EPNK, a consortium of five organizations, has a budget of 4.7 million (USD $5.8 million) for 2016-2019, whereas CRISP [Crisis Simulation for Peace], a small organization, received only around 50,000 (USD $61,000) for 2016 to do trainings in the Caucasus.” 27

In the same vein, the PeaCE initiative, created for “re-engag(ing) Armenians and Azerbaijanis from geographic areas affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in peacebuilding activities, as well as reviv(ing) the peacebuilding process within and between these societies,” has seen limited participation of NGOs from NK, according to interviews. This is attributed both to cumbersome application procedures and to a lack of significant physical presence of PeaCE’s international implementing NGOs. As neither the implementing NGOs nor the EU appears to publish details online as of February 2018, there is no readily available information as to the projects and beneficiaries of the PeaCE programme. Rather than addressing the shortcomings of an existing programme i.e., EPNK the EU launched an additional programme with almost identical objectives and an overlapping implementer (International Alert).

Another factor, which specifically inhibits the participation of Azerbaijani NGOs, is restrictive legislation. According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), despite a significant simplification of the registration process for foreign-funded NGOs approved in October 2017, Azerbaijani law still allows for “government discretion on whether to approve or deny registration of a grant.” 28

IV. LINKS and EPNK Financial Concerns

The London-based NGO LINKS is the only EPNK consortium member that was not directly or indirectly involved in the decision-making process surrounding EPNK’s initiation and renewal (see section II). Regardless, financial reports point to a clear financial dependence of LINKS on EPNK funds, as well as a notable financial reliance on fellow EPNK member Conciliation Resources in the two years leading up to EPNK’s initiation.

For three of the eight years during which LINKS participated in the EPNK programme, there are no available financial reports submitted to the UK’s company registrar (“Companies House”). These include seven months during which the organisation did not legally exist from its forced liquidation in February 2013 to its re-incorporation under a slightly different name in October 2013 “LINKS (Dialogue, Analysis, Research).” Throughout its existence, LINKS had a total of 11 registered employees of which all but two had resigned by the time of its dissolution in 2013. 29 Since its re-incorporation, the organization’s sole registered employee is the director, Dennis Sammut.

Screenshot of Companies House notice for compulsory strike-off to LINKS, November 2012

According to the financial reports available on the Companies House website for the period of LINKS’ participation in EPNK (2010, 2014, 2015, 2016), EPNK grants amount to an average of over 85% of the organisation’s annual income, of which an average of over 50% was paid to Sammut in the form of consultancy and travel fees, or owed to him in debt (see Table I). 30

As of 2016, the company reports a retained deficit of 5,289 and a total debt of 36,110 of which 23,913 is owed to Sammut. The 2016 report states, “The director believes that the company is able to pay its debts as they fall due… In particular, the director does not intend to seek full repayment of amounts owed to him if this would affect the company’s ability to continue in operation. Furthermore, European Union funding was secured in 2016 for a period up to May 2019” (emphasis added).

Of the few reported non-EU contributions during this period, at least two appear to be EPNK funds under a different name. In 2015, the only source of income other than the EU is reported as “the OIC Youth Forum Conference” (17,593). As described in the narrative section of the report dedicated to EPNK activities, the OIC Youth Forum Conference was in fact “a major conference in Brussels” held in March 2015 by LINKs and the inter-state Organisation for Islamic Co-operation (OIC), under the auspices of EPNK. The OIC Youth Forum was created and chaired by a high ranking official of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 31

Similarly, the 2016 financial report lists a 22,000 contribution from “Caucasus Concise.” Caucasus Concise is the name of a weekly newsletter issued by LINKS’ news portal, commonspace.eu, as part of the EPNK program. It is available on an EU-funded website. There is no indication that Caucasus Concise is an entity in its own right, nor are there any details available as to additional sources of funding. 32

Over the course of its existence, LINKS was threatened four times with forced liquidation. Between 2007 and 2010, it did not publish financial reports, publishing accounts for the years 2007-2009 only retroactively, between December 2010 and May 2011. 33 LINKS’ 2008 financial report notes that “The company has net liabilities of 180,049 at 31 December 2008[.] The company has secured additional funding after the year end and the accumulated losses are expected to be eliminated.” However, the following year (2009), LINKS’ total income amounted to a mere 45,527, all of which came from Conciliation Resources. LINKS also received a 56,370 grant from Conciliation Resources in 2008.

Table 1: Data from LINKS’ Financial Reports

YearTotal IncomeEU ContributionOther ContributionsRemuneration to SammutDebt Owed to Sammut

2008111,875NoneConciliation Resources: 56,370

FCO: 16,055

Irish MFA: 16,055

“Other grants 5,000 and under”: 10,00013,00042,220

200945,527NoneConciliation Resources: 45,527None59,823

2010175,481175,481 (reported

as International

Alert)None21,00049,217

2014137,333135,150Donations: 2,18363,725 + travel

fees (unspecified)1,501

201599,60581,997OIC Youth Forum Conference: 17,59361,3261,316

2016192,333143,848John Smith Trust: 24,150

Caucasus Concise: 22,000

Miscellaneous: 2,33295,63023,913

LINKS proclaims to have “provided space for dialogue and analytical discussion, backed by in-depth research, on issues related to the Caucasus region and more particularly the Nagorno Karabakh conflict for nearly two decades.” In addition, the organisation claims to contribute “to a broader understanding of the conflict, and processes around it, in a wider regional and international context through constant engagement with the international community.” 34

In contrast, local civil society representatives interviewed for this report have emphasised the lack of on-the-ground engagement of LINKS in NK. Although LINKS claims to maintain “regular dialogue with the governments, parliaments and political forces in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, the displaced community of Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh, and other stakeholders from across the conflict divide,” de-facto officials in Stepanakert noted with concern the persistent lack of any engagement with LINKS.

LINKS’ most meaningful endeavour within the EPNK framework appears to be commonspace.eu, a news portal that publishes articles and commentaries in Russian and English, and is complemented by a Facebook page with approximately 15,000 followers. 35

In EPNK’s third phase, LINKS is “working closely with two leading think-tanks, the European Policy Centre in Brussels and the International Peace Institute in Vienna.” It is unclear whether or how this affects funding allocations. Dennis Sammut is also a member of the European Policy Centre’s strategic council. 36

V. EPNK Consortium Members

The inadequacy of the EPNK programme is further implicated by the activities of some of its respective consortium members.

The “lead EPNK member organisation” is International Alert. 37 The UK-based NGO has been working on the NK conflict for almost 15 years, since 2003, and was referred to in interviews with local activists as an active and important actor. 38 International Alert is also an implementing partner in the PeaCE programme.

According to the EPNK website, International Alert’s activities within the programme consist of two main projects:

“Envisioning Peace” a “participatory research initiative” that “brings together a group of 11 researchers from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh,” who “were trained in our new methodology to stimulate reflection on the human and social cost of the conflict.” Envisioning Peace has an inactive Instagram account with three followers and no posts. 39 There is no other available platform regularly communicating activities related to the initiative.

“Unheard Voices” a “cross-conflict network of journalists and editors from leading media outlets in Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK,” which aims to “ensure their voices are heard both at home in their own societies and on the other side of the conflict divide, allowing readers to see the real faces hidden behind the images of ‘the enemy.'” According to International Alert, articles are published in Armenian and Azeri in local media outlets, and in Russian on a designated Facebook page with 1,173 followers. The project also has a Twitter account with 40 followers (as of February 2018). 40 In September 2017, EPNK announced a “relaunch” of the project along with a new website, JAMNews, which is regularly updated. 41

International Alert’s 2016 annual report makes no mention of EPNK activities. While it reports 1.9 million in “institutional grants,” it does not provide a breakdown. 42

Activities conducted by other EPNK organisations appear to be more sporadic and have poor outreach.

According to its 2016 annual report, 7% of CMI’s budget came from the EU (roughly 450,000), with EPNK being the only EU-funded project. 43 On its website, CMI boasts “the creation of a cross-conflict platform of emerging professionals,” the result of “five years of sustained engagement by CMI” within the framework of EPNK. 44 There is no systematic documentation of the activities carried out within this network, or their impact.

In 2015, CMI produced an animated video highlighting the importance of dialogue in the conflict. The video, captioned, “Peacefall, Episode 1: ‘Legacy,'” has 2,463 views on YouTube as of February 2018. No further episodes were uploaded. 45

Civil society activists from NK reported activities conducted by CMI with civil society representatives from the region. One participant in CMI activities reported that they had managed to procure a PeaCE grant for a project focusing on debate and research thanks to the skills they had acquired over the course of their participation.

Similarly to CMI, Conciliation Resources leads a Karabakh Contact Group (KCG) “a flexible and confidential format in which controversial issues can be discussed, assumptions tested and ideas generated.” 46 According to Conciliation Resources, the group provides “a rare opportunity” for activists from both sides to exchange ideas face-to-face: “Meetings, held under the Chatham House Rule, typically last 2-3 days and take place in a location that is accessible and acceptable to all participants. Most meetings have taken place in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi.”

The only KCG gathering highlighted by Conciliation Resources and the EPNK program is a 2014 meeting in Washington. 47 As of February 2018, there is no documentation available on other meetings, except for a 2015 publication “based on a meeting of the Karabakh Contact Group… Held over three days in Tbilisi in late 2014.” 48 In addition to the EU, the KCG also received funding from the UK Government’s Conflict, Stability, and Security Fund. 49

Kvinna till Kvinna “supports Armenian and Azerbaijani women’s organisations and individual women’s rights activists to promote women’s empowerment and participation in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process.” 50 While the organisation has a section on its website dedicated to the “South Caucasus,” the most recent post (as of February 2018) is dated April 2013. 51 According to Kvinna till Kvinna’s country page on Azerbaijan (last updated in June 2016 as of February 2018),

“Several of The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation’s partner organisations in Azerbaijan are cooperating with Armenian women’s organisations to create opportunities for dialogue between women affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In general it is very difficult for Azerbaijanis and Armenians to meet or to talk about the conflict… Through an EU-funded project Kvinna till Kvinna’s partner organisations in Armenia and Azerbaijan also work to prepare women for participation in official peace processes, as well as conflict resolution.” 52

No details are provided on how and where this cross-conflict cooperation takes place. According to an interview with a Kvinna till Kvinna coordinator, the organisation has three mentors in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and NK, who facilitate mentoring activities, dialogue, and gender-related research.

VI. Conclusion

The EU continues to avoid any direct engagement with NK and the peace process, largely due to sensitivities and limitations related to the question of recognition although the EU is nevertheless active in other territories with a similar legal status. The EU’s EPNK and PeaCE programmes were initiated for the specific purpose of overcoming these difficulties by engaging civil society and facilitating cross-conflict dialogue.

As shown in this report, these efforts have been inadequate, failing to meet their stated objectives or to contribute meaningfully to the peace process. In fact, the implementation of EPNK has corresponded with an increase in inflammatory rhetoric and skirmishes, culminating in a renewed round of hostilities in April 2016. 53 So long as these inadequacies remain unaddressed, the EU will most likely not promote other peacebuilding efforts in the region, leaving room for other international actors first and foremost Russia to fill the vacuum.

As direct cross-conflict engagement is extremely difficult to facilitate in the context of Nagorno-Karabakh, the use of social media and other online platforms seems a reasonable alternative in the attempt to break down barriers. However, while EPNK has reportedly launched a number of social media initiatives and online networks, these have poor outreach and have achieved little to no visibility an essential condition for any potential impact.

Beyond highlighting these programmes’ shortcomings, the findings presented in this report reflect structural issues in the EU’s funding policies and more generally in its relationship with NGOs. The EU appears to have relied on NGOs’ perceived expertise before commissioning the same NGOs to implement the very policies they had recommended. The circular nature of the policy-making and evaluation process results in the EU overlooking obvious impediments and subsequently failing to adequately oversee the programme’s implementation.

It is unknown whether these findings reflect unintended consequences, abuse of trust on behalf of one or more of the parties, or political backscratching. It appears, however, that the EU’s existing mechanisms for engagement with NGOs and external action fall short in terms of due diligence and oversight.

Footnotes

https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/426/conflict-prevention-peace-building-and-mediation_en

http://epnk.org/

Footnote

See EUR-Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011SC1000; International Alert, http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/ToR final evalution EPNK.pdf; EU Financial Transparency System, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm

EuropeAid. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/files/iati/XI-IATI-EC_FPI_C_QSA.xml

https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/25540/grants-opportunities-peacebuilding-through-capacity-enhancement-and-civic-engagement-peace_en

http://bucharest.mfa.gov.az/content/38

USC Institute of Armenian Studies, https://armenian.usc.edu/focus-on-karabakh/highlight/russia-calls-azerbaijans-ban-ethnic-armenians-savagery/

https://www.halotrust.org/minefreenk/our-role-in-nagorno-karabakh/

http://www._css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CAD-51-52.pdf#page=21

EU Neighbours East, https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2017-10/EUNEIGHBOURSeast_AnnualSurvey-2017report_AZERBAIJAN_0.pdf#page=10, https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2017-10/EUNEIGHBOURSeast_AnnualSurvey2017report_ARMENIA.pdf#page=10

European Parliament Policy Department, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/133502/EU relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan.pdf, p. 22, 25; see also Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijans-relations-with-minsk-group-hit-new-low/

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, http://eplo.org/activities/project-archive/initiative-peacebuilding/

https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/38326628/the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-initiative-for-peacebuilding, p. 13.

https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-IFP-EU-Mediation-Dialogue-2009-English.pdf, p. 16.

EUR-Lex, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011SC1000

International Alert, http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/ToR final evalution EPNK.pdf

http://eplo.org/wp content/uploads/2017/02/CSDN_Geographic-meeting_Nagorno-Karabakh_Report.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm

http://www.epnk.org/

http://www.epnk.org/about-us/our-goals

http://www.epnk.org/about-us/how-we-make-difference

http://www.epnk.org/regional-grants-initiative

http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights

http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights/importance-confidence-building-measures-resolution-karabakh-conflict-stressed; http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights/importance-confidence-building-measures-resolution-karabakh-conflict-stressed

http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights/relaunch-unheard-voices-media-project; http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights/young-researchers-gather-minsk-methodological-training; http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights/confidence-building-measures-are-important-tool-support-peace-karabakh-not

Veliyev, Jehun, Assessing the Impact of NGO Peacebuilding Programs in the South Caucasus: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh,Central Asia Fellows Paper204, March 2018.

http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/azerbaijan.html

UK Companies House, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03402701/officers

Financial reports downloaded from UK Companies House: https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/

LINKS-2008.pdf, https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LINKS-2009.pdf, https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LINKS-2010.pdf, https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LINKS-2014.pdf, https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LINKS-2015.pdf, https://www.ngo-monitor.org/nm/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LINKS-2016.pdf

http://www.icyf-dc.org/about-us/history/

http://commonspace.eu/index.php?m=23andnews_id=3882

https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03402701/filing-history

http://www.epnk.org/partners/links

http://www.commonspace.eu/; https://www.facebook.com/commonspace.EU/

http://www.epc.eu/about_council.php

http://www.epnk.org/partners/international-alert

http://www.international-alert.org/where-we-work/caucasus/nagorny-karabakh-conflict

https://www.instagram.com/envisioningpeace/

https://www.facebook.com/unheardvoices.intalert/; https://twitter.com/UnheardVoicesIA

https://jam-news.net/?page_id=51751

https://jam-news.net/?page_id=51751

http://cmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/cmi-ar-1page.pdf#page=28

http://cmi.fi/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/cmi-ar-1page.pdf#page=28

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M3DxALDuBJI

http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/caucasus/karabakh-contact-group-0

http://www.epnk.org/project-highlights/karabakh-contact-group-meeting-washington

http://www.c-r.org/downloads/755%20CR%20Caucasus%20Report%202014%20WEB.pdf#page=10

http://www.c-r.org/where-we-work/caucasus/karabakh-contact-group-0

http://www.epnk.org/partners/kvinna-till-kvinna

http://thekvinnatillkvinnafoundation.org/region/southcaucasus/

Armenia elections: Final voter turnout was less than 50%

Karakhanian Suren
News.am, Armenia
Dec 9 2018
Armenia elections: Final voter turnout was less than 50% Armenia elections: Final voter turnout was less than 50%

21:24, 09.12.2018
                  

YEREVAN. – The final voter turnout in the National Assembly election in Armenia was 48.63% of eligible voters, Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) Tigran Mukuchyan said.

Only  1, 260, 840 voters out of 2, 592, 481 cast their ballot in the first early parliaemntary elections in Armenia’s history. Overall, 47.6% voted in capital city Yerevan, 39.22% in Gyumri and 46.66% in Vanadzor.

As of 8 pm the turnout is 12 percent lower as compared to the parliamentary elections in 2017.

Two blocs and nine parties are running in the elections. Among them are “My Step” bloc, “We” bloc, the Republican Party of Armenia, Prosperous Armenia party, ARF Dashnaktsutyun, Orinats Yerkir, Bright Armenia,  Sasna Tsrer party, Christian-Democratic Party, Citizens’ Decision party and National Progress party.

Nikol Pashinyan called on the Armenian people to make an economic revolution

Karakhanian Suren
Arminfo, Armenia
Nov 24 2018
Nikol Pashinyan called on the Armenian people to make an economic revolution

November 24

Yerevan

Marianna Mkrtchyan. In the spring, the Armenian people made a political revolution, now it’s time to make an economic one. This was announced during the march in Yerevan by the Acting Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan.

According to him, the goal of the march is to once again fix the victory of the people during the May revolution. “We made a political revolution in April-May, the time has come for economic. Today we are starting an economic revolution. We believe in the creative power of our people, we believe that we can make an economic revolution that raises the economic development of our country to a new level of our people. Long live the industrious Armenian people! “, said Pashinyan.

The march of Pashinyan’s supporters led by the Acting the premiere goes to the Kanaker-Zeytun administrative district. The culmination of the procession will be in the administrative district of Malacia- Sebastia. Participate in processions with the flags of Armenia and the block “My step”, under the drumbeat, chanting “Armenia” are moving through the streets of the capital.

The California Courier Online, November 29, 2018

Karakhanian Suren
The California Courier Online, November 29, 2018

1 –        Commentary

            Should Armenia Grant Citizenship

            To Foreign Investors?

            By Harut Sassounian

            Publisher, The California Courier

            www.TheCaliforniaCourier.com

2-         AGBU Unfazed as Some Members Decry Organizational Mismanagement

            By Jenny Yettem

3-         2018 Armenia Fund Thanksgiving Day Telethon Raises $11,109,633

4 –        Turkish Police Detain Academics, Activists, Journalists in Raids

5-         Anthony Brindisi defeats Claudia Tenney in NY 22nd Congressional race

******************************************

1 –        Commentary

            Should Armenia Grant Citizenship

            To Foreign Investors?

            By Harut Sassounian

            Publisher, The California Courier

            www.TheCaliforniaCourier.com

The Acting Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan has made
attracting overseas investors the priority of his new government.

So far, it is too early to determine whether foreign investors are
interested in doing business in Armenia. The common explanation for
the lack of new investors is that they are waiting for the results of
Parliamentary elections scheduled for December 9, 2018. It is expected
that the Acting Prime Minister’s political party will win the majority
of the Parliamentary seats. Government officials believe that this
will encourage foreigners to start investing in Armenia.

However, there is an additional way that Armenia can attract new
foreign investors relatively quickly by offering them citizenship.
Many countries around the world have offered such citizenship
opportunities to foreigners, including the United States, Europe and
third world countries.

Earlier this year, the hetq.am investigative website published an
article on Arton Capital, a company that specializes in “citizenship
by investment” programs around the world. A delegation from the
company visited Armenia last year at the invitation of the
International Center for Migration Policy Development. Anton Capital’s
website stated after the visit: “the concept of citizenship by
investment was embraced by [Armenia’s] high level officials at the
Ministry of Economic Development and Investments, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Administration, the Central Bank,
the Police, the State Migration Service and the Center for Strategic
Initiatives.”

Armand Arton, a Bulgarian-Armenian, is the President of Arton Capital,
and Emil Shahmooradian is the company’s Vice President of Business
Development. Arton Capital has offices in a dozen countries. On his
company’s website, Armand Arton stated: “as a proud Armenian, I am
honored to offer my years of professional experience and acute
know-how to help the country meet its foreign direct investment goals.
In support of its philanthropic commitment, Arton Capital has pledged
to donate the consulting fees awarded by the contract to help refugees
in Armenia. More than 20,000 Syrians, many of whom are ethnically
Armenian, have found refuge in Armenia since the Syrian war began in
2011.”

Countries offering such a program require from foreigners different
levels of investment to qualify for citizenship. Arton Capital
recommends that Armenia require the small amount of $50,000 as a
minimum investment for a foreigner to become a citizen. Other
countries demand much more from foreign investors with the most
attractive countries asking as much as $10 million of investment for
citizenship. The Company estimates that Armenia would receive $138
million of additional revenue in the next six years, if it implements
the suggested investment for the citizenship program.

According to hetq.am, Arton Capital recommended that “Armenia offer
potential investors two options: a $50,000 direct contribution to a
state-owned fund or a $100,000 investment in a fund run by an asset
management company chosen by the government, which would offer the
possibility of some return. It further suggests that Armenia sets two
types of fees. The first would be a non-refundable processing fee of
up to $10,000; the second fee, the amount of which is not specified,
would cover background checks into applicants’ records and sources of
income.”

Arton Capital’s trip report on Armenia “highlights the country’s
positives, such as its strong ties to global economic hubs and its
geographic and cultural proximity to strategic markets. Armenia offers
investors access to Russia and almost all the post-Soviet states,
which means around 250 million potential consumers, including in
Central Asia—plus almost 82 million more in neighboring Iran, with
which the country has friendly relations.

And if the country achieves visa-free access to the Schengen zone,
which it might in five to seven years, it could justly claim to have
recreated its historic role as a stop on the Silk Road linking east
and west. As a whole, investors looking for long-term value can be
sold on the advantages of Armenia. With [visa-free access] to 60+
countries and its special relationship with Russia together with its
geographical proximity with Iran, obtaining an Armenian citizenship
will be seen not only as a means to secure one’s future and security,
but also as a strategic move for one’s business development and
positioning.”

Significantly, hetq.am cautioned in its article that some foreigners
interested in investing in other countries for the sake of acquiring
citizenship can bring with them all sorts of illegal activities, such
as tax evasion, money laundering, corruption and organized crime.

Armenian government officials have to balance the benefits of the
investment for citizenship program with its drawbacks. Foreign
applicants have to be thoroughly vetted before being granted Armenian
citizenship in return for their investments.

Update on Armenian-American Candidates in US Elections

In addition to the list of Armenian-American candidates in the U.S.
midterm elections that I reported in an earlier article, we should
add:

– Dick Harpootlian (Democrat) was elected to the South Carolina State
Senate on November 6, 2018. He won 52.3 percent of the votes against
his Republican rival Benjamin Dunn’s 47.6 percent.

– Anthony Brindisi (Democrat) was elected a Member of Congress from
upstate New York on Nov. 6, 2018, according to the final count of the
vote. Brindisi’s great grandparents were born in Mardin, southeastern
Turkey and fled during the Armenian Genocide to Aleppo, where his
grandfather was born. As of January 2019, there will be three
Armenian-Americans in the U.S. House of Representatives: Brindisi,
Eshoo, and Speier.

**************************************************************************************************

2-         AGBU Unfazed as Some Members Decry Organizational Mismanagement

            By Jenny Yettem

LOS ANGELES (The California Courier)—A letter originating from a group
of signatories based in Cyprus, Switzerland, Lebanon and Bulgaria that
was directed in October to the New York headquarters of the Armenian
General Benevolent Union (AGBU) President Berge Setrakian and members
of the Central Board was submitted to The California Courier on
November 15.

The “dedicated but highly concerned AGBU members” said they “wished to
raise certain critically important issues with AGBU’s
leadership”—which they describe as a specific set of recommendations,
coupled with a critical analysis of the organization’s method of
operating over the last two decades. They expressed their
dissatisfaction with the organization’s response to their letter
saying, “the AGBU Central Board essentially rejected our calls for
genuine dialogue and indicated their refusal to engage with members in
any meaningful way over the issues of greater transparency,
interaction with and involvement of grassroots members in the running
of the organization, and the need for accountability and
democratization within the organization.”

The signatories—Tigran Kalaydjian, Taline Ouzounian Avakian, Stephanos
Kamakian, Nar Khatchadourian, Nigol Vanian, Jilda Demiryan, Seta
Seraydarian Essade, Leyla Terzian Cermak, Vicken Bayramian, and Sonia
Bedrossian, a number of who are former AGBU Chapter chairs and have
long been involved in AGBU activities—said the “current momentous
changes underway in our homeland have provided Armenians everywhere
with a new burst of energy and a desire for introspection,” and called
upon the AGBU to urgently consider a number of issues “that we believe
require immediate redress” in order to “avoid the errors and omissions
that have cast a shadow over its glorious history in recent decades”
saying that “whilst we hold the AGBU’s multifaceted innovative
programs, as well as the work and dedication of its senior leadership,
in high regard, we are of the opinion that the organization must
undertake internal reforms that will allow it to become an institution
that adheres to the principles of transparency, accountability and
democratic process.”

According to the signatories, the decline in grassroots involvement in
the operations of AGBU and in particular in its decision-making
procedures, could be traced back to the “prejudicial” 1996 Convention,
which “in effect cut loose the rank-and-file from the central bodies
of the organization.”

The signatories said this structural shift is keenly apparent today,
particularly with the advent of social media, application and
networking technologies that would otherwise allow for the instant
relaying of opinions and votes from disparate members spread across
continents. “The technological advances that now securely permit (and
indeed necessitate) high levels of involvement and interaction between
a Center and its branches were simply not in existence in previous
decades. But they are now. It is our opinion, and one that is shared
widely, that the organs making critical decisions on behalf of the
entire organization not only do not take account of the views, ideas
and reservations of individual Chapter members, but furthermore, have
little interest in them. This has led to a situation where grassroots
members justifiably feel that the select few running the AGBU in a
‘command and control’ format hold the ideas and sentiments of ordinary
members in contempt—and has created an organizational infrastructure
that allows those feedback loops to be easily and summarily ignored.
This is neither a design that is becoming of the legacy of our
organization, nor one that is in sync with the values of the new
Armenia,” the signatories said in the letter.

The signatories explained that the outcome of not utilizing such
technology has been a “glaring, palpable disconnect between the
Central Board—reflected in the actions it takes and the statements it
releases—and rank-and-file members who may well have opposing views on
crucial matters and who would want those views to be taken into
account” that was particularly apparent during the recent Velvet
Revolution in Armenia during which the signatories noted the “Central
Board did not once formally request the views and positions of a
single Chapter, even ones whose members were acquainted with or
closely connected to the protagonists of the events in question. The
position of the organization both politically and socially was thus
compromised and fragmented, as a supposed representative voice for a
global amalgamate of chapters.”

According to the signatories, the AGBU’s reactions were not
well-aligned to the reality or appropriate to the events underway in
Yerevan from April to May 2018, during which tens of thousands of
people from all walks of life rose up in defiance against a corrupt,
discredited, autocratic regime and forced it to relinquish power to a
representative, law-abiding administration of their choice. “The
Central Board both misread and underestimated this movement and failed
to comprehend the motivations, aspirations and determination of the
people who had taken to the streets. AGBU rank-and-file members were
in a position to help; they could have supported the Central Board in
better understanding the true nature of those events, encouraging a
position that would not have been interpreted as complicit silence
with a discredited tyrant until the revolution was won,” wrote the
signatories. “The inability to mobilize, analyze and react in sync
with the incredible international grassroots of the AGBU is not the
only problem; the excessively close personal relationships between
certain Board members and the former ruling elite of Armenia also
prevented the objective positioning that would have reflected the true
mission of the organization. Rather than being committed exclusively
to the institutions of state and the professional channels of exchange
with bodies that represent the country and Nation, some members were
so intimately connected to figures like Serge Sargsyan and Garegin II
that they failed (and fail, still) to see the big picture. Those
relationships facilitated acceptance of a misconfigured and truncated
view of developments presented to them by these individuals; both of
whom, we have now seen, have lost credibility and respect in Armenian
society and the Diaspora at large,” said the signatories.

In their letter, the signatories said that the logistical and
practical limitations cited by the Central Board in previous years no
longer apply but that very few visible or practical measures have been
taken in recent years to address the issues of operational and
communications management. The signatories explained that dozens of
technical solutions are available on the market today at reasonable
prices, and cited new transnational organizations such as The
Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEm25)—a pan-European,
cross-border movement political movement launched in 2015 to help
repair the flagging European Union—and the tools they utilize to
engage and liaise with their members. “Few organizations can claim to
have members who feel as engaged, appreciated and respected as DiEM25,
and this has encouraged those members to participate more
energetically in the movement’s progress and take responsibility for
its actions, in whose evolution they feel they have played a decisive
role. This is in stark contrast with the modus operandi of the AGBU
since 1996,” the signatories said in the letter, proposing that the
AGBU consider “the relatively minor investment that is required to
license or develop the platform needed to ensure grassroots members
from across the world are properly and directly engaged.”

According to the signatories, valid (paid) memberships can easily be
verified through individual Chapters and managed at low cost through a
central database, and then these members can be consulted on major
issues concerning the AGBU and its future courses of action. “This
should include consultation, and in certain cases a binding vote, on
all major issues,” said the signatories, citing DiEM25 that operates a
dynamic online presence and utilizes secure methods of communicating
with registered members. “It regularly provides feedback to its
rank-and-file about what policy discussions are taking place, and
requests members to vote on actions it proposes to take or statements
it proposes to issue. These votes are not compulsory, and depending on
the issue concerned may or may not be binding; however the effect of
addressing members directly and requesting their feedback is highly
stimulating.”

The signatories suggested that the AGBU could utilize similar
technology to allow members to vote on proposed candidatures for
membership of the Central Board; nominations of candidates for the
Central Board by rank-and-file members; whether all future Presidents
of the AGBU should be limited to a maximum of two consecutive terms (a
reform that the undersigned support); and examine the wording of major
policy statements issued, such as those released during the recent
political revolution in Armenia.

The signatories explained that such consultations (and voting) on
major issues could be conducted and the results analyzed in less than
24 hours, and therefore would not be a limiting or delaying factor
when urgent action is required.

“Ultimately, we seek to be supportive of the future of the AGBU and
help address the reputational issues that have been amplified by a
modus operandi that treats the views and opinions of ordinary AGBU
members with disdain. This began more than a decade ago when the
decision to unilaterally shut down the Melkonian Educational Institute
in Cyprus was taken. Almost every Armenian in our global community
knows well that Melkonian has been languishing in a state of
scandalous neglect for thirteen years now, a period of time that was
certainly long enough for alternative viable, creative,
revenue-generating uses for the buildings and site to be applied. The
outcome would have been different had there been the capacity to
design an alternative viable plan drawing on the resources and
capabilities of global members,” said the signatories, who called upon
the AGBU Central Board to urgently implement internal reforms that
would usher the organization into modern technological and democratic
times.

“All members should have the option and right to have un-politicized,
objective, transparent and systematic interaction with the Center,
including a regular transfer of views, assessments and opinions prior
to important policy decisions being taken. We also request greater
transparency with regard to Central Board meetings and decision-making
procedures. This is long overdue and is completely in tune with the
expectations of our new generation of Armenians. The social, economic,
political and community development of our people in the 21st century
will be radically different than the current unsatisfactory status
quo. We are convinced that the esteem in which the AGBU and its
various programs and chapters are held will only increase when these
needed reforms of its operations, information infrastructure and
management are implemented,” said the signatories.

Upon receiving the October 11 letter, the AGBU responded to the
signatories, noting that the letter had been received and shared with
members of the Executive Committee of the AGBU Central Board.

“AGBU has a long and proud 112-year history of transparent governance
and clear bylaws that are closely followed. Most importantly, we have
an irrefutable history of benevolence, touching 500,000 lives across
the globe each year. With respect to the Republic of Armenia, we
continue our established policies and actions: unreserved support to
the nation, and we enjoy a straight-forward and supportive
relationship with the present government, as we did with each of its
predecessors,” wrote AGBU Central Board Secretary Sarkis Jebejian in
the letter on behalf of the Executive Committee of the organization.
“As you know, our membership is invited to a General Assembly every
two years. This is an opportunity to discuss programs, follow progress
on various initiatives and address questions, all with a collaborative
spirit of partnership and constructive dialogue for the good of the
Armenian nation and people around the world. We will continue to
operate in that same manner going forward and welcome the
participation of every Armenian who shares our organization’s vision
and mission. As always, if you wish to discuss any issues regarding
the organization, we are available.”

*********************************************************************************************

3 –    2018 Armenia Fund Thanksgiving Day Telethon Raises $11,109,633

On Thanksgiving Day, Armenia Fund hosted its 21st annual telethon,
raising $11,109,633 thanks to the contributions of supporters from
around the world. The organization continued to accept donations after
the telecast.

This year’s telethon theme was “Create Together” and donations
received are slated to be used for major infrastructure projects in
Armenia and Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh). One of them is aimed at
expanding local irrigation networks while the other seeks to support
greater use of solar energy by Karabakh households

On the eve of Telethon 2018, President of Armenia Armen Sarkissian—who
serves as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Fund—visited the
Yerevan headquarters of the Hayastan All Armenia Fund where he signed
a pledge card for some 5.7 million AMD (approx. $12,000), equivalent
to his salary for six months. Sarkissian will also donate his salary
for the next six months to the fund. Acting Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan donated 1 million AMD from the Prime Minister’s fund, and
also made a personal contribution of 500,000 AMD ($3000 in total).
Pashinyan made a live televised appeal to Armenians around the world
during this visit to the headquarters, urging patrons to donate more
funds to the charity, stressing the importance of its projects
implemented in Armenia and Karabakh.

Artur Vanetsyan, Head of the National Security Service, visited
Hayastan All-Armenian Fund’s Yerevan where he delivered a contribution
of 9.5 million AMD (approximately $20,000) on behalf of the National
Security Service; Vanetsyan also donated one month of his personal
salary to the telethon.

The biggest donations came from: an anonymous benefactor ($2.5
million); Iranian-Armenian philanthropists Henrik and Adrine
Ter-Ghukasyan ($1.34 million) for the renovation of a key road in
Artsakh; Grand Holding owners Karen and Mikayel Vardanyan (AMD 60
million or approx. $123,000) for the renovation of the road connecting
the Armenian towns of Dilijan and Ijevan; and U.S.-based Armenians
Andranik Baghdasarian and Albert A. Boyajian, who donated $1 million
each. Alex Holding donated $200,000.

Armenia Fund received $12.5 million and $15.5 million in donations
during the 2017 and 2016 telethons, respectively.

As in previous years, the Thanksgiving Day telethon featured prominent
members of the Armenian community in the United States and Karabakh
Armenian leaders.

It was broadcast by Armenian and U.S.-Armenian TV channels.

Armenia Fund has implemented over $350 million worth of projects in
Armenia and Artsakh since its inception in 1992.

The fund’s current Board of Trustees is headed by Sarkissian, and
comprises Pashinyan and other senior Armenian state officials;
Catholicos Karekin II, as well as prominent members of Armenian
communities around the world.

The organization’s activities were overshadowed in July by the arrest
and ensuing resignation of its then executive director, Ara Vartanian
following an embezzlement scandal. Although Vartanian admitted using
Hayastan’s money for online gambling and other “personal purposes” he
avoided prosecution after reportedly compensating the charity.

Pashinyan’s government has since pledged to help ensure greater
transparency in the fund’s activities.

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4 –        Turkish Police Detain Academics, Activists, Journalists in Raids

ANKARA (Associated Press)— On November 16, Turkish police detained 13
academics, activists and journalists over links to a jailed
businessman and human rights defender, and allegations that they
sought to topple the government by supporting mass protests during
2013.

Anadolu Agency said professors Betul Tanbay and Turgut Tarhanli of
Istanbul’s Bosphorus and Bilgi universities, and journalist Cigdem
Mater were among those detained in simultaneous police operations in
Istanbul and in three provinces. Other detainees include Asena Günal,
Ayşegül Güzel, Bora Sarı, Filiz Telek, Hakan Altınay, Hande Özhabeş,
Meltem Aslan, Yiğit Ali Emekçi, Yiğit Aksakoğlu, and Yusuf Cıvır. They
were being questioned over their links to the Anatolia Culture
Association founded by Osman Kavala, a philanthropist businessman who
was arrested a year ago and accused of attempts to “abolish” the
constitutional order and the government. No indictment has been issued
against him. Anadolu said police are searching for seven other people
linked to the association, which says it aims to promote peace and
minority rights through culture.

The group is suspected of trying to bring down the government by
fomenting “chaos and disorder” through their alleged involvement in
efforts to expand anti-government protests that grew from opposition
to the cutting down of trees at Istanbul’s Gezi Park. Authorities
suspect that Kavala used the association, as well as a foundation that
he also headed, to finance and organize efforts to broaden the
protests, the agency reported.

The detentions drew criticism from the European Union, which called
the development “alarming,” and from human rights groups. “The
repeated detentions of critical voices and the continued widespread
pressure on civil society representatives run counter to the Turkish
government’s declared commitment to human rights and to fundamental
freedoms,” the EU said a statement. The statement said the detentions
would be raised during a high-level EU visit to Ankara next week.

Amnesty International’s Turkey Strategy and Research Manager Andrew
Gardner said: “This latest wave of detentions of academics and
activists, on the basis of absurd allegations, shows that the
authorities are intent on continuing their brutal crackdown of
independent civil society.”

 Since an attempted coup in 2016, Turkey’s government has been accused
of stifling freedom of _expression_ by arresting thousands of people for
alleged connections to U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom Turkey
blames for the failed attempt, or links to terror groups. It has
purged many more people from state institutions and jailed dozens of
journalists.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called Kavala “Turkey’s
Soros,” a reference to American billionaire George Soros, whose Open
Society Foundations have funded education, health, justice and media
projects around the world. Pro-government media in Turkey accuse
Kavala of engaging in anti-government conspiracies.

Eleven prominent activists, including Amnesty International’s former
Turkey chairman, were arrested last year at their hotel on an island
off of Istanbul while training. They were eventually released from
jail pending the outcome of their trial for supporting terror groups.

Separately on November 16, police detained 86 people, most of them
former Air Force personnel, in operations across Turkey and were
looking for 100 others for alleged links to Gulen’s movement, Anadolu
reported.

More than 15,000 people have been purged from the military since the
coup, Turkey’s defense minister has said. The cleric denies
involvement in the coup.

“It is telling that the detentions are part of the investigation into
the jailed civil society leader, Osman Kavala, who—more than a year
after his detention—is yet to be indicted or have evidence of an
internationally recognized crime presented against him. Osman Kavala
and all those detained today must be immediately and unconditionally
released and the crackdown against Turkey’s independent civil society
must be brought to an end,” said Gardner.

*****************************************************************************************************

5-         Anthony Brindisi defeats Claudia Tenney in NY 22nd Congressional race

By Chris Baker

On November 20, Democrat Anthony Brindisi won the race for New York’s
22nd Congressional District, defeating incumbent Republican Claudia
Tenney with nearly all absentee ballots tallied—the results from
absentee votes gave Brindisi a lead too large for Tenney to overcome.

The race was too close to call on election day two weeks ago. Brindisi
finished the day with a 1,293 vote lead over Tenney. Tenney said she
would not concede until learning the results of more than 15,000
absentee ballots.

With nearly all those absentee ballots counted in the district, Tenney
now has no possible chance for victory. Brindisi grew his lead as each
county reported absentee totals.

Tuesday afternoon, the Oneida County Board of Elections reported
absentee ballots had been counted in 109 of 192 election districts.
Oneida County is the last of eight counties in the district to finish
counting absentee ballots.

Brindisi won 1,529 of the Oneida County absentees, compared to 755 for
Tenney. Even if Tenney won all of the 1,881 remaining ballots, she
would still come up short of Brindisi.

Tenney has not conceded and her campaign has not responded to requests
for comment.

Brindisi released a statement Tuesday evening claiming victory.

“As I said on Election night, I’ll work to be a representative for our
entire community,” he said. “I’m humbled that I’ll have the honor to
represent this district in Congress. Now that this campaign is behind
us, I look forward to a smooth transition with Congresswoman Tenney to
ensure that we hit the ground running in January.”

On November 20, Brindisi led Tenney 125,925 to 121,957.

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Ara Babloyan holds meeting with Iranian MP

Karakhanian Suren
  • 18:14 | November 27,2018 | Official
  • Armenian:

Speaker of the Parliament of Armenia Ara Babloyan on November 27 received member of the Iranian Parliament Masoumeh Aghapour Alishahi, who arrived in Yerevan to take part in the 52nd plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), the Parliament reports.

During the meeting the Speaker of Parliament highly valued the Armenian-Iranian relations and highlighted the inter-parliamentary cooperation, in particular, the activities of friendship groups. Babloyan highly appreciated the friendly attitude of the Iranian authorities and people shown to the Armenian community representatives.

Coming to the regional issues, Ara Babloyan attached importance to making joint efforts for ensuring stability and peace, in which the parliamentary structures play a great role.

The Iranian lawmaker thanked for the meeting and conveyed the warm greetings of the Iranian parliament speaker to Ara Babloyan. She said the Iranian side highly values the relations with Armenia.

The MP attached importance to the mutual partnership between the parliaments of the two countries, expressing hope that the traditions of the past will continue. She valued the contribution the Armenian community had in Iran’s domestic life.

Armenian Leaders Congratulate Salome Zurabishvili

Karakhanian Suren
Georgia Today, Georgia
Nov 30 2018

The leaders of the Armenian government congratulated their foreign colleagues to the newly-elected Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili.

Armenian President Armen Sarkissian addressed a congratulatory message with the following words: “I am full of hope that thanks to our joint efforts, Armenian-Georgian friendly relations will continue developing and expanding in all sectors, bringing the partnership to a qualitatively new level”.

Armenia’s acting Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also congratulated Zurabishvili, focusing on the significance of electing the first female President in Georgia, stating: “Your Excellency, please accept my warmest congratulations on the occasion of being elected President of friendly Georgia. Your election as the first woman President is a historical event and I heartily wish your tenure to be marked in the Georgian history as a period of growth and welfare.’ Like the President Sarkissian, Pashinyan also expressed his expectations about the continuation of the friendly relations between Georgia and Armenia.

 

By Ketevan Kvaratskheliya

Image source:  

Sports: Henrikh Mkhitaryan or Alexis Sanchez? Man Utd and Arsenal fans ponder same thing

Karakhanian Suren
The Mirror, UK
Nov 25 2018
Henrikh Mkhitaryan or Alexis Sanchez? Man Utd and Arsenal fans ponder same thing

The Armenian played all 90 minutes of the Gunners’ 2-1 win over Bournemouth on Sunday – but failed to inspire throughout

By Thomas Bristow


It’s nearly a year on sinceManchester Unitedand Arsenal agreed a sensational swap deal for Henrikh Mkhitaryan and Alexis Sanchez – and fans of both clubs are pondering the same thing.

At Old Trafford,Sanchezhas failed to replicate the form he showed while at the Gunners. The Chilean has only scored four goals in 30 appearances and is failing to nail down a regular starting spot in Jose Mourinho’s first XI.

At the Emirates,Mkhitaryanhas scored the same amount of goals in one less game. The Armenian has failed to show consistency and is also in and out of the starting line-up.

Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang reveals half-time talk that inspired Arsenal win

Mkhitaryan’s display against Bournemouth was slammed by Gunners fans, and it prompted supporters of both Arsenal and Manchester United to ask the same thing: Which club came off worse?

One fan tweeted: “The Mkhitaryan/Sanchez swap deal is football’s equivalent of Brexit. Neither side got what they wanted and everyone is a little disappointed.”

Another supporter posted: “Can’t quite figure out who got the s****** end of the stick with the Sanchez and Mkhitaryan swap deal.”

A separate fan tweeted: “These days you don’t even know who is worse between Mkhitaryan and Sanchez.”

Mkhi vs Sanchez

Cristiano Ronaldo’s iconic celebration now even better thanks to Juventus fans

Jose Mourinho was recently asked if Sanchez could leave in January following reports the 29-year-old is unhappy, but dismissed the notion.

“I don’t think so because he never told me that he wants to leave or isn’t happy to stay,” said the United boss.

“He is improving like the team is improving, and when he plays he giving us his personality, his desire to play and to produce for the team and trying to adapt to how we play, and vice versa.

“Can he do better? I think we can all do better.

“I can do better and he can do better and all the other players can also do better.”