Une Fondation Armenienne Cherche A Regagner Les Droits De Propriete

UNE FONDATION ARMENIENNE CHERCHE A REGAGNER LES DROITS DE PROPRIETE D’UNE ECOLE
Stephane

armenews.com
vendredi 26 octobre 2012

Une fondation armenienne cherche a regagner les droits de propriete du
terrain qui accueille l’Ecole primaire Bomonti Mihitaryan, placee dans
le district de Sisli a istanbul qui a ete saisi par une municipalite
de la province d’Ankara en 1982.

La fondation armenienne, la fondation de l’Ecole et du monastère
Catholique armenien Mihitaryan Surp Gazar avait ete depossedee du
terrain en 1982 après avoir rencontre des obstacles legaux imposes a
la vente de terre aux fondations des minorites. La fondation a lutte
pour reacquerir le terrain depuis.

S’expliaunt dans le journal Zaman, le president de la fondation, Rita
Nurnur, a dit qu’ils ont essaye de resoudre le problème par des moyens
bureaucratiques auparavant intentant un procès, ajoutant qu’ils ont
poursuivi en justice la municipalite d’Ayas selon les conseils d’Adnan
Ertem, le chef de la Direction generale des Fondations (VGM), un corps
autonome qui traite avec les proprietes des fondations musulmanes et
non-musulmanes. ” Nous sommes sûrs que cette injustice de 33 ans sera
bientôt resolue ” a note Rita Nurnur.

Une directive a ete presentee en Turquie en 1936 qui a interdit
aux fondations dirigees par des minorites d’acheter la moindre
propriete en Turquie, après que le gouvernement turc ait ordonne a
toutes les fondations de minorite de declarer tous leurs actifs et
leurs proprietes.

La fondation armenienne a achete un terrain a une femme Turque,
Emine Tevfika Ayasli, en 1958 pour etablir une ecole. La fondation a
dû vendre un terrain dans Moda, place dans le district de Kadikoy,
pour acheter le terrain dans Sisli. Selon la directive de 1936,
une fondation dirigee par des minorites peut acheter une propriete
a condition qu’en retour elle vende une propriete qu’elle possedait
avant la sortie de la directive.

La fondation n’avait jamais rencontre de difficultes jusqu’a la mort
en 1979 d’Ayasli.

La femme a legue trois quart de ses proprietes a la municipalite
d’Ayas dans la province d’Ankara et les droits de propriete ont ete
officiellement transmis a la municipalite en 1982. La bataille de
la fondation pour acquerir la propriete de ce terrain est en cours
depuis 1982.

La municipalite a au commencement voulu force la fondation armenienne
a quitter le terrain et fermer l’ecole bien que la fondation ait un
acte de propriete. La municipalite plus tard a permis a la fondation
de payer un loyer pour l’ecole. La fondation a intente un procès pour
regagner les droits de propriete del’ecole et le procès a commence
l’annee dernière. La cinquième audience aura lieu prochainement.

Baku: Armenian Press Distorts Australian State’S Resolution On "Nago

ARMENIAN PRESS DISTORTS AUSTRALIAN STATE’S RESOLUTION ON “NAGORNO KARABAKH” – UPDATED

APA
Oct 25 2012
Azerbaijan

The resolution adopted by legislative body of New South Wales state
does not contain an item on recognition of independence of separatist
regime

Baku. Anakhanim Hidayatova – APA. Armenian press distorted the
resolution adopted by the legislative body of Australia’s New South
Wales state on the occasion of 20th anniversary of “Nagorno Karabakh
Republic”. According to APA, although Novosti Armenia Agency noted
the recognition of independence of separatist regime by the state in
the resolution, the document does not contain such item.

The resolution in the website of Armenian National Committee of
Australia (ANC Australia) also does not contain an item on recognition
of independence of “Nagorno Karabakh”.

The resolution introduced by the Pro-Armenian member of Legislative
Council Marie Ficarra acknowledges recognition of right to
self-determination of “Nagorno Karabakh people”.

The Council supports and promotes the representation of “Nagorno
Karabakh” in the community and calls “Nagorno Karabakh” to mutual
cooperation with the international community for ensuring peace in
the world and region and solution of regional problems.

The MPs called Australian Government to recognize separatist regime
NKR officially and strengthen Australia’s relationship with the
“Nagorno Karabakh” and its citizens.

Along with this, the Council considered important to continue
humanitarian and economic support to “Nagorno Karabakh Republic”.

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=181361

Baku: Armenia And Iran To Construct Hydroelectric Power Station Over

ARMENIA AND IRAN TO CONSTRUCT HYDROELECTRIC POWER STATION OVER ARAZ RIVER

APA
Oct 25 2012
Azerbaijan

Baku. Anakhanim Hidayatova – APA. Construction of hydroelectric power
station over Araz River in Armenian Mehri village bordering on Iran,
will start within next 10-15 days, said the Armenian Minister of
Energy and Natural Resources Armen Movsisyan, APA reports quoting
Armenian website.

The Minister said that Armenia and Iran would construct HPSs in the
both sides of the border. One of them will be constructed in Mehri,
other – in Garachilar village. Carrying out the construction works
the same time will cause reduction of expenses by 10-15%.

Every station will produce 793 mln kVt/hour in a year. Mehri HPS’s
capacity will make 130 MVt. Construction works will last 54 years,
project is valued at $323 mln and this will be financed by Iran
Investment Company.

After completion of construction, Mehri HPS will be exploited by
Iranian Farat-Sepasat Company for 15 years and produced energy will
be transported to Iran. So, Armenia will repay Iran’s investment.

Thereafter, the station will be exploited by Armenia.

Baku: Azerbaijani Ambassador To U.S To Expand Cooperation Between Tw

AZERBAIJANI AMBASSADOR TO U.S TO EXPAND COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES

Trend
Oct 25 2012
Azerbaijan

Azerbaijani ambassador to U.S. Elin Suleymanov has held several
meetings with Illinois officials during his visit to Illinois, U.S,
the Azerbaijani embassy to the U.S told Trend.

Representatives of various state agencies, businessmen, members of
the Turkish community, as well as the Australian and Israeli Consuls
General in Chicago attended the working lunch, given by Speaker
Michael Madigan in honour of the Azerbaijani diplomat.

In his speech, the ambassador talked about the geo-strategic position
of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy orientation and relations between the
two countries. Suleymanov called the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
as the U.S. most successful project in the region. He stressed the
importance of expressing the political support by the U.S. and other
energy projects which are on the agenda and in particular, TANAP.

The ambassador met with Illinois governor Pat Quinn. The sides
exchanged views on possible cooperation between Illinois and
Azerbaijan. The governor said that mutual investments and the
establishment of the relations between their respective universities
will be useful.

The Azerbaijani ambassador also addressed teachers and students of
the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy which is
considered to be one of the U.S most prestigious universities.

Suleymanov informed the participants about the successful oil diplomacy
of our country, infrastructure and energy projects which are on the
agenda. The ambassador added that Armenia’s involvement in these
projects will be useful for full regional integration. However the
main condition is the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
settlement within Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

Il Karabakh Dopo Safarov

IL KARABAKH DOPO SAFAROV

Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso
25 ottobre 2012
Italia

Ilenia Santin | Yerevan

La vicenda dell’azero Safarov, graziato in patria dopo aver ucciso un
ufficiale armeno, sta provocando una delle più destabilizzanti crisi
degli ultimi anni tra Yerevan e Baku. Le ripercussioni sul dialogo
per il Nagorno Karabakh, i rischi di un’escalation

In Armenia il caso di Ramil Safarov , l’ufficiale azero che nel
2004 uccise a colpi d’ascia un militare armeno con il quale stava
partecipando ad un corso Nato in Ungheria, continua a far discutere.

Il dibattito sulla liberazione dell’omicida, recentemente estradato
dall’Ungheria e subito graziato al suo arrivo in Azerbaijan, si
è trasferito dalle prime pagine dei giornali ai social networks,
dove abbondano i gruppi “anti-Safarov” e le proteste “contro la
glorificazione dell’omicida azero”.

Timori per il Nagorno Karabakh

Oltre all’indignazione della societa civile, la vicenda ha
suscitato una dura reazione da parte della comunita internazionale,
che teme gravi conseguenze per la pace in Nagorno Karabakh. Le
istituzioni europee e altri organismi internazionali, inclusi Amnesty
International, il Consiglio d’Europa, la NATO e la CSTO (Collective
Security Treaty Organization , un’alleanza militare che unisce vari
paesi dello spazio post-sovietico tra cui Armenia e Russia, ma non
l’Azerbaijan), hanno unanimemente criticato il gesto dell’Azerbaijan
ed espresso forte preoccupazione per le ripercussioni sui colloqui di
pace. Anche l’OSCE, e in particolare i tre co-presidenti del Gruppo di
Minsk – l’americano Robert Bradtke, il russo Igor Popov e il francese
Jacques Faure – hanno da subito condannato l’accaduto, esprimendo
“profonda preoccupazione e rammarico per il danno che il perdono e
qualsiasi tentativo di glorificazione di tale crimine hanno provocato
al processo di pace e di fiducia tra le parti”, come si può leggere
nel comunicato stampa diramato dopo l’accaduto .

Oltre alle condanne, sono arrivate richieste di espulsione
dell’Azerbaijan dai consessi internazionali, come quella
dell’Associazione Atlantica Armena , una ong associata alla Nato,
che ha chiesto al Segretario Generale dell’Alleanza Rasmussen, in
visita in Armenia, di sospendere la partecipazione azera al programma
“Partnership for Peace”. Il 4 ottobre, inoltre, durante una sessione
dedicata al caso Safarov presso l’Assemblea Parlamentare del Consiglio
d’Europa, il rappresentante francese ha sollevato la questione del
diritto dell’Azerbaijan di continuare a far parte dell’Assemblea dopo
tali fatti.

La posizione di Yerevan

Altrettanto decisa la posizione di Yerevan che, dopo aver interrotto
le relazioni diplomatiche con l’Ungheria a seguito dell’estradizione
di Safarov, ha ritirato la propria partecipazione ad una serie di
eventi internazionali, richiamando i propri ufficiali di polizia da
un’esercitazione internazionale che si stava svolgendo a Budapest
e rifiutando di partecipare all’incontro dei ministri degli Interni
dei Paesi della Comunita di Stati Indipendenti (CSI), prevista a Baku
agli inizi di settembre.

Yerevan ha inoltre ospitato le esercitazioni militari della CSTO
“Interaction 2012” nella regione armena di Armavir tra il 15 e il 19
settembre scorso. Secondo Richard Giragosian, direttore del centro
studi armeno Regional Studies Center , “il significato politico
dell’esercitazione è chiaro, si rivolge all’Azerbaijan affermando che
la CSTO e la Russia sono partner fondamentali. L’Armenia è considerata
inoltre un partner affidabile della NATO, come dimostrato dalla visita
di Rasmussen nel Paese il 6 settembre scorso”.

Ci sara una guerra

Anche la notizia della prossima apertura dell’aeroporto di Stepanakert,
il principale centro del Nagorno Karabakh, secondo Giragosian è
“una risposta diretta al caso Safarov”. L’Azerbaijan ha tuttavia
reagito alla notizia dell’apertura dei voli nella regione minacciando
di colpire i velivoli in rotta su Stepanakert. Nonostante in molti
nutrano dubbi sull’attendibilita delle minacce azere, il comandante
in capo delle Forze del Karabakh, Arkady Karapetyan, ha dichiarato
che “l’Azerbaijan sarebbe tecnicamente in grado di abbattere un aereo
civile, ma tale atto significherebbe l’inizio delle ostilita. Prima o
poi ci sara una guerra, ne parlo spesso perche la nostra gente crede
alla favola di una soluzione pacifica. È semplicemente inaccettabile
parlare di una soluzione pacifica dopo l’affare Safarov: a questo
riguardo, le azioni dell’Azerbaijan equivalgono ad una dichiarazione
di guerra”.

Anche il presidente Sargsyan, in un’intervista rilasciata il 6
ottobre all’agenzia Reuters, ha accusato l’Azerbaijan di prepararsi
alla guerra: “Dopo diciotto anni dalla firma degli accordi per il
cessate il fuoco, l’Azerbaijan ci minaccia con una nuova guerra”,
come dimostrato dal “pericoloso accumulo di armamenti” da parte
azera. “Non abbiamo dubbi che il proposito degli azeri sia di cambiare
la situazione attraverso mezzi militari. L’unico meccanismo preventivo
a questo loro desiderio è la preparazione a combattere delle forze
armate armene”, ha concluso Sargsyan.

Esercitazioni

Il 14 ottobre si sono concluse alcune esercitazioni militari che hanno
impegnato le forze armate armene per due settimane. Sargis Harutyunyan,
giornalista di Armenialiberty, ha riferito che la simulazione prevedeva
“attacchi missilistici contro obiettivi militari e impianti di gas
e petrolio in Azerbaijan”, aggiungendo che “i sistemi missilistici
armeni hanno una gittata di oltre 300 chilometri, che rende quasi
tutte le strutture strategiche azere alla loro portata”. Nonostante
il ministero della Difesa armeno abbia negato qualsiasi connessione
tra l’esercitazione e le violazioni lungo la linea di contatto tra
Armenia e Azerbaijan, secondo Harutyunyan “tali manovre sembrano
evidenziare l’aumento del rischio di un’altra guerra”.

A nulla sono valsi finora i tentativi di mediazione del Gruppo OSCE
di Minsk che, dallo scoppio del caso Safarov, ha tenuto due incontri
separati coi ministri degli Esteri dei due Paesi.

Public dialogues

La vicenda ha provocato “una delle più destabilizzanti crisi tra
Armenia e Azerbaijan degli ultimi anni”, ha dichiarato ancora Richard
Giragosian il primo ottobre scorso al network Public Dialogues ,
e si sta pericolosamente ripercuotendo sui negoziati per il Nagorno
Karabakh. Non si tratta più di trovare una soluzione al conflitto,
secondo Giragosian, il problema ora riguarda la gestione del conflitto:
“La questione è come riprendere il dialogo. Sotto vari aspetti,
l’Armenia non ha più un partner per la pace, in quanto l’Azerbaijan
ha superato ogni limite ragionevole. Ci vorra del tempo, ma il dialogo
è una necessita per entrambe le parti”.

Anche secondo Peter Semneby, ex Rappresentante speciale dell’Unione
Europea per il Caucaso meridionale, “il conflitto del Nagorno Karabakh
è vicino ad un’inammissibile soglia di tensione. Attualmente la
situazione è peggiorata rispetto a qualche anno fa, il rischio è molto
più alto. Si tratta di un conflitto che deve essere preso sul serio.

Osserviamo incidenti che possono contribuire ad un’escalation della
tensione, e questo dovrebbe preoccupare in primo luogo le parti
in conflitto, ma allo stesso tempo i partner internazionali devono
considerare che, se succede qualcosa nel Nagorno-Karabakh, le sue
conseguenze interesseranno anche i paesi dell’Unione europea”.

Nella speranza che le parti tornino a incontrarsi a fine ottobre a
Parigi, l’Ue intanto continua a sostenere l’impegno della societa
civile per la pace nella regione: il 22 ottobre ha inaugurato la
seconda fase del Programma triennale “European Partnership for the
Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh” (EPNK) ,
iniziato nel 2009 da un consorzio di cinque ONG europee che collaborano
con partner sudcaucasici a progetti di “costruzione della pace”
e di promozione del dialogo tra tutte le parti coinvolte nel conflitto.

http://www.balcanicaucaso.org/aree/Armenia/Il-Karabakh-dopo-Safarov-125251

7 Lessons Of Cuban Crisis For Karabakh Conflict

7 LESSONS OF CUBAN CRISIS FOR KARABAKH CONFLICT

Huffington Post
Oct 25 2012

Simon Saradzhyan, Research fellow, Harvard’s Belfer Center and Artur
Saradzhyan

The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 stands out as not only one of the most
dangerous moments in human history, but also as the most thoroughly
researched case of a confrontation between two great powers that ended
up being peacefully resolved. The wealth of evidence and quality of
analysis that have been produced by participants and scholars of the
October 1962 crisis make the latter an indispensable case study for
anyone interested in management of any inter-state conflict.

The current conflict over Nagorny Karabakh is no exception. There
are, of course, profound differences between the two conflicts —
the absence of nuclear weapons in the Armenian and Azeri arsenals
being the most obvious and important. And, yet, there are a number of
valuable lessons that parties to the Karabakh conflict should learn
from the 1962 crisis:

First, Armenian and Azeri leaders should review their militaries’
routines to weed out those contingency SOPs that may lead to escalation
of a crisis into a war against their orders. The 1962 crisis set
in motion a number of such routines that almost plunged the USA
and USSR into a war, including arming fighter aviation with nuclear
missiles and permission granted to commanders to use nuclear weapons
without approval by the head of state if under an attack that disrupts
communications with superiors. In addition to review and revision of
their own contingency routines, the parties to the Karabakh conflict
should familiarize themselves with their opponent’s SOPs.

Second, parties to the Karabakh conflict should keep in mind that
escalation can acquire its own logic. Had U.S. President John F.

Kennedy ordered a ground invasion of Cuba, the Soviets could have
retaliated by striking U.S. nuclear missiles in Turkey, thereby
escalating the conflict to a nuclear war, according to Graham Allison,
one of the most thoughtful scholars of the 1962 crisis. Armenian and
Azeri leaders should consider directing strategic games specifically
designed to identify points of no return in different escalation
scenarios.

Third, a hotline should be established in Yerevan and Baku. In October
1962 Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev made a number of
urgent important decisions that had to be preceded by gauging the
opponent’s reaction, but they had no way to communicate directly and
discreetly. Today, there is no publicly known hotline between the
presidential offices in Yerevan and Baku, so the leaders may also
be unable to communicate directly and candidly if a crisis ruptures
peacetime channels of communications. This needs to be rectified.

Fourth, neither Azeri nor Armenian side should harbor hopes that
the opponent will back down. Khrushchev knew about the American
superiority in strategic nuclear weapons and backed down when the
Cuban crisis peaked. Neither side in the Karabakh conflict enjoys
overwhelming military superiority, and therefore, should not count
on the opponent backing down in case of escalation.

Fifth, both sides should avoid cornering the opponent. That
Khrushchev was able to back down during the crisis was partly a
result of a deliberate strategy by Kennedy who built pressure,
but left a face-saving way out. Armenian and Azeri leaders should
not only consider which of their actions may corner the opponent,
but also how to avoid cornering themselves.

Sixth, Armenian and Azeri leaders also should factor in reaction of
key stakeholders on both sides of the conflict just as the USSR and
USA had to take into account interests of their allies in October
1962. For one, Baku should not assume that the self-proclaimed Nagorny
Karabakh Republic will blindly follow Republic of Armenia’s lead.

Karabakh Armenians — whose representatives dominate Armenia’s power
establishment — will not concede to any change that would threaten
their survival.

Seventh, Azeri and Armenian leaders should avoid adventurist moves. If
fully implemented, Khrushchev’s decision to deploy nuclear missiles
in Cuba would have narrowed the U.S.-Soviet nuclear gap. However,
implementation of that decision was poorly planned and its failure
contributed to Khrushchev’s ouster in 1964. Azeri and Armenian leaders
should avoid adventurism, keeping in mind that a failure may lead
not only to ouster, but also to exile in addition to disastrous
consequences for their countries.

A new war over Karabakh would be much more devastating than the one
fought 20 years ago. In fact some of the weapons — that the sides
have acquired — can wreak havoc that would be as disastrous for these
small nations as a limited U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange would have
been for the American and Soviet peoples in 1962. Institutionalizing
lessons of the Cuban missile crisis would help leaders on both sides
of the Karabakh conflict to avert an ‘accidental’ devastating war. If,
of course, they wish to avoid it.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/simon-saradzhyan/7-lessons-of-cuban-crisis_b_2000943.html

Armenian Pupils Won 16 Medals At International Olympiads

ARMENIAN PUPILS WON 16 MEDALS AT INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIADS

Story from Lragir.am News:

Published: 10:33:50 – 25/10/2012

The Armenian pupils set a record for Armenia at international Olympiads
this year. They have won 16 medals in the Olympiads of Mathematics,
Biology, Chemistry, Astronomy and Informatics. 29 Armenian pupils
participated and won 16 medals ~V 1 gold, 2 silver, 13 bronze and 5
Diplomas. In 2003 Armenian pupils won 11, in 2004 ~V 14, in 2005 ~V
10, 2006 ~V 5, 2007 ~V 8, 2008 ~V 5, 2009 ~V 7, 2010 ~V 7 and in 2011-
6 medals.

Ministry of Education, Press Service

http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/country27838.html

Semi-Constructed Building Collapses In Yerevan Center

SEMI-CONSTRUCTED BUILDING COLLAPSES IN YEREVAN CENTER

news.am
October 25, 2012 | 13:35

YEREVAN.- A semi-constructed building collapsed on Thursday morning
in the center of Armenia’s capital, Yerevan.

At 1:10 p.m. Emergency Ministry received a call saying firemen and
rescuers are needed.

The Ministry said firemen and rescuers had already left for the scene.

According to information at Armenian News-NEWS.am’s disposal, nine
construction workers were under the debris. One of them was taken
out and transferred to the hospital.

La Voix De La Turquie En France

LA VOIX DE LA TURQUIE EN FRANCE
Jean Eckian

armenews
jeudi25 octobre 2012,

Nous vous proposons d’écouter, sans commentaire de notre part,
un extrait l’intervention de l’ambassadeur de Turquie en France, M.

Tahsin Burcuoglu lors d’une émission de radio (23/10/2012). On y
apprend, entre autres, qu’il y aurait 572 000 originaires de Turquie
établis sur le sol francais, dont environ 250 mille a 280 mille
franco-turcs, 103 élus et 500 associations. Egalement, que si un
nouveau projet de loi criminalisant la négation du génocide des
arméniens venait a aboutir, la Turquie gèlerait de nouveau les
relations diplomatiques avec la France.

En fin d’interview, l’ambassadeur affirme que des représentants
de l’Asala accompagnaient l’ex Président Sarkozy dans son voyage a
Erevan au mois d’octobre 2011.

Hraparak: Arf-D Again In Uncertainty

HRAPARAK: ARF-D AGAIN IN UNCERTAINTY

TERT.AM
25.10.12

The paper claims the situation in the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation-Dashnaktsutyun is again uncertain with the presidential
elections appear to be another headache for them as boycott and
participation with own candidate will possibly make them appear behind
the political margin.

On the other hand the issue of own candidate is the matter of
disputes inside the party. Armen Rustamyan-Vahan Hovhannisyan want
that candidate be Hrant Margaryan, while the latter understands why
‘some’ want to burden the ARD-D’s ‘defeat’ on him, thus he sees all
the members of the party as candidates but not him.

The paper says Armen-Vahan will also back participation with a united
candidate. “Armen will even agree to back Armenian National Congress
(ANC) candidates but he will not be allowed to negotiate with them.

Hrant would not like it,” the paper quoted its source in the ARF-D.

As to Vartan Oskanian-Armen Rustamyan talks, it was not so decisive
though the meeting discussed the possibility of Oskanian being
ARF-D-ANC-Heritage joint candidate if the Prosperous Armenia party
backs Serzh Sargsyan. The paper says it is rather important for the
ARF-D when the second President Robert Kocharyan enters the game and
what Serzh Sargsyan’s wing will do. The paper says there are people in
the ARF-D who think they will declare a double game but do other thing.