INTEGRATION ASPIRATIONS OF ARMENIA AND SOME ISSUES OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL SECURITY OF THE REP. OF ARMENIA AND NKR
12.09.2013
Sergei Sargsyan
Both Moscow and Brussels, which diplomatically and ornately state
that there are no contradictions between the integration of Armenia
in European and Customs Unions, nevertheless, hint that the suit of
documents necessary for signing the EU Association Agreement and
entering Customs Union contain some insuperable contradictions,
which in fact present RA and NKR with a crucial dilemma of choice.
In fact, formally the point is not “either/or”; the pivotal problem is
that Armenia has to make a choice of a main vector of its integration,
meanwhile the additional vector of political and, firstly, economic
cooperation will be inferior.
At the same time it looks like Moscow and Yerevan do not quite clearly
understand mutual reaction to the integration aspiration of Armenia.
It seems to be caused particularly by two main key divergences.
Firstly, today the same situation as in 90s and early 2000s when Russia
ensured Armenia’s military security and in economic and political
sphere the West played key role, is not possible. Both the situation
in economy and policy of these countries, power centers and Russia (its
geopolitical weight) have changed. Today Moscow regards ally relations
exclusively as common military-political and economic complex.
Secondly, Armenia considers signing of the EU Association Agreement as
another step in the direction of strengthening of its complementary
foreign policy and Moscow considers it as another step to the moving
stairway after which Yerevan will have little chances to “jump off”
and Armenia will inevitably become an ally and partner of the EU, i.e.
Russia’s geopolitical competitor, no matter what the diplomats and
politicians say.
On this assumption Russia, seeing that pro-European moods if not
among the majority in general, but at least among the majority of
media-active representatives of the expert community of Armenia are
prevailing, sharply activated its policy in regard to Armenia in
several directions simultaneously. In particular:
It intensified negotiations on all the joint military-political
and military technical projects which are on different stages of
implementation; It supplied heavy offensive arms worth $1 billion
to the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. They informed about it in the
June. This, on the one hand marked the process of marketisation of its
relations not only with Baku but also with its military and political
ally in the region – Yerevan, and on the other hand it strengthened
Armenia’s dependence on military technical and moreover military and
political support of Russia in Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Russia is not the only but one of the main suppliers of weapons to
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fact of selling large amount of weapons
by Russia – co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is responsible
for Nagorno-Karabakh settlement by peaceful means, affords ground for
diplomatic rhetoric, but this will not change the situation because
race of armaments began in the region long ago. And not only Russia
but Turkey (by the way, it is also a member of the OSCE Minsk Group)
supplied arms to Azerbaijan too.
But in this case Russia – Collective Security Treaty Organization
member, supplied weapons to Armenia which is member of the CSTO too,
and to Azerbaijan – which is not the CSTO member and which is in the
state of war with Armenia. Though according to the Article 2 of the
Collective Security Treaty “member-states will consult with each other
on key issues of international security, which affect their interests,
and coordinate their stances” and nothing more.
The similar example is the military sales by the NATO member countries
to Turkey, which is also a NATO member country and to Cyprus, which is
not a member of NATO and part of its territory is occupied by Turkey.
And Great Britain and the US used to arm Pakistan – their CEATO ally
(South-East Asia Treaty Organization, 1955-1977) and its rival India
in the period between escalations of the longstanding conflict and
imposing an embargo during the full-fledged military operations
(Second Kashmir War in 1965 and Third Indo-Pakistani War in 1971).
For Moscow it is both policy and business.
Business:
– It does not lose solvent Azerbaijan as a market for its weapons
and military equipment;
– It boosts its military industrial complex not only in the aspect
of production but also in the aspect of guarantee and post-guarantee
maintenance, modification, after market support, supply of ammunition,
etc.
– It receives additional financial dividends from training of the
operators of the modern weapons systems, etc.
Policy:
– It consolidates it positions:
in military and technical cooperation with (at least) Azerbaijan;
over the whole range of military-technical, military-political and
military-economic cooperation with Armenia. After the $1 billion worth
military sales to Azerbaijan, re-equipment and modification of both the
102nd Russian military base in Armenia and Armenian Armed Forces are
expected. In particular, it has already been stated about initiating
additional armament of the RA Air Force with combat aircrafts. Besides,
part of the armaments, military equipment, ammunition and components
will be produced at the military industrial facilities of Armenia. It
is clear that re-armament and modification will be carried out with
the consideration of current needs and broad range of equipment which
was supplied or is planned to be supplied to Azerbaijan;
– Russia strengthens its military and political presence in the South
Caucasus region in general: Consecutive visits of the secretary of
National Security Council of Russia N.Patrushev (June 23-25) and
Secretary General of the CSTO N.Bordyuzha (June 26-27) to Armenia
took place. During these visits a number of documents were signed and
several projects, which promote not only bilateral military-technical
and military-political partnership but also regional growth of
significance of Armenia, were initiated.
In particular, regional infrastructure of joint reserves will
be created – “ArmRosreserv”. The topicality of this project is
conditioned by the increase of the productivity and level of the
military-industrial cooperation between Armenia and Russia and will
allow solving crucial problems of ensuring security of Armenia, first
of all economic one, and it will also be of regional significance
because its infrastructure is of civilian designation (food, technical
equipment, etc.)
During the visit the Secretary of National Security Council of Armenia
A.Baghdasasryan and CSTO Secretary General N.Bordyuzha signed a
protocol, which consists of 20 points, stipulating deepening of the
cooperation in some directions within the framework of the CSTO of
both bilateral and multi-lateral character. It is supposed to create:
– special rescue units;
– mechanisms of cooperation between police agencies, constant dialogue
between special services and law-enforcement agencies;
– new joint enterprises in the sphere of military industry.
Besides, within the framework of decision of the CSTO about the
creation of the CSTO Troops, Collective Air Force – from Armenian Air
Force units and air units of the 102nd Russian military base will be
formed. Their goals will be:
– Implementation of troops carrier missions to the necessary regions
during the operations carried out by the CSTO
– Air defence of the CSTO operations.
And in general the CSTO Air Force will support armies of the member
countries during the protection of their sovereignty and territorial
integrity,
During the visit the issues of strengthening and modernization of the
Air Force of the RA, air units of the 102nd Russian military base in
Gyumri and modernization and re-equipment of the Antiaircraft Defence
of Armenia were also discussed.
* * *
Currently the military security of the Republic of Armenia is
guaranteed by:
– Armed Forces of the Rep. of Armenia and Army of Defence of NKR;
– Membership in the CSTO, and first of all military-political and
military-technical cooperation with Russia, 102nd Russian military
base and “Armenia” tactical group of Border Troops of FSS (Federal
Security Service) of Russia;
– Availability, maintenance, readiness and constant modernization of
the engineering facilities along the confrontation line in the area
of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
At the same time, as the Russian emperor Alexander III stated at the
end of the 19th century: “Russia has only two allies – its army and
fleet”, Armenia, generally speaking, also has only two allies – Armed
Forces of the Republic of Armenia and Army of Defence of NKR. And
these two pieces are of paramount importance at the chess board of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
August, 2013
“Globus” analytical journal, #8, 2013
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