Author: Kanayan Tamar

HEIKO LANGNER: “THE ARMENIAN-AZERBAIJANI CONFLICT CAN BE SETTLED WITH RUSSIAN MEDIATION”

Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Nov 18 2013

18 November 2013 – 1:32pm

Interview by Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European Bureau of
Vestnik Kavkaza

German political scientist and expert in the post-Soviet area, Heiko
Langner, commented on the situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan following
the elections, the upcoming summit of the Eastern Partnership, and
the prospects of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for
Vestnik Kavkaza.

– Mr. Langner, Georgia has recently held the presidential
elections. What do you expect from Georgia in a post-election period?

Will foreign political vectors change?

– Foreign political vectors will unlikely change. We should consider
the objective reality that was established after the Russian-Georgian
war in August 2008. Russia has recognized independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Actually it means that Georgia has lost these
territories completely. I don’t believe that Russia will ever take
its recognition back – the step would destroy trust to the Russian
policy in the region. At the same time, I cannot imagine that any
Georgian government would accept the loss. The factor will influence
Russian-Georgian relations greatly in the future. Thus, we cannot
speak about a pro-Russian turn of the Georgians; but Tbilisi intends
to build pragmatic economic relations with Moscow, which is reasonable,
considering attractiveness of the Russian market for Georgian products.

– Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev was re-elected for the third term
in October. What do you expect from Baku policy in next five years?

– It should be noted that Azerbaijan obtains the highest level of
independence among three states of the South Caucasus. It is explained
by its effective foreign political strategy and economic prosperity,
as Baku has thoughtfully built relations with all regional and
international players. Azerbaijan closely cooperates with Russia and
Europe, the U.S. and Turkey. Baku manages to build neutral relations
with Iran. Azerbaijan will continue implementing this foreign political
strategy and no radical changes are expected.

– The summit of members of the EU program of the Eastern Partnership
will take place in late November. What are advantages of the Eastern
Partnership for its members?

– European economic interests obviously prevail in the program
of the Eastern Partnership. I don’t mind an economic exchange and
cross-border trade, but it depends on conditions. The agreement on
free trade will only be beneficial for all sides if the members of
the agreement are equal in economic development. However, this is
not the case. The EU countries are much more developed in the sphere
of economy and technologies than the post-Soviet countries. The
former Soviet republics are in the middle of establishing diversified
economies. Free trade between unequal partners will create unbalanced
economic relations and improve the gap between European and post-Soviet
economies.

Thus, all advantages belong to the EU which is trying to conquer new
outlet markets. It is confirmed by the trade balance of the EU with
the countries of the South Caucasus. Both Georgia and Armenia have
a great trade deficit with the EU. Both countries import much more
products from the EU than export to Europe. The main reason is that
Georgia and Armenia have no products which would be interesting for the
EU. Of course, Georgian wine and Armenian cognac are nice products,
but in general they are niche goods which cannot compensate for the
development of diversified economy.

As for Azerbaijan, it has trade surplus with the EU in recent years,
but it happens only due to oil and gas export to Europe. The trade
balance without the energy segment demonstrates huge deficit of the
Azerbaijani side. However, Azerbaijan has an advantage in comparison
to its neighbors in the region as it can reinvest its oil dollars in
diversification of economy, which happens in reality.

I think that consumers goods, including washing machines and fridges
can be domestically produced; it’s not necessary to import them. It
will create new jobs in processing and producing industry which is
necessary for any economy. I believe that effective domestic economy
and specialization in certain export products are not controversial;
together they provide opportunities for economic development of the
country and improvement of living standards.

>From this point of view, Azerbaijan’s progress is much better
than Georgia’s or Armenia’s. Azerbaijan provides 80% of the whole
industrial producing in the whole South Caucasus; an average income
level is much higher here, while the poverty level is much lower than
in the neighboring countries. I understand that not all problems have
been settled, but the main economic development strategy of Azerbaijan
is right. And an equal partnership with the EU can be established in
this context.

– What do you think about Armenia’s rejection to sign the association
agreement with the EU at the Vilnius summit?

– Armenia’s decision to reject the association agreement with
the EU and to join the Customs Union headed by Russia reflects the
geopolitical balance of forces in the region. Armenia depends seriously
on Russia because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Armenian foreign
policy is not flexible and depends on Moscow’s good will, which of
course doesn’t want to reject its interests and will prevent the
EU’s improvement in the area of Russian influence from economic and
political point of view. It is reasonable, from the point of view of
Russia and its interests. However, it will lead Armenia to a disaster.

Armenia can continue its policy of illegal occupation of
Azerbaijani territories, however, it pays a lot for this – economic
underdevelopment, massive poverty, poor social conditions for the
population, and massive migration and serious demographic problems.

The international diplomacy should try to take Armenia away from the
isolated position in the region; but it requires that Armenia will
change its current foreign policy and will be ready to move forward in
the process of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Yerevan
should refuse from maximalist demands to reach a compromise with
Azerbaijan. In this case Azerbaijan and Turkey would stop the economic
isolation, and Armenia would benefit from this.

– What do you think about possible ways out of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict?

– First of all I would like to note that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
cannot be considered frozen, as many people think. People are being
killed on the frontline and clashes are taking place. It is wrong
to consider this conflict frozen in this context. On the other hand,
I don’t see opportunities for settlement of the conflict in the near
future. If we look at the OSCE Minsk Group which is responsible for
talks on the settlement of the conflict, we will see that the only
mediator which has real power in the South Caucasus is Russia. Neither
France nor America can compete with it. And only under mediation of
Russia the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan can be settled. The
key from the Karabakh conflict lies in Moscow. Only cooperation between
Yerevan, Baku, and Moscow can lead to settlement of the situation.

I think a logical way out should be based on territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan, which is damaged today. Two principles of the international
law – of territorial integrity and of self-identity – are not mutually
exclusive. Seven regions around Nagorno-Karabakh were populated by the
Azerbaijani people mainly and they should be returned to Azerbaijan
as soon as possible.

RUSSIA HOPES FOR THE RESUMPTION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA OVER NAGORNO- KARABAKH

Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Nov 18 2013

18 November 2013 – 6:51pm

Russia hopes for a resumption of direct contacts between the leaders
of Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and intends to render
any assistance in resolving this conflict, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov said today after a meeting with his Armenian counterpart.

“We hope that in the near future direct contacts between the leaders
of Armenia and Azerbaijan will be resumed, and we will do our best
to help, as I have said, creating the necessary atmosphere for the
settlement of the conflict on a particular basis of the earlier reached
agreements acceptable to the parties”, RIA Novosti reports quoting him.

As VK previously reported, on November 19 in Vienna a meeting between
Azerbaijani and Armenian Presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serzh Sargsyan
will be held.

COMING SOON TO DOWNTOWN: THE DISTRICT’S MOST VALUABLE VACANT LOT

Washington Business Journal
Nov 18 2013

Michael NeibauerStaff Reporter- Washington Business JournalEmail
| Twitter

Coming to the heart of downtown Washington: a vacant lot.

The Minneapolis-based Cafesjian Family Foundation Inc. was issued
permits Friday to raze three vacant commercial buildings at 1338, 1340
and 1342 G St. NW, which will leave a 5,700-square-foot empty space
steps from 14th Street. The properties, once home to Clement’s Pastry
Shop, Graffix Tattoo, Natural Nails and Bensonis Italian Kitchen,
have a taxable assessed value of $8.3 million, all but $3,000 of
which is on the land.

The three buildings, briefly classified as blighted by the District
in 2012 and now simply listed as vacant, back up to the historic
National Bank of Washington on 14th Street, the long-planned home of
the Armenian Genocide Museum. The foundation owns all four buildings,
in addition to the office building at 1336 G.

The vacant classification brings a property tax rate of $5 per $100
of assessed value, roughly four times the standard commercial levy –
unless the buildings are knocked down.

Gerard Cafesjian, a wealthy former publisher and Armenian
philanthropist, purchased the G Street properties in 2000 for about
$5.5 million, with the idea of turning them into a contemporary
art museum.

But the art museum was built in the Armenian capital of Yerevan
instead, and Cafesjian conditionally agreed to donate the G Street
buildings to the Armenian Assembly of America for an expansion of
the genocide museum.

The grant agreement between Cafesjian and the Armenian Genocide Museum
nonprofit, an arm of the Armenian Assembly, set Dec. 31, 2010, as
the point at which the properties would be returned if they weren’t
developed. They were not, and neither was the $100 million museum,
which has been caught in lawsuit limbo for half a decade.

As a result, what we’ll have after 13 years of waiting for an Armenian
Genocide Museum is a vacant lot on prime downtown real estate. It’s
unclear what will become of the space – a temporary parking lot isn’t
out of the question, but it would require a variance from the Board
of Zoning Adjustments as the property sits in the Downtown Development
Overlay District.

In any case, this is not progress.

Other permits issued Nov. 15:

3419 14th St. NW: Establish a retail bakery use on the first level of
the building. The work involves the installation of a three-compartment
sink, a hand sink and a mop sink.

1919 M St. NW: Interior alterations to suit new tenant Command
Consulting Group on the second floor. Command Consulting is currently
headquartered at 1501 M St. NW, on the fifth floor. Work at the new
offices will include the conversion of conference rooms, a copy center
and business center to office space, division of the main conference
room to three offices and removal of full height walls to be replaced
with partial height walls.

2822 Pennsylvania Ave. NW: Renovate existing Georgetown space to
accommodate new retail store. No retailer name was provided.

7112 Chestnut St. NW: Construction of a new single-family home.

1503 Gallatin St. NW: New, two-story single-family home on what is
currently a vacant lot.

Vardan Petrosian’s lawyer releases new facts of road accident

Saturday, November 16, 2013

Actor Vardan Petrosian’s lawyer, Nikolai Baghdasarian, released today
photos taken immediately after the road accident. According to him,
there are no side-view mirrors on the Niva car in those photos,
PastInfo news agency reported.

In Nikolai Baghdasarian’s words, Marat Ginosian who defends the
aggrieved party’s interests said in a television interview two days
ago that the car had side-view mirrors.

`The reports given to me contain no information about any broken
mirrors found at the scene of the accident,’ Baghdasarian said,
adding, `The blow was from behind so there is no slightest chance that
both mirrors broke during the accident’.

Nikolai Baghdasarain also called attention to the motor oil stains on
the roadway in another photo. `How could the oil leak from the BMW car
on the roadway rather than the roadside when the accident happened on
the roadside?,’ the lawyer asked.

TODAY, 17:01
Aysor.am

Politkom.ru (in Russian), Russia
Nov 11 2013

Karabakh Conflict: Will There Be a ‘Window’ for a Peaceful Scenario?

by Aleksandr Karavayev, research fellow of the Russian Academy of
Sciences Economics Institute

The first visit following the series of elections in Armenia and
Azerbaijan of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group to Yerevan and
Baku took place last week. The American Co-Chairman James Warlick, a
diplomat recently appointed to this office, described on his Twitter
page his first impressions as follows: “Following the meeting with
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, I believe that the first summit in
more than two years with the president of Armenia can be arranged.” We
can agree in principle, there are certain grounds for diplomatic
optimism.

The organization of personal negotiations of Aliyev and Sargsyan is no
great achievement for the OSCE Minsk Group, specially since the
presidents themselves also might desire this, considering the
emergence of new factors in the current regional situation as a whole
and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in particular. Armenia’s decision to
accede to the Customs Union, the definite positive stabilization of
Russo-Azerbaijani relations -all this alters the context somewhat. But
what will follow this meeting is another matter.

The Karabakh equation could to some extent represent the function of a
triangle, where an unknown variable belonging to Russia is encountered
several times. Baku and Yerevan will determine the solution for
themselves, of course. But a very great deal, namely, the conditions
for the prefential materialization of this scenario or the other, will
depend on how Russia behaves in this conflict. Their range, from tense
expectation and the cold military confrontation of individual gunshots
to active combat operations, will depend on the assertiveness of
Moscow. This proposition earlier appeared in greater relief, then,
when the new context of mutual relations of Russia and the greater
West appeared, it began to blur. In subsequent years, following the
“seepage” of the conflict, as it were, into the broad regional agenda
of Middle East and Caspian stability, this assertion has not appeared
that obvious. But, nonetheless, this, to a considerable extent, is how
it is. Yerevan and Baku are looking very intently to Moscow, in a
varying degree of dependence and constraint. Whence, from this point,
it will be productive to take a brief retrospective look and see how
the positional arrangement in the conflict has changed in the past 20
years.

First, the cyclical nature of events of a warming and cooling of
interest in the conflict, corresponding to the political rhythms of
Baku and Yerevan, is present as invariable constants. The second point
has to do with the permanent competition between Russia and the United
States for influence on the participants in the conflict, with the
OSCE Minsk Group being, perhaps, the sole format on the post-Soviet
territory where Moscow and Washington are institutional and legal
partners in peacekeeping. A third point is the conservatism of the
elites and national populists obstructing solutions achievable at the
level of the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Twenty years ago, on 3 October 1993, Heydar Aliyev was elected
president of Azerbaijan. Practically immediately he banked mainly on
Moscow, and, in addition, a favourable moment for negotiations to end
the war arose. Aliyev not only “returned” Azerbaijan to the CIS but
also proposed a broader programme of integration in exchange for
pressure in the direction of Yerevan. It was even a question of the
preservation of Cyrillic in the Azerbaijani alphabet. Such a proposal,
even if symbolic, both then and now, could delight part of the Russian
establishment. There was within Azerbaijan also a mass of positive
expectations from the return of so experienced a political
heavyweight. There was an opportunity for compromise, thanks to the
possibility of “throwing off” responsibility for the military defeats
onto the previous regime (which, strictly speaking, was not an
exaggeration of the reality).

In turn, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who had at that time
harvested the bitter fruit of the country’s economic isolation and who
found himself under the fire of the criticism contained in four UN
resolutions, obviously wanted to conclude a peace treaty. The British
political analyst Thomas de Waal quotes in his well-known book
Armenian politicians pointing out that, after the Armenian attack on
Kalbajar in the spring of 1993, Ter-Petrosyan was disapproving of all
offensive operations of the Armenian armed forces outside of Karabakh.
The start of international pressure on Armenia was taking its toll,
and it is possible that he really was tired of large-scale
hostilities. But the conflict had already acquired its own inertia,
and Ter-Petrosyan simply lost control of the Armenian war machine.
Inspired by the successes at the front, the Karabakh Armenians began
to operate more aggressively and independently. The enclave itself, de
Waal says, “became a lesser Sparta, where the entire adult male
population served in the army.” Be that as it may, thanks to the
series of reciprocal military attacks, all of Southwest Azerbaijan,
except for Zangelan District with its 30,000-strong population in a
pocket close to the border with Iran to the south, found itself
effectually occupied. At the end of October an offensive from two
directions -Nagornyy Karabakh and Armenia -swept up Zangelan also. The
capture of Zangelan effectually completed the picture of Azerbaijan’s
occupied territories or, as they are called in Armenia, “security
zones” around Karabakh.

What’s the situation today? Ilham Aliyev has gained a new mandate of
trust for another presidential term. But he has to confirm and
consolidate it, this is why he needs forward progress on the Karabakh
issue. The shakeup in the army corps of Azerbaijan points for a number
of commentators to a prewar strengthening of the discipline and
mobilization readiness of the officer corps. Yes, the Azerbaijani army
is modernizing, but it is hard as yet to draw conclusions about its
military employment. Ilham Aliyev, like his father also, is far from
the foremost supporter of war in his country. He should rather be
called a pacifist with a capital P, considering the realities of a
public opinion ready to go to war tomorrow even and the mood of part
of the elite in accord with it.

The position of Serzh Sargsyan is to some extent reminiscent of the
situation of Armenia’s first president. The wave of criticism that has
arisen regarding Armenia’s turn towards Eurasian integration is, in
actual fact, a comparatively weak blow to his regime, far more
powerful is the fact that he is unable to show the possibility of the
new political landscape accommodating Karabakh’s security. Moscow can
and will guarantee his personal stability and the economic stability
of the elite and also the physical security of Armenia, but these
guarantees hardly extend to Karabakh itself. There remains an
ambiguity, which is not dispelled by official interviews or even
statements of the Russian military (see the Krasnaya Zvezda interview
with the commander of the Russian base in Armenia).

Whereas earlier Yerevan could have manoeuvred on this issue, citing
the interests and desires of the United States and the EU and, in a
sense, putting pressure on Moscow with its possible “flight” to the
West, now the possibilities of Armenian manoeuvre are confined to the
Procrustean bed of Russian interests. The attachment of Yerevan to the
context of the relations between Moscow and Baku is now stronger by an
order of magnitude. Of course, this has a flip-side also, increasing
the distinctive symbiotic Yerevan-Baku dependence via Moscow. In any
event, the main prize -making Stepanakert a party to the negotiations
-will hardly eventuate without some tradeoff. Perhaps it will not
eventuate at all, considering that it has not been possible to impart
to Karabakh international status all these 20 years. Moscow is not
eager to impair the status quo, constantl pointing out, at the level
of Foreign Ministry officials and notes, that it supports the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

Now, in fact, about Russia. All these years our country has been the
sole power capable of rapidly sending peacekeepers to the conflict
zone. The word “power” is no accident here. Only at this point on the
post-Soviet territory, perhaps, does Moscow still preserve an
overwhelming influence advantage. Earlier this was much stricter and
more obvious. In 1993 the Caucasus and Russia were still part of a
common economic space: everyone spoke Russian, and even the phones of
the old government line still supported direct communications with
Moscow. True, the most sensitive issues of the conflict were settled
at that time not by the efforts of the Foreign Ministry, rather by
coercion on the part of generals of the Defence Ministry. Now the
economic ties are part of a global context, but the Moscow dominant
persists. The prerogative of the adoption and monitoring of decisions
has migrated to the office of President Putin, and it is hardly likely
to let go of the initiative. Russia remains the sole mediator with
mechanisms of military pressure and economic management. In fact,
whatever scenarios of the deployment between the Armenian and
Azerbaijani positions of “disengagement forces” are considered, Russia
is the sole country that could effect such a deployment within a
matter of days.

There are still various theories and suppositions concerning the
Russian military’s participation on the opposite sides of the conflict
(for example, Armenia believes that Azerbaijan obtained military
assistance from Russia in the winter of 1993-1994). But, specifically,
in the spring of 1993 Russia insisted that Armenia return Kalbajar.

The saga of the Kremlin’s attempts to persuade the elite of the two
countries of the need for compromise has occurred several times. The
result for some have been losses of political influence, for others,
disintegration of the team. Ter-Petrosyan resigned when the Karabakh
military elite refused to accept his peace proposals. Then Robert
Kocharyan also was unable to persuade his clan of the need for
concessions. In Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev failed to find the arguments
for pushing through among government officials and politicians the
need for compromise. All this was compounded by the fact that the gap
between rhetoric and the actual progress of the negotiations grew by
the year. Now, at the present stage, Zangelan District could be a
subject of bargaining over the return of some territory to Azerbaijan
in exchange for the opening of supply lines with Armenia. Despite the
practice of the settlement of the buffer zone with Syrian Armenians,
these areas are empty, and possible conflicts when the two communities
interact could thus for the time being be avoided.

It is believed that military control of the territory conveys
confidence as to security. But the actual degradation of the region
cannot instil confidence as to the long-term efficacy of the chosen
tactics of ensuring security. Far more reliable, from the stability
perspective, are clear parameters arrived at in an agreement and, if
necessary, guaranteed by outside peacekeepersa¦.

Generally accessible information indicates that it is planned to hold
an Aliyev-Sargsyan meeting around the end of this year or the start of
next year. Following the re-election of Ilham Aliyev and Sargsyan’s
choice of the integration vector, a unique period of quiet, in which
the countries’ political elites are not under heavy psychological
pressure and are capable of making decisions more freely, ensues.
There is no tension hanging over these elites, a period of quiet,
within which new steps may be taken, is beginning.

The economic integration of Armenia could stimulate a number of
adjustments. Russia needs an economically stronger Armenia with
development prospects. Any economic scenario of a gradual resolution
of the conflict would appear preferable and, which is important,
entirely manageable.

Of course, the conflict is, owing to the diametrically opposite
positions of the parties, admittedly already within the category of
greatly protracted, nigh-insoluble ethno-territorial confrontations
like the Cypriot, Arab-Israeli, and such conflicts. They have remained
unsettled for decades. Everything is further complicated by the fact
that some new approaches that would affect the deep-seated roots of
the propaganda sentiments in Armenia and Azerbaijan and the system of
“calibration” of civil society in accordance with this theme are today
a priori impossible. Moreover, different emphases are arranged in the
two countries upon a discussion of the Karabakh problem. In Armenia,
for example, this means the people residing on the territory of
Nagornyy Karabakh. In Azerbaijan this means the territories themselves
and the refugees. But if we try, closely-related approaches may be
found by way of dialogue. Moscow attempts periodically to resuscitate
dialogue initiatives, on the latest occasion this was aired by Mikhail
Shvydkoy during the Baku International Humanitarian Forum. But all
this has thus far been very shaky.

In my view, therefore, the sole prospect for the start of a peace
process is a “deal” at the top formalized with the mediation of the
Kremlin. Strictly speaking, it is of no significance whether the
parties reach agreement on the insertion of Russian peacekeepers in
the future demilitarized zone. It is important to provide for some
material and political background to the process. It is likely that
Baku will be forced to pay the Armenians’ “costs” through a kind of
financial guarantee in the form, for example, of investments in
Russia’s infrastructure. Subsequently, the transfer to Azerbaijan of
some localities close to the line of contact, which are simply
standing empty, is possible. Azerbaijan could in exchange agree to
concessions: grant access to part of its transit infrastructure. In
any event, Russian Railroads and Rosneft could provide for the first
trade and economic contacts between Azerbaijan and Armenia. There’s
little left to do -to resolve to do it. Experience shows that such a
scenario requires for its execution quiet, not publicity, and the
absence of public discussion. Whether such a format is possible for
Armenia and Azerbaijan, I shall not venture to say. But Serzh
Sargsyan’s Customs Union decision was in precisely this style.

[Translated from Russian]

Premium Official News
November 16, 2013 Saturday

EBRD sees 3.5 per cent growth in Armenia in 2014

Luxembourg

The European Bank For Reconstruction and Development has issued the
following news release:

The Armenian economy is expected to grow modestly in 2014 after a
sharp slowdown this year, the EBRD says in its latest Regional
Economic Prospects report, published today.

Growth had been affected by delays in public infrastructure spending
and a significant increase of prices of Russian gas and related
tariffs hikes.

GDP growth is now seen at 2.5 per cent in 2013 after 7.1 per cent in 2012.

The latest 2013 forecast represents a further downward revision from
May when the EBRD was predicting 4 per cent growth. The revisions are
largely driven by the worsening outlook for Russia and its knock-on
effects in the region and on its trading partners.

However Armenia’s GDP growth is expected to recover modestly to 3.5
per cent in 2014 as remittance inflows have remained strong and
Armenia’s decision to seek membership of the Eurasian Customs Union
may bring about a reduction of natural gas prices.

For more information please visit:

ARMENIE-FRANCOPHONE
Le Maire d’Erévan à Paris pour le congrès international des Maires francophones

Dans le cadre de la rencontre organisée par l’Association
internationale des maires francophones (AIMF) présidée par Bernard
Delanoë, le maire d’Erévan Taron Margaryan se trouvait vendredi à
Paris pour le 33e congrès de l’organisation. Des délégations de 50
pays avec plus de 500 représentants participaient à cette réunion qui
vit une intervention du président François Hollande. Le Maire d’Erévan
-accompagné de l’Ambassadeur d’Arménie en France, Viguen Tchitétchian-
a rencontré de nombreux maires et délégations.

Krikor Amirzayan

dimanche 17 novembre 2013,
Krikor Amirzayan ©armenews.com

COMMUNIQUE DE DA CONNEXION
Retour sur une campagne d’été riche en émotions

Depuis 14 ans l’association humanitaire Diaspora Arménie connexion
oeuvre pour l’amélioration des conditions de vie et d’éducation des
enfants des villages d’Arménie et du Haut-Karabagh en offrant chaque
été à des bénévoles venus de tout horizon la possibilité de vivre une
expérience hors du commun. Des liens se créent, une parfaite union
franco-arménienne accompagne la mission des bénévoles. Plus de 20
villages ont déjà bénéficié de l’intervention de la DA-connexion qui
assure au terme de son projet un suivi des lieux construits ou
rénovés. Cette aide se matérialise par la construction et la
rénovation des btiments destinés à l’éducation, par l’organisation de
centres aérés mais aussi par la sensibilisation des enfants et jeunes
parents aux règles d’hygiène.

La campagne 2013 de la DA-connexion se résume en trois actions dans
trois villages.

Cet été une dizaine de bénévoles ont vécu l’expérience dans le petit
village d’Arpi et ont permis à plus de 120 enfants de découvrir de
nouvelles activités manuelles, artistiques et sportives. La Diaspora
Arménie connexion a également terminé la dernière phase de réfection
de l’école maternelle de Mets Mantach qu’elle avait commencé il y a
trois ans en mettant en place un système de chauffage fonctionnel.
L’association a par ailleurs financé la rénovation et l’agrandissement
des locaux du centre aéré de Saghmossavank qu’elle avait construit en
2004.

Mais `l’expérience DA-connexion` ne s’arrête pas là ! Un nouveau
bureau vient d’être élu, plusieurs campagnes auront encore lieu à Arpi
et ailleurs, en Arménie et dans le Haut-Karabagh, de nombreux
bénévoles sont donc attendus…

Si vous êtes intéressés pour vivre une expérience humanitaire
enrichissante, n’hésitez pas à nous contacter…

dimanche 17 novembre 2013,
Ara ©armenews.com
‘853

Environmental Documentary to Be Screened at Ararat Eskijian Museum

Friday, November 15th, 2013

`Armenia’s Breaking Backbone’

LOS ANGELES – The PAEF (Pan-Armenian Environmental Front) has organized
a movie screening of `Armenia’s Breaking Backbone’, an environmental
documentary that will be featured at the Ararat Eskijian Museum on
November 17th. The documentary will display Armenia’s internal
oligarchy and greed behind the over-exploitation of our nation’s
natural resources. Also, viewers will get a close-up of the many
ecological disasters, such as tailing dumps and pollution caused by
excessive mining mostly in the Syunik region, that reduce Armenia’s
air quality, serve as a source of emigration and quash any chances of
having an ecologically and economically secure nation. The documentary
aims to reach out to native and diasporan Armenians worldwide,
exhibiting current trends and the consequences of ignorance. Without
persistent environmental activists and a caution light to all
Armenians, we will have to fight an unconquerable war to regain the
health and beauty of our motherland.

PAEF’s motto `Protection of our environment is the protection of
Armenia’ represents their main goal, which is the preservation of
nature, the sustainable development of economy and the ensuring of
social justice in Armenia. To achieve these goals, the PAEF will
assure rehabilitation and development, reproduction and sustainable
use of natural resources, elimination and prevention of negative
effects of economic and other activities on the environment, and
socially just distribution of natural resources.

Its prominent environmental activists, Yeghia Nersesyan, Anna
Aglamazyan, and Levon Galstyan, gave a lecture at UC Irvine last month
exposing Armenian youth to the dangers our homeland currently faces.
They stressed the importance of more Armenian youth becoming involved
with our homeland’s concerns to prevent loss of discourse and work
towards a secure Armenia for Armenians everywhere.

Armenian Parliament Speaker leaves for Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina

11:52, 16 November, 2013

YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 16, ARMENPRESS: The delegation, headed by the
President of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia
Hovik Abrahamyan, will leave on November 18-26 to the Federative
Republic of Brazil, the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Republic
of Argentine with an official visit on the invitations of the
parliaments’ speakers of the abovementioned countries.

The Department for Mass Media and Public Relatiosn of the National
Assembly of the Republic of Armenia informed Armenpress that the
delegation, headed by Hovik Abrahamyan, will involve the deputies
David Harutyunyan, Artak Davtyan, Naira Zohrabyan, Armen
Rustamyan, Heghine Bisharyan, Margarit Yesayan, Samvel Farmanyan,
Ruzanna Muradyan, Rubik Hakobyan and Tachat
Vardapetyan.