WEST UNABLE TO CONCEDE RUSSIA’S POINT ON UKRAINE
The Japan Times
May 5 2014
by Gregory Clark
It’s hard to understand the rationale for the Western, and Japanese,
sanctions against Russia over Ukraine. Moscow says it wants a federal
system of government giving more power to semi-autonomous regional
units. And many in the West say they would support something similar.
Even Kiev sees it as one acceptable outcome of the constitutional
referendum it plans for May 25. So why the sanctions and all the
heavy breathing?
The best answer we can get from Washington is that while it supports
decentralization, it opposes too much power being given to the regions
since this will favor Moscow in the traditionally pro-Russia east of
the nation. So the Western objection is simply over the hypothetical
degree of an autonomy to be decided in the future? And for that reason,
we have troops being rushed into Poland, Cold War warriors are being
unleashed, and sanctions imposed?
True, there are also objections to Moscow running military exercises
along the east Ukraine border. But that is something the U.S. does
along the North Korean border every year. The only other possible
objection is over Crimea. But while many were unhappy about its
separation into Russia, is anyone asking for that to be reversed?
The real complaint, it seems, is the claim that Moscow is behind the
takeovers of east Ukraine government offices and towns by pro-Russian
elements, and could plan a Crimea-like takeover of the area. But
this too is hypothetical, and the evidence provided so far has been
highly dodgy, including the usual doctored photos dragged out for
these occasions. It is also highly illogical.
The last thing Moscow needs is a division of Ukraine into east and
west. It would leave a backward minority in the east dependent on
Russia for economic recovery, and a strongly anti-Russian majority
in the west determined to point a pro-EU, pro-NATO dagger directly
into Russia’s underbelly.
The ideal for Moscow is an intact Ukraine, but with the pro-Russian
regions able to prevent anti-Moscow moves by Kiev. In other words,
neutralization on the Finland model. Is that really so sinister
and outrageous?
Ironically the origin of the current disputes was something very
un-sinister. It was the naive Soviet illusion that under communism all
peoples would come to love each other. Druzhba narodov — friendship
of the nationalities — was the slogan. So it did not matter if
they were bundled together in the various republics of the former
USSR. Southern Ossetians and Abkhazians were pushed into Georgia even
though they had little cultural, religious or any other connection;
Christian Armenians found themselves inside Muslim Azerbaijan. And
large numbers of Russian-speakers found themselves inside Moldova,
Kazakhstan, the Baltic States and Ukraine.
The hoped-for Communist love-in never happened. One of the better
Radio Armenia jokes doing the rounds when I was working in the former
Soviet Union goes like this:
Dear Announcer, what is druzhba narodov? Comrade, it is when Armenians
join together with the Russians, the Uzbeks, the Azerbaijanis, the
Tajiks, the Kirgizi, the Kazakhs, the Turkmenians, the Estonians,
the Latvians, the Lithuanians, and the Ukrainians, and they all go
off together to beat up the Georgians.
As you can guess, Georgians were not greatly loved by neighboring
Armenia. The only thing keeping them all together was strong central
control from Moscow, and harsh repression of any nationalistic
break-away tendencies
With the arbitrary breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 into its former
republics, frictions were inevitable, and some were ugly. Russians
in the Baltic states suffered severe job discrimination. Armenians
went into a brutal and still continuing war with Azerbaijan over the
Nagorno-Karabakh district inside Azerbaijan but populated by Armenians.
In 1992 Russians stranded in Moldova fought a brief war to create their
own independent self-styled republic (Transnistria, now blockaded by
Ukraine), as did the pro-Russians in Georgia’s Abkhazia.
In 2008 the Georgian attack into South Ossetia led to a counterattack
by Russia, which then recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as
independent states.
Crimea, which had been rather foolishly gifted to Ukraine by Russia
in 1954, despite its Russian majority and strong military importance
to Moscow, has now been returned to its former owner.
Within Ukraine, the situation had long remained fairly stable under
the rule of Kiev; Ukrainians and Russian-speakers share fairly similar
languages, religions and cultures. But as the economy faltered and
the politics disintegrated, lingering historical distrust between
east and west surfaced, with the results we see today. Pro-Russians
blame ultra right-wing, anti-Russian nationalists in the west acting
under Western influence, and to some extent they are right.
Kiev’s short-lived attempt to restrict use of the Russian language
in this bi-lingual society was extremely foolish.
Moscow is also to blame; its repressive politics have repelled many in
the Ukraine, the better-educated especially, who now see closer ties
with the West as the only escape from current problems. A federation
that allows both sides reasonable autonomy under a central government
is clearly the best answer.
As for the Crimea problem, we can learn much from the former
Yugoslavia. Here the communistic ideal of mixing the peoples together
in a bid to overcome deep wartime hatreds has also proved optimistic.
The only answer has been separation of the peoples — in Croatia,
with the expulsion of the Serb minority, and in Bosnia with the
Serbs setting up their own semi-independent republic. As constituent
republics in former Yugoslavia they have been able to go their own
independent way. But in Kosovo, which like Crimea did not have republic
status, independence from Serbia could only be claimed after the Serb
minority was either expelled or forced into a tiny enclave.
Curiously, the West which condemned the bloodless separation of Crimea
from Ukraine, supported the separation of Kosovo from Serbia.
Ask Western officials why the difference and they will say because
the Kosovo separation was done over time. Yes, time for the brutal
bombing of Serbia and for the savage ethnic cleansing of remaining
Serbs, Jews, and Romas. It is time for a lot more clear thinking in
the West over the Ukraine problem.
Japan needs it even more. By its knee-jerk support for the West over
Ukraine, Tokyo not only guarantees Moscow’s refusal to offer any
compromise in the dispute over ownership of the south Kuril Islands
(the so-called Northern Territories). It is also supporting Western
moves that guarantee Russia will move closer to China. Tokyo loses
out in both directions, simply to support Western moves of doubtful
common sense and dubious legality. Strategic thinking was never a
Tokyo forte, but this time it has really blundered.
Gregory Clark is a former Australian diplomat with China and Russia
experience, and a longtime resident of Japan.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/05/05/commentary/world-commentary/west-unable-to-concede-russias-point-on-ukraine/#.U2fRAcaKDIU