Russia’s next acquisition
By Luke Coffey
Jan. 17, 2015
[Summary: If Russia wanted to exploit the situation in Georgia’s
Samtskhe-Javakheti province, there’s no better time than now.]
[Luke Coffey is a research fellow specialising in transatlantic and
Eurasian security at a Washington DC based think tank. He previously
served as a special adviser to the British defence secretary and was a
commissioned officer in the United States army.]
It is no secret that Russia views the South Caucasus as being in its
natural sphere of influence. In light of Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, and on the back of Moscow’s recent treaties with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Georgians have legitimate reasons to believe that
Russian activity in their country will only increase in 2015.
Consequently, many are keeping a close eye on the Georgian province of
Samtskhe-Javakheti – a majority ethnically Armenian region located
just three hours’ drive from the nation’s capital city of Tbilisi.
Causing instability in Samtskhe-Javakheti would achieve two goals for Moscow.
First, it would further dismember the territorial integrity of
Georgia. The Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are
already under Russian occupation. By some accounts they are closer
than ever to being annexed by Moscow. An independent
Samtskhe-Javakheti, or one under Russian influence, would divide
Georgia down the middle.
A perfect storm
Armenian separatism in Samtskhe-Javakheti might not be as vocal as it
was only a few years ago; but there is still a fear that Moscow could
easily reenergise separatist movements in the region.
Secondly, and more importantly for Russia, bringing the region under
Moscow’s influence would make a land corridor between Russia and
Armenia, via South Ossetia, one step closer. This is important because
Russia maintains a sizeable military presence in Armenia. The bulk of
the Russian force is based in the city of Gyumri and consists of
approximately 5,000 soldiers and dozens of fighter planes and attack
helicopters.
Russia has long had the difficult challenge of supplying these forces,
especially since Georgia and Turkey refuse transit rights. This has
left a reliance on Iran, which for obvious reasons, is not ideal for
Russia.
It is not only for Russia that Samtskhe-Javakheti is strategically
important, but also for Europe.
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the South Caucasus Pipeline,
carrying oil and gas respectively from the Caspian Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea, passes through the province.
As the possibility of more Central Asian oil and gas finding its way
to Europe becomes likely, these pipelines bypassing Russia will become
a vital part of Europe’s energy security.
In addition, the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway, which is due to open later
this year, passes through Samtskhe-Javakheti. It is expected that this
rail line will eventually transport 3 million passengers and over 15
million tons of freight each year.
There is a perfect storm brewing in the region and if Russia wanted to
exploit the situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti it could not ask for
better timing than now.
Russian sympathies
First is the fact that many Javakheti Armenians have Russian
sympathies. Until its closure in 2007, the Russian military base there
was the single biggest source of employment. It has also been
reportedthat Moscow is issuing Russian passports to ethnic Armenians
living in the region.
This in itself is telling; Russia issued passports to Abkhazians and
South Ossetians just before its 2008 invasion of Georgia and also
issued passports to Crimeans ahead of the annexation of Crimea last
year.
But Russia is only part of the problem. Many of the grievances
Javakheti Armenians have are a result of poor policy making by the
central government in Tbilisi.
Many Javakheti Armenians feel that their culture and language are
discriminated against. There has been a decrease in the quality of
education among the Javakheti Armenian population.
The bilingual education program of teaching in both Georgian and
Armenian has been described as a “total failure” because there are not
enough qualified teachers with proficiency in both languages.
Unemployment is high in Samtskhe-Javakheti and future economic
prospects in the region look bleak. Many Javakheti Armenians travel to
Russia or Armenia for work.
Economy strained
Thanks to the drop in the value of the Russian ruble – almost
one-third of its value in the past year – remittances have also
decreased. The unusually harsh winter in the region is placing a
further strain on economic activity.
Then there is the issue of citizenship and immigration. Many Javakheti
Armenians do not have Georgian citizenship. Instead, many hold
Armenian passports because finding seasonal work in Armenia and Russia
is easier this way.
Until recently, Armenian citizens were allowed to live and work inside
Georgia without any special authorisation as long as they crossed the
border back into Armenia at least once a year.
Last September this changed. Now Javakheti Armenians without Georgian
citizenship can only stay in Georgia for three months at a time.
Longer term residency permits are costly.
These policies breed animosity and form a perfect storm that could
easily be exploited by Russia.
It does not have to be this way. Sensible policies can be pursued by
Tbilisi to address the legitimate grievances of the Javakheti
Armenians. The West can make it clear to Russia that further meddling
in Georgia’s domestic affairs could lead to additional sanctions.
The last thing the South Caucasus needs is another sectarian conflict.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/russia-caucasus-georgia-armeni-2015114111654383153.html