Mideast Mirror
January 12, 2012 Thursday
Common denominators
Poverty, deprivation, lack of services, absence of construction, and
the rarity of modernization and development are just about the sole
major common denominator that brings together various Iraqi
constituents in the shadow of the catastrophic regime of [sectarian]
share-distribution. This may be the only sort of ‘equality’ that
brings the Iraqis’ various elements together. It is the same
‘equality’ that grants all those taking part in power ‘the right’ to
share fairly and justly the various posts and loot among themselves,
and enjoy the blessings of power and money–Mahdi Qassem on Iraqi
What else then lies behind the behavior of [Iraqi] PM Maliki in the
manner witnessed by Iraqis, Arabs, and the entire world? In addition
to Iranian backing and Maliki’s own personality,…observers of Iraqi
events mention a third important reason – U.S. support. For various
and sometimes conflicting reasons, the man has managed to unite
Washington and Tehran behind him. The main reason for this is the two
capitals’ conviction that there is no alternative to him in the post
he occupies at the moment–Sarkis Na’oum in Lebanese an-Nahar
Instead of intervening in Iraqi affairs and fanning the flames of
sectarian sedition by speaking of “the marginalization of Iraqi
Sunnis,” the Turkish government would do better to apologize to the
Armenians and the Kurds for the massacres committed against them,
urges an Iraqi commentator. Iran and the U.S. are technically in
competition in Iraq, but the strange consensus between Washington and
Tehran over Nuri al-Maliki as Iraq’s PM stems from the fact that there
is no apparent acceptable alternative to him, argues a Lebanese
commentator.
EVERYONE HAS SUFFERED:
“We – like others – have repeatedly written that all constituents of
Iraqi society have suffered, and continue to suffer, from the negative
effects and consequences of the detestable, catastrophic, and vile
regime of sectarian share-distribution,” writes Mahdi Qassem on
Thursday on the independent Iraqi website
That regime has paralyzed the country, been unjust to the people, and
disappointed the hopes of the Iraqis in the countries of the Iraqi
Diaspora and emigration.
The Iraqi Shiites have not found prosperity in their bitter lives; nor
have their cities and towns developed or become more urbanized; nor
for that matter have their miserable conditions improved. In fact,
everything may have become worse. And the same can be said about
Iraq’s Sunnis, as well as the rest of Iraq’s constituents, with the
exception of Kurdistan Province.
Poverty, deprivation, lack of services, absence of construction, and
the rarity of modernization and development are just about the sole
major common denominator that brings together various Iraqi
constituents in the shadow of the catastrophic regime of [sectarian]
share-distribution.
This may be the only sort of ‘equality’ that brings the various Iraqi
elements together. It is the same ‘equality’ that grants all those
taking part in power ‘the right’ to share fairly and justly the
various posts and loot among themselves, and enjoy the blessings of
power and money.
In light of this, the majority on the Iraqi street, which rejects all
intervention by the Iranian and Saudi regimes in Iraqi affairs, also
rejects the Turkish government’s intervention via talk of the
marginalization of ‘Iraq’s Sunnis.’ After all, all sectors of Iraqi
society have been marginalized by the thieves in the Green Zone as far
as their right to a happy life and human dignity are concerned.
For this reason, and instead of intervening in Iraqi affairs and
fanning the flames of sectarian sedition among the various Iraqi
constituents, the Turkish government would do better to apologize to
the Armenians and Kurds for the horrible mass massacres that Turkey
has committed against these two nations, as well as other nations.
“They should do this before intervening in the affairs of other states
and nations in an attempt to extend their influence,” concludes
Qassem.
IRAN’S GREAT INFLUENCE: “No one following the situation in Iraq doubts
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s great influence there,” writes Sarkis
Na’oum in the Lebanese daily an-Nahar.
This was established after U.S. armies brought down the regime of the
late president Saddam Hussein in 2003, which allowed those Iraqi
groups that had sought refuge in Iran to escape the regime’s injustice
and repression, to return home. Most were Shiite, and they do not and
will not forget Islamic Iran’s protection and the fact that it
provided them with all that they needed in order to return to their
country victorious.
Iranian influence began to be consolidated as a result of the sharp
confessional divisions that Iraq witnessed after being ‘liberated’
from Saddam, and after simultaneously falling under U.S. occupation.
This pushed Iraq’s Shiites- or the majority of them- to view Iran as
their strategic depth after they felt the direct aid that Iraq’s
neighboring Sunni Arab countries provided to the country’s Sunnis, and
after the refusal to recognize them as a popular majority which – from
a democratic perspective – grants them to right to rule, in
partnership with others of course.
The U.S. occupation of Iraq did not succeed in restoring the country’s
situation to what it was before Saddam and those who preceded him. In
fact, those with bad-intentions claim that the occupation did not wish
to do so anyway. Be that as it may, the result was one and the same:
Washington had to deal with Iraq’s Shiites after they came to power as
the majority, despite the hostility between it and Iran, which has the
most influence in Shiite circles.
After the Americans completed their military withdrawal, developments
in Iraq confirmed that Iran’s influence there, especially among the
country’s Shiites, cannot be belittled. In fact, soon after the
withdrawal, Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki took measures against [Sunni]
Deputy-President al-Hashemi and his two allies, Rafi’ al-‘Issawi and
Saleh al-Mutlak. He charged them with involvement in criminal and
terrorist operations, accusing Hashemi of preparing for such acts
along with some of his official bodyguards.
It so happened that all three are members of the Sunni sect that
relies on the backing of the neighboring Sunni countries that are
hostile to Iran and have long enjoyed U.S. support. Of course, the
problem is still developing and remains without a solution. But its
importance stems from the fact that it occurred after the U.S.
withdrawal. It may have been the result of a green light from Iran,
which was in a hurry to say to the U.S. that it retains the primary
and most important say in Iraq after the U.S. military withdrawal from
the country.
Of course, other Iraqi and Arab factions have another explanation for
Maliki’s behavior towards his ‘enemies’ in the Iraqiya List headed by
his opponent Iyyad ‘Allawi. Some do so by reference to his harsh and
unforgiving character and his deeply personal tendency to settle
scores. However, despite their detailed knowledge of Maliki’s
personality, these observers of Iraqi events believe that it is Iran
that has had a leading role in what has happened. Maliki’s
psychological profile can thus be seen as a secondary factor.
What else then lies behind PM Maliki behavior in the manner witnessed
by Iraqis, Arabs, and the entire world?
In addition to Iranian backing and Maliki’s own personality, these
same observers of Iraqi events mention a third important reason – U.S.
support. For various and sometimes conflicting reasons, the man has
managed to unite Washington and Tehran behind him. The main reason for
this is the two capitals’ conviction that there is no alternative to
him in the post he occupies at the moment.
Thus, Dr. ‘Adel ‘Abdelmahdi, who was former vice-president, and is a
member of the [Shiite] Supreme Islamic Council headed by Sayyid ‘Ammar
al-Hakim, enjoys the support of only a small parliamentary bloc (16
members) which is divided, despite its small size. Former PM Ibrahim
al-Ja’fari is a good speaker and can charm those he addresses;
however, in some people’s opinion- including some of his opponents –
he is not good at managing executive powers.
For his part, former PM Iyyad ‘Allawi, also has no chance of returning
to that post despite his strong personality and his powerful
parliamentary bloc. This is because he cannot be viewed as a
representative of the Shiites. He won his parliamentary seat via the
Sunni’ vote and the majority of his bloc belongs to that sect.
Moreover, at least at the current phase, he has important
disagreements with the U.S.
As for Dr. Ahmad Chalabi, he is totally unacceptable to the U.S. after
the ‘suspect’ role he played when Washington used to view him its main
man before it occupied Iraq, and before he subsequently turned towards
Iran.
Of course, all of this is not intended as praise for Maliki. He may
yet turn out to be the Shiite Saddam Hussein. And he may succeed in
ruling Iraq in his own manner. But the current conditions are still
putting wind in his sails.
“But he could have dealt with the urgent Hashemi issue in a different
manner displaying greater respect for Iraq’s constituent elements, the
justice system, and individual rights,” concludes Na’oum.