Why Erdogan Wants Peace With the PKK
The End of An Insurgency
Article Summary: Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party’s
nearly three-decade-long struggle with the Turkish state. His
announcement came at an opportune time, not least because Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems ready to pursue peace with
the Kurds as a way to consolidate his own power. Still, regional
developments might be a stumbling block around which neither party can
maneuver.
Foreign Affairs
March 27, 2013
By F. Stephen Larrabee
Last week, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK), declared a cease-fire in his party’s nearly three-decade-long
struggle with the Turkish state. Before then, the insurgency — which
had claimed some 40,000 lives — had seemed intractable. Ankara’s
attempts to put it down had only inflamed Kurdish nationalism and made
the PKK stronger. But with Ocalan now apparently ready to try to
resolve differences peacefully, the prospects that the uprising will
come to an end have improved.
Ocalan’s announcement came at an opportune time. Several factors had
already made the moment ripe for peace. First, the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) and the broader Turkish public had come to
recognize that trying to end the insurgency with force was a dead end
and that the government would have to make a more determined effort to
find a political solution to the Kurdish conflict.
Second, the Kurdish issue is closely linked to Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s political ambitions. Under AKP bylaws, Erdogan cannot
run for another term as prime minister when his second term ends next
year. Instead, he is widely expected to try to run for president. If
he wins, he will be the first popularly elected president in Turkish
history, capping his political career and giving him the chance to
shape Turkish politics until 2023, the hundredth anniversary of the
founding of the Turkish Republic.
The one problem is that, currently, the presidency is largely a
ceremonial post. Erdogan has thus signaled his intention to amend the
Turkish constitution to give the president stronger executive powers
and to diminish the authority of the prime minister. The AKP lacks the
votes in parliament to make such changes to the constitution; to do
so, it needs the support of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
(BDP), which has 33 seats in parliament. A peace accord with the PKK
and promises to revise the constitution to expand Kurdish cultural
rights and to broaden the definition of Turkish citizenship would help
Erdogan’s government secure the BDP’s allegiance. In effect, to build
the presidency he wants, Erdogan will need to strike a grand bargain
with the Kurds. However, this prospect worries many Turks, who believe
that a new constitution along these lines would concentrate too much
power in the hands of one man and open the way to greater
authoritarianism.
The final factor that has improved the prospects for peace is a
rethinking in AKP circles of Ocalan’s role in any attempt to bring the
PKK insurgency to a close. In November 2012, Ocalan helped end a
67-day hunger strike of more than 600 Kurds. His personal intervention
demonstrated his influence and the necessity of involving him directly
in any peace plan. It was thus not surprising when, a month after
Ocalan’s mediation, Erdogan announced the opening of exploratory talks
with Ocalan aimed at ending the PKK insurgency. On the Turkish side,
Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization and a
close confidant of Erdogan’s, is leading the discussions. He and
Ocalan have focused on developing a strategic road map for a peace
accord.
Of course, peace is still far from a done deal. Several issues could
derail an accord. For one, the question of amnesty could pose
difficulties. Many Kurdish groups — and Ocalan himself — insist that
PKK fighters must be granted amnesty as part of any
agreement. However, much of the Turkish population considers the PKK
fighters terrorists and strongly opposes letting them walk.
In addition, Ocalan might want peace and he might have great sway
within the Turkish PKK, but the organization is no longer his baby. It
has become a transnational movement with networks and operations
across the region. Not all of them are under his control. Even if
Ocalan can persuade large segments of the PKK to support a peace
agreement, some hardcore nationalist groups might still be unwilling
to lay down their arms. After all, many PKK commanders see no future
for themselves outside of the armed struggle.
Regional developments have also complicated the peace talks. In Syria,
the withdrawal of Syrian government forces from five Kurdish-dominated
towns along the Syrian-Turkish border in July 2012 created a political
vacuum that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) — which has close ties
to the PKK — rushed to fill. The speed and ease with which the PYD
was able to establish control raised Turkish suspicions that Assad
might have orchestrated the withdrawal to strengthen the PKK at the
expense of Turkey and the Sunni-dominated Syrian opposition. Now
Turkish officials worry that the PYD-held areas could become a base
for PKK attacks against Turkish territory and security forces. Turkey
has threatened to intervene militarily if such attacks take place,
raising the chance that any scuffle could quickly expand.
In Iran, as in Turkey, the government has faced a Kurdish
insurgency. The movement there is led by the Free Life Party of
Kurdistan (PJAK), an offshoot of the PKK. On occasion, Turkey and Iran
used to coordinate efforts and share intelligence to combat PKK and
PJAK attacks. However, the two countries’ relationship has grown
strained over Syria, leading to a sharp reduction in
cooperation. That, in turn, has weakened Turkey’s ability to deter PKK
attacks. Moreover, according to Turkish officials, Iran has started
clandestinely supporting the PKK. Iran has little interest in the PKK
insurgency coming to an end, since that would eliminate one of
Tehran’s main levers for putting pressure on Turkey.
F. STEPHEN LARRABEE holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security
at the RAND Corporation.