Author: Kalantarian Kevo

Hellenic News of America
Feb 23 2005

ISTANBUL GREEKS SEEK JUSTICE IN LAND CLAIMS

Turkey is trying to bring its laws on minorities in tune with those
of the EU, but ethnic Greeks living in the capital say they are
victimized through unfair land expropriations.

By George Gilson – Athens News

VARTHOLOMEOS, ecumenical patriarch and archbishop of Constantinople,
is wont to call the 2,000-strong Greek community of Istanbul a “drop
in the ocean”.

Shrunken and scarred by the violent vicissitudes of Greek-Turkish
relations over the decades, that drop is now in danger of
evaporating. Despite reforms for the protection of minorities
intended to bring Turkey in line with European Union law, the leaders
of Istanbul’s Greek community are struggling for basic rights.

That includes establishing the legal grounds to claim back around 400
pieces of prime Istanbul real estate gradually confiscated by the
Turkish state since 1974. “The confiscated property was certainly
worth billions of dollars. We are talking about entire apartment
buildings and tracts of city land that produced significant
revenues,” says Vasslis Kalamaris, an attorney for the patriarchate.

Based on a 1974 supreme court decision, the Turkish state refused to
recognize titles to Greek minority properties purchased or acquired
by donation after 1936, when Turkey conducted a mandatory
registration of minority properties. “Under the Turkish legal
framework, the state would come knocking at our door and say that you
had no right to possess this land you acquired in 1944, 1959 and so
forth, because it was not registered in the list you submitted in
1936,” Kalamaris told the Athens News.

New property law

In an effort to streamline its minority rights laws with those of the
EU, which it hopes to join, Turkey enacted a law last August. “The
new law passed in August said that we can acquire new property. The
reform was a worthless gift. None of our communities or foundations
want new property. All we want is to get back what was unjustly taken
away from us,” Kalamaris underlined.

The cumbersome requirements of the law also suggest that Turkey’s
reforms do not always achieve their goal. The law required cabinet
approval for the purchase or sale of property by communities. The
August law stated: “Community foundations, regardless of whether or
not they have a charter or foundation, can acquire or dispose of real
property with the permission of the council of ministers.” A further
directive issued by the directorate of foundations in October,
reportedly on instructions from the office of then premier Bulent
Ecevit, threw even more bureaucratic red tape in the way of community
organizations seeking to acquire or sell property.

After the EU refused to open accession talks with Turkey last
December, the law was revised in January, doing away with the need to
obtain cabinet approval to buy or sell property belonging to minority
foundations. But it is still necessary to obtain approval of both the
local directorate of foundations and the headquarters in Ankara.

But the real issue for the Istanbul Greeks remains the return of
confiscated property. Although the new law passed in January does not
specifically establish a right to reclaim confiscated property,
Kalamaris believes it provides sufficient grounds to legally
challenge in the courts past judicial rulings by which valuable real
estate was confiscated. Moreover, those properties acquired by the
Greek minority after 1936 and not previously registered in the land
registry can now be legally registered with proof of ownership like
rental agreements or utility bills.

“The Greek Balouki Hospital suffered most from this situation. They
have had 136 pieces of valuable real estate confiscated by the
state,” Kalamaris said.

Another key property is a huge real estate parcel that once housed an
orphanage on the posh resort island of Prinkipos off Istanbul, and
was owned by the patriarchate. This land was also expropriated by the
state, which blocked an effort by the church to develop the prime
property as a hotel unit. The patriarchate’s case against the state
is still under review in the Turkish Council of State.

But the problem is not exclusive to the Greeks, as the Armenian
community has faced a similar predicament on a much smaller scale.
Diram Bakar, a lawyer for the community, told the Athens News that he
was successful in reversing a handful of expropriations through legal
challenges in court.

Over several weeks until the February 8 deadline for registering all
property, a small group of Istanbul Greeks worked for hours on end
compiling the full record of title to hundreds of pieces of property
owned by dozens of Greek community foundations. These were submitted
to both the land registry and the directorate of foundations in
compliance with the new law. The registered properties are the legacy
of a once vibrant community of wealthy merchants and businessmen
numbering over 150,000 just half a century ago.

No equality for Istanbul Greeks

Although they are Turkish citizens, the Greeks of Istanbul complain
that they do not enjoy equality in the eyes of the law. Greek
Orthodox foundations are placed under the category of “foreign
foundations”, even though the Greek minority is comprised of
native-born Turkish citizens whose ancestors have lived in the
country for centuries.

Article 37 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which still largely determines
the rights of Istanbul’s Greek minority, stipulates that no Turkish
domestic law can limit the treaty rights of the Greek community,
including that of self-administration. But the Turkish state
frequently finds formal pretexts to dissolve the governing boards of
Greek community foundations, opening the way for the judicial
expropriation of the property of minority communities.

The majority of Greek-owned property is still in Greek hands – some
$10 billion worth – but there are fears that the process of
expropriation will soon target these properties as well.

Greek foreign ministry spokesman Panos Beglitis told the Athens News
that the revised EU accession partnership for Turkey, due to be
submitted at the end of March, will set forth a clear obligation for
Ankara to respect the property rights of the Greek minority –
including the right to reclaim properties arbitrarily expropriated by
the state over the last three decades.

“The EU Commission’s evaluation report last October refers to
religious foundations and their rights. It stresses Turkey’s
shortcomings and requests a change in the legal framework to address
that. We underlined this problem leading up to Copenhagen and will do
so again for the revised accession partnership. This will certainly
be a condition Turkey must fulfill,” Beglitis said.

ARKA News Agency
Feb 22 2005

NA Speaker interferes in spheres outside his competence: RA Premier

Armenian President discuss with Armenian Transport and Communication
Minister issues of rehabilitation of roads

PACE resolution on Nagorno Karabakh also contains positive accents,
NKR Foreign Minister believes

Sergei Karaganov: Russia should pursue more active policy in
Transcaucasia, in particular, in Armenia

*********************************************************************

NA SPEAKER INTERFERES IN SPHERES OUTSIDE HIS COMPETENCE: RA PREMIER

YEREVAN, February 22. /ARKA/. Speaker of the RA National Assembly
Artur Baghdasaryan is interfering in spheres that are outside his
competence, RA Premier Andranik Margaryan stated in his interview to
the Armenian `Haykakan Zhamaknak’ newspaper. According to him, the
matter concerns the councils formed under the Speaker, which,
according to the NA Regulations, is not within the Speaker’s
competence. The RA Premier pointed out that the NA Speaker can deal
with existing problems through parliamentary committees, as well as
by means of the institution of hearings. I have instructed all the
executive power bodies not to answer the papers of the councils
formed by the Speaker of the National Assembly and not to take part
in their work,’ Margaryan said. He added that he `never interfere[s]
in the sphere of activities the law defines as that of the
legislative body and its leadership.’ P.T. -0–

*********************************************************************

ARMENIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSS WITH ARMENIAN TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION
MINISTER ISSUES OF REHABILITATION OF ROADS

YEREVAN, February 22. /ARKA/. Today Armenian President Robert
Kocharian discussed with Armenian Transport and Communication
Minister Andranik Manukyan the issues of rehabilitation of roads of
Armenia. As Armenian President Press Service Head told ARKA, during
the meeting the officials considered program of the WB on road
construction presented to financing of the WB and the US Millennium
Challenges as well as issues related to expected loan by the Japanese
Bank for Cooperation and Development. They also discussed the issues
concerning the construction of a new section of Kapan-Meghri highway
that will be the second road linking Iran with Armenia and will be
more advanced per a number of technical and economic parameters
compared to the existing road. Particularly if the existing road
allows performing cargo operations of auto vehicle with tonnage of 80
tons. The construction of the road for which AMD 6.6b was allocated
from the state budget will start in April 2005 and will be completed
next year. Armenian President instructed Minister to take under
control works for the construction of the new road, mentioning that
`it must meet quality standards and be put into operation according
to et schedule’. ($1 – AMD 472.57). T.M. -0-

*********************************************************************

PACE RESOLUTION ON NAGORNO KARABAKH ALSO CONTAINS POSITIVE ACCENTS,
NKR FOREIGN MINISTER BELIEVES

YEREVAN, February 22. /ARKA/. Resolution of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe on Nagorno Karabakh contains
positive accents as well as Nagorno Karabakh Foreign Minister Arman
Melikyan said. In his words, the positive thing is a new approach
contained in PACE’s call on the Azerbaijani authorities on the
beginning of negotiations with the NKR authorities. `This to some
extent confirms that our opposition is right when stating that format
of bilateral negotiations may be productive’, he said. Melikyan
stressed that the NKR side also must demonstrate the readiness to
participate in the negotiations and to discuss the approaches that
will secure peace in perspective.
Report on Nagorno Karabakh prepared by David Atkinson, representative
of PACE was heard in PACE on January 25, 2005. T.M. -0–

*********************************************************************

SERGEI KARAGANOV: RUSSIA SHOULD PURSUE MORE ACTIVE POLICY IN
TRANSCAUCASIA, IN PARTICULAR, IN ARMENIA

MOSCOW, February 22. /ARKA/. Russia should pursue more active policy
in Transcaucasia, in particular, in Armenia, as Sergei Karaganov,
President of the RF Foreign and Defence Policy Council, Deputy
Director of the Europe Institute told ARKA. `Russia, unfortunately,
hasn’t constituted its interests yet, so we pursue not enough active
policy not only in respect of Armenia but also in respect of many
Russian regions’, he said. According to the political scientist, some
projects, such as restoration of railway communication, will solve
many problems for Armenia, Georgia and finally for the stability of
Transcaucasia. A.H. -0–

Armenia’s economy advances, official says
By Vanessa Colón

The Fresno Bee
(Updated Saturday, February 19, 2005, 7:36 AM)

Armenia is on the move to a better economy, but more work needs to
be done, said the U.S. ambassador to Armenia.

Members of the Armenian community in Fresno took in the good news
Friday, but some of them wondered whether the United States could do
more to help the nation prosper.

John Evans, U.S. ambassador to the republic of Armenia, made an evening
stop at the Holy Trinity Armenian Apostolic Church. The U.S. Embassy
in Armenia and the offices of Armenian Technology Group Inc. in Fresno
coordinated his visit.

“The main problem is persistent poverty. … [but] the rate of poverty
is coming down,” Evans said.

“First of all, we are trying to bring a measure of security and
stability in that nation. Secondly, we are trying by every possible
means to build up the economy.” Many Armenians say they are thankful
for the economic assistance the United States gives to Armenia, but
some of them want more change. They say Armenia can’t prosper as much
because of an economic blockade from neighboring nations.

“The U.S. provides economic assistance to Armenia. … You do see
good economic development, but in the countryside you do see poverty,”
said Varoujan Der Simonian, executive director of the nonprofit group
Armenian Technology Group Inc. in Fresno.

“Overall, it’s in need of help,”

In fiscal 2004, an estimated $89.7 million was budgeted for assistance
programs in Armenia.

Der Simonian hopes the Bush administration doesn’t make cuts in
financial help to Armenia.

The nation, which borders Turkey, was part of the former Soviet
Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and a debilitating
economy, many fled to Russia and others emigrated to the United States
and Western Europe.

Part of the financial strain includes an economic blockade by
Azerbaijan and Turkey. The country was hit with an earthquake in 1988
that killed more than 25,000 people.

“The sooner the blockade is lifted, the better,” Der Simonian said.

Some Armenians say part of the economic difficulty includes the
Armenian diaspora.

More than one million of Armenia’s roughly 3 million residents left
the nation when it gained its independence in 1991. Many left their
nation between 1915 and 1923 when the Ottoman Turks executed 1.5
million Armenians. The modern republic of Turkey evolved from the
Ottoman Empire.

Several people at the church have taken trips to Armenia and have
seen the changes.

“It’s improved but has not improved as much as we wanted to,” said
Hygo Ohannessian, chairwoman of the Armenian National Committee of
Central California.

Ohannessian said: “It was one of the top-producing countries in the
Soviet Union during the Soviet era.”

The reporter can be reached at [email protected] or (559) 441-6313.

–Boundary_(ID_qlkQB/xeZytFBromt9EDeA)–

GIVING THE GIFT OF MUSIC
By Glenn Lovell

San Jose Mercury News
Feb 19 2005

Mercury News

Nahum Guzik leafed through a stack of e-mail printouts, looking for
the one about the Armenian baby and the 1989 earthquake.

“It’s tear-jerking story, but it’s true,” he said. “The hospital in
ruins . . . the baby frozen, dead. . . . But then, when they bring
her home, she begins to cry.”

Now, thanks to the 70-year-old Russian emigre — founder of Guzik
Technical Enterprises in Mountain View and possibly Silicon Valley’s
least-known arts benefactor — that earthquake survivor is studying
piano in Vienna. She is one of hundreds of young Russian and Armenian
musicians whose training and, in some cases, international tours
have been made possible by more than $500,000 in gifts from Guzik’s
foundation.

“No, I don’t meet all the winners,” said Guzik, a small, wiry man with
a deliciously droll sense of humor. “But that’s fine, I don’t need to
be remembered. I just give the scholarship winners a start. If they
are successful, if I draw them out of obscurity, I am grateful. My
job is done.”

Last year’s seven Guzik Foundation artists, ranging in age from 13 to
22, will perform Wednesday at the Herbst Theatre in San Francisco,
and Thursday and Friday at the Florence Gould Theater at the Palace
of the Legion of Honor. Wednesday’s and Friday’s programs also will
feature the Moscow Chamber Orchestra. Winners Alexandre Bouzlov,
a cellist, and Haik Kazazyan, a violinist, will then make their
Carnegie Hall debuts in a Feb. 28 concert underwritten (for $90,000)
by the foundation.

“Haik has just signed with a big-concert agency, and Alexandre is
on his way to a major concert career,” said Constantine Orbelian,
the music director of the Moscow Chamber Orchestra, who, with Guzik’s
pianist cousin Svetlana Gorzhevskaya, oversees the open auditions in
Moscow and St. Petersburg in Russia, and in Erevan, Armenia.

Gifts big and small

Since it was established in 2001, the foundation has awarded
scholarships to 350 young musicians. Recipients receive anywhere from
a $100-a-month stipend to study at local conservatories to a $50,000
career grant for major concerts. Next year, the foundation plans to
mount a music festival at the Louvre Museum in Paris.

“Why do I give money? Because I think it’s a good thing to do, and I
love music,” explained Guzak, who still puts in a 50-hour work week
at Guzik Technical Enterprises, which makes test equipment for the
hard-disc-drive industry, including Hitachi GST. The Mountain View
plant reflects Guzik’s notoriously spare lifestyle — bare walls,
concrete floors, discount furniture. “I’m a slob,” he apologized,
laughing. “But the walls are clean.”

Road to Bay Area

Guzik (“button” in Polish) was born in Odessa in Ukraine but during
World War II fled with his family to the Urals, then Moscow. In 1972,
he emigrated to Israel. Ten months later, he arrived in the Bay Area.
He founded Guzik Technical Enterprises in 1982 and, in the years
since, has donated millions to cancer and stem-cell research. In 1996,
he received the Ellis Island Medal of Honor for his philanthropic
endeavors. He is not married and has a grown daughter at college.

While he has yet to return to Russia or his native Ukraine — “I
have some bad memories, but mostly good ones” — he has many Russian
friends in the Bay Area and an affinity for Russian culture. His
favorite composer: Dmitri Shostakovich.

“I know Russia, and I know the country is not in great economical
shape, so young talent is neglected, schools in disrepair,” he said.
“Russia used to produce a lot of great musicians, and doesn’t now.
So I try to participate to help.”

`I was never musical’

Asked whether Guzik’s largess stems from some unrealized childhood
dream to play great music, Orbelian said his boss is a brilliant
inventor-businessman with “an internal need for music.”

“Sure, my mother wanted me to play piano — I’m a Jewish kid,” Guzik
said, laughing. “I escaped it. I never was musical.”

Which is why he defers to Orbelian and cousin Gorzhevskaya’s
scholarship choices.

“I like the music: It fills up the vacuum emotionally. But I cannot
tell what’s good or bad, or judge their musical abilities. At same
time I am not bad judge of human qualities. You cannot run a small
company without that.”

Though he has no plans to retire, and appears healthy enough, Guzik
describes himself as a workaholic diabetic who started smoking again
10 years ago. “When I croak,” he said matter-of-factly, “whatever
I own will go to the foundation. What people will do with it, God
knows. But I hope they will follow what I started.”

EFFECTS OF TRANSITION IN EDUCATION SECTOR ADDRESSED BY NEW UNDP PROJECT

ArmenPress
Feb 18 2005

YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 18, ARMENPRESS: Armenian Ministry of Education
and Science and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
launched today the Strengthening Policy Development Capacities of the
Ministry of Education and Science project. Minister Sergo Yeritsyan
and UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative Lise
Grande signed a Memorandum marking the official start of the project.

A UNDP press release said the first component of the project will
include a survey and analysis of the country’s labor market and
forecasts of labor requirements through 2015. Under the second
component, a Concept Paper will be developed and policy
recommendations made on reforming state management of science. The
recommendations will aim at making the sector sustainable and
efficient and responsive to the Armenian economy. The recommendations
will also aim at ensuring that Armenian science remains highly
competitive in the world and at the cutting edge of new technologies.

This innovative project supports other reforms in the education
sector aimed at addressing the impact of the transition and ensuring
links between employers and the country’s education and training
system. Recognizing that standards have declined and that the
excessive supply of graduates has contributed to unemployment, acted
as a break on wage rates and led to continuing brain drain, the
Government and international organizations are working together to
reform the sector. Through UNDP’s project, efforts will be made to
ensure that instruction is targeted at the labor market and that
vacancies are filled by candidates with practical knowledge and
skills.
Ms. Grande noted in her speech: “This project is a concrete
indication of UNDP’s commitment toward helping Armenia to build an
open, modern and knowledge-based economy that is able to compete
globally and attract investments. Education and science are critical
sectors not only for the economy, but also for the social and
cultural development of any country. And for a country like Armenia,
with highly valuable human capital, sustaining positive traditions is
the key to real success.”
The half-year project is co-financed by the Government of Armenia
and UNDP.

KASPRZYK TO DRAW REPORT ON SITUATION AT KARABAKH AND AZERI ARMED FORCES CONTACT LINE

PanArmenian News
Feb 17 2005

17.02.2005 13:55

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have addressed the
OSCE Chairman-in-Office a request for the structure special mission
to draw a report on the situation at the contact line between the
armed forces of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan. It was reported by
the Office of Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
Andrzej Kasprzyk in Tbilisi. As reported by the source, the Co-Chairs
are seriously concerned over the periodical breaks of the cease-fire
regime at the front line lately. “The situation is clear and simple:
the cease-fire agreement is being broken and this should be cut
short. The tension at the front causes the concern of the countries
co-chairing the Minsk Group. This also prejudices the OSCE mediation
activities,” A. Kasprzyk office reported.

Agence France Presse
9 février 2005 mercredi 12:29 PM GMT

Le communiqué du Conseil des ministres du 9 février

Convention entre la France et l’Arménie en matière fiscale

La ministre déléguée aux affaires européennes a présenté un projet de
loi autorisant l’approbation de l’avenant sous forme d’échange de
lettres modifiant la convention entre le Gouvernement de la
République française et le Gouvernement de la République d’Arménie en
vue d’éviter les doubles impositions et de prévenir l’évasion et la
fraude fiscales en matière d’impôts sur le revenu et sur la fortune.

La France et l’Arménie sont liées par la convention fiscale du 9
décembre 1997, qui est entrée en vigueur le 1er mai 2001.

L’article 23 de cette convention relatif à l’élimination des doubles
impositions, qui comportait une erreur matérielle, est modifié par
cet avenant. Le nouvel article 23 est désormais conforme à l’objectif
d’élimination des doubles impositions en matière d’intérêts et de
redevances voulu à l’origine par les deux États parties.

–Boundary_(ID_vSvCYrE0HsiDXkYzeSImFw)–

EU plans special envoy to help end Moldova strife
By Sebastian Alison

BRUSSELS, Feb 8 (Reuters) – The European Union plans to appoint a
special envoy to Moldova to help end a frozen conflict in the breakaway
Dnestr region as EU interest in the tiny ex-Soviet state picks up,
diplomats said on Tuesday.

The move signals Brussels’ desire to bring about an end to the disputed
Russian military presence in Europe’s poorest country before Moldova’s
neighbour Romania joins the EU in 2007.

“There is no doubt that there is an increase in interest and attention
in Moldova,” Cristina Gallach, spokeswoman for EU foreign policy
chief Javier Solana, told Reuters. “The role of the European Union
can only be useful.”

The Dnestr region — a mainly Russian-speaking sliver of land between
the Dnestr river and Ukraine which calls itself the “Pridnestrovian
Moldavian Republic” — broke away from Moldova, which has a
Romanian-speaking majority, in 1990 as the Soviet Union was collapsing.

The two sides fought a war in 1992. Russian troops intervened to help
end the fighting and have remained there since to uphold the truce,
despite a pledge to withdraw them.

EU diplomats say political agreement has been reached to appoint an EU
Special Representative and a formal announcement is expected within
a few days. The envoy could take up the post soon after Moldovan
parliamentary elections on March 6.

The EU has no formal role so far in the Dnestr conflict, which is
under mediation by Russia, Ukraine, the Organisation for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, the Moldovan government and the Dnestr
leadership.

The naming of an envoy comes as Moldova prepares to open a separate
mission to the EU for the first time. The EU’s executive Commission
will also open a permanent mission in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau,
later this year.

INCREASED EU DIPLOMACY

Following the bloc’s eastward expansion last May, when 10 mainly
ex-communist countries in central and eastern Europe joined, the EU
has stepped up diplomatic activities in several former Soviet states
which are now neighbours.

Moscow views the policy with suspicion, seeing the region — Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova and the Caucasus republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Georgia — as its “near abroad.” The EU says they are the “common
neighbourhood” of Brussels and Moscow.

Diplomatic tensions came to the fore last year when the EU mediated
in a dispute over the Ukrainian presidential election which led the
Supreme Court to overturn the victory of the Moscow-backed candidate,
Viktor Yanukovich, for vote-rigging.

Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko won a re-run in December after
lengthy mediation by Solana and the presidents of EU states Poland
and Lithuania. Yushchenko has already said he intends to move Kiev
towards EU membership.

Diplomats said Yushchenko could be willing to close Ukraine’s border
with the breakaway Dnestr region to put pressure on the Russians to
reach a settlement.

An EU diplomat said closer ties with Chisinau were a priority because
Moldova would have an EU frontier from 2007. By one estimate, 600,000
Moldovans hold Romanian passports, which will give them EU citizenship
when Bucharest joins, he said.

Moldova’s communist President Vladimir Voronin was elected in 2001
vowing to take Chisinau closer to Russia. But he changed direction
and is steering the country ever closer to the EU.

02/08/05 10:48 ET

Interview on Yerkir’s web site

Yerkir/arm
February 04, 2005

The Yerkir online has initiated a series of interviews with
politicians, statesmen and public figures. You can address your
questions to them by visiting

Between January 24 and 31, questions were addressed to Kiro Manoyan,
the director of the ARF Bureau’s Central Hai Dat Office. Below is an
excerpt of that interview. The full interview will be posted on the
site on February 7.

Sargis.- What do you think Turkey’s place is in the new US plan of
the Greater Middle East, and is it possible that the US would take
steps for an Armenian-Turkish reconciliation or at least a dialogue?

Kiro Manoyan.- First it should be noted that the US plan of the Greater
Middle East is still in the stage of elaboration, and the initial
plans and perceptions could be changed depending on what the real
players would do. However, it is apparent that Turkey’s role will be
changed according to the American understanding of the Greater Middle
East. In the military aspect, due to its negative stance in the Iraq
issue, Turkey has already become less important than it was before the
Iraq war, though even today, the Americans are trying to use Turkey’s
territory and military infrastructure for their “war on terror.”

Regardless of the American plan for the Greater Middle East, the United
Sates have a goal of normalizing the relations between Armenia and
Turkey due to other concerns, one of them being the reduction of the
Russian influence in the South Caucasus. If Turkey is no more seen
as a threat to Armenia, the American strategists say there will be
less need for the Russian troops in Armenia. Due to this and other
reasons, the US is trying to normalize the relations between Armenia
and Turkey, seeing the opening of the border as a first step.

Shamil Rashidov, Istanbul. Given that Armenia is not going to drop
the Armenian Genocide claim and Turkey is not going to recognize it,
is it possible to find some solution in the middle to satisfy both
sides. If yes, what in your opinion are the solutions and when can
they be reached?

K.M. – Armenia is not going to and cannot drop the â~@~Genocide
claim,â~@~] because Turkey closed the border and refused to
establish diplomatic relations with Armenia when it was ruled by an
administration which did insist on the Armenian Genocide issue in
the international arena and especially before Turkey.

This means that Turkey has proved that it expects from Armenia to
completely forget its history because Turkey is not satisfied by
merely not raising the issue in the international arena: however, no
Armenian administration that considers itself to be really Armenian,
will do that.

The truth has no middle way; it is not a subject for a bargain. A
middle way can be only considered in terms of the future plans and
only after the truth has been admitted. Turkey cannot avoid its history
forever, it will recognize the Armenian Genocide sooner or later.

Aram. – Taking into account that the official Turkish history denies
the Armenian Genocide, do you think a dialogue with historians denying
the Genocide is possible?

K.M. – A so-called dialogue between the Armenian and Turkish historians
is largely dangerous because it would mean the disagreement over the
Armenian Genocide is only between the historians.

A great number of non-Armenian historians and genocide experts admit
that the Armenian Genocide is the first genocide of the 20th century.

Any dialogue between historians â~@~S even with those who admit
the fact of the Genocide â~@~S would reduce the issue to an
Armenian-Turkish dispute over history.

–Boundary_(ID_98m1vrqU/LWfsaO30/gmDw)–

Moscow alienating its near abroad
By Molly Corso

Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Feb 7 2005

Russia has seen its influence in the Caucasus – and the rest of the
former Soviet Union – wane significantly since the November 2003 Rose
Revolution in Georgia. Although economics play a part in the drive
to become closer to the United States and the European Union, Moscow
largely blames post-revolution Georgia for the Orange Revolution in
the Ukraine and its perceived loss of influence there.

While Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko were in Strasburg for a Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin
made no secret of meeting separatist leaders in Moscow, including
the newly elected president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, and the
defeated Ukrainian presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych. Russian
policies have become increasingly anti-Georgian since Saakashvili
came to power, which regional experts feel is Moscow’s response to
Saakashvili’s decidedly Western bent. But its decision to punish
Georgia and other opposition leaders in the former republics may be
working against long-term Russian interests.

Abkhazia

The first major blow to Russia’s influence in its own background
was not the election in the Ukraine but the October elections in
Abkhazia. Abkhazia is officially a part of Georgia, but gained de facto
independence from Tbilisi after Georgia lost control of the republic
following a war in the mid 1990s, a fact that is largely credited to
Russian interference. The ruling regime in Abkhazia is supported by
Russia. Russian peacekeepers monitor its borders with Georgia, the
Russian ruble is the local currency and any economic development is
limited to Russian investors. Moscow also pays Abkhaz pensions and
has widely issued Russian passports throughout the Abkhaz population.

Candidate Raul Khajimba actively campaigned on a pro-Russian platform,
promising an increase in investments from Russia and stronger
relations with Moscow. Sergei Bagapsh, known in the Russian media
as the opposition candidate, also pledged to foster greater ties
with Russia. Neither candidate spoke favorably of Georgia or the
possibility of improving Abkhaz-Georgian relations. Tbilisi distanced
itself from the whole election; only Russia recognizes Abkhazian
independence and, therefore, the election. The Russian media were
the only source of international coverage. Despite support from the
Kremlin and other Russian politicians, Khajimba officially lost the
election on October 3, an event that nearly resulted in civil war
when he refused to accept the Central Election Committees final count
in favor of Bagapsh. Events came to a head in December, when Bagapsh
refused to give up plans for his inauguration.

In response to the unexpected turmoil in a republic fully dependent
on Russian support, Russia closed its borders and cut off trade
with Abkhazia, in effect squashing the main source of income for
most Abkhaz, the citrus trade. While that show of strength helped
convince Bagapsh to bow to Russian pressures, it also underscored
what analysts say caused his victory in the first place. The only real
difference between the two candidates was Bagapsh’s calls for a truly
independent Abkhazia, recognized by the international community. In its
current state, both Tbilisi and Sukhumi refuse to have relations and
Georgia refuses to allow any trade to Abkhazia to cross its borders,
even to the extent that Saakashvili ordered Turkish boats heading to
Abkhazia bombed over the summer. That limits Sukhumi to relations with
Moscow. While it is unlikely that any country in the international
community will recognize Abkhazian independence, Bagapsh’s strong
stance in that direction was perceived as a threat to the current
status quo.

Thanks to the immediate embargo on Abkhazian goods, Moscow was able
to convenience Bagapsh to accept a compromise between the two former
rivals. Days before the planned inauguration, Bagapsh agreed to a
revote and ran with Khajimba as his vice presidential candidate.
Under the current agreement, Khajimba wields an unusually large
amount of power, including a reported 40%of the state budget. Since
his election on January 12, Bagapsh has stepped up rhetoric against
Georgia and made open overtures to strengthen Abkhaz-Russian ties.
Moscow was able to reel the wayside republic back in, but it took a
last ditch show of strength to do it.

The Orange Revolution

Despite a much stronger Russian effort during the Ukrainian election
in November, the Russian-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych could
not defeat opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. Analysts have debated
on what Yushchenko’s victory will really mean for Ukrainian-Russian
relations, but regardless of Yushchenko’s Western-looking policies,
Ukraine remains a major Russian trading partner. Historically,
religiously and ethnically Russia and Ukraine have close ties. The
new president’s first international trip was to Moscow, albeit quickly
followed by the address at Strasburg.

The real question remains what this growing trend of peaceful
uprisings will mean for the remaining Russian-supported presidents
in other former republics. However insulting Yushchenko’s victory
is for Moscow, in the long run it will only truly adversely affect
Russian-Ukrainian affairs if Putin decides to punish Yushchenko like he
is currently castigating Georgian president Saakashvili. The Ukrainian
vote for Yushchenko was more a vote against rampant corruption and the
questionable election than a vote against Russia. Yushchenko has gone
out of his way to pacify Russians in the eastern part of the country,
even defending the role of the Russian language in Ukraine. His drive
toward the West is less a statement of anti-Russian sentiment than
as an accepted desire to improve conditions in his country. But that
can change if Russia is not willing to actively work with Yushchenko.

Yushchenko has roughly a year to prove to his divided country that
Ukraine will benefit from better relations with Western states. If
Russia tries to openly sabotage his effects – like it is in Abkhazia
and Georgia – Putin risks a much more serious backlash during the
upcoming parliamentary elections. By supporting Yushchenko, Russia
can help strengthen Ukraine, which will result in a deeper alliance
between the two countries and increase stability in the region. Any
effort by Moscow to further antagonize the country, especially the
western half, could have the opposite effect.

New ethnic discord will only weaken Russia’s chance to increase
its influence in the region as both current leaders and opposition
forces throughout the former Soviet Union are watching Ukrainian
developments closely. If it becomes apparent that Moscow will not
tolerate any action perceived to weaken its influence in the region,
economic and military aid from the West will seem more desirable.
While existing leaders might welcome Russia’s brand of friendship,
the opposition will work more strongly to free their respective
countries from Moscow’s influence if it becomes evident Russia sees
them not as sovereign states but as internal problems.

Special relationship with Georgia

Moscow’s continued interference with ethnic problems within Georgia
has not strengthened its role in the Caucasus. Even before the Rose
Revolution, Russia’s efforts to destabilize the region and bring
it into submission with military force backfired. In 2002, Moscow
accused Tbilisi of harboring terrorists in the lawless Pankisi Gorge
that borders Chechnya. Instead of resulting in an increase of Russian
military personnel to Georgia, the accusations led to stronger ties
between Georgia and the US and the US-led “train and equip” program
for the Georgian army. Since Saakashvili came to power, Georgia has
made every effort to strengthen ties with the US and Europe.

Russia’s continued support for separatist leaders in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia is meant to deter stability – and therefore foreign investment
– in Georgia. However, in reality Russia’s obvious interference
has helped the Georgian leadership turn to the West for support and
resolution. During his speech in Strasburg, Saakashvili clearly stated
that Russia is not capable of leading Georgia to a peaceful resolution
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Venetian Commission’s decision to
actively participate in the development of a peace settlement even
further decreases Russia’s influence in its own near abroad.

Moscow’s newest tactic – vetoing the continuation of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border patrol on the
Chechen, Ingushetia and Dagestani borders – has been more successful.
Under its current policy, Russia will guarantee no international
observers will be monitoring the borders by late spring. When the
snow melts, Chechen rebels will have easy passage into Georgia and –
according to Russia – Moscow will have ample cause to bomb the Pankisi
Gorge, or force Georgia into accepting more Russian peacekeepers inside
the Georgian border. Those troops would be in addition to the soldiers
already in place along the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
as well as the two Russian army bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.

But this could also backfire. Saakashvili and his administration
have actively been searching for willing replacements to the OSCE
monitoring group and the EU has tentatively expressed interest. While
the EU’s monitors are far from certain at this point, any move to
place independent international monitors would work against Russia.
Under the OSCE, Russia had a say and a role in the monitoring. If it
becomes the duty of the EU – or a mixture of observers from various
countries – Moscow’s say would be diminished and its claims that the
Georgian government is not strong enough to protect its own borders
would be disproved.

Tbilisi and its allies are also becoming more adamant about the
remaining two Russian army bases in Georgia. In January, Saakashvili
attacked the role of Russian peacekeepers inside Georgian territory.
Georgia has proposed creating joint anti-terrorist centers with
Russia on the current army bases. So far Russia has shown no real
interest, but if it continues alienating itself from the international
community with coercive tactics, Georgia will gain more support from
the international community and could garner the necessary support
to force Russian troops out of the country all together.

Problems in Armenia

Another potential defeat for Russian influence is waiting in Armenia.
In the past, Armenia has been a bastion of Russian support in
the Caucasus. Russia has long supported the country militarily
and economically – for example, Armenia receives all of its gas
from Russia. While only an estimated 20% of Armenia’s exports are
purchased in Russia, a reported 2 million Armenians live there and
their families at home depend on the financial support they send.

Russia supported Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan and still stands firmly behind Yerevan during peace talks
about the contested territories. During the civil unrest in Georgia
leading up to the Rose Revolution in 2003, both Russia and Armenia
made public statements about their mutually strong and beneficial
relationship. Russia strengthened its already strong military presence
in Armenia, increased arms sales and even moved some soldiers from
bases in Georgia to Armenia during the protests in Tbilisi.

Nevertheless, Armenia’s support for Russian influence is not as strong
as it was a year ago. While the opposition was emboldened due to the
success of the Rose Revolution, another important negative development
for Russia came in September 2004, following the terrorist attacks
at Beslan. When Russia closed its borders with Georgia following
the attack, hundreds of Armenian trucks and buses were stranded for
a month, unable to go to either Russia or back to Armenia. While
there are no concrete figures for how much Armenian businesses
lost during that month, Armenians felt slighted by their ally and
insulted at Russia’s reaction to punish them along with the rest of
the Caucasus. That added to dissatisfaction with Russia’s continued
support of President Robert Kocharian, whose victory in 2003 is widely
disputed by opposition parties and the public.

Russian diplomats were slow to react to the situation, and statements
from Moscow largely consisted in recommending different routes
into Russia. The US, however, was not slow to act. Since the Rose
Revolution, Washington has been paying more attention to Armenia.
Sensing a weakness in Russian-Armenian relations over the past year,
America has picked up the pace. A new consulate is planned for Yerevan
which reportedly will be the biggest in the region. In addition,
American-driven aid projects have been on the rise.

A third party could further weaken Russian influence in Armenia.
Yerevan and Iran have held intense talks about a proposed gas
pipeline. While there are no investors yet, the pipeline has the
potential to free Armenia from its current state of dependence on
Russian gas.

Conclusion

Due to shortsighted policies, Russia has already lost considerable
influence in Georgia. Moscow’s erroneous politics in Abkhazia and
Ukraine resulted in embarrassment and more strained relationships
within Russia’s sphere of influence. If Putin does not reverse this
trend, Russia could lose support during the next Armenian elections
and further encourage the currently weak opposition parties in
Central Asia. Although opposition presidents are well aware of the
importance of good relations with Putin, political games force them
to increasingly turn to Europe and the US for aid and support in an
effort to balance more evenly between Russia and the West. If Moscow
does not start realizing that coercive tactics in its near abroad are
causing a loss of support from these states, it will continue to see
its interests in the region weaken.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an
analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All
comments should be directed to [email protected]