THE US-IRAN-ISRAEL STAND-OFF: NO CONFLICT IN SIGHT; BUT FOR THE US, NO SUCCESS FOR EMBARGOES; NO ABILITY TO CONSTRAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis
January 25, 2012 Wednesday
The Real War is Between Iran and Turkey
Analysis. By Gregory R. Copley, Editor, GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the options for US or
Israeli military attacks on Iran are limited to the point that any
such options would produce profoundly counter-productive results.
Equally, it is becoming apparent that Irans own military options,
either to unilaterally close the Strait of Hormuz linking the Persian
Gulf with the Arabian Sea or to strategically undertake a first-strike
attack against Israel, would be equally profoundly counter-productive
for Iran.
At the same time, there is no viable mechanism for any effective
economic embargo against Iran by the US and Western states; and there
is no real way in which the US and its allies can stop the progress of
Iran toward acquiring indigenous nuclear weapons production capability.
It is also apparent that those in the West calling for war against Iran
” to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons ” have no strategic
understanding of what this would entail, nor do they comprehend the
fundamental mathematics involved in achieving such an objective. This
applies equally to the media, the politicians, and even the military
pundits in the US. It is as though they have forgotten the principles
and calculations of strategic warfare which the great thinkers of the
Cold War, coming from a World War II experience, grasped absolutely.
Moreover, there is no strategic understanding of what a nuclear Iran
actually means. Does possession of a few nuclear weapons by Iran
mean that it could prevail in a total conflict, even with Israel? Let
alone the West as a whole. Possession of nuclear weapons has proven,
for more than six decades, to be an effective deterrent to potential
attackers. Nuclear weapons have never prevailed as the decisive
weapon in an actual conflict, not even when the US used two of
them against two Japanese cities in 1945. World War II was already
decided by the time Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed; the nuclear
weapons merely helped determine that there would be fewer Allied and
Japanese casualties than if the war had continued to its conventional
conclusion.
Then, as now, nuclear weapons are more often (and often more meaningful
as) symbolic elements of power than power themselves.
There are several facts to consider in the current childish hysteria
about a possible Iran-US-Israeli conflict:
Iran already has a number of imported nuclear weapons, acquired since
1991. The US Government knows this, but has ” as it did in the case
of DPRK (North Korean) nuclear weapons ” forbidden open acknowledgement
of the fact, or even wide discussion of it within secure groups. The
US Government said repeatedly that it would not allow the DPRK or
Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and yet it has proven powerless to
prevent the acquisition. The foolishness was for Western leaders to
paint themselves into a position where they could only be proven
powerless. The US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) came as
close as any US official, in 2009, when he admitted that Iran could
have acquired nuclear weapons from foreign sources. GIS/Defense
& Foreign Affairs has seen absolutely convincing evidence, since
1991, that these weapons were acquired by Iran. They are, however,
not militarily meaningful, other than for psychological purposes,
and particularly including deterrence of invasion.
The US and its allies lack the economic and military resources to
sustain a meaningful conflict against Iran, just as Iran lacks the
resources to sustain a war outside its own boundaries. It is possible
for US forces to inflict one, or a few, sharp military strikes at some
of Irans infrastructure, but these would merely reinforce popular
support for the clerics, just as Iraqs attacks on Iran saved the
Iranian clerics from political collapse so soon after the 1979 start
of the clerical era. Iranians rally around their political leaders
in the face of foreign attack. Significantly, punitive US strikes
at Iran would (a) not significantly inhibit Irans strategic weapons
or its national command mechanism, which are mobile and hardened;
and (b) would force Iran to respond, either immediately or after
due consideration. Bear in mind that the loss of Pan Am PA103 over
Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, was a patiently considered response
to the shooting down of an Iran Air Airbus airliner (Iran Air flight
655) over the Persian Gulf by the USS Vincennes on July 3, 1988,
dragging not only Libya into strategic consequences which plagued
it until the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in 2011,
but which also sees ongoing US-Iranian mutual antagonism almost a
quarter-century later. All military planners know that the US and NATO
lack the resources and will to sustain a major military engagement
against Iran. The Iranian leadership also understands this, but
recognizes the dangers inherent in an escalation of public rhetoric,
such as is now occurring.
Israel could suffer significant damage if Iran chose to inflict it,
but Iran could suffer even more from an Israeli retaliation. But
in fact many in Israel, and some in Iran, recognize the 2,700 years
of mutual strategic dependence between Israel and Iran. This is now
becoming interesting. Irans growing, and geo-strategically critical,
competition with Turkey comes at a time when Turkey ” far from being a
modern, secular state with common interests with Israel in the Eastern
Mediterranean ” has begun to revert to Ottoman pretensions of rightful
hegemony over the Levant. It was the destruction of the Ottoman hold on
the Levant in 1917-18 which enabled, very specifically, the creation
of the modern State of Israel. Iran, despite enormous pressure from
Russia to maintain viable relations with Turkey to enable expanded
Russian control over oil and gas trade into Europe from Central Asia
and the Northern Tier, cannot tolerate an expanded, neo-Ottoman and
a pan-Turkish (although not truly pan-Turkic) expansionism from
Ankara. Classical geopolitics are again at play, and the Iranian
clerics ” which depend on religious authority for legitimacy at
home and prestige abroad ” are now being forced to recognize the
historical geographic interests of Iran (perhaps including Israeli
support for maintaining a non-Ottoman, non-Sunni domination of Syria)
as perhaps being more important than the rhetorical use of Israel as
a rallying call.
The US Obama White House remains committed to Turkey, despite the
reality that Turkey has long since departed the Western Alliance
(and any pretensions at membership in the European Union). Indeed,
Turkey has explicitly posed a threat to US and EU interests in the
Eastern Mediterranean, but the Obama White House (and, indeed, the
UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office) seems oblivious to this, clinging
to a vision of Turkey and its context which was created around the
time of the Crimean War of 1853-56. There is a growing recognition in
Europe and the US, however (including by US Republican Presidential
candidate Rick Perry), that the only strategically positive aspect
of Turkey from the US standpoint is that it has, under its present
leadership, so profoundly betrayed its major (and very recent,
since 2008) strategic patron, Russia. What cannot be forgotten is
that some seven- to 11-million Turks ” out of a population of more
than 75-million ” are Shia, and very much under the influence of the
Iranian-controlled Grand Ayatollahs . There is a very large population
of Kurds in Turkey, consistently under-reported as to size, but at
least 14-million in number. There is also a substantial population
of Alawites in Turkey, most of whom owe at least nominal allegiance
to Shiism. As well, a population of Armenians still exists in Turkey.
Only some 14 percent of Turkeys population has Turkic blood. This
makes Turkey extremely vulnerable, and also at a time of great internal
schisms, a weakened military, a weakened economy, and a Prime Minister
who was, by November 2011, reportedly seriously ill from Rectosigmoid
cancer, and had apparently undergone treatment at Istanbul hospital
and then at Hacettepe Hospital in Ankara. Even during his illness,
Pres. Abdullah G l had, by December 18, 2011, held a meeting with the
military command to discuss the prospect of a war against both Syria
and Iran. Within all of this fragile matrix, the prospect exists for
Turkey to face real existential challenges in the coming year and
years. A question which faces Europe, the US, and Israel is whether
a stable and prosperous Iran could be a more important Western entr e
into Central Asia ” as it promised to be under the late Shah of Iran
” than a troublesome and ambitious Turkey?
Does Iran Need the Israeli Threat Any More? The Iranian Government
escalated its hostility toward Israel in 2002 for very pragmatic
reasons. It saw the US-led Coalition invasion of Iraq as a move
which had the potential to seriously isolate Iran geographically and
geopolitically. It attempted to outflank this move by broadening
the scope of the conflict and making Israel ” easily painted as the
nemesis of the Arab/Muslim world ” the problem. This move substantially
escalated the clerics already hostile attitudes toward Israel, which
differed dramatically from the traditional Persian (and pre-Islamic
origin) friendship and strategic alliance with Israel, which had
been strong until the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Today, Israel
is a threat of significantly lower magnitude as far as the clerics
are concerned, but it is not immediately possible for the clerics to
overturn their anti-Israeli rhetoric at short notice. But the prospect
exists for Iran and Israel to rebuild their mutuality of interests.
Can Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz? Theoretically, Iran could close
the Strait of Hormuz and shut down a significant oil and gas shipping
choke-point, but it would be a self-destructive act. More likely is
the fact that the threat of Iranian attacks on tanker traffic ” or the
threat of military conflict which would impact tanker traffic ” would
significantly impact shipping insurance rates in a fashion similar
to the Libyan act of dropping three floating sea mines in the Red Sea
from the minelayer Ghat in 1984. The escalation in insurance rates was
sufficient to cause tanker traffic to divert from the Red Sea-Suez sea
lane, and transit around the Cape of Good Hope, a substantially more
expensive option. The US and Iranian rhetoric on the subject is what
is most damaging. A US military spokesman noted recently: The naval
forces of the United States stand ready to oppose any action that is
aimed at the free passage of ships through the straits. An Iranian
military spokesman then said in reply: America is not in a position
to oppose the decision of Iran in this matter Iran does not need
permission to take whatever steps is necessary to defend itself.
And, indeed, although the US had by January 24, 2012, reportedly had
three carrier battle groups in or ready to deploy to the Persian Gulf
or the broader region as a show of force on the matter, the reality
is that these capital ships are extremely vulnerable, and the Iranian
Pasdaran and naval forces have, in recent years, ensured that the US is
aware of the ships vulnerability. The US has no ironclad protection
against either Irans Kilo -class (Project 877 EKM) submarines or
Iranian supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. A US carrier-launched
strike at Iranian targets would probably invoke an anti-ship response,
and yet neither the US nor Iran have viable follow-on capabilities to
follow such politically irreversible actions. The real concern is that
tactically-minded operational officers (on either side) could initiate
an action which has consequences which take both parties into uncharted
territory, much as the staggeringly inadvisable rules of engagement
” apparently drafted by a US Marine Corps colonel lawyer with no
understanding of the contextual situation ” caused the USS Vincennes
to shoot down the Iran Air Airbus A300. Western analysts talk about
such a confrontation occurring imminently, but the reality is that
the new embargoes against Iran do not come into effect for months,
and they are more rhetoric than substance (especially given Irans
options to circumvent them with the help of Russia and the Peoples
Republic of China).
Who Promotes Military Action Against Iran? The main, discreet
proponents of military containment or engagement against Iran are Saudi
Arabia and Turkey, both of which desire a reduction in Irans growing
regional dominance, which severely threatens their own influence and
security. Indeed, Iran has been extremely active in working against
the sovereignty and unity of Saudi Arabia, promoting the existence of
an Islamic Republic of Eastern Arabia, a Shiite region carved out of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And Iran is all that stands between
Ankara and its goal of re-asserting influence over Syria (and Turkey
severely threatens Irans historical links to the Mediterranean through
Syria). Little wonder, then, that Greece ” which has legitimate fears,
along with Cyprus, of Turkish territorial claims in the gean Sea ”
spoke out against European Union moves to impose an embargo on Iran,
even though this action came at a time when Greece was courting EU
indulgence in its debt negotiations.
DPRKs R ‘le if Iran-US Confrontation Escalates: Any significant
expansion of the US/Western confrontation with Iran will lead to the
appearance of a significant outbreak of strategic concern centered
around North Korea (DPRK). This has been the pattern since the early
1980s, as a result of a strategic agreement between then-Iranian
leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and then-DPRK leader Kim Il-Song.
Each state undertakes to provide a major strategic distraction, to
divide US attention, if the other faces a significant threat from the
US. Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, in a report entitled
DPRK Upcoming Tests Linked to Iranian Interests and Japanese Changes
on September 5, 2006, noted this pattern ” as have other Defense &
Foreign Affairs reports. This report and an earlier one, on August 25,
2006, noted: … it should be expected, given past experience, that
a rise in DPRK activity, possibly built around a new round of missile
tests involving the TaepoDong-2 missiles now in place on fixed launch
systems, should also serve as an indicator of impending major Iranian
action. The DPRK and Iran have a mutual pact to provide diversionary
operations to each other in times of operational threat. The September
5, 2006, report noted: the DPRK has on a number of occasions provided
strategic diversion for Irans clerical leadership, by undertaking
incidents which divert US and world attention away from the Middle East
at critical times. We can absolutely expect the new DPRK Government
of Kim Jong-Un to fulfill its part of the treaty with Iran in the near
future, and create a strategic diversion in North-East Asia. Moreover,
the US and EU cannot expect Russia and the PRC to sit idly by while the
West pressures a state which Moscow and Beijing consider important to
their separate interests and to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) treaty states in general. Expect the issue of the SCO clause
which states that an attack on one is an attack on all to be raised
again soon; Iran is an associate member of the SCO, and is expected
to soon be a full member of the organization.
At the bottom of all this is whether the US and Europe, and Israel,
can find a way to rebuild ties with Iran. This, indeed, would undercut
Russian southward penetration of the Middle East to the Mediterranean
and Persian Gulf more dramatically than a Western rapprochement with
Turkey could ever do. Part of the problem, however, lies not in the
clumsily-handled US attempts to send signals to Tehran (while at the
same time threatening it), but in the inward-looking and paranoid
view of the West held by most of the leading Iranian clerics. In
other words, there is a mutual inability to overcome cultural biases
and insensitivities on both sides.
Internal political demands in the West and in Iran delay both a
normalization of inter-state relations as well as progress toward
political evolution in Iran. The isolation of Iran has reinforced both
the power and the religious character of post-1978 Iranian governance.
Now, however, we are seeing, with the end of the Iraq and Afghan wars,
that the Central Asian and Northern Tier regions are moving toward a
period of considerable evolution, possibly including the re-drawing
of boundaries. It is possible to foresee a break-up of Afghanistan
within a decade, with considerable impact on the boundaries of
Pakistan and Iran. All states in the region will need to re-think
their identities, because there will be significant fissiparous
trends toward the break-up, along ethno-linguistic lines, of modern
nation-state structures in the region.
This is likely to affect Saudi Arabia and India, as well. For its own
part, the US and UK have been actively engaged in attempting to bring
about just such fissiparous trends in Iran, by sponsoring secessionist
movements in Iranian (Arab) Khuzestan and in Iranian Baluchistan.
Significantly, however, the one state in the region which has very
deep-seated overarching identity ” embracing multiple ethnicities ”
is Iran. One of the few other such states is Oman.
Footnotes:
1. See, in particular, Possony, Stefan T.: Strategic Air Power for
Dynamic Security . Washington, DC, 1949: Infantry Press.
2. See, for example, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy
report of February 1992 by Yossef Bodansky: Iran Acquires Nuclear
Weapons and Moves to Provide Cover to Syria. And the report ” among
many others published by this Service in Defense & Foreign Affairs
Special Analysis ” by Bodansky on October 21, 2002: Irans Ballistic
Missile and WMD Programs: The Links to the DPRK.
3. See Copley, Gregory R.: The Prospect of an Israeli Military Strike
Against Iran: Far Lower than Western Analysts Would Like to Think,
in Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, July 6, 2010. That
report noted: Iran has a core of externally-acquired nuclear weapons,
something which the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the US
indirectly admitted on March 11, 2009. As did the report in Defense
& Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, of March 11, 2009: US Confirms
Consistent Defense & Foreign Affairs Reporting Since 1992: DNI Noted
He Cannot Rule Out That Iran May Have Already Acquired Nuclear Weapons.
4. See, particularly, the report by Yossef Bodansky in Defense &
Foreign Affairs Daily of December 2, 2002: Tehran Maneuvers for a
Wider War With Israel to Ensure That the US-led War on Iraq Does Not
Leave Iran Isolated and Surrounded.
5. Cited by Amb. Ardeshir Zahedi, the last Iranian Imperial Ambassador
to the US (and former Iranian Foreign Minister), in an excellent
interview in the California-based Farsi publication, Rahezendegi
(Way of Life), January 2012. See full-text reprint of document, below.
6. See, for example, Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, May
18, 2009: Iran Moves at Highest Level to Support the Newly-Declared
Republic of Eastern Arabia.