Impact of the Change in Government in Armenia on the Karabakh Conflict: View From Baku

The Jamestown Foundation
 
 
 
 
Impact of the Change in Government in Armenia on the Karabakh Conflict: View From Baku
 
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 74
 
By: Farhad Mammadov
 
04:49 PM Age: 23 hours
 
(Source: Al Jazeera)
 
The mass street protests across Armenia, which began in late March, forced the resignation, on April 23, of Serzh Sargsyan, who had recently taken over as prime minister (with strengthened constitutional powers) after ruling as president for the last decade. Shortly thereafter, on May 8, opposition politician and leader of the demonstrations, Nikol Pashinyan, was elected the new head of government (see EDM, April 23, May 10). Thus, the political history of this South Caucasus country now enters a qualitatively new phase because the leadership transition represents not simply a single change at the top, but also a broader upending of the political elite. For Azerbaijan, perhaps the most important issue to watch will be how this political change in Yerevan will affect prospects for the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Karabakh.
 
For the past 25 years, Armenia’s domestic politics were always closely linked to developments in the conflict settlement process. Arguably, the resignation of Armenia’s first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan; the transfer of power in Armenia to the Karabakh politicians Robert Kocharyan and later Serzh Sargsyan; the shooting in the Armenian parliament, in 1999, resulting in the deaths of the parliamentary speaker and prime minster; the July 2016 seizure of a police building by the revolutionary “Sasna Tsrer” armed group; and the resignation of Hovik Abrahamyan’s government in fall 2016 were all strongly influenced by events surrounding the Karabakh conflict (Vestnik Kavkaza, May 4).
 
While both international and local media coverage, not to mention the expert community, enthusiastically focused on the “democratic profile” of the recent protests in Armenia, many failed to highlight two important issues that will continue to have a significant impact on domestic politics, even despite the change in government: First, the so-called “Karabakh Clan”—composed largely of corrupt and often criminally linked generals who came to power in the 1990s, during or after the Nagorno-Karabakh War—remains entrenched in the Armenian economy and politics. Second, the country continues to be regionally isolated, with 83 percent of its border (with Turkey and Azerbaijan) closed as a result of Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territory.
 
The new Armenian government hopes to be able to relaunch a “Turkish-Armenian normalization” process—i.e., steps to reopen the Turkish-Armenian border, which Ankara closed in 1993, in support of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. But such attempts had failed in the past, while the strategic nature of Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation has continued to grow in relevance thanks to a number of joint regional energy-transport projects and other initiatives (see EDM, January 5, 2012; March 11, 2014; October 16, 2017; October 26, 2017). The government may also seek to attract more financial aid from the West with the assistance of the Armenian diaspora. Following Pashinyan’s election, the Armenian National Committee of America called on US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo to support Armenia by considering allocating a new Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant worth $140 million (Anca.org, May 8).
 
Meanwhile, the new prime minister’s populist statements proposing that the separatist Karabakh authorities participate directly in conflict negotiations as well as his declaration that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic should become an integral part of Armenia” (see EDM, May 10) tend to match the self-held beliefs of much of his domestic audience. As such, under Pashinyan’s government, the Armenian Armed Forces cannot be expected to voluntarily abandon their long-held positions in occupied Karabakh and the seven adjacent districts of Azerbaijan (A1plus.am, December 4, 2017; Mediamax.am, May 10, 2018; Rosbalt, May 13, 2018).
 
Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev recently declared that his country and its people will not allow for the creation of second Armenian state on Azerbaijani soil, emphasizing, “If someone thinks differently, I believe he vainly lives in illusion” (President.az, May 10). At the same time, Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov underscored that “the format of the negotiations has already been approved within the framework of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Armenia and Azerbaijan participate as negotiators… Such attempts [to allow Karabakh to be a party to the negotiations] were made earlier, but this is unrealistic, absurd and does not correspond with the negotiation process. Nagorno-Karabakh is an occupied territory of Azerbaijan, end of discussion” (Apa.az, May 10). Azerbaijani foreign ministry spokesperson Hikmet Hajiyev commented that Pashinyan’s narratives on the Karabakh conflict are regrettable and controversial, designed to stir political agitation. As Hajiyev stressed, “Armenia and Azerbaijan were recognized as two sides of the conflict [in compliance with a 1992 decision by the OSCE], and the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the region were accepted as the interested parties.” In addition, the United Nations Security Council resolutions “constitute the fundamental basis for a political settlement,” he added (Mfa.gov.az, May 10). Therefore, in Baku’s view, Pashinyan’s statements will hamper the peaceful resolution process and muddle the negotiating format originally established by the OSCE Minsk Group.
 
Based on Prime Minister Pashinyan’s early remarks, the new Armenian government could negatively affect the settlement process of the Karabakh conflict. In this context, the activity of the international mediators, the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group—Russia, the United States and France—will be particularly important. The question is whether the co-chairs will continue pursuing a coordinated line, or whether regional and global tensions will also affect the workings of the Minsk Group format. Throughout the period of political crisis in Armenia, Azerbaijan hoped for the eventual formation of a government in Yerevan able to soberly to assess the regional security realities. But additionally, Baku was concerned that the Karabakh generals might exploit the political turmoil by heavily escalating the military situation on the frontline with Azerbaijan in order to arouse nationalist sentiment in Armenia. Provocations on the line of contact have repeatedly broken out since the Nagorno-Karabakh War ceasefire of 1994; however, in Armenia’s present political reality, such future armed skirmishes will likely be perceived more emotionally, potentially leading to unpredictable consequences. Thus, Pashinyan’s yet-to-be-formed vision regarding the Karabakh conflict could give rise to further frontline clashes to which Azerbaijan will likely respond forecefully, as it did in April 2016 (see EDM, April 6, 2016).
 

Turkish PM: If Armenia abandons hostile attitude, Turkey will respond positively

News.am, Armenia
Turkish PM: If Armenia abandons hostile attitude, Turkey will respond positively Turkish PM: If Armenia abandons hostile attitude, Turkey will respond positively

18:24, 11.05.2018
                  

Ankara is ready to respond accordingly if Armenia wants to open new page in ties, but Yerevan first has to abandon its “hostile attitude” regarding the border issue, Turkey’s Prime Minister Binali Yildirimn has responded to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement on the establishment of diplomatic ties with Ankara without preconditions, Hurriyet reported.

“If Armenia gives up its hostile attitude, which it has shown for years against Turkey, if gives up its wrong attitude against Turkey’s territorial integrity and borders, if wants to opens a new page then we will respond accordingly after looking at the details,” Yıldırım told reporters on May 11.

“We do not want to be hostile to anybody, especially our neighbors. If such an approach is taken, we will naturally evaluate it in the interests of our country,” he said, adding that the government’s principle is “to increase friendships and diminish hostility.”

THE CATHOLIC PARTICIPATION OF THE GREAT HOUSE OF Cilicia in the 300th ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MKYTARIAN UNIVERSITY IN VENICE

BIG THE HOUSE Cilicia CATHOLIC CHURCH PARTICIPATION VENICE IN Mkhitareyan UNITY CONFIRMATION 300-AMEAK

 

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Communication & Information Department

F18News: Russia – "Everyone has become much more cautious"

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one's belief or religion
The right to join together and express one's belief
=================================================
Wednesday 
RUSSIA: "EVERYONE HAS BECOME MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS"
The authorities use two Administrative Code articles to confine the
exercise of freedom of religion and belief to easily regulated places, and
to limited numbers of people. "Where the boundaries of lawful behaviour lie
is incomprehensible," a Hare Krishna lawyer told Forum 18.
RUSSIA: "EVERYONE HAS BECOME MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS"
By Victoria Arnold, Forum 18
Religious believers and communities continue to face prosecution for
publicly exercising freedom of religion and belief. Forum 18 found 156 such
prosecutions in 2017 and prosecutions have continued in 2018.
Almost any expression of freedom of religion and belief outside the place
of worship of a state-recognised community may lead to fines, unless
individuals or communities follow legal requirements that are unclear and
which the authorities apply inconsistently. This imposes a large burden on
individuals and organisations in fines, legal costs, and bureaucratic
hurdles - particularly for smaller religious communities.
The authorities use two Administrative Code articles to restrict the
exercise of freedom of religion and belief to easily regulated and
monitored spaces (places of worship), and to limited numbers of people
(existing members of religious communities).
The main instruments now used are the July 2016 "anti-missionary" legal
changes, Administrative Code Article 5.26, Parts 4 ("Russians conducting
missionary activity"), and 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary activity").
In 2017, Forum 18 found 143 prosecutions under this Article, as against 13
under Administrative Code Article 20.2 ("Violation of the established
procedure for organising or conducting a gathering, meeting, demonstration,
procession or picket"). Article 20.2 was the previous main Administrative
Code article used to restrict freedom of religion and belief in public (see
below).
The use made by the authorities of the anti-missionary legal changes has
led to widespread confusion and concern among religious communities. They
are "worried because they do not know how to profess their religion and
share it with others without violating the law", Pentecostal Union lawyer
Vladimir Ozolin told Forum 18. He commented that "most Christians sharing
their beliefs on the street do not even suspect that they are violating the
law. They learn about this later, when employees of the competent
authorities begin fabricating the case" (see below).
Hare Krishna lawyer Mikhail Frolov told Forum 18 that "the fines are large,
and where the boundaries of lawful behaviour lie is incomprehensible ..
Everyone has become much more cautious in their public actions" (see
below).
Legal context
The July 2016 "anti-missionary" legal changes tightened the existing
restrictions on exercising freedom of religion and belief in public,
including on anyone and any organisation or religious group who could be
said to engage in very broadly and imprecisely defined "missionary
activity". The changes also heavily restricted the people who were
permitted to carry out "missionary activity".
Prosecutions under the July 2016 changes have been brought under
Administrative Code Article 5.26 (see Forum 18's general Russia religious
freedom survey 
<
Prior to July 2016, prosecutions for the exercise of freedom of religion
and belief in public were mainly brought under Administrative Code Article
20.2 ("Violation of the established procedure for organising or conducting
a gathering, meeting, demonstration, procession or picket"), which is
linked to the Demonstrations Law (see Forum 18's general Russia religious
freedom survey 
<
"Where the boundaries of lawful behaviour lie is incomprehensible"
The "anti-missionary" legal changes exert a chilling influence beyond
public spaces such as streets, squares, parks, and rented buildings such as
conference centres. This is where activities previously prosecuted under
Administrative Code Article 20.2 have usually taken place. Law enforcement
agencies now use Administrative Code Article 5.26 Parts 4 ("Russians
conducting missionary activity") and 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary
activity") against the exercise of freedom of religion and belief in these
public spaces, as well as in private homes and on the internet (see Forum
18's general Russia religious freedom survey
<
"The fines are large, and where the boundaries of lawful behaviour lie, is
incomprehensible," lawyer Frolov told Forum 18 on 16 April. "This could not
but affect the behaviour of religious believers - everyone has become much
more cautious in their public actions. The public activity of religious
associations has decreased noticeably."
Lawyer Ozolin commented to Forum 18 on 12 April that "religious
associations are also worried because they do not know how to profess their
religion now and share it with others without violating the law. Churches
face extra problems here, because no one knows what the permission to carry
out missionary activity should look like - its form has not been
established by law. In addition, state bodies do not conduct explanatory
work and do not use warnings, but immediately issue fines."
He also noted that "most Christians sharing their beliefs on the street do
not even suspect that they are violating the law. They learn about this
later, when employees of the competent authorities begin fabricating the
case."
Punishments
Fines under the various parts of Administrative Code Article 20.2
("Violation of the established procedure for organising or conducting a
gathering, meeting, demonstration, procession or picket") are: Part 1 -
10,000 to 20,000 Roubles for individuals, 15,000 to 30,000 Roubles for
officials, and 50,000 to 100,000 Roubles for legal entities; Part 2 -
20,000 to 30,000 Roubles for individuals, 20,000 to 40,000 Roubles for
officials, and 70,000 to 200,000 Roubles for legal entities; Part 5 -
10,000 to 20,000 Roubles (individuals only).
The authorities now prefer to mainly use Administrative Code Article 5.26,
Parts 4 ("Russians conducting missionary activity") and 5 ("Foreigners
conducting missionary activity"). These fines are potentially much higher,
and can be up to 50,000 Roubles for individuals and 1,000,000 Roubles for
religious organisations. Foreigners can be fined up to 50,000 Roubles and
(unlike under Article 20.2) may also be deported.
A fine of 50,000 Roubles is over one month's average wage for those in
formal work.
Forum 18 has found that judges have tended to impose the minimum possible
fines. For example, in 2017 the most common fine for individuals convicted
of breaking Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 4 ("Russians conducting
missionary activity") was 5,000 Roubles, the lowest possible fine. For
organisations the most common fine was 100,000 Roubles, also the lowest
possible fine.
Most fines are minimum fines because most cases are first offences, without
any aggravating circumstances, lawyer Frolov told Forum 18 on 16 April. If
an individual reoffends, the penalty will be greater.
Of the 10 foreigners prosecuted in 2017 under Administrative Code Article
5.26, Part 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary activity"), at least seven
were convicted, with the most common fine also the minimum of 30,000
Roubles. Five were deported - three South Koreans, one Ghanaian, and one of
unknown nationality.
Two foreign citizens prosecuted under Article 5.26, Part 5 in 2016 have
since appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg
(see forthcoming F18News article).
Social consequences
Social consequences also follow. "To be found guilty of committing an
offence for a Christian means that they committed a misdemeanour that does
not correspond to Christian values," lawyer Ozolin told Forum 18 on 14
March. "They are considered to be a lawbreaker. This is especially
important for a pastor, as he preaches Christian values and encourages
believers to observe the law, and certain norms and rules, while he himself
is an 'offender'."
Ozolin was speaking about the sharp increase in the number of fines for
meeting for worship on land not designated for religious use, such as in
private homes (see F18News 20 March 2018
<
 His comments also
apply, however, to any conviction under Russia's increasing restrictions on
the exercise of freedom of religion and belief.
"Of course, the situation is the same," Ozolin added on 12 April about
convictions under Administrative Code Articles 5.26, Part 4 ("Russians
conducting missionary activity"), Part 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary
activity"), as well as 20.2 ("Violation of the established procedure for
organising or conducting a gathering, meeting, demonstration, procession or
picket") (see Forum 18's general Russia religious freedom survey
<
Convictions and appeals
Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 4 ("Russians conducting missionary
activity") and Part 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary activity") has a
higher rate of initial convictions than Administrative Code Article 20.2
("Violation of the established procedure for organising or conducting a
gathering, meeting, demonstration, procession or picket"). In 2017, courts
found 82 per cent of defendants under Administrative Code Article 5.26,
Parts 4 and 5 guilty. This compares with 70 per cent of those punished
under Administrative Code Article 20.2 between 2015 and 2017.
Defendants appealing against their sentences have a similar rate of success
under both articles: 19 per cent under Administrative Code Article 5.26
Part 4 in 2017; and 17 per cent under Article 20.2 between 2015 and 2017.
Prosecution appeals against acquittals under both Articles are usually (but
not always) unsuccessful.
Following a December 2012 appeal to the Constitutional Court, the Court
ruled that under Administrative Code Article 20.2 ("Violation of the
established procedure for organising or conducting a gathering, meeting,
demonstration, procession or picket") notification of an event is necessary
only if the authorities are required to provide health and safety measures.
Also, the Religion Law was changed in October 2014 to clarify where
religious events may be held (see Forum 18's general Russia religious
freedom survey 
<
Police and prosecutors have continued to bring charges for the exercise of
freedom of religion and belief which required no notification on these
grounds. But judges have often acquitted defendants on the basis of either
the 2012 Constitutional Court ruling or the 2014 Religion Law change. 
Why the shift to Administrative Code Article 5.26?
The main instrument the authorities now use to restrict freedom of religion
and belief in public is Administrative Code Article 5.26, Parts 4
("Russians conducting missionary activity"), and 5 ("Foreigners conducting
missionary activity").
In 2017 Forum 18 found 143 prosecutions under this Article, as against 13
under Administrative Code Article 20.2 ("Violation of the established
procedure for organising or conducting a gathering, meeting, demonstration,
procession or picket"). Article 20.2 was the previous main Administrative
Code article used to restrict freedom of religion and belief in public.
Alexander Verkhovsky, Director of the SOVA Center for Information and
Analysis in Moscow, attributes the decline in Article 20.2 prosecutions of
religious believers "partly" to the "anti-missionary" legal changes.
"Often, the police simply choose the law [under which to prosecute] at
random", Verkhovsky commented to Forum 18 in July 2017. "The emergence of
options leads to a redistribution" (see F18News 8 August 2017
<
Forum 18 asked the Justice Ministry on 13 April 2018 if there had been a
deliberate decision to use Administrative Code Article 5.26, Parts 4 and
Part 5 instead of Article 20.2. Forum 18 received no reply as of the end of
the working day in Moscow on 18 April.
The decrease in use of Article 20.2 is partly explained by the state's
nationwide ban from March 2017 on Jehovah's Witnesses as allegedly
"extremist" and the consequent cessation of their public activities (see
F18News 18 July 2017 
<
In 2017, no Article 20.2 cases involved Jehovah's Witnesses; in 2016 there
were 10, and in 2015, there were 83.
Jehovah's Witnesses told Forum 18 that they had abandoned their normal
practice of offering religious literature from stands in the street. This
was because large quantities were impounded at the border, and a March 2016
change to the Demonstrations Law required notification to the authorities
of a one-person "picket" if it used "prefabricated collapsible structures"
such as stands and trolleys (see Forum 18's general Russia religious
freedom survey 
<
Pentecostal Union lawyer Ozolin told Forum 18 that he has also seen Article
20.2 cases "declining every year", with no appeals for help so far in 2018.
He did not think there had been a deliberate decision to switch to using
Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 4 ("Russians conducting missionary
activity") and Part 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary activity").
"Article 5.26, Part 4 is just more relevant now, because the passions
stirred by the Yarovaya [anti-missionary] laws have not abated yet," Ozolin
said. "I am sure that if an offence is committed under 20.2, then charges
are certainly brought under it."
The number of prosecutions under Administrative Code Article 5.26, Parts 4
and 5 also decreased in the latter part of 2017. This also appears at least
partly attributable to the lack of Jehovah's Witness cases after the
nationwide ban. The first half of 2017 saw 28 cases, but only two (from the
same investigation) in the second half of 2017.
Some religious communities have familiarised themselves with the
requirements of the "anti-missionary" legal changes and taken steps to
avoid prosecution. "We have now managed more or less to overcome the
situation with Article 5.26, Part 4 (‘Russians conducting missionary
activity')," lawyer Ozolin told Forum 18. "Most religious associations
(religious groups and organisations) issue citizens with so-called
permission to carry out missionary activities, with which they walk without
fear through the streets and invite people to church."
Can individuals share their beliefs?
Under Administrative Code Article 5.26, Part 4 ("Russians conducting
missionary activity") and Part 5 ("Foreigners conducting missionary
activity") sharing beliefs is only possible if someone carries paperwork
from a legally-recognised group or organisation. "Missionary activity" is
so poorly defined that it can cover almost any exercise of freedom of
religion and belief, meaning that people may not even be aware that state
authorisation is legally required for what they wish to do - even though
this requirement violates Russia's binding international human rights
obligations.
The commonest grounds for cases under Administrative Code Article 5.26,
Part 4 ("Russians conducting missionary activity") and Part 5 ("Foreigners
conducting missionary activity") is an individual's lack of documentation
showing that they are authorised by their state-recognised religious
association to perform missionary activity. The Religion Law also requires
that they also carry proof of their organisation's registration or their
religious group's notification to the Justice Ministry of its creation. The
requirement for such notification also violates Russia's binding
international human rights obligations (see Forum 18's general Russia
religious freedom survey
<
Defendants often argue that they do not have such documents because they
are exercising their constitutional right as individuals to share their own
beliefs. Police, prosecutors, and judges, however, appear to be
increasingly seeing individual religious expression as tied, by definition,
to formally constituted and officially recognised groups and organisations,
thus increasingly confining the freedom of religion and belief to an
officially regulated and monitored sphere.
For example, Council of Churches Baptists refuse on principle to register
their congregations with the state as organisations. They and others see
the July 2015 Religion Law requirement for religious groups to notify the
Justice Ministry of their existence and membership as just another form of
state registration (see Forum 18's general Russia religious freedom survey
<
Council of Churches Baptists cannot therefore have documents "authorising"
them to carry out missionary activity, which frequently leads to
prosecution. For example, Yevgeny Olkov was fined 5,000 Roubles on 25
August 2017 for handing out religious literature in the Altai Republic
village of Kosh-Agach. According to the written decision from Gorno-Altaisk
Magistrate's Court No. 3, seen by Forum 18, Olkov "freely distributed
information about his beliefs among village residents". The judge's verdict
was based on Olkov's lack of documentation authorising his "missionary
activity" and the local Justice Ministry's confirmation that he had
submitted no notification of the creation of a religious group.
Kosh-Agach District Police telephones went unanswered when Forum 18 called
to discuss the case on 16 April 2018.
2017 Administrative Code Article 5.26 prosecutions
Forum 18 found 143 prosecutions under Administrative Code Article 5.26,
Part 4 ("Russians conducting missionary activity") and Part 5 ("Foreigners
conducting missionary activity") in 2017. These involved 135 individuals
and 8 religious organisations, with 133 under Part 4 and 10 under Part 5.
Only 17 of these prosecutions resulted in acquittals, with 117 defendants
being found guilty and fined. Judges returned five cases to police or
prosecutors for technical reasons. Two cases were closed because the
statute of limitations had expired, and two more were closed for unknown
reasons.
Defendants appealed in 72 cases. Only 14 of these were successful, while 51
were unsuccessful and four were rejected without consideration. The outcome
of three appeals is unknown. One defendant was sent for retrial, but was
convicted again. Police and prosecutors appealed against eight decisions,
but succeeded in having only one case returned for re-examination. That
defendant's acquittal was subsequently overturned.
Forty-two of the 83 federal subjects of the Russian Federation saw at least
one prosecution (not counting Crimea and Sevastopol). The highest figures
were in: the Republic of Bashkortostan (17 cases); Sverdlovsk Region (9);
Krasnodar Region (9); Nizhny Novgorod Region (7); Zabaikalsk Region (7);
Chelyabinsk Region (6); Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Region (6); Kirov Region
(5); Oryol Region (5). There were four cases each in: the Republic of
Tatarstan; Tver Region; Kamchatka Region; Tomsk Region; Bryansk Region;
Voronezh Region; and Rostov Region.
Individuals or organisations belonging to the following religious
communities were prosecuted: Protestant churches, including Pentecostals -
35; all Baptists (Baptist Union, Council of Churches, independent/unknown)
- 35; Jehovah's Witnesses - 30; Society for Krishna Consciousness (Hare
Krishna) - 11; people associated with the Protestant Gideons Bible
distribution group - 6 (all from the same investigation); Seventh-day
Adventists - 4; Muslims - 4; other Hindu - 2; New Apostolic Church - 1;
Jews (a Kabbalah teacher) - 1; and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad - 1.
The leader of a group interested in ancient Slavic culture, accused of
propagating pagan beliefs on social media, was also brought to court. The
religious affiliation of 12 individuals is unknown.
Of the 133 individuals brought to court under Administrative Code Article
5.26, Part 4 ("Russians conducting missionary activity") and Part 5
("Foreigners conducting missionary activity") in 2017, 35 were women and 96
were men, while the gender of four defendants is unknown.
2017 Administrative Code Article 20.2 prosecutions
Forum 18 found 13 prosecutions in 2017 to punish exercising freedom of
religion or belief under Article 20.2 ("Violation of the established
procedure for organising or conducting a gathering, meeting, demonstration,
procession or picket"). All of those prosecuted were individuals: two event
organisers under Part 1; five people who organised events without formally
notifying the authorities in advance under Part 2; and six event
participants under Part 5.
This compares to 28 such prosecutions in 2016 (see F18News 5 July 2017
<
 and 122 in 2015
(including three of communities) (see F18News 18 May 2016
<
In 2017, there were in 10 convictions (all fines) and two acquittals
(before appeals). Six fines were challenged in higher courts, but only one
was overturned. The police also appealed against one acquittal, but this
was unsuccessful.
Of the 13 prosecutions in 2017 found by Forum 18, three involved Hare
Krishna adherents, three Council of Churches Baptists, and two other
Protestants. Two cases were brought against activists holding traditional
Adygey prayers beside a sacred tree (see below). Unusually, three Russian
Orthodox (Moscow Patriarchate) believers were also prosecuted for
protesting against the 2017 film "Matilda", which they say desecrates the
memory of Tsar Nicholas II. The Moscow Patriarchate has canonised him as a
"passion-bearer".
Of the 13 individuals known to have been prosecuted, only one was a woman.
These cases were initiated in eight Regions: Ryazan (three prosecutions
from the same investigation); Buryatia Republic (two prosecutions from the
same investigation); Krasnodar (two prosecutions from the same
investigation); Udmurt Republic (two prosecutions). One prosecution each
occurred in: the Republic of Bashkortostan; Perm Region; Tomsk Region; and
Tyumen Region.
The total number of Article 20.2 cases increased sharply in 2017 to 816
cases from 387 in 2016 and 462 in 2015. These increases are mainly of mass
prosecutions after anti-corruption protests of March and June 2017, as well
as other rallies supporting opposition politician Aleksei Navalny.
Unexpected prosecutions
Prosecutions for exercising freedom of religion or belief under
Administrative Code Article 20.2 ("Violation of the established procedure
for organising or conducting a gathering, meeting, demonstration,
procession or picket") can come unexpectedly, for an event which has been
regularly held with no previous problems. Two people in Krasnodar Region,
Aydamir Basto and Ruslan Gvashev, were fined 10,000 Roubles each under
Article 20.2, Part 2 and 5 respectively.
The event was a memorial for the dead of the 1817-1864 Russo-Caucasian War.
It lasted about 15 minutes, and consisted of traditional Adygey prayers led
by Gvashev at a tulip tree outside Sochi which the Adygey people consider
sacred. Basto then distributed funeral cakes, before some of the 100 or so
participants went to the shore and threw funeral wreaths into the sea. The
same commemorations have been held on 21 May each year for many years.
Basto was found guilty on 24 May 2017 of organising the event without
formally notifying the authorities in advance, and his appeal at Krasnodar
Regional Court on 21 June 2017 was unsuccessful. Lazarev District Court
sentenced Gvashev on 2 June 2017. On 2 August, Krasnodar Regional Court
sent his case back for re-examination, but his conviction was upheld on 30
August. His second appeal on 16 October was unsuccessful.
Gvashev went on hunger strike for a time in protest. On 23 February 2018,
the presidium of Krasnodar Regional Court decided that all previous rulings
against him should remain in force.
Gvashev now intends to appeal to the Supreme Court and the ECtHR in
Strasbourg, he told Caucasus Echo website on 2 March 2018.
Lazarev District Police telephones were busy when Forum 18 called on 16
April.
Inconsistent judgments 
Judgments under Administrative Code Article 20.2 ("Violation of the
established procedure for organising or conducting a gathering, meeting,
demonstration, procession or picket") can also be inconsistent, with
differing outcomes for similar cases in different courts.
Protestant Ivan Golubenko was charged under Part 2 for distributing
literature at a crossroads without formally notifying the authorities in
advance. He was charged despite having notified the authorities, who had
not replied to him. He was acquitted on 6 January 2017 because the judge at
Lysva City Court (Perm Region) found that his actions were "religious
service", which did not constitute picketing.
Council of Churches Baptists A. Sinyukov, Yu. Grechukha, and V. Bely,
however, were each fined 5,000 Roubles under Part 5 for handing out
literature near a bus stop. On 14 February 2017, the judge at Ryazan's
Railway District Court decided that the location was "not intended for
public religious events" and the defendants had "openly demonstrated
[their] religious beliefs in a place which sees the mass passage of people,
thus creating the danger of violation of public order, associated with
moral and physical damage to the health of citizens".
Legal challenges
One Baptist pastor fined under Article 5.26, Part 4 ("Russians conducting
missionary activity") has appealed to the Constitutional Court. On 13 March
2018, the Court ruled that "missionary activity" must involve the sharing
of actual religious beliefs with non-members of a religious association,
with the explicit aim of involving them as members. The Court did not rule
on how to distinguish between a religious association's "missionary
activity" and the personal sharing of beliefs by individuals. It is unclear
what impact this ruling might have (see forthcoming F18News article).
Two foreigners punished in 2016 under July 2016 "anti-missionary" changes
have appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (see
forthcoming F18News article). (END)
For more background see Forum 18's surveys of the general state of freedom
of religion and belief in Russia at
<
 and of the dramatic
decline in this freedom related to Russia's Extremism Law at
<
A personal commentary by Alexander Verkhovsky, Director of the SOVA Center
for Information and Analysis 
<
 about the
systemic problems of Russian anti-extremism legislation, is at F18News 19
July 2010 
<
A personal commentary by Irina Budkina, Editor of the
 Old Believer website, about continuing denial of
equality to Russia's religious minorities, is at F18News 26 May 2005
<
More reports on freedom of thought, conscience and belief in Russia can be
found at
<
A compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments can be found at
<
A printer-friendly map of Russia is available at
Twitter: @Forum_18
Follow us on Facebook: @Forum18NewsService
All Forum 18 material may be referred to, quoted from, or republished in
full, if Forum 18  is credited as the source.
© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855.
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Armenian Genocide memorial lanterns inaugurated in Switzerland

PanArmenian, Armenia

PanARMENIAN.Net – A monument called “Lanterns of Memory” (Les Réverbères de la Mémoire), which is composed of nine tall bronze street light poles, was inaugurated in Switzerland to honor the memory of the victims of the Armenian Genocide, 10 years after the project was first approved, Tribune de Genève reports.

Authored by French contemporary artist of Armenian origin Melik Ohanian, the project in Geneva’s Trembley Park pays tribute to the links between Geneva and the Armenian community.

More than 500 people had gathered in the park to follow the opening of the monument, when French Armenian crooner and Armenia’s ambassador to Switzerland Charles Aznavour appeared to deliver short remarks.

Those delivering speeches, including artist Ohanian, recalled the obstacles the lamps met since 2008, when the Geneva City Council unanimously voted in favor of the realization of the project.

Back in 2014, a letter from Swiss Foreign Minister and serving Swiss President, Didier Burkhalter, addressed to the canton of Geneva, recommended turning down the construction of a memorial, “Les Réverbères de la Mémoire”.

The Geneva city authorities, however, remained determined to erect the eight-meter bronze memorial.

The Swiss House of Representatives recognized the systemic massacre and exile of Armenians from their homeland by Ottoman Turks as Genocide in 2003.

The teachers who returned from Abkhazia were hosted by the Ministry of Diaspora

Please find the attached press release of the Ministry of Diaspora.
Sincerely,
Media and PR Department:
( 374 10) 585601, internal 805
----------------------
Sincerely
Department of Press and Public Relations
( 374 10) 585601, extension 805


103. Hranush Hakobyan received the teachers who returned from Abkhazia.docx

application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document



JPEG image

Des heurts entre des pèlerins arméniens et la police israélienne à Jérusalem

Sputnik France
7 avril 2018


© AP Photo/
International

14:56 07.04.2018(mis à jour 15:01 07.04.2018) URL courte

Des affrontements entre des pèlerins arméniens venus pour célèbre le miracle du Feu sacré et la police israélienne ont eu lieu à Jérusalem ce samedi.

Les pèlerins qui se sont ressemblés près du Patriarcat arménien de Jérusalem, dans le quartier arménien de la vieille ville, n’ont pas eu le droit de se déplacer vers l’église du Saint-Sépulcre pour assister au miracle du Feu sacré ce qui a provoqué des heurtes avec la police locale, annonce le site Panorama.am.

Fondé au VIIe siècle, le Patriarcat arménien de Jérusalem est indépendant des autres institutions chrétiennes et possède à égalité avec les Patriarcats orthodoxe et catholique une partie des principaux sanctuaires de la Terre Sainte, y compris l’église de la Nativité à Bethléem et l’église du Saint-Sépulcre à Jérusalem.

Les milliers de pèlerins venus du monde entier ont assisté samedi au miracle du Feu sacré à Jérusalem qui, selon la tradition chrétienne, symbolise la lumière miraculeuse de la Résurrection du Christ. Le feu apparaît à la veille de la Pâques orthodoxe grâce aux prières du patriarche orthodoxe, du clergé et des milliers de pèlerins. Les premières à s’allumer sont une lampe et 33 bougies, pour marquer les années de la vie terrestre de Jésus-Christ.

Les fidèles croient que la non-apparition du Feu sacré pourrait marquer le début de la fin des temps.

Sports: Major ski resort complex to be built in Armenia

PanArmenian, Armenia
April 6 2018

PanARMENIAN.Net – Mount Maymekh in Armenia will turn into a ski complex under a new project which will attract about $30 million in investments and create some 1600 jobs.

Investor Tigran Harutyunyan revealed at the presentation of the program on Friday, April 6 that the province of Lori was chosen for the massive potential it possesses for the development of tourism, stressing, in particular, the pure nature and the Pambak Mountain Range.

All the necessary infrastructures will be built for the year-round project, including special lanes, high-tech cables cars, as well as entertainment options for summer activities.

Director of Maymekh Ski Resort Mher Baghdasaryan detailed the geographical and climatic peculiarities of the project and its commercial value.

According to him, the complex will operate all year round with a capacity to host 2000 visitors each day.

In the first stage of the initiative, hotels, shopping centers, restaurants, shops and other facilities will be built

The resort is expected to help develop the tourism sector in the northern Armenian province and liven up the community life.

Turkish Press: Turkey, Azerbaijan aim to improve judicial cooperation

Yeni Şafak , Turkey
April 3 2018

Turkey, Azerbaijan aim to improve judicial cooperation

16:43 Anadolu Agency

Turkey and Azerbaijan are aiming to consolidate bilateral judicial cooperation, according to Turkish justice minister on Tuesday.

Abdulhamit Gul met his Azerbaijani counterpart Fikret Memmedov as part of his official visit to the country.

Gul said the projects that are realized with the view of “one nation, two states” — such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway project and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) — were part of efforts to boost Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.

Stressing that political and economic stability provides growth, he said both countries achieved much to become stronger. “We hope the cooperation to be in the best level.”

Speaking about Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Gul said: “We believe that Azerbaijan’s demands in this issue are rightful. Turkey supports Azerbaijan in this regard and it will continue to do so.”

Azerbaijan and Armenia remain in dispute over the occupied Karabakh region. Karabakh broke away from Azerbaijan in 1991 with Armenian military support, and a peace process has yet to be implemented.

“Our biggest problem is Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We have always seen support from Turkey in this matter,” said Azerbaijani Justice Minister Memmedov.

He also touched on the issue of Turkey’s defeated coup in July 2016 and said the incident shook them as well, but the Turkish nation had shown that they were on the side of democracy, development and justice.

Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) orchestrated the defeated coup of July 15, 2016 in Turkey, which left 250 people martyred and nearly 2,200 injured.

Noting that Azerbaijan is benefitting from Turkey’s experience in judicial subjects, Memmedov said around 220 agreements have been signed between the two countries in different fields.

There are 30 more agreements in preparation phase, he added.

– ‘Turkey’s strength is Azerbaijan’s strength’

Justice Minister Gul also met Azerbaijan’s President of the Court of Cassation Ramiz Rzayev.

Expressing his pleasure with the fact that his first official visit abroad was to Azerbaijan, Gul said: “We will increase cooperation in the field of judiciary like in all other fields.”

Turkish-Azerbaijani brotherhood is going to last forever, he added.

Rzayev, for his part, reiterated that both countries support each other. “Turkish education institutions have big role in educating, especially, our judges,” he added.

Rzayev also praised Turkey’s success in Syria’s northwestern Afrin, as its center was liberated from terrorists during Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch. “Turkey’s strength is our strength.”

Turkey on Jan. 20 launched Operation Olive Branch to clear terrorist groups from Afrin, northwestern Syria, near Turkey’s border, amid growing threats from the region.

On March 18, Turkish-backed troops liberated the town of Afrin, which had been a major hideout for the terrorist organization PYD/PKK since 2012.

The Turkish Armed Forces are working to restore normal daily life in Afrin by providing necessary humanitarian aid to the region.

A total of 1,096 terrorists were “neutralized” in March as part of the operation, enabling civilians to return to their homes.