Can the EU Support Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace?

U.K. – Jan 6 2022

While Brussels is keen to provide technical help and mediation, its role can only go so far.

A Brussels meeting between Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev on December 15 led to agreements including on restoring railway lines, the return of detainees and handing over minefield maps. Organised by the European Council’s President Charles Michel, the summit also highlighted the European Unions’ interest in supporting peace between the two countries.

However, Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, told IWPR that while Brussels was keen to support the process on delimitation and demarcation of the state border, “in the end, it boils down to the political will in Baku and Yerevan”.  

IWPRThe trilateral meeting in Brussels was a rare opportunity for the EU to assume the mediator’s mantle in this region. What does Brussels have to show for its efforts?

Klaar: It was the first such meeting in Brussels, but President Michel personally had been quite involved with both leaders since the early summer… the three leaders spent four and-a -half hours together. President Michel also enabled a bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Pashinyan and President Aliyev, which was a welcome sign.

What are the tangible results?

Prior contacts of President Michel with both sides [resulted] in the establishment of a hotline between the ministers of defence, which is used by both sides. We have had the release of prisoners of war [and] detainees and the handing over of maps of minefields. It’s obviously an ongoing process. There have been contacts with Russian officials, involving President Putin with the leadership of both countries, and similarly, with our American colleagues – and frequent contacts entertained by France. All of this is in one way or another contributing to the peace process.

What is the EU’s next objective regarding the border delimitation issue?

We are looking into how we can support the border delimitation process. We are willing to engage… in the process of reducing tensions on the bilateral border, through technical know-how and advice, and of course to the extent that the involved parties want us to be engaged. It will ultimately depend also on the two sides to say where [they] want the EU to be active, and President Michel offered technical assistance in form of an advisory group.

Was an advisory group something either Yerevan or Baku asked for?

Ultimately, in such a process what is required is for both sides to agree on a baseline from which to start working.  I’m not sure that we are quite there yet. We have consistently heard that there is a desire for more EU engagement. The EU is genuinely interested in supporting the emergence of a South Caucasus that is that is peaceful, that is prosperous. We are a genuinely benevolent actor, that was our message. I think that is also recognized in Baku and Yerevan.

There are reports of calls to President Putin by both EC President Michel and French President Macron.  Was it a coordinated effort?

There have been numerous phone calls between President Michel and President Putin. We want to follow up on the desire of the leadership of both countries to have the EU be engaged and we want to make sure that engagement is as productive and as result oriented as possible.  It makes perfect sense to have regular contacts with others who also are strongly involved. But I think it would be too much to say that there is any kind of concentrated effort, division of duties or anything like that between the EU and Russia. In the end, we are pulling largely in the same direction. No contradiction, but no daily coordination either. That’s maybe a bit too much.

Could this be the case of the “dialogue with Russia” that western leaders so desperately want to have?

I think it depends very much on how Russia sees this. We think there is a win-win scenario that would allow everyone to benefit… From our side, this is something that that we can certainly see happening. We are genuinely interested in helping our partners reach a better state.

The terms detainees and prisoners of war have been used interchangeably, but President Aliyev says that people currently in detention “cannot be considered as prisoners of war”. You were on the plane when they were released. What’s the official EU interpretation?

Instead of delving deeper into semantics …we’ve said many times over that all of them should be released. There have been additional transfers of Azerbaijani and Armenian prisoners since the Brussels meetings, this is something we warmly welcome.

Both President Aliyev and PM Pashinyan claim “We want peace and it’s enough of war”. You’ve spoken to both, what is their interpretation of peace?

We are dealing with a very long and bitter history here. Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis can point at moments where they can consider that they have been badly treated, that their people have been killed and driven from their homes. When you keep [this] in mind, it is quite natural that both sides come at things from different perspectives. It will take time to arrive at some common understanding. There has been so much bad blood over so many years… But I think the important thing is, to have a desire to come to turn a page and to move forward in a positive direction. If the leadership in both countries stay true to their commitment, that this is the only way forward, it can be achieved. It will take time to, to come to the point where you say that, yes, we have suffered, but we understand also that you have suffered…. The leaderships have a very important role to play to guide their people.

There is no peace treaty, just a ceasefire. President Aliyev told El Pais that he hoped that “European partners will persuade Armenia”.

We believe that the comprehensive agreement that will address all the outstanding issues is necessary and this is something where we want to support the sides. And there is still also the Minsk Group and its co-chairs, so there are different avenues, there are different possibilities.

Could the EU make this happen? Does Brussels have the clout, the backbone, or even the interest to take it upon itself?

Allow me to turn the question around. Ultimately, any agreement is signed between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. So, we, as the European Union, can support. Ultimately, however, it is it up to them, to wish to move forward, to make compromises, any sort of comprehensive settlement will have to entail compromises regardless of what the outcome of the 44-day war was. To achieve a durable peace, there should be a just, fair settlement. In the end, it boils down to the political will in Baku and Yerevan.

With regards to the legal status of the Zangezur corridor, President Aliyev demanded reciprocity. Many in Armenia and Azerbaijan interpreted the statement President Michel issued after the meeting as agreeing with that sentiment. Is that the case at hand?

I believe that the wording of the statement was rather referring to railroads. Transit was discussed in detail, and it is quite natural to have a reciprocal approach. As for the legal status, the EU concentrates more on enabling physical connectivity rather than labeling anything.  We have heard that there are plans in both [countries] to invest in making sure that this railway connection is built in the near future. I think that is a very good development.




RFE/RL Armenian Report – 01/05/2022

                                        Wednesday, January 5, 2022
Government Pressing Ahead With COVID-19 Health Pass
        • Gayane Saribekian
Armenia - Pedestrians wear mandatory face masks in Yerevan, November 2, 2021.
The Armenian government will introduce after all a mandatory coronavirus health 
pass for entry to cultural and leisure venues, Health Minister Anahit Avanesian 
announced on Wednesday.
Avanesian said that her ministry will publicize a relevant directive on January 
10. “It will come into force within the next 15 days,” she told a cabinet 
meeting in Yerevan.
The decision means that only those people who have been vaccinated against 
COVID-19 or have had a recent negative test will be allowed to visit bars, 
restaurants and other public venues. It is part of government efforts to boost 
Armenia’s vaccination rate, which remains one of the lowest in Europe and 
Central Asia.
In Avanesian’s words, only 722,409 making up roughly a quarter of the country’s 
population have been fully vaccinated so far. More than 224,000 others have 
received only the first dose of a vaccine.
The vaccination process accelerated after the government began requiring on 
October 1 virtually all workers to get inoculated or take frequent coronavirus 
tests at their own expense.
Armenia - Health Minister Anahit Avanesian visits the Armenian company Liqvor 
producing Sputnik Light vaccine, Yerevan, December 6, 2021.
The Armenian Ministry of Health first announced plans for the health pass in 
November, prompting strong criticism from some restaurants and other affected 
entities. The requirement was initially expected to take effect on January 1.
The ministry is pressing ahead with the measure despite a significant drop in 
coronavirus cases and deaths recorded in recent weeks. It has reported between 
100 and 150 cases a day for the last two weeks, sharply down from over 2,000 
daily cases recorded in late October.
Only three Armenians died from COVID-19 on Tuesday, according to the ministry. A 
record 62 deaths caused by the disease were registered on November 2.
“If we don’t continues vaccinations in a proper manner, the [coronavirus] crisis 
will inevitably return,” Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said, commenting on 
Avanesian’s announcement.
Pashinian noted in this regard that Armenian authorities have not yet detected 
any cases of the more contagious Omicron variant of the virus.
“I can hardly imagine that variant not entering Armenia,” he said.
Armenian Retailers Ignore Ban On Plastic Bags
        • Robert Zargarian
Armenia - A woman in Yerevan carries groceries in plastic bags, January 5, 2022.
Supermarkets and other shops in Armenia continued to provide or sell plastic 
bags to customers on Wednesday five they days after such items were legally 
banned.
The ban, effective from January 1, stems from a 2020 law aimed at reducing 
plastic waste and its serious damage to the environment. It means that shoppers 
can get only single-use bags made from recycled paper or other organic materials.
There was little evidence in Yerevan of retailers’ compliance with the new 
requirement. Supermarket chains and grocery stores across the city clearly did 
not abandon plastic bags.
“No, they didn’t offer me any alternative,” a man carrying groceries in such a 
bag told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service as he left a shop.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Environment Minister Hakob Simidian touted 
the ban’s entry into force during a weekly cabinet meeting in Yerevan. But they 
seemed to acknowledge problems with its enforcement.
Pashinian stressed that it is local government bodies, rather than state 
inspectorates subordinate to the central government, that are supposed to ensure 
retailers’ compliance with the requirement. He told Minister for Territorial 
Administration Gnel Sanosian and provincial governors to make this clear to city 
mayors and other community heads.
Pashinian warned that the government will task its inspectorates with enforcing 
the ban if local authorities fail to do the job.
Cigarette Sales In Armenia Regulated
        • Artak Khulian
The Armenian government pledged to enforce on Wednesday major restrictions on 
cigarette sales designed to curb widespread smoking in the country.
Starting from January 1, Armenian supermarkets, smaller shops and kiosks are not 
allowed to display cigarette packs on their shelves. Nor can they advertise 
tobacco brands, e-cigarettes and vaporizers in any way.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian stressed the importance of the ban at the start 
of a weekly cabinet meeting in Yerevan. Pashinian said relevant government 
inspectorates must ensure retailers’ compliance with it.
“We are doing everything to get people to forget about buying cigarettes,” he 
said.
Health Minister Anahit Avanesian said the new restrictions should specifically 
help to prevent many minors and other young Armenians from becoming smokers.
Davit Melik-Nubarian, a public health expert, welcomed the measure. “This is the 
right path,” he told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. “Those who have travelled abroad 
must have noticed that such regulations are in force in Russia and European 
Union countries and they are really effective.”
Armenia is a nation of heavy smokers, with few restrictions on tobacco sales and 
use enforced to date. According to the Ministry of Health, 28 percent of the 
country’s adult population are regular smokers. Medics blame this for a high 
incidence of lung cancer among Armenians.
A study jointly conducted by the ministry, the United Nations and other 
international organizations found that each year smoking-related diseases kill 
about 5,500 people in the country of about 3 million.
The sales restrictions stem from a law drafted by the Ministry of Health and 
passed by the Armenian parliament about two years ago. The law also banned 
smoking in cafes, restaurants and all other indoor public places. The ban’s 
entry into force was delayed until March 2022.
Melik-Nubarian said the government should also sharply raise taxes on tobacco. 
“Unfortunately, cigarette prices in Armenia are the lowest in the region,” he 
said.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2022 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
 

Secretary of State Discusses Armenian Relations with Turkish Foreign Minister


Jan 5 2022


01/05/2022 United States (International Christian Concern) – This week, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu regarding the relationship between their two countries, which has been filled with tension as of late. Among other topics addressed, the two discussed Turkey’s recent appointment of a special envoy to normalize relations with Armenia following its several transgressions against the small Caucasus country in the past few years.

The new envoy leading up the normalization of relations with Armenia, Serdar Kilic, is the former Turkish Ambassador for the United States. Foreign Minister Cavusoglu, in consultation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, appointed him to the new position last month in an ongoing effort by both Turkey and Armenia to mend a bilateral relationship.

During the 2020 Karabakh War, Turkey provided Azerbaijan with drone support and Syrian mercenaries, many of whom were formerly ISIS fighters, to fight against Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian: Artsakh). Government officials from the United States and several human rights organizations have condemned both Turkey and Azerbaijan for committing a litany of war crimes during the conflict, including the continued detention of prisoners of war, killing of civilians, and destruction of Christian heritage sites in Artsakh.

Recently, the United States has pushed back on some of Turkey’s religious freedom violations, condemning the detention of Armenian activist Osman Kavala and hosting the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox Church. In its 2021 annual report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that Turkey be placed on the State Department’s Special Watch List for engaging in or tolerating “severe” violations of religious freedom. However, the State Department excluded Turkey from this list when announcing its designations in November.

Although the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia may mean peace for the region, Turkey’s religious freedom transgressions against Armenian Christians must not be erased from collective memory, and the United States must hold Turkey and Azerbaijan accountable for their human rights violations.

Armenia PM: Construction of Meghri section of Yeraskh-Julfa-Meghri-Horadiz railway is starting

News.am, Armenia
Dec 29 2021

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of Armenia on Wednesday chaired the year-end meeting of the interdepartmental working group on the issues of Syunik Province.

Opening the sitting, Pashinyan noted as follows, in particular: “In 2021, a program worth about 1.1 billion drams [approx. US$2.2 million] was allocated and implemented in Syunik Province through the channel of the [aforesaid] working group. (…).We have already announced that we are starting the preparatory work for the construction of the Meghri section of the Yeraskh-Julfa-Ordubad-Meghri-Horadiz railway.”

Subsequently, the members of this working group—that is, the representatives of the relevant departments—reported on the work done in accordance with domains.

During the ensuing exchange of views, a number of issues and ideas were discussed and suggestions were made.

At the end of this meeting, PM Pashinyan thanked the members of this working group and the expert group for the work done, and stressed that the agenda for the development of Syunik Province is quite comprehensive and it is necessary to work patiently to implement the set priorities in this regard.

Armenia’s new road projects: no simple endeavour

Dec 22 2021

The new Ltsen-Tatev road under construction near Ltsen.


By Neil Hauer in Ltsen 

There are few regions in which the importance of international connectivity, or the lack thereof, is on starker display than the Caucasus. Three decades ago, the region went from an integrated province to an isolated backwater nearly overnight. The collapse of the USSR, and the wars that followed, left an erratic set of Soviet-drawn borders interspersed with war-torn separatist enclaves to create a new geography of chaos.

Nowhere was this breakdown felt more than Armenia. As a result of its own war in Karabakh, the newly independent state found itself with 80% of its borders closed, a near-death knell for a landlocked country. That only increased the importance of those few outlets that remained: the border with Georgia in the north, and the distant outlet to Iran in the south.

It is that latter lifeline that has come under threat in recent months, part of the new reality faced by Armenia in the wake of its defeat by Azerbaijan in last year’s Second Karabakh War.

On a stony hillside outside the village of Ltsen, in southern Armenia’s Syunik province, a group of excavators and lorries rends the terrain. Just ahead of them, the remainder of the road they are improving is visible – little more than a dirt track, seldom used even by locals.

“This road will go all the way to Tatev and the monastery there,” says Derenik Hovhannisyan, the Ltsen village head. “They’ve done about seven kilometres already. When it’s finished in the spring, even cargo trucks will be able to use it,” he says.

Hovhannisyan is one of perhaps a hundred residents of Ltsen, an otherwise unremarkable settlement that is now set to lie astride one of several new major north-south highways under construction in southern Armenia.

“This road will lead to Tatev village, where it will intersect with the larger road there,” says Hovhannisyan, sketching out a crude map of several of the new arteries. “From Ltsen, it’ll connect onwards to Sisian or the main road north of here – it’s not clear how yet,” he adds.

Formidable terrain

These new projects have taken on crucial significance in the past few months.

Following last year’s war, the parts of Azerbaijan bordering southeast Armenia returned to Baku’s control for the first time since 1993. Among these gains were several stretches of land where the highway between Goris and Kapan – the main north-south roadway in Armenia, leading from the Iranian border to the capital Yerevan and beyond – passed into Azerbaijani territory. While Armenia remained able to use this road for a time, Azerbaijan eventually decided to erect customs points along the stretches it controlled, effectively closing it to Armenian traffic and severing the country’s primary north-south highway.

As a result, the state found itself scrambling to improve alternative roads, or construct them from scratch. The Ltsen-Tatev road is one of at least seven bypass roads currently under construction.

At the road’s terminus, at the village of Tatev, reconstruction of the current north-south alternative has already finished, bringing hope to locals but not alleviating the problems caused by recent closures.

“We are very happy with this new road,” says Donara Badalyan, a Tatev local, speaking of the Tatev-Kapan road that was recently repaved with commercial-grade asphalt following the Goris-Kapan road’s shuttering. “Before, it used to take two hours to get from here to Kapan. Now it’s just 40 minutes,” she says.

Photo: Neil Hauer, bne IntelliNews

The upgraded road snakes its way across formidable terrain, with switchbacks climbing a half kilometre in elevation just before reaching Tatev. The very nature of the terrain makes it unsuitable for heavy cargo trucks, something that is already becoming clear.

“There are many crashes on this road now with the [commercial] trucks using it, one or two every day,” says Ruzana Aleksanyan, another Tatev villager who sells dried fruits at the famous nearby monastery. “The road is too narrow for these large vehicles. It will be even more dangerous in the snow – winter here is terrible,” Aleksanyan adds.

The Tatev-Kapan road is not meant as a permanent industrial artery, but a stopover while the main alternative is built. Connecting the far south town of Kajaran with the city of Sisian, about 10km to Ltsen’s northwest, the planned new highway will be a mammoth project, involving blasting some 8km of tunnels at a cost of nearly $1bn, and is still years away.

“They won’t announce the tender [for the Kajaran-Sisian road’s construction] until next year,” says Hovhannisyan, the Ltsen village head. 

But the project’s completion is even further on the horizon.

“The [Kajaran-Sisian] road won’t be finished until at least 2026,” Hovhannisyan reveals. “It will take a very long time.” In the intervening years, Armenian imports coming from Iran seem sure to suffer.

Rampant corruption

With last year’s war having exposed how dependent Armenia was on the now lost north-south road, many in the country have asked why the state is only now getting round to building a workable alternative. 

The answer, as with so many aspects of Armenia’s recent past, lies in rampant corruption.

The current infrastructure projects are just the latest incarnation of what began as the ‘North-South Road Program,’ an initiative begun under previous president Serzh Sargsyan in 2008. The plan was to construct a 556km-long set of highways reaching from the country’s border with Georgia all the way to Iran, including a four-lane highway in its main section.

But the project never got off the ground. Of the $1bn raised for the project in its early years, most of it was siphoned away by federal and local officials. By 2015, the only work that had occurred was on the easiest (i.e. non-mountainous) segments with no sections completed, leading one newspaper to deem it a ‘corruption heaven.’ An investigation by Factor TV earlier this year found dozens of individual corruption schemes by companies and officials contracted to build specific sections of the road, totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. By 2017, just two years from the project’s announced deadline, a mere 6% of the work required had been completed.

The abject failure of this earlier highway project is just another of the poisoned chalices inherited by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan after the 2018 ‘Velvet Revolution’.

Stark reality

Amidst the stark reality of trying to play catch-up while under constant Azeri military pressure, the current roads under construction still represent something of immeasurable importance to southern Armenia’s local villages: hope.

For 40-year old Abgar Margaryan, one of the most ambitious residents of Ltsen, the new road past the village represents salvation.

Margaryan currently has a team of locals working on a major guest house project in the village’s center, erecting concrete slabs and drilling away on a mostly completed central building. 

“We started this project two years ago, and I think the house itself will be finished next year,” says Margaryan, speaking via video link from Finland, where he works for half the year in international shipping.

Born in Yerevan himself, Margaryan’s grandfather was from Ltsen, and in the early 1990s his father relocated the family back to their ancestral village before passing away just a few years later.

“My father moved back to the village to keep it strong, at a time when villages were emptying,” says Margaryan. “He had the beginnings of this [guest house] project in his mind then, but only now am I finally able to make it a reality,” he says.

The new guest house already employs about 20 people, and once auxiliary facilities are completed – which Margaryan plans to include a horse farm, shooting range, and recycling plant – the hope is to employ over 100.

A strong sense of patriotism – and of the need to develop Armenia’s rural areas and not just the glitz of downtime Yerevan – drives Margaryan.

“For me, Ltsen is the symbol of Armenia,” Margaryan says. “These villages are the heart of the country, and improving them is how we make Armenia strong.”

Hovhannisyan, the village head, approves of Margaryan’s plan, having borne witness to Ltsen’s decline himself.

“When I was a kid, there were about 500 people in Ltsen,” says Hovhannisyan. “Now, there’s a little over 100. There isn’t even a shop in the village anymore – it was unprofitable and had to close down. This road, and this guest house, are our hope to revive [Ltsen],” he says.


Karabakh slams world praising Azerbaijan for returning Armenian PoWs

PanArmenian, Armenia
Dec 22 2021

PanARMENIAN.Net – Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) State Minister Artak Beglaryan has slammed world leaders praising Azerbaijan for releasing Armenian captives.

Beglaryan reminded in a tweet that it is a requirement of international law and that Azerbaijan’s continues keeping many Armenian captives hostage.

According to him, if leaders praise “good will” of a criminal instead of punishing him, they encourage deviant behavior.

EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia Toivo Klaar has repatriated 10 Armenian prisoners of war from Azerbaijan. European Council President Charles Michel lauded the move as an “important humanitarian gesture”.

Hate speech has nothing to do with freedom of speech – Armenian Ombudsman

Public Radio of Armenia
Dec 21 2021

Human Rights Defender Arman Tatoyan has published a video on the negative consequences of hate speech, emphasizing that it has nothing to do with the freedom of speech.


This anti-hate speech awareness video was produced as part of the EU-funded Partnership for Good Governance II project “Promoting access to justice for victims of discrimination, hate crimes and hate speech through out-of-state compensation mechanisms in the Eastern Partnership countries” and implemented by the Council of Europe.


The message of the video is that we should all live together as a united and democratic society, respecting the dignity and rights of everyone.

Phoney peace fails to break Armenia-Azerbaijan deadlock

Dec 15 2021
Phoney peace fails to break Armenia-Azerbaijan deadlock

Since a ceasefire brought the 2020 Karabakh war to an end, peace initiatives have won only rhetorical support while the reasons driving conflict multiply.

EXPERT COMMENT

15 DECEMBER 2021

The 2020 Karabakh war was widely framed as breaking the preceding status quo of 26 years, but assessments of its transformative potential overlook the fact the war resulted in outcomes satisfying only a minority of stakeholders – Turkey and, to a considerable but ambiguous extent, Azerbaijan. Two false narratives have circulated widely which obscure this absence of consensus – that the war ‘ended’ the Karabakh conflict, and that Russia ‘won’ the war.

Two significant post-war dynamics contradict the notion that the Karabakh conflict is now resolved. The first is the widening of the spaces and issues in conflict. Azerbaijan’s restoration of sovereignty over territories it lost in 1990s surfaced the long-submerged issue of border demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani forces are now deployed across the border to occupy 40-100 square kilometres of Armenia’s territory.

Since no formal border has ever been demarcated, Azerbaijan maintains a ‘plausible deniability’ narrative about these deployments. Their purpose appears to be to compel Armenia to agree to Azerbaijani terms for a wider settlement, which include Armenia’s fulfilment of Article 9 – the final and most transformative clause of the 2020 ceasefire statement.

Russia’s intervention to bring the war to a close, and whether that was driven by grand strategy or tactical improvisation, will be keenly debated for years to come

Article 9 commits both parties to opening borders and transport links, and additionally commits Armenia to guaranteeing safe transit connecting mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave in Nakhichevan. Publicly, Azerbaijan frames this clause as a geopolitical prize allowing Azerbaijani citizens, vehicles, and goods transit using the corridor without customs checks. But this assertion of what is effectively a sovereign right of use leaves the discussion of corridors mired in a competitive understanding of sovereignty.

The second dynamic is the narrowing of active mediation efforts to focus only on issues appearing since the ceasefire. The OSCE’s Minsk Group – mandated to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement – has struggled to reassert itself after being sidelined during the 2020 war.

Rather, the Minsk Group has become by default both the guardian of the most contested and difficult issue of all – the political identity of the Armenian population in Nagorny Karabakh – and the vehicle for this issue’s indefinite deferral to an uncertain future.

It is instead Russia’s trilateral formats of summits and a working group on infrastructure convened by the vice-prime ministers that now take the diplomatic centre stage but, despite feverish speculation, these did not result in the anticipated agreements to coincide with the end of the war’s first anniversary.

Russia’s diplomatic calendar is haphazardly subject to renewed frontline violence and competitive summitry, asserting a performative diplomacy and Russia’s dominance over other outside actors rather than a substantive diplomacy generating new agreements.

Turkey’s role is crucial because the combination of Russian and Turkish foreign policies have created a system of distinct but interconnected pressure points in the theatres where both powers are involved

Russia’s intervention to bring the war to a close, and whether that was driven by grand strategy or tactical improvisation, will be keenly debated for years to come but one popular view is Russia won the war by planting ‘boots on the ground’, excluding Euro-Atlantic actors, and securing new sources of leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

An alternative – and less ideological – view is that Turkey’s successful execution with Azerbaijan of a military operation bringing an external actor into the formerly Soviet space presented a shocking challenge to Russia’s assumed monopoly on security provision in former Soviet domains, as well as an ongoing quagmire which will continue to illustrate the limits of Russian power.

Moreover, Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh are present by mutual consent of Armenia and Azerbaijan and so, combined with the absence of a territorial proximity of their area of deployment with Russia, this introduces substantial conditionality to their presence. It is a two-way street when it comes to leverage, particularly in the relationship with Azerbaijan which is decidedly more ambivalent about Russia’s presence.

Russia’s capacity to actually keep the peace is also under constant interrogation and it has on at least two occasions taken the unusual – for this context – step of naming the party violating the ceasefire. But this had little impact in deterring either further violations or the large-scale Azerbaijani offensive witnessed on 16 November. Russia’s presence may deter the outbreak of sustained war, but it is insufficient to deter major offensives, skirmishes, or even civilian executions.

The compromised ceasefire relates to the fact that Azerbaijan can now ‘lean into’ Turkish patronage to resist Russian control. Turkey’s role is crucial because the combination of Russian and Turkish foreign policies have created a system of distinct but interconnected pressure points in the theatres where both powers are involved. Russia’s Karabakh policy – and enforcement capacity – is no longer independent of this wider system.

So, Russia must bear responsibility for a situation which satisfies no-one except possibly Turkey. It is responsible for both mediation and the containment of violence in a context where coercive bargaining has been normalized – and a wider regional context where Russia makes extensive use of coercive bargaining tactics. This is highly concerning when considering the parties’ continuing dissatisfaction with the new status quo.

The exposure of Azerbaijani society to the devastated wastelands of territory occupied by Armenian forces in 1992-3 was always going to elicit shock and trauma. And these reactions are then sustained by dozens of landmine casualties, including a reported 29 civilians, since the end of the war, but also a steady investment in enemy imagery, such as a horrific ‘trophy park’ in Baku which featured racialized waxwork caricatures of Armenian soldiers in various poses of distress – thankfully removed after Armenia and Azerbaijan both filed cases with the International Court of Justice relating to claims of racial discrimination.

Despite a decisive victory in 2020, Armenians are still presented to Azerbaijani society as a monolithic mythologized enemy to be dominated, instead of distinct real-world communities needing differentiated Azerbaijani approaches and policies. Mobilization around other ideas or values is meanwhile violently suppressed.

In late 2021 Azerbaijani forces shot dead three Karabakh Armenian civilians, reinforcing Karabakh Armenian fears that Azerbaijan has no other plan but their demographic attrition through intimidation. Azerbaijan also continues to hold an uncertain number of Armenian prisoners whose maltreatment has been attested to by human rights organizations.

 

Trilateral deputy prime ministerial task force meeting to resume in ‘coming days’

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 11:04, 2 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 2, ARMENPRESS. The December 1 meeting of the trilateral task force led by the deputy prime ministers of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan will resume in the “coming days”, Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan’s office told ARMENPRESS when asked to present details from the session held in Moscow.

“We can speak about the results of the session only after its completion,” Grigoryan’s office said.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

100-Year-Old Grandma Cries Tears of Joy at Seeing Hometown in Virtual Reality

Newsweek
Nov 30 2021
A video of a grandmother, aged 100, having an emotional response to seeing her hometown cathedral via virtual reality has gone viral online, having garnered more than 2.6 million views.

The heartwarming clip, which was shared to TikTok by a woman called Michelle, known on the app as Schellywelly, begins with an elderly lady sitting on a sofa.

Text overlaying the footage reads: “Showing my 100 year old Armenian grandma the Etchmiadzin Cathedral in virtual reality.”

The camera then cuts to the grandma wearing a VR headset, as she is being told to look around her.

Overcome with emotion the woman begins saying “it’s so beautiful,” before appearing to let out a sob, then wipe her face with a tissue.

A man’s voice asks why she is crying and the 100-year-old responds again: “It’s so beautiful!”

The Etchmiadzin Cathedral is located in the Armenian city of Vagharshapat, which is where the grandmother grew up, and it is thought by some scholars to be the oldest Christian cathedral in the world.

Michelle captioned the adorable footage, which can be watched here, writing: “She is the most precious sweetheart [sad-face emoji] #fyp #cute #grandma #armenian #armenia.”

Since the video was posted to TikTok on November 26 it has gained lots of traction online, having received more than 520,100 likes and surpassing 6,540 shares.

More than 2,800 people also rushed to the comments section to share their thoughts on the video, with many finding it adorable.

One TikTok user, Manimakes2378, wrote: “I love seeing older people interact with technology.”

Another person, Simplysisii, added: “Aww my heart bro [sad-face emoji] she’s the sweetest.”

Unrealistic_human typed: “This is so heart-warming,” alongside a string of red-heart emojis.

Theodoros opined: “Y’all don’t understand how much she’s seen over 100 years…”

SG stated: “Not a day this app doesn’t make me cry. God bless her and all.”

Mohamed G. Dessouky revealed: “I’m Muslim and this touched me, may God keep her for you for many more years.”

Hasmik gushed: “They are our treasure! We have to keep them safe at all cost! May God give her health to stay with us.”

Happy_adriana commented: “This. This is what VR should be used for.”

Simardeep Dhall gushed: “Beautiful way to use the technology! God bless.”

J.wilson9 revealed: “My Grandmother was Armenian and past away a little over a year ago. They could pass as twins and seeing this video brought tears to my eyes.

To this, Michelle responded: “Yess!! We were so excited when we realized we could show her where she grew up.”

A photograph of Etchmiadzin Cathedral and a stock image of an old woman wearing a VR headset. On TikTok an 100-year-old grandma broke down after seeing her hometown cathedral in virtual reality.ISTOCK/GETTY IMAGES