Author: Jagharian Tania

The Ukrainian crisis has prompted many initiatives in the international arena and the situation in the South Caucasus is one of them.
One chapter of the South Caucasus file is Russia’s relations with Georgia or its fait accompli to declare Georgia’s two autonomous republics — Abkhazia and South Ossetia — independent. Russia is not likely to backpedal from these initiatives unless there is a tectonic change in the region. On the contrary, it may continue to press more countries to recognize the independence of the two autonomous republics. It may be aiming at a scenario in which these two republics will seek to join the Russian Federation as it now is planning to do for Donetsk and Luhansk. Georgia is reluctant to become part of cooperation among three South Caucasus countries — Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, because of Russia’s involvement in the initiative.
The second chapter is Georgia’s interest in becoming a member of the EU and, if possible, of NATO. Russia acquiesced without much resistance to Ukraine’s EU membership, so we may conclude that it may not strongly oppose Georgia’s EU membership either. However, NATO membership is a more sensitive issue. It will probably raise stronger objections to Georgia’s NATO membership. It may do so even if it emerges weaker from the Ukrainian crisis.
Because of the Ukrainian crisis, Sweden and Finland have become uneasy about Russia’s interest in expanding its zone of influence. Moscow is already active in Transnistria and Moldova. These countries have every reason to be worried. We will see the ultimate outcome if and when a new defense architecture is worked out in Europe.
The third chapter in the South Caucasus is Nagorno-Karabakh. While Turkey is not part of the South Caucasus, it is part of the regional security architecture because of its close relations with Azerbaijan.
Russia was and still is to a large extent the game-maker in the South Caucasus, but it may have moved this question to the backburner, because most of its energy is being absorbed by the Ukrainian crisis.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan continue to work on a framework initiated by Putin. It would become a good precedent if they could continue this pattern without Putin’s supervision or intervention.

Despite goodwill on all sides, stabilization in the South Caucasus may not be expected soon.

Yasar Yakis

Azerbaijan and Armenia do not agree on all issues, but their leaders give positive signals. A contention with roots going back centuries may not be solved easily. Putin has laid the foundations for negotiations by persuading the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders. He did this to keep the situation in the Caucasus under Russia’s control. There may be pitfalls on the road, but reasonable decision-makers on both sides seem to be aware that if the present negotiations derail, they may grind to a halt. Bearing in mind the uncertainties created by the Ukrainian crisis, it would be difficult to foretell where the present Azerbaijani-Armenian efforts will lead.
The Artsakh (Karabakh) lobby is influential in Armenia’s domestic politics. It is composed of far-right nationalist Armenians who seek to annex Karabakh to Armenia, whereas if a stable administration could be established in Karabakh, Armenians may benefit from oil-rich Azerbaijan’s economic resources in their capacity as full-fledged citizens of Azerbaijan.
The fourth chapter of the South Caucasus file is the relations between Turkey and Armenia. Armenians and Turks have lived in the same geographical area for more than 1,000 years. There is a high degree of appreciation for Armenians among the Turks. They enjoyed similar fortunes and faced similar hardships. They helped each other in difficult times.
After the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, Turkey was one of the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to Armenia — together with Azerbaijan and Georgia. It sent humanitarian assistance to Armenia and invited it to join as a founding member of the newly established Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization.
After Armenia’s occupation in 1993 of the autonomous Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, Turkey closed its borders with Armenia. There were several attempts to mend relations between the two countries. On Oct. 10, 2009, Turkey and Armenia signed a protocol to establish diplomatic relations and open the borders. The Armenian church and Armenian nationalist political parties reacted against the protocol and the Armenian government had to refrain from submitting the protocol to parliamentary approval. Therefore, the protocol remained a dead letter.
Pashinyan sees the advantages of normalization with Turkey. The 2009 attempt at reconciliation failed for emotional reasons. Turkey had not taken Azerbaijan on board before embarking on a rapprochement with Armenia. This time, Ankara is closely coordinating with Baku, but this does not mean that it may not fail again for other reasons. Irrelevant third parties may step in and spoil the process.
Despite goodwill on all sides, stabilization in the South Caucasus may not be expected soon.

• Yasar Yakis is a former foreign minister of Turkey and founding member of the ruling AK Party.

The 24th of April 2022 marked the 104th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. On this day, Ottoman authorities arrested Armenian intellectuals and community leaders in Constantinople, ultimately leading to the deportation, massacre, and mass extermination of over one million Armenians. Although the Armenian Genocide began over a century ago, ethnic and religious conflicts remain relevant in Turkey and conflict with the Kurds has become a major component of Turkish policy.

The anniversary of the Armenian Genocide was recognized from world leaders including United States President Joe Biden. In a statement released on the White House website, President Biden recognized the event while using it as a forum to discuss the role of obstruction of human rights in modern geopolitics. Although the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide has been recognized by several states on its anniversary, the significance of Turkey’s lack of recognition has not gone unnoticed. It is relevant to note that Turkey as well as its allies such as Israel have not recognized the Armenian Genocide. In Turkey, it is illegal to mention to the genocide as it opposes the nationalist agenda that has been in place since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Republic of Turkey in 1923. While human rights advocates continue to fight for Turkey and her allies to recognize the Armenian Genocide, Turkey continues to be held accountable for controversial obstructions of the rights of minorities.

Numerous human rights concerns within Turkey have emerged in recent years, especially since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s accession to presidency in 2014. These concerns exist within the scope of domestic issues, Turkey’s relationship with the Kurds, and Syrian refugees. Turkish relations with the Kurds have been truculent since the Kurds’ failure to acquire an independent nation in the aftermath of World War II. According to a Study by the Harvard University School of Divinity, the Kurds make up roughly 18% of Turkey, making them a significant minority within Turkey’s population. Less than a week before the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, Turkey launched new offensives against Kurds in Iraq and Syria, further condemning the group to the status of a repressed population in the areas they inhabit. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) has tracked Turkey’s violations of International Human Rights Law within President Erdoğan’s centralized and authoritarian government in which the HRW recorded restrictions of media, human rights defenders, Kurdish activists, the LGBTQ+ community, and anyone who could be considered a threat or critic of Erdoğan’s government. Furthermore, the treatment of women by the Turkish government has rapidly deteriorated as the country has left the Istanbul Convention, a convention on the prevention of violence against women, despite having been the first country to join this agreement and having previously held a reputation of being progressive in the fight for women’s rights. According to the UN Refugee Agency, the immense population of refugees currently residing in Turkey including 3.7 million Syrians. The number of Syrian refugees in the region opens opportunities for widespread discrimination and poor treatment of minorities which has increased in times of economic hardship. Violence between Turkish communities and refugees has become more frequent and systematic hostility has strengthened.

Widespread recognition of the Armenian Genocide by nations and organizations across the globe is vital in achieving equality and reducing the harm done to minorities in Turkey. If these human rights violations continue to go unnoticed in Turkey it can have monumental consequences on the future of European peoples and refugees as well as signify hypocrisy from those who condemn the Armenian Genocide while allowing the mistreatment of minorities in Turkey to continue.