The Armenian authorities assert their commitment to peace, unwavering even in the face of adversity. However, residents of the country interpret the leadership’s conciliatory stance differently. While many condemn the government’s approach, even those who refrain from criticism doubt the feasibility of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s peace initiatives. This skepticism is reinforced within Armenian society by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s statements, perceived as laden with threats and animosity towards Armenians and Armenia.
Local experts echo these sentiments, suggesting that “Azerbaijan harbors no interest in Armenia’s peace agenda,” and that “Aliyev is gearing up for conflict,” with support from Turkey and Russia.
In light of these developments, what lies ahead for Armenia? Political scientist Stepan Grigoryan weighs in with commentary.
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“The Armenian government is earnestly pursuing a peace agreement, demonstrating a willingness to make significant concessions, often without justification.
I, too, advocate for peace and negotiations, but peace must come at a reasonable cost. While the signing of a peace treaty would be welcomed, it should not come at the expense of unilateral concessions.
I see no genuine desire for peace from Azerbaijan, particularly evident in the official statements of Azerbaijani officials and leadership.
Baku continues to impose new preconditions in the negotiation process, which undermines the path to a peace treaty. Recent statements suggest that Armenia must amend its constitution, withdraw complaints against Azerbaijan in international courts and other bodies, further indicating Azerbaijan’s reluctance to pursue genuine peace.”
“Azerbaijan is actively and openly falsifying history and manipulating everyone, to such an extent that it has become evident: following the signing of any peace agreement, regardless of its terms, Aliyev will inevitably assert new claims the next day.
One such instance is illustrated by Ilham Aliyev’s assertion regarding the population demographics in Armenia prior to the onset of the Karabakh conflict in 1988. Aliyev contends that there were significantly more Azerbaijanis residing in Armenia than Armenians in Azerbaijan.
However, a cursory examination of readily available statistics reveals the contrary: there were five times as many Armenians living in Azerbaijan as there were Azerbaijanis in Armenia.”
The expert community continually poses the question to the authorities of Armenia: why does there seem to be no response to Aliyev’s statements?
Aliyev demands the return of Azerbaijanis to Armenia, alleging their expulsion. However, this topic is artificially constructed and unrelated to the peace agenda.
No international structure or document has registered the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia.
During the Soviet era, Azerbaijanis living in Armenia sold their homes and departed without coercion. In contrast, Armenians in Azerbaijan lacked such freedom. Moreover, Soviet Armenia provided compensation to departing Azerbaijanis, while Armenians leaving Azerbaijan received nothing.
Following the 1988 escalation of the Karabakh issue, Armenians in Azerbaijan faced massacres in Sumgait, Kirovabad, Baku, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijanis sought to address the conflict by expelling Armenians, prompting the formation of self-defense forces. This led to a major war lasting until 1994, resulting in the displacement of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis in and around Artsakh.
Aliyev also demands control over some eight villages. However, there has been no reciprocal assertion of claims over Armenian territories from Yerevan. For instance, the Tavush region, which remained on the Azerbaijani side of the self-defense line during the 1990s, has not been subject to claims from Yerevan.
The Armenian authorities also acknowledge that Azerbaijan does not desire peace, yet they justify their policy by expressing a desire to avoid new aggression from Baku. Within today’s Armenian political elite, there exists an opinion that peace could eventually be attained through concessions.
I fundamentally oppose this approach because giving in only fuels further demands. If concessions are made easily, why wouldn’t Aliyev seek more?
Advocates of concessions within the Armenian political elite seem disconnected from recent history. In the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey and Azerbaijan proposed the surrender of at least one region around Artsakh as a gesture of goodwill, with promises to open borders and foster cooperation. Presently, all of Artsakh and its surrounding seven regions are under their control, devoid of Armenians. Despite this, the borders remain closed, indicating Turkey’s lack of intention to open them.
Moreover, Turkey has never explicitly laid out conditions for Armenia, instead directing attention towards Azerbaijan for resolution. Of the seven districts surrounding the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), we voluntarily surrendered three and a half. Aliyev himself acknowledged this when he admitted that continued war would have inflicted significant losses on the Armenian side.
The interests of Azerbaijan and Russia intertwine in this scenario. Russia, with its overarching aim to revive the USSR in some capacity, seeks to diminish Armenia’s sovereignty and independence. In pursuit of this goal, Russia openly supported Azerbaijan in occupying Artsakh and displacing Armenians from the region. Consequently, Azerbaijan is indebted to Moscow, and Russia demands control over the so-called “Zangezur corridor” from Baku. This demand is communicated by Baku on behalf of the Russian Federation.
The primary objective of this alliance is the dismantlement of Armenian statehood. Russia aims to annex a portion of Armenia into the Russian Federation as a new region. Notably, this does not encompass the entirety of Armenia. The remaining territory, particularly Syunik [the southern border region of Armenia], is intended to be ceded to Azerbaijan.
Strategically, Russia also aims to assert dominance over Azerbaijan. However, due to the presence of Turkey, which acts as a safeguard for Azerbaijan’s sovereignty, Moscow is currently focused on exerting control over Armenia. Given that this aligns with Azerbaijan’s interests as well, Armenia finds itself under dual pressure.
“They argue that as elected representatives, they possess legitimacy and the authority to make concessions, to enact policies they deem necessary, even if they diverge from their initial program. They justify their actions by pointing out that all regional actors are aligned against us.
In response, we must seek support externally, from other partners, other allies. Currently, we receive open support from the United States and Europe, despite lacking strategic relations with them and barring their involvement in the region.
However, when the authorities face criticism for their shortcomings, it’s essential for people to remember that they were the ones who voted them into power. Voting decisions require careful consideration.
The expert community also plays a significant role, offering guidance to the authorities on right and wrong courses of action through personal conversations, speeches, and interviews. While criticism may be harsh at times, it does not negate their legitimacy.
Critiquing former leaders was easier as they lacked legitimacy, having ascended to power through rigged elections. The current situation is more challenging.
Nevertheless, concerning matters of territorial integrity and sovereignty, no government, regardless of its legitimacy, has the right to compromise on these fundamental values.”
“Armenia faces numerous threats, diverse in nature, not only from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, but also from the evolving global situation, which renders everyone vulnerable.
A war against the world order established after the Second World War is underway. In such turbulent times, the influence of international courts and structures, upon which Armenia could traditionally rely, is diminishing.
The probability of war looms large today, necessitating preparedness. Azerbaijan may exploit the preoccupation of the United States with its domestic affairs, given the Biden administration’s divided attention, as well as similar distractions in Europe due to upcoming European Parliament elections.
Backed by formidable diplomatic support from Turkey and Russia, Azerbaijan is conducting a potent, focused campaign against France, placing our allies in a challenging position.
Furthermore, complications may arise if the Middle East conflict escalates, diverting Iran’s attention from us. Aliyev could seize upon such a situation to target Syunik.
The prospect of an Azerbaijani attack on Armenia may be temporarily deterred by upcoming elections in Azerbaijan and Russia. As Putin and Aliyev coordinate all their actions, I have little insight into Baku’s potential aggression before Putin’s inauguration. However, once this transition is complete, possibly in May or June, no scenario can be discounted.”
“Direct negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan without mediators have never taken place. Moscow communicates its demands to Armenia through Baku. An example of this is the demand for the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” by Azerbaijan, which would be under Russian control.
Russia and Azerbaijan actively work to block Western mediation, as it aligns with their mutual interests, and they are determined to maintain this stance.
Consistency is crucial. Avoiding travel to St. Petersburg and Sochi is essential. Despite this, we announce engagement with Western platforms, and then we go to St. Petersburg [he means the participation in the meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Council in St. Petersburg in late December 2023]. This shift comes after a prolonged period during which Armenian authorities boycotted all meetings within Russian integration structures.
However, the West currently supports us, irrespective of whether we request assistance or not.
Sanctions against Azerbaijan are imminent and deliberate. Expulsion from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) effectively isolates a country from Europe. The European Union intends to terminate its gas contract with Azerbaijan.
Similar actions were taken against Russia, initially stripping the Russian delegation of voting rights in PACE before eventually expelling it altogether. Azerbaijan faced immediate expulsion from PACE. Here, it’s not primarily the Armenian influence driving this process, but rather Europe’s own decision that an authoritarian regime, aligning itself with Russia, must face consequences. Half of the PACE resolution focuses on the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Artsakh.
Our primary ally is the West, and it’s imperative to further broaden our engagement. Having invited European observers to monitor the border with Azerbaijan, the next step is to welcome military bases, even while remaining in the CSTO and hosting a Russian base on our territory. Our constitution does not forbid the presence of both Russian and Western military bases simultaneously.”
https://jam-news.net/probability-of-armenia-azerbaijan-war-opinion/