Washington Institute for Near East Policy, DC
June 5 2008
Ending (or Deepening) the Crisis in Lebanon: The Role of Electoral Reform
By Jean-Pierre Katrib
June 6, 2008
The May 25 election of Gen. Michel Suleiman as Lebanon’s twelfth
president was a central element of the Qatari-brokered compromise
between the March 14 coalition and the Hizballah-led opposition. The
agreement was greeted with relief in Washington and other
international capitals, allaying fears that Lebanon was once again
heading toward civil war. Now that Fouad Siniora has been
re-designated as prime minister, the Doha agreement’s remaining
elements include the difficult task of establishing a "national unity
government" and holding parliamentary elections in 2009. The new law
governing those elections will determine whether Lebanon will have a
solid future foundation or if the day of final reckoning has been
merely postponed.
Lebanon’s Electoral History and the Doha Agreement
According to Lebanon’s constitution, citizens have the right to change
their government periodically in free and fair elections. However, in
the course of Lebanon’s troubled political history, parliamentary
elections have never been entirely ”free” or "fair." Past electoral
reform efforts have been cosmetic and limited to redrawing of
districts.
Elections held between 1960 and the outbreak of civil war in the
mid-1970s produced four legislative assemblies that fairly represented
most communities, therefore contributing to political stability. At
that time, Lebanon was structured administratively into six large
governorates (muhafazat) and twenty-six smaller districts
(qada). These smaller areas were then adopted as electoral districts
in 1960 under a law that governed the elections of 1964, 1968, and
1972.
Since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 and the ratification
of the Taif Agreement, four elections took place (1992, 1996, 2000,
and 2005) under rigged electoral laws engineered by Damascus to
benefit its local allies. Through systematic gerrymandering and
political intimidation, the weight of the then predominantly Christian
and anti-Syrian opposition was diluted. The most notorious of these
laws was the 2000 electoral law, which Lebanese lawmakers were
compelled to readopt for the 2005 elections.
In Doha, the signatories agreed to replace the 2000 law with an
amended 1960 law based on districts — notwithstanding the fact that
both the Taif Agreement and the ill-fated Boutros Commission (a
government-appointed expert commission tasked with crafting a new
electoral law) envisioned proportional representation using
governorates, presumably to ensure effective representation. With the
exception of the Christian constituencies, the principal effect of the
changes was to consolidate the main players’ power over their various
constituencies.
Members of parliament are elected according to the "block vote" or
slate system, in which each voter can vote for as many candidates as
there are seats in a given district. However, distribution is subject
to the number of seats reserved for each confession in each
district. For example, in a district with two Maronite seats and one
Shiite seat, the two highest-scoring Maronite candidates and the
highest scoring Shiite candidate enter parliament. Throughout
Lebanon’s history, the formation of slates has not been guided by a
common policy platform but rather by unconcealed power calculations to
secure key swing votes. Thus, slates are loose alliances of individual
candidates who agree to ask their voters to also vote for other
candidates with whom they form a bloc.
Winners and Losers
The determination to use small districts in the next election coupled
with the Doha decision to redistrict Beirut and maintain
Marjeyoun-Hasbaya, Baalbek-Hermel, and West Bekaa-Rachaya as single
electoral constituencies guarantees that the status quo will change
little in the next elections. Only Christian voters will have real
alternatives to choose from: among the opposition, Gen. Michel Aoun’s
Free Patriotic Movement and Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh; on the
March 14 side, Samir Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Amin Gemayal’s
Kataeb (Phalange) Party; and the soon to be announced candidates
affiliated with the new president, General Suleiman. Still, there are
a number of districts where shifting alliances could prove crucial.
In Jbeil, the home of president-elect Suleiman, a cluster of
pro-Hizballah and Amal Shiite voters will be central in determining
the outcome of one of two Maronite seats, potentially to the benefit
of their Christian ally, General Aoun. His lock, however, on the
district of Keserwan, where he swept the Maronite seats in 2005,
appears to have weakened following his 2006 alliance with Hizballah
and subsequent developments.
The North Metn district of Mount Lebanon will also experience change
in 2009. In 2005, Aoun won the majority of seats through his alliance
with the affluent Greek Orthodox former vice-premier, Michel Murr, and
the Tachnaq — Lebanon’s largest Armenian party. But the defection of
Murr from Aoun’s parliamentary bloc and his likely new alliance with
Amin Gemayel will undoubtedly redraw the 2009 electoral landscape of
that locality, influencing the outcome of eight parliamentary seats:
four Maronite, two Greek Orthodox, one Catholic, and one Armenian
Orthodox.
Finally, Beirut’s redistricting at Doha clearly gave Saad Hariri’s
Future Movement the upper hand in determining the ten seats of the
capital’s third district, since 64 percent of its registered voters
are Sunni. Yet, the outcome of Beirut’s first and second district is
not certain and will depend largely on Armenian Orthodox
voters. Finally, if Hariri guarantees Tachnaq seats on his list, he
could consolidate additional gains for March 14, reducing Hizballah’s
representation in the capital still further.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The electoral changes agreed to in Doha are not true reforms. And if
they are ratified by parliament, the changes will serve merely to
solidify the current parties’ dominance and the ongoing political
stalemate. If that occurs, the Amal-Hizballah alliance will collect
the majority of Shiite seats, especially in the districts of the Bekaa
and the south, again denying moderate Shiite figures access to the
legislature. Walid Jumblatt will remain the chief power broker of the
Druze community, and Saad Hariri of the Sunni constituency. Only
within the Christian constituency is there any chance of a shakeup.
The Doha agreement called for the adoption of some of the Boutros
Commission reforms, but did not go far enough. It is critical, for
example, that an independent electoral commission be established and
resourced. Likewise, all candidates should have access to the media
and strict campaign financing and monitoring should be enforced. The
elections should also be conducted in one day, and other procedures
related to the elections should be observed. If possible,
international monitors and observers, including Arab delegations,
should be deployed in Lebanon well before the elections take place to
ensure the transparency and fairness of the electoral process.
In the long-term, however, even these reforms will not put Lebanon on
a new course. Only a wholesale reform of the electoral system as
envisioned under the Boutros Commission can ensure that genuine
pluralism in Lebanon is guaranteed. If the 1960 law is to provide the
basis for the upcoming elections, efforts must be made in the time
between these elections and the next to revise the system further. If
Lebanon is to break out of its sectarian ghettos, ultimately some form
of proportional representation based on larger electoral districts
will need to be adopted.
In 2005, the 2000 law was readopted out of expediency. As a
consequence, Lebanon today is on the verge of civil war. If the
mistake of 2000 is to be avoided in the coming months, the
international community, and particularly the United States, must
actively engage President Suleiman and the Lebanese government to
ensure the electoral process moves the country in a forward, not
backward, direction. As it stands today, it looks as if the false
stability of the past is being restored. For some this will be a
comfort. If the past is any example, however, avoidance of difficult
issues in Lebanon is likely to be a recipe for future conflict.
Jean-Pierre Katrib is a visiting fellow in The Washington Institute’s
Project Fikra.
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