Author: Hambardsumian Paul

AMERICANS RE-ELECT GEORGE W. BUSH AS WORLD LEADER
Turkish Probe
November 7, 2004
On Nov. 2 Americans of voting age decided upon not only their own
president, but also by definition the world leader for the remainder
of the globe. In re-electing George W. Bush with more votes than ever
recorded before for a presidential candidate in U.S. history, each
and every one of the 120 million or so voters in the United States
decided the short-term fate of much of the world as well as their own.
But was there really a choice? The answer may be “yes and no.” Yes,
there was a choice — but the choice was limited to only two: Bush or
Kerry. Yes, for the world and the United States Bush was the devil you
know with Kerry the unknown. Yes, Bush was known regarsding his fight
against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Kerry — the unknown
quantity — proved not good enough in what was essentially a wartime
election for a trial and error period of 1,460 days in the White House.
The election campaign ended on Nov. 2 neck and neck in a real
photofinish race with the United States divided right down the middle
intellectually and emotionally — as was the case in the presidential
election of 2000. Indeed, when Americans woke up the following
day to find they had as yet no clear winner and no president, many
feared it would be a repetition of four years before with merely a
change of venue; Ohio instead of Florida. As the day wore on, common
sense prevailed and with or without Ohio, John Kerry could not win,
whereupon he accordingly — and graciously — conceded defeat to the
winner, George W. Bush.
As the voting shows, the ordinary U.S. voter could not easily decide
which of the two — Bush or Kerry — was the better bet for them in
this the highest participated election in U.S. history. So it was a
gamble to foretell the popular vote, and even the crystal balls of
the exit polls proved to be wildly wrong in predicting a landslide
victoryfor John Kerry.
Americans are, generally speaking, a predictable and basically
conservative people, and their antiquated election system is the
same. Indeed, it is so complex that even they cannot understand
it, varying as it does from state to state with different rules
and even different ways of voting. In no democratic country in the
world is there anything like this mind-boggling U.S. electoral system
whereby the president is not chosen directly by the number of popular
personal votes, but by the number of Electoral College delegates on
his side. Many Americans have proposed changing this archaic system,
but to no avail. It is not the ordinary man in the mid-West or the
South who determines the next U.S. president, indeed this was the
first time since 1988 that a president received a majority of the
popular vote in addition to an Electoral College majority — this
time by almost four million votes.
In 2000 George W. Bush was announced by the Supreme Court as the winner
by a margin of only 527 votes in a country of 270 million people, Al
Gore with half a million more votes than Bush having been previously
declared the winner by the media for at least three hours. This time
every effort was made to show the system to be fair, not to rush into
a disputed decision or give Michael Moore more material for a sequel
to Fahrenheit 9/11, busy as he was with his cameras around the Florida
polling stations. In addition, for the first time ever and because
of 2000, some 100 Organization for the Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) representatives, including three Turkish members
of Parliament, monitored the elections for possible irregularities
and vote rigging as if the United States was a developing country,
not the “leader of the free world.”
In addition to choosing the president, this election was also to
decide the 435 members of the House of Representatives and one third
of the Senate. The Republican majority in both houses of Congress,
the Senate and the House of Representatives was also at stake, but in
the event the majority in the House of Representatives was increased
from one to five.
A figure of 270 of the total 538 Electoral College delegate votes
were needed to win the presidency, with the votes being given en
bloc to the winning party in each state. This cutthroat race which,
like that in 2000, had the extra candidate Nader factor, making a
difference this time of two percent as opposed to one percent last
time, was not an easy win for Bush. Like his opponent, he spent
about $ 500,000 on attack advirtisments in this the most vitriolic
and expensive election in U.S. history; about $ 5 billion.
In this wartime election, it was the swing voters who finally
decided the winner on the platform of security and the fight against
terrorism. They were to vote either (i) not to change horses in
midstream or (ii) for Kerry as the “fresh start for America,” to
quote Kerry. To the question asked in the U.S. media, “Is Kerry of
the same timber as Roosevelt, Kennedy or Clinton who built alliances
as commander in chief for a safe and secure United States and the
world?” over half of the United States said “no,” and less than half
said “yes.” Thus Bush, the incumbent, won his case, with half of
America thinking he was the right candidate to represent the heart
and soul of the country, and the other half thinking him to be the
wrong choice for a more secure United States and world.
This was an election fought on the threat of terrorism and about Iraq,
though there were shades of the original Puritan immigrants of some
four hundred years ago with the continual zealous proclamation of
“Christian and family values” throughout the campaign which doubtless
also played a considerable part in the outcome. The question was which
of the two candidates represented the heart and soul of the United
States; Kerry or Bush, with even the fringe issues of gay marriages
and stem cell research entering the equation. In this frantic race no
stone was left unturned by either side, and it seems that the balance
was finally tipped by the evangelical community in Ohio which were
a 23 percent factor in the total votes for Bush there. To quote a
voter in the critical state of Ohio, “The people of America are far
more biblically centred than is generally realised.”
We also witnessed the last minute TV intervention of Osama bin Laden,
doubtless designed to influence the election in Kerry’s favour, though
it turned out to have the opposite effect, making many Americans
vote for Bush to show that they would not be intimidated. It is an
irony of history that President Bush should have Osama bin Laden to
thank for his unintended support and for four further years to spend
searching for him.
With up to 16 million new and young voters, these first timers
were expected to tip the gold scale balance in favour of Kerry,
but the results show young voters to have been the same percentage
in this frantic race as in that of 2000, and no more. Al Gore had
won 90 percent of the black vote in 2000 and in this election 18 to
24-year-olds, Catholics, singles and Hispanics were expected to vote
for Kerry, with two to three percent of voters undecided on the eve
of the election.
>>From an international perspective, when all is said and done,
we, the silent majority outside the United States, ordinary America
watchers, friends, allies and partners can only stand on the sidelines
as well-wishers, though our common future is closely bound and at
stake, as was the case in the Afghanistan war after Sept. 11, and as
it is now in the chaotic Iraq war. The first priority of President
Bush in his second term should be to solve the Iraq debacle, which
he owes to the Iraqi people, and perhaps it is not a vain hope that
he will heed the advice and warning of his friend Tony Blair to seek
“reconciliation in a fractured world,” to “recognise that this will
not be achieved by military might alone”, and to “find a just solution
to the Palestinian question, the source of so much resentment in the
wider Middle East and the reason for the roots of so much terrorism.”
But have we seen any multilateral, rather than unilateral, leanings in
this president so far? Did President Bush care to ask his NATO allies
for their opinion before his “pre-emptive strike” against Saddam? No,
he did not bother, as he already knew the answer. Did he care about the
advice of the United Arms Inspectors when they asked for more time to
search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? No, he did not. So Bush
in his first term as president acted alone for the United States most
of the time as a Texas lone ranger, despite the hotch-potch “Coalition
of the Willing” that he founded, minus Turkey, as makeshift partners
in the war against Saddam. In his new term in the Oval Office, his
friends and allies will require from President Bush more understanding
than imposition, more co-operation than independent action.
As regards Turkey, the Turkish Parliament’s decision in March 2003
to opt out of the Pentagon’s military plans to invade Iraq from the
north was a political shock for the United States, coming just three
short months after Bush and Erdogan showed themselves in the White
House photo sessions as “arm to arm, shoulder to shoulder” friends
and strategic partners in peace and war, with Bush patting Erdogan
on the back as “an honest man who can be trusted.”
After the March parliamentary rejection, in the eyes of the U.S.
public, Turkey was branded as a traitor, although conversely in Europe
it was praised for its “democratic decision.” President Bush was
reportedly so angry that he did not want to hear mention of Erdogan or
Turkey again. He and his administration seemed unaware that even if the
parliamentary motion had been passed, neither Turkish public opinion,
nor the leaders and people of Iraq, approved a Turkish presence or
intervention there, and that refusal of the motion caused considerable
popular relief in both countries.
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was not welcome in Washington DC for many
months, with the official line being that, “Turkey had disappointed
and let down the United States in Iraq.” The Kurdish-U.S. strategic
partnership replaced the Turkish-American alliance and partnership
of half a century’s standing, and it took nearly a year to put
Turkey-U.S. relations back on track and convince President Bush that
Turks were not renegade friends or traitors to the U.S. alliance and
interests because of their (mistaken) democratic vote against a joint
Turkish-U.S. intervention in Iraq. But this is all history now.
While the Bush period of 2000 to 2004 saw a marked improvement in
Turkish-U.S. Trade, now balanced at around $ 7 billion, the Bush push
into Iraq has cost Turkey a loss of trade and investment in that
country. It has also endangered regional stability, with increased
Kurdish influence and power over U.S. policies bringing the threat
of civil war to northern Iraq. This is a matter for great concern
to immediate neighbour Turkey and other countries in the area with
Bush’s threat of Iran and Syria as an “axis of evil,” or rogue states,
creating shock waves in the region.
The abiding heritage of the Bush first-term administration, with
the help of crusader and freudian slips, was to revive the “those
who are not with us are against us” dictum, and especially with the
“axis of evil” doctrine to encourage anti-Islam attitudes in the
wake of Sept 11, while in turn provoking a surge in anti-American
attitudes throughout the world. His next target must be to correct,
ameliorate and change this perception. As Christiane Ammanpour put
it, “President Bush is spectacularly unpopular outside of the United
States.” The continental rift between the United States and Europe was
blamed on President Bush and his policies, with continental Europe
generally preferring Catholic French-speaking Kerry. Among the many
bridges that need to be built, President Bush needs to build them
with the European Union.
Where Turkey is concerned, it must be granted that President Bush
genuinely and vocally supported Turkey’s candidature to the EU,
though his active help proved somewhat counterproductive by hurting EU
leaders’ pride and sensitivities as they considered he was interfering
in their business. But it must have been Bush’s definite push for
Turkey in Helsinki which helped to guarantee its candidacy. It should
be mentioned, however, that Turkey’s getting closer to the EU does not
necessarily mean that she is moving away from the United States. On
the U.S. Armenian lobby’s continuing claims of “genocide,” President
Bush did not appease them but stopped at the “tragic events of 1915”
so as not to hurt Turkey’s deep sensitivities, while candidate Kerry
was on record for his pro-Armenian sympathies, and reportedly had
to be educated as to where Turkey was, what Turkey is good for, and
why it is detrimental to Turkish-American relations to recognise the
“crime of genocide” as claimed by some Americans of Armenian origin.
Bush, on the other hand, showed that he was educated and informed
on Turkey. While friendships are basically between countries, not
incumbent party leaders, it is a big plus that he and Erdogan have
such good chemistry. Even if it was only skin-deep, he and his wife
charmed Istanbul and Ankara on their visit to the NATO Summit in June
2004, praising Turkish food, especially the pear dessert, and the
“beautiful country,” though security considerations did not allow his
public relations efforts to go as far as that of President Clinton and
the famous picture of the baby clutching his nose. While in Turkey he
also took the opportunity to market his greater Middle East Project by
giving prominence to Turkey as a model for a democratic and Islamic
country which, while doubtless well-meant, created many ifs and buts
in Turkish minds as well as in Arab and Islamic countries.
Israel and Russia preferred Bush to Kerry for the reason that they
see him as a leader in the war against terrorism. The Arab world and
China, on the other hand, blamed George W. Bush for being pro-Israel
and responsible for the Iraq war and showed preference for Kerry.
Turkish leaders were careful not to make their secret choice public,
though it was implied that they preferred to see the man they knew
in the White House, rather than have to start all over again.
President Bush was returned to power in an election to a great extent
dominated by the three “Gs” — God, Guns and Gays, but most likely
the deciding element was simply that “he is a likeable guy” and
“one of us,” the preferred image of the ordinary American.
So welcome back, George W. Bush, as president-elect, in the hope of
a safer and more peaceful world where the United States takes more
trouble to integrate and co-operate and win the hearts and minds
of all the citizens everywhere, including that half of your country
which voted against you and your policies.
Yuksel Soylemez

GENOCIDE MUSEUM
Azg/Arm
6 Nov 04
Pan-Armenian Establishment In Center of Washington
The issue of Washington Museum of Armenian Genocide hasn’t been
touched in the Diaspora press for many years. Recently, Alin
Grigorian, reporter of The Armenian Mirror Spectator weekly, informed
in the October 23 issue of the newspaper that “the program is in
progress and the money accumulation is continuing.”
Ruben Adalian, Executive Director of the Armenian National Institute,
explained that the institution he leads has become a branch for
accumulating money for the museum-memorial and thanks to their efforts
they managed to secure one third of the program’s probable cost
($100million). The first donorwas Anush Matevosian who presented $3,5
million in 1996. Gerard Gafeschian followed her example and donated
$15 million for the project. Hrayr Hovnanian joined them by giving $5
million. Sarkis Kechejian (Texas), Nshan Kechejian (Massachusetts) and
James Keshishian were among the donors as well. “That would be an
absurd to miss such an opportunity. Each member of the American
Armenian communityis confident that the project will be a success,”
Adalian stated, emphasizing that the museum will become rich annals
for important materials and sources.
Adalian was the author and the editor of many books on Armenian
Genocide. He taught at John Hopkins and Georgetown Universities. He
did his PhD in history at UCLA.
The museum that is situated in the corner of streets N14 and “G” in
Washington, in the former building of the National Bank, is very close
to the White House. Adalian didn’t specify about the deadlines of the
museumâ=80=99s final exterior, but he considered the issue of choosing
a high-class architect. They received 90 applications, but the members
of the board that makes decisionswill chose the one who will be able
to combine the features of the traditional American architecture with
the Armenian national atmosphere, the Armenian history and the
Armenian Genocide, particularly. It is expected that a quarter of a
million of visitors will attend the museum annually. Besides the
exhibitionhall, the museum will have conference halls and research
centers. The main building of the Armenian National institute will be
situated there too, and besides its current mission will unfold
researches, as well.
“The museum is sure to become a pan-Armenian center. We are sure that
everyone will participate in accumulating the exponents,” Ruben
Adalian said.
By Hakob Tsulikian

US elections and faded hopes
Azg/Arm
5 Nov 04
Harut Sassounian, publisher of The California Currier comments with
pain on the US elections: “Kerry’s presidency could greatly support
the Armenian Cause. We should feel proud for supporting the side that
was more beneficial for the Cause. This is not the end, life goes on
and our struggle carries on”.
Sassounian does not think that George Bush’s re-election will have a
negative turn-up for American-Armenian relations. “I think the
relations will remain the same. Politicians don’t have personal
revenge. Just the contrary, Bush’s victorious supporters can even make
a friendly gesture”, Sassounian said.
Co-chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party Yervand Azatian informed
in a phone talk with Azg Daily that not all Armenians voted for
Kerry. Those whoput first the Armenian Cause voted for Kerry but there
were also Armenians who voted for Bush out of economic and ideological
views, Azatian said.
Yervand Azatian thinks that the political parties propping Kerry up
will not face difficulties in their later activity as America is a
democratic country. “There are no worries from this point of view but
on the other hand, Bush will carry on his policy in the Caucasus and
Armenia will even more get isolated as a result”, Azatian said adding
that the US is perusing its goals in Azerbaijan as regards the oil and
Georgia is viewed as potential NATO member. “In America’s Caucasian
policy Armenia is more weightless”, Azatian said.
Arpi Vardanian, regional president of the Armenian Assembly of America
in Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, also noted that not all Armenians
voted for John Kerry. “I don’t think that Armenian-American relations
will undergoserious changes as this is Bush’s second term. We have to
keep on working as we did for the good of Armenian and American
nations”, Vardanian said.
Another source preferring to remain unknown informed from Washington
that Bush ‘s re-election will by no means influence Armenian-American
relations. “Armenians who voted for Kerry like myself were led by the
hope that Armenian-American relations will get even tighter with Kerry
as a president. But there were minuses in Kerry’s calculations as
well. For instance, he was planning to hand over America’s Eurasian
and Caucasian policy lynchpins to its allies. Turkey is playing that
role in our region. This means Kerry was going to implement regional
policy with the hands of Turkey”, the source informed and added that
Kerry’s pro-Armenian activity of the past still made them turn to him.
“Bush’s stance differs. He builds direct relations with foreign
countries, i.e. his policy is bilateral. If Armenia is ready to come
closer to USA then the latter is ready to maintain closer
cooperation. All depends on Armeniaâ=80=99s pose. Will Armenia send a
group to Iraq? If Yes, USA will consider Armenia a normal state. If
not, Armenia will be viewed as a non-important country”, the source
informed.
By Tatoul Hakobian

ARMENIAN FROM BEIRUT WELCOMED IN WORLD OF FASHION
Azg/Arm
4 Nov 04
Touching upon the Julien McDonald’s fashion show program held in
London, The Guardian informed that the master of brilliancy who
threatened to leave London for Milan last year, this time decided to
move to New York. “I like London but I can’t earn enough money here,”
he told the reporter of the newspaper.
The most successful part of his show was the retrospective of the
clothes fashionable in 1930s and 1970s. The mini shows of five
designers-beginners also attracted the attention of the
spectators. Particularly, The Guardian pointed out Karen Demirchian’s
collection called “Kardem” Karen Demirchian is an Armenian from
Lebanon. The Guardian called his collection “a ray of hope” that
contradicts other collections of “ugly, not wearable and extremely
badly represented” clothes.
Representing Karen, the newspaper writes that he was born in 1975 in
Beirut but he works in Paris, at present. “In his collection the
appearance and the quality were in harmony and that made the
collection notable among the collections of other promising young
designers. The brilliancy of the lines, the specter of the colors
reminds of Hussein Chalanyan’s days of fashion in London,” the
reporter of The Guardian writes.
By Hakob Tsulikian

EU ready to accept any Azeri-Armenian peace agreement, envoy
Trend news agency
29 Oct 04
Baku, 29 October: The European Union (EU) is ready to accept
any agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia that would resolve
the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, Trend has quoted the EU special
representative in the South Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie, as saying at
a news conference today at the end of his two-day visit to Azerbaijan
(27-29 October).
The EU is interested in the establishment of fair peace between the
two countries and is ready to help them achieve this, he said.
Talvitie added that the EU is interested in a bilateral dialogue
between the parties to the conflict and the settlement process within
the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group. He also dismissed media reports
that the EU had prepared suggestions on the conflict.
“Our job is to render assistance to the conflicting parties,” the
envoy said.
The diplomat expressed his satisfaction with the visit to Azerbaijan
and the negotiations held with the authorities and opposition. He
said the talks had mainly focused on the EU’s New Neighbourhood policy.
In his meeting with the chairman of the Azerbaijani Central Electoral
Commission, Talvitie gave some recommendations on the forthcoming
municipal and parliamentary elections in the country. The EU
representative spoke highly about the intention of opposition parties
to stand in the municipal elections.
Touching on the court system in Azerbaijan, Talvitie said the work
of the judicial system should be developed in all the three regional
countries. He said it was necessary to make it independent. Attempts
are being made in Azerbaijan to reverse this process and these attempts
should be stopped, he said.
He also said a report would be prepared on the organization’s
cooperation with the South Caucasus countries, including Azerbaijan.
“It will be a constructive report and we will try to reflect everything
in an objective way,” Talvitie said.
While in Baku, Heikki Talvitie met Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev,
Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and ambassadors of EU member-states.

Beyond the nuclear stalemate
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Asia Times, Hong Kong
30 Oct. 2004
TEHRAN – As expected, two rounds of talks between Iran and the European
Union Big Three (EU-3) – France, Germany and Britain – have failed to
resolve the growing dispute over Iran’s quest to produce low-enriched
uranium. In response to the EU-3’s demand that Tehran halt enrichment
activities, Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, this week
denounced what he called an “oppressive and unreasonable request” and
warned that Iran may terminate nuclear dialogue if the other side
persists in asking Iran to forego its “inherent right”.
The European negotiators in Vienna, including a representative from the
EU, refrained from calling the talks a failure, however, and, seeking
to salvage a seemingly sinking ship of diplomacy, expressed hope for a
more fruitful result in the next round, reportedly scheduled on
November 5 in Paris, just a couple of weeks before the United Nations’
nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
meets in late November to review the growing storm over Iran’s program.
The EU has warned Iran it will back United States calls for Iran to be
reported to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions at the
November 25 IAEA meeting if enrichment suspension is not verifiably in
place by then.
>>From Iran’s vantage point, in light of some 15 visits by the IAEA
inspectors in the past couple of years, the 23-member IAEA board of
governors should “close the file” on Iran – or face the prospects of
Iran withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But at the same
time, not every aspect of the EU-3’s “package offer” has been appraised
negatively by Tehran.
On the contrary, Iranian officials tried to put a positive spin on the
offer, which included promises from the EU that it would help Iran
acquire nuclear fuel “at market prices” and also support its light
water facility, as well as Iran’s bid to join the World Trade
Organization if Iran agrees to suspend its nuclear enrichment program
pending a “long term agreement”. A spokesman for Iran’s Supreme
National Security Council interpreted this as a step forward from the
previous, US-led demand that Iran suspend its enrichment activity
“indefinitely”. On the eve of the second Vienna talks, Iran’s top
negotiator articulated a sentiment widespread among Iranian officials
for a European deal that “would be thicker on the positive and thinner
on the negative”.
Meanwhile, the United States and Israel, playing anxious observers,
made a concerted effort to up the ante, with an Arabic paper in London
circulating a “reliable rumor from Washington” regarding an impending
strike by US forces against various Iranian facilities “including
certain mosques”, and Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon airing his
fear of “Iran’s existential threat to Israel”.
Concerning the latter, there are reasons to take such fears with a
grain of salt. For one thing, it was Iran under Cyrus the Great who
freed the Jews enslaved by the Babylonians and issued a decree allowing
them to return to their homeland. Even in today’s Islamic Republic,
with a population steeped in ancient history, it is hard to see how
Iran would ever venture to drop nuclear bombs on Israel, killing not
only the Jews but also the Muslim Arabs inhabiting Israel. Israel is
widely regarded as an “out of area” country by most Iranian foreign
policy makers, and while Iran remains ethically committed to the
struggle of Palestinian people for their right to self-determination,
this does not, and for the most part has not, translated into any
Iranian “over commitment” to the Palestinian people.
Nor is the situation of Lebanese Shi’ites, led by militant group
Hezbollah, any different, substantively speaking. Iran no doubt enjoys
its hard-earned sphere of influence in Lebanon, after 23 years of
military and financial investment, and has encouraged the Hezbollah to
take the parliamentary road to power. Thus, Israel’s paranoia about an
Iranian bomb in Hezbollah’s hands imperiling Israel’s existence is a
tissue of an unrealistic nightmare scenario built around a caricature
of the Muslim “other” as irrational zealots, when in fact, a cursory
glance at Iran’s foreign policy indicates the rule of sober national
interests over ideology.
>>From the Persian Gulf, where Iran has entered into low-security
agreements with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as shared energy
projects with nearly all the oil states of the Gulf, to Central
Asia-Caucasus, where Iran has promoted regional cooperation through the
Economic Cooperation Organization, and, in addition, has acted as a
crisis manager (eg, in Tajkistan and Nagorno-Karabakh), Iran’s foreign
policy has been widely praised by its neighbors, including Russia, as
constructive, pragmatic, and peace-oriented.
For US and Israeli officials – and their media mouthpieces – to
overlook this and, instead, attribute an out-of-control, purely
ideological orientation to Iran’s foreign policy, begs the question of
objectivity on their part; their virulent Iran-bashing actually serves
as a self-fulfilling prophecy, since by causing the further wrath of
Iranians by their pre-scripted policy of sanctions and isolation of
Iran, Tehran’s hardliners turn out to be the major beneficiaries, much
to the detriment of Iran’s liberalist reformers.
This aside, it is important, particularly for Europe, to consider the
fact that Iran is still leaving the door open for the extension of
Iran’s voluntary suspension of the fuel cycle. Hence, the glass may
actually be half full, and the EU-3 should ultimately embrace this
opportunity to seal an agreement with Iran, even though it may be short
of their hoped-for maximum objective. To do so, however, the EU-3’s
leadership must recognize that Iran is not another Iraq, and that with
its strong military and a population twice the size of the rest of
Persian Gulf combined, Iran must be treated with a great deal more
deference than Iraq.
After all, Iran is a main source of energy for Europe, both now and
more so in the future, and any UN sanctions on Iran’s oil industry will
instantly translate into higher prices at the European gas pumps,
hardly a pleasant prospect for the EU as a whole. Not only that, some
EU countries, such as Norway, Spain, Greece, and Italy, are likely to
oppose the EU-3’s hard diplomacy toward Tehran in light of their
cordial economic and trade ties with Iran. This means that the
collateral damage of a failure of EU-3’s Iran diplomacy may be a lot
more widespread than hitherto thought; that is, it may introduce policy
fractures inside the European Union itself.
With the stakes so high, a prudent European approach to the Iranian
nuclear stalemate might be explored along the following lines: A
balanced package whereby Iran would agree to a temporary, six months to
a year’s halt in its enrichment activities as part of a “confidence
building” measure, in exchange for which Iran would implement its
declared policy of “full transparency” and allow unfettered access of
IAEA inspectors to the nuclear facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and
elsewhere in Iran, per the terms of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.
Such an agreement may not allay Europe’s fear of Iran going nuclear
altogether, but at least it provides institutional mechanisms for close
monitoring of Iran’s nuclear programs, which in turn, minimizes the
risks or threats of Iran telescoping these programs to weaponization.
If combined with parallel initiatives, such as an Iran-EU security
dialogue, this initiative would likely be effective in terms of the
long-term process of dissuading Iran from the path of acquiring nuclear
weapons, a path that in the current milieu of a sole Western superpower
acting like a “wild elephant”, to quote an Iranian official, is
theoretically conducive to the idea of Iranian nuclear deterrence.
Historically, rising insecurity has been a prime motive force for
nuclear weapons, and Iran may turn out to be no exception, in the long
haul, if the US and Israel fail to address Iran’s security worries.
For the moment, such theoretical concerns do not appear to have
influenced the drift of actual Iranian policies, notwithstanding the
repeated public pledges of Iran’s leader to refrain from pursuing
nuclear weapons considered “amoral”. Yet, the dictates of national
security interests may dictate otherwise in the future, all the more
reason to consider the issue of Iran’s nuclear program within the
larger framework of regional and global security, instead of apart from
it.
Unfortunately, the US and some European officials often overlook that
other countries too may have legitimate national security worries, a
serious oversight caused by their consistent Euro-centrism and
US-centrism. As long as a clean break from such arcane, underlying
security conceptualizations, or a cognitive map, has not materialized,
it is hard to see how the two sides in this stalemated negotiation can
achieve a healthy, mutually satisfactory, breakthrough.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions
in Iran’s Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and Iran’s Foreign Policy
Since 9/11, Brown’s Journal of World Affairs, co-authored with former
deputy foreign minister Abbas Maleki, No 2, 2003. He teaches political
science at Tehran University.

THERE ARE MANY SPIES IN ARMENIA
A1+
29-10-2004
“Unambiguously USSR was a dictatorship and the political prisoners made
a part of it. Only 70 members of ‘Union of National Self-Determination’
were political prisoners during the Soviet years”, Paruyr Hayrikyan,
Chairman of UNSD announced at a press conference.
October 30 is the Day of Political Prisoners of USSR. According to
Hayrikyan, in the 1970’s to come out of the international isolation
the leaders of Soviet Union announced they accepted Helsinki Agreement
of Europe Security and Cooperation underlining protection of human
rights. Agreement demanded that there would be no political prisoners
in a country.
But Hayrikyan says the Soviet leaders kept announcing to the world
that those arrested are criminals and not political prisoners and
supplementing the army of political prisoners.
Mr. Hayrikyan thinks there aren’t political prisoners in Armenia but
the number of spies causes concern. “Imagine a state where the majority
of Parliament members make spies and the rest are the people depending
on them. Since the owners of the spies know that their ‘activity’ –
establishment of the spy network is illegal, they try to lay their
hands on everything possible in a lawful way”, he stated.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Vatican hesitant on Turkey’s bid for EU membership
Vatican, Oct. 29 (CWNews.com) – The Vatican has not yet offered
any official statement on the prospect of Turkey’s entry into the
European Union, but believes that the union should cover Europe “from
the Atlantic to the Urals,” according to Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo.
In a lengthy interview with the Italian daily La Stampa , the Vatican’s
Secretary for Relations with States did make the observation that if
Turkey enters the European Union, the government of that predominantly
Muslim country will be obliged to fulfill the same political criteria
as all other member-states, including the guarantee of religious
freedom. And that guarantee, the archbishop added, should be “not
only ensured in the constitution, legislation, and administration,
but also protected concretely and effectively in the social realm.”
Archbishop Lajolo stressed that “the Holy See is not afraid of
enlarging Europe.” He pointed out that in the past the Vatican
has supported the application of Eastern European countries for EU
membership. In determining which states should enter the Union, he
said, “The decisive point is that the new Europe should have a deep
internal cohesion.”
The archbishop said that European leaders should “pay more attention”
to other countries that have already indicated a desire to join
the Union, such as Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Ukraine. Georgia,
and Armenia. These countries, he observed, are clearly aligned with
Europe’s cultural tradition.
Earlier this week, Bishop Piero Parolin– the deputy to Archbishop
Lajolo at the Vatican Secretariat of State– had also expressed
sympathy for the Eastern European nations seeking EU entry. The goal
of the Holy See, Bishop Parolin said, is “not so much to promote their
entry, but to facilitate the return of the Eastern European countries
to the European family, from which they were excluded during their
years of totalitarian oppression.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Oct ober 28, 2004
Another Side of the Georgian-Russian Conflict
by Christopher Deliso
balkanalysis.com
When it comes to coverage of the ongoing feud between Georgia and Russia,
the Western mass media have a tendency to draw their testimony from
“official” sources – political leaders, think tank analysts and the
representatives of semi-political organizations such as the OSCE and
Western-funded NGOs. However, with only a few exceptions, the voice of the
common people is rarely heard. This tacit media complicity all too often
invalidates the viewpoint of regular Georgians or Russians as being
irrelevant, while it ends up bolstering the policies of their increasingly
bellicose governments or blessing the programs of allegedly populist
organizations supported from without.
Further, media articles featuring miniature maps of the Caucasus tend to be
political too. That is, while they reveal the jagged borders of far-flung
territories unknown to most outsiders, and the locations of various cities
therein, they tend to pay less heed to the geographical realities –
something which is unfortunate, considering that the history of the entire
Caucasus region has always been shaped by the exigencies of its rugged,
mountainous terrain.
Having had an interest in the country and its key problems for several
years, I endeavored on my latest trip to Georgia to visit other parts of the
country, and get a mixture of opinions that would include the testimonies of
non-official people whose lives are being affected by the decisions of their
increasingly rash leaders.
A nice place to visit: Georgia’s northern terrain is a joy to see – unless
you can’t exit.
Into the Mountains
It is less than a four-hour drive north to reach the Russian border from
Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. But the road is winding and difficult, as it
cuts through mountains that reach their peak in Mt. Kazbek (16,558 feet).
Known as the Georgian Military Highway, this historically strategic route is
marred with crater-sized potholes and disintegrates completely into dirt and
rocks at its summit, the Jvari Pass. At many points, the road is carved out
of sheer cliff faces and contains numerous built-in tunneled underpasses on
the sides – a necessity, owing to the massive snowfall this area gets in
winter. Needless to say, the views are magnificent throughout.
I negotiated this route after enlisting the services of one Tariel
Tabashidze, a 40-year-old agronomist by training who now works as a
translator for German and U.S. companies and individuals. Since the journey
is definitely too challenging for the average car, we took his brother’s
trusty white Lada Niva – the Russian answer to a Jeep. Along the way,
Tabashidze proudly recounted how the very same vehicle had been hired out a
decade ago to BBC reporter Andrew Harding for his forays into neighboring
Chechnya.
Unlike that volatile region, Georgia’s Kazbegi region is a
sparsely-populated oasis of tranquility, featuring abundant wildlife and
medieval stone churches, sprinkled with tiny villages that culminate in the
small town of Kazbegi itself, just a few miles from Russia. The proximity of
the border means that the dilapidated shops in Kazbegi and its outlying
villages are filled with Russian goods. Georgian farmers also send the
majority of their produce north for export. Unlike claims of allegiance with
Russia voiced by secessionists in Georgia’s South Ossetian and Abkhazian
provinces, Kazbegi’s Russian relationship has nothing to do with politics.
Rather, the greater distance and geographical difficulties of communicating
with Tbilisi – especially in winter, when the whole area is snowed under –
mean that the locals must rely on their connections with their much closer
neighbors to the north, and especially the regional center of Vladikavkaz.
For remote mountain villages, having connections with nearby North Ossetia,
over the Russian border, is necessary for survival.
The Border Swings Shut
However, these connections were instantly severed by the tragedy of Beslan
on Sept. 1. In the wake of this deadly terrorist attack, Russian President
Putin ordered the closure of Russia’s border with the south as a security
measure. Yet by early October, when I visited, the Kazbegi border (known as
the Upper Lars crossing) was still closed. Any security risks (had there
really been any) were long ended.
There was another factor to consider here. Almost exactly two years before,
I had traveled via helicopter to another border point – Shatili – which sits
snug on the Chechen part of the Russian border. Here, young OSCE monitors
had, two days earlier, been stopped in a remote place by a dozen heavily
armed Chechens. Luckily for them, the monitors were released, but with the
following warning: “We know all about your little camp. So if you tell the
Russians about us before two days have passed, we will destroy it.”
>>From this and many other accounts, it thus seemed that Russian charges are
justified. At least on their part of the border, Chechen terrorists did
occasionally slip in and out of the Georgian wilds. However, it was also
hard to believe that any such individual would be found standing in line,
waiting to be processed at an official border checkpoint. Whether or not the
Russians decided to close the border at Kazbegi would thus mean little for
state security.
Pressing on to the closed border checkpoint, this old woman planned to camp
overnight until it reopened.
And so even if initially understandable, the Russian border closure simply
made no sense. And, as I found, it has meant trouble for both local
Georgians and travelers trying to pass through. Elderly Makhvala Sargishvili
owns a kiosk located (literally) in a hole in the wall running outside her
tiny mountain village. Crammed inside the shop window were dusty boxes of
outdated Russian provisions. Almost all of her products came from Russia,
but with the blockage at the border she was faced with a real problem. “Life
is not so bad, but not so good, either. This problem with the border is
really difficult for us.”
These comments were shared by three farmers, Giorgi, Emzar, and Vano,
pitching hay in the idyllic mountain village of Kobi. Tomorrow would be
dog-fighting day in the village, they announced; there was simply nothing
else to do for entertainment. “There’s no TV,” said Giorgi, “and nobody has
enough money to get married. There are now 59 couples from these villages
waiting to have a wedding someday.”
Agriculture is the only source of income for these villagers, and a very
seasonal one. Within a few weeks after my visit, they predicted, the snow
would start falling. Now, with the Russian border closed, “we can neither
get goods we need nor export our produce,” lamented Vano. Geography, not
politics or ethnicity, had forced these Georgians to throw in their lot with
the Russian Ossetian population to the north.
“We feel like animals. We have been stuck here for 32 days,” said Isak
Ogosian (right).
The Stranded Armenians
However difficult the border closure was for ordinary Georgian villagers,
those most affected at the time were 25 Armenians who’d had the bad luck of
reaching the border just as the carnage in Beslan was unfolding. Some were
trying to go to Russia for work, others to return to their adopted homes in
Vladikavkaz. None of them were prepared for the ordeal that would leave them
trapped at the border for almost two months.
“We feel like animals,” growled Isak Ogosian, the group’s bearded spokesman.
“We have been stuck here for 32 days. We have to sleep sitting up in the
bus. And, despite our pleas, nobody helps us.”
Among the disconsolate bunch were old ladies, young mothers and small
children. They had little remaining money and supplies, and subsisted only
due to the help of the already impoverished locals. While Georgian media had
paid them a visit early on in the saga, nothing substantial had been done to
ameliorate their situation. The mountain chasms falling into the river – in
any other situation, hopelessly breathtaking – had become a sort of prison.
Indeed, life seemed pretty unhappy for the stranded Armenians. Some people
slept in the rusty old bus, while one old woman prepared some variety of
borscht in a metal pan. A little boy kicked one of the many crushed cans
littering the ground as if it were a soccer ball. Off to one side, a young
man snoring in a sleeping bag competed with a mangy, dozing dog. When they
couldn’t get him to wake up, Isak formed the shape of a cross on his back
with some grass, sending the rest into hysterics. It was a rare uproarious
moment for a dejected and powerless group of forgotten travelers.
“All we want is to go back to Armenia,” said Anna, 22, pictured with
daughter Angelina.
“Nobody gets to go through [the border] except important people,” charged
Elizabeta Abramovna, a retired doctor who moved to Vladikavkaz 37 years ago
with her late husband, then an official in the Soviet government. “Because
of my complaining, everyone knows about me now, the governments and media.
But still nobody helps us.” According to her, the official response to the
travelers’ requests was a perfect example of passing the buck: since the
Georgian side gave them permission to exit Georgia, it was no longer their
problem when the Russians denied them entry. The Armenian officials they had
consulted said there was nothing they could do either.
For a month the Armenians had lived with the vague promise that the border
would soon be open. Nevertheless, this endless waiting had caused some to
give up hope.
“About 12 of them want to just forget it and go back to Armenia [190 km/118
mi. to the south], where they have family,” revealed Isak. “All we need is
about $100 to hire a minibus. This situation is hard, especially for the
children,” he said, nodding at 3-year-old Angelina, an adorable and shy
little girl hiding behind her mother, Anna. “All we want is to go back to
Armenia, just to get at least to the [Armenian] border,” said Anna. “After
that we can find a way, somehow.” And that is how we left them, in the
chilly afternoon preceding yet another spectacular Caucasus sunset.
Yet the saga continued. Only on Oct. 22 was the border finally reopened.
Armenian President Robert Kocharian “hailed” the event as “evidence that
tension in North Ossetia is subsiding after the Beslan events.” In other
words, not only did his government fail to help his own stranded citizens,
but the president went out of his way to toe the Kremlin’s official line on
the reason for the border having been closed in the first place.
For his part, Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili, appearing together with
Kocharian, could only grumble that the border closure “has reminded us once
again that sales markets should be looked for not only in Russia.”
Wonderful. Yet unless Saakashvili proposes to detonate hundreds of miles of
mountain range, it doesn’t seem likely that the north Georgians of Kazbegi
will change their habits.
A woman enjoys the trapped bus’ spacious sleeping quarters.
The Ossetian Question
And why should they? “We have no problem with the Ossetian people,” said my
earnest guide, Mr. Tabashidze. “It is the politicians who create these
conflicts.” His opinion was echoed by villagers we surveyed. “For us, it
should not be a problem to visit a doctor, say, or go in the Russian shops
there [in Vladikavkaz],” said Giorgi the farmer from Kobi. “This is our
normal life.”
Indeed, though the South Ossetian “government” desires to join up with its
kin on the other side of the border – Russia’s North Ossetia, where the
Beslan saga unfolded – there is no wide-ranging ethnic hostility as has been
the case in the Balkans, for instance. The Georgians of Kazbegi, at least,
have long been trading with and visiting the Ossetians just over the border,
and vice versa.
Hostilities often seem to be manipulated by the decisions of powerful
leaders far above and far removed from the areas in question. Indeed, as a
Georgian soldier unlucky enough to be serving in the South Ossetian “neutral
zone” told one recent visitor, “this isn’t between us and the Ossetians.
It’s between us and Russia.”
“We have no problem with the Ossetian people,” said interpreter Tariel
Tabashidze. “It is the politicians who create these conflicts.”
Threats of War
However, the continued brinkmanship between these two major players
is having its predictable local effect. “We will not wait long,”
threatened an unnamed local from the Georgian village of Abasheni, on
the edge of the neutral zone. “We will wait two or three days and then
we will also shoot at [the South Ossetian town of] Tskhinvali.” The
threat follows weeks of agitation from Georgians who claim they are
being targeted by Ossetian paramilitaries during overnight outbursts
of violence. The Georgians blame the Ossetian side for provoking
the attacks, while the Ossetians are equally adamant that it’s the
Georgian army that is inciting them. For his part, the Russian major
general heading the Joint Peacekeeping Force in South Ossetia told
the protesting Georgians that he “cannot control everybody.” The
Georgians question whether Russia is even interested in controlling
their Ossetian charges. In this vacuum of responsibility, however,
“both sides are laying mines despite the pleas of OSCE to stop,”
and talk has again returned to war.
As if to set an example, Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili
last week started a three-week military training course for army
reservists. President Saakashvili – who wants to ban anyone who
hasn’t undergone such training from taking up a civil post – sees
the militarization of Georgian society as indispensable for proving
the unity of the “Georgian nation.” These perhaps ominous developments
occur at a time when the Georgian government is beefing up its military
presence in the conflict area. The Ossetians are likewise digging in.
It was the international shock over Beslan that seems to have hushed
the Georgian government’s warmongering words in September. After
all, the summer months had been “hot,” peaking in late August
with Saakashvili’s memorable declaration that Georgians should
prepare for imminent war with Russia. However, if these recent
developments are any indicator, it appears that sufficient time has
passed to allow for heated words to once again shape the political
discourse. Unfortunately, this will also mean that foreign media
coverage of Georgia remains obsessed with the breathless statements
of officials – and not the common people they allegedly empowered
with last year’s “Rose Revolution.”
–Boundary_(ID_jm+OctOuYp3uA9QGqJy7wQ)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

COOPERATION BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA IN THE FIELD OF ECOLOGY IMPOSSIBLE
[October 26, 2004, 21:47:01]
AzerTag, Azerbaijan
26 Oct. 2004
Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the field of ecology is
impossible since the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh conflict is
not settled. Minister of ecology and natural resources of Azerbaijan
Huseyngulu Bagirov at conference of the ministers of environment of
the countries of the East Europe, Caucasus and the Central Asia,
which was taken place in Tbilisi, stated it. Officials have taken
part in work of conference from the European Union, the USA, and also
representatives of some international organizations.
As was informed to correspondent of AzerTAj in the press-service of
the ministry of ecology and natural resources, during discussions
around the question on regional cooperation and presentation of the
report “Environment and the initiative of safety on the Southern
Caucasus”, prepared by OSCE, UNDP and the Program of the United
Nations on environment, the head of the Azerbaijan delegation,
minister Huseyngulu Bagirov in reply to the offer of the international
organizations concerning cooperation with Armenia, has called them to
act from real positions and has stated that in conditions of absence
of safety for life of people in zone of the conflict there can not
be a speech about the solution of problems of ecological safety in
any way. It has been marked, that as a result of occupational policy
of Armenia, serious damage was caused to the unique nature of region,
and natural riches of Azerbaijan are plundered. Non-alignment of some
countries of region to the conventions regulating ecological questions
of trans-national character, prevents solution of available problems,
in particular, connected with the Kur River.
At the conference, also were discussed realization of ecological
strategy for the countries of the East Europe, Caucasus and Central
Asia adopted at the Kiev conference of ministers of environment of the
European countries last year. The head of the Azerbaijan delegation
who has acted at the Conference, devoted to questions of partnership
of private and public sectors at realization of strategy, has told
about the successes achieved in Azerbaijan in sphere of preservation
of environment, and on the basis of concrete examples has informed
on synthesis of private and public sectors in the decision of
environmental problems.
During discussion of the questions of partnership between the
countries-participants of strategy and international donors,
the Azerbaijani minister, speaking about donors in solution of
environmental problems, with the purpose to reduce dependence on the
donor assistance, has expressed a wish about more effective utilization
of national resource.
Minister Huseyngulu Bagirov has carried out in Tbilisi also a number of
meetings – with the prime minister of Georgia Zurab Zhvania, minister
of protection of environment and natural resources of this country
Tamara Lebanidze and minister of Moldova – Konstantin Mikhailesku,
and also with heads of the international organizations.