Turkish Cabinet meeting to address Rubinyan-Kilic talks

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 17:47,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 17, ARMENPRESS. The results of the recent meeting of the special envoys of Armenia and Turkey Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kilic will be touched upon at the upcoming session of the Turkish government, CNN Turk reports.

The session will take place on Wednesday.

The special envoys of Armenia and Turkey for dialogue between the two countries met on January 14 in Moscow, Russia.

Arman Tatoyan discussed issues related to the rights of Armenian community with Kazakh counterpart

panorama.am
Armenia – Jan 10 2022

Armenia’s Human Rights Defender Arman Tatoyan on Monday held a phone conversation with Human Rights Commissioner of Kazakhstan Elvira Azimova to discuss issues related to the rights of Armenian community in light of recent developments in Kazakhstan. 

As the Ombudsman’s Office said in a press statement, during the Azimova stressed that issues of the rights of the Armenian community remain in the center of her attention and expressed readiness to offer support upon necessity. 

During the conversation, Ombudsman Tatoyan expressed condolences over the victims of the ongoing developments in the country. 

1st meeting of the special envoys of Armenia, Turkey will take place on January 14 in Moscow

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 20:38, 5 January, 2022

YEREVAN, JANUARY 5, ARMENPRESS. The first meeting of the special envoys of Armenia and Turkey will take place on January 14 in Moscow, ARMENPRESS reports the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of Armenia Vahan Hunanyan wrote on his Facebook page.

Deputy President of the National Assembly of Armenia Ruben Rubinyan will represent Armenia, while former Ambassador of Turkey to the USA Serdar Kılıç will represent Turkey.




Why Reconciliation With Azerbaijan Is Economically Beneficial To Armenia? – OpEd [Azeri Opinion]

Dec 28 2021

By Ali Mammadov*

The 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in the liberation of occupied territories by Azerbaijan and put an end to a three-decade-long conflict. The war had significant effects on the economies of both countries and is expected to continue to have several long-term impacts for years. The armed conflict was costly for both sides, but it was especially costly for Armenia which had a smaller economy. Apparently, Azerbaijan is now at an advantageous position benefitting from the lands and the natural resources and energy sources they contain, while Armenia became deprived of that ability. Undoubtedly, the economic benefits of the liberation of the occupied territories for Azerbaijan are almost countless. However, it can be said that the resolution of the conflict and improvement in relationships can eventually benefit almost everyone in the region, including Armenia. 

Since investors usually prefer a stable environment, the conclusion of the three-decades-long conflict may help both sides attract more foreign investment in the long run. Eventually, GDPs of both countries can potentially rise moderately as a result of increased FDI.  The stability is also likely to rise the credit ratings of both countries over time and thereby lower the interest rates for both countries. However, investors will not be the only ones to perceive Armenia as more attractive. The absence of conflict may also attract more tourists from all around the world. As a result of higher foreign investments in the region, the number of business-related travels may increase as well.

Also, it is known that peace and stability generally promote economic growth. The absence of threat may lead to a reduction in military spending and allow Armenia to spend more funds on other areas, such as public projects and human capital, and strengthen its economy.

Furthermore, the funds that were supposed to be spent on the occupied territories, especially the Karabakh region, can now be spent on other projects. According to Berlin Economics, Armenia could save up to 3% of GDP annually by not distributing funds and loans to support the economy of the Karabakh region. (1) It should be noted that the loans were rarely profitable for Armenia. Usually, the receiving side of the interstate loans would have difficulties in paying the debt and cause problems for the country. Also, despite the high costs associated with supporting the region, Armenia was never able to make full use of the occupied territory since it had a scarce population to inhabit the region and underdeveloped infrastructure to fully exploit the natural resources. The maintenance of the region could sometimes be excessively costly for such a small economy.

Additionally, the absence of conflict may improve Armenia’s relationships with Azerbaijan and Turkey, the two countries that have imposed blockade on Armenia and closed borders with it since the beginning of the three-decades-long conflict. The blockade had two major negative consequences for Armenia: undiversified transportation routes and the opportunity cost of not having trade relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Except for the two countries, Armenia has only Georgia and Iran as its neighbors. Most of Armenia’s exports to Europe are still being transported through Georgia. Exports pass through two routes in Georgia: The Port of Poti and the Upper Lars transport corridors. Neither of the routes provides ease for Armenia because Poti causes the loss of too much time and is costly, while Upper Lars is uncomfortable and risky. (2) Undiversified trade routes also meant that if Georgia stopped passing Armenian goods deliberately or unintentionally Armenia would face serious problems.

For example, in 2008, a rail bridge was destroyed in Georgia, and this caused difficulties in the transportation of goods from Armenia. The situation eventually increased gas prices. (3) Therefore, it is in Armenia’s best interest to add more transportation links to mitigate the risks associated with relying heavily on one country for transportation and to lower the costs of transportation. In addition to the exports to Europe, Armenia can also transport goods to Asian countries, such as Kazakhstan, more efficiently through Azerbaijan’s Caspian Sea ports eventually as a result of improved relationships. 

Armenia’s exports have been generally low. Trade volume can be improved by having a better relationship with Turkey and Azerbaijan and having open borders. Though Armenia has been able to import from Turkey, the blockade has prohibited it from exporting to the country.  In fact, if the borders open and trade relations normalize Turkey can potentially become one of the major trade partners of Armenia.  In addition, Armenia may start buying gas from Azerbaijan, one of the biggest gas suppliers in the region, and diversify the list of countries it purchases gas from, which includes Russia and Iran only.  This would allow Armenia to diversify away the risks and find better terms when purchasing gas. 

In short, although the war had significant negative impacts on the economy of Armenia, it still has the chance to benefit from stability and peace by cooperating with its neighbors. In order to develop a sustainable economy, Armenia must not lose the chance to improve its ties with its neighbors and must contribute to the maintenance of peace in the region. 

*Ali Mammadov is a Master of Arts in International Relations student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and has earned a Bachelor of Science Degree from George Washington University. Currently, he is a visiting researcher at Economics Research Institute and writes blog posts on his Medium blog.

References:

De Waal, T. (2021). In the South Caucasus, Can New Trade Routes Help Overcome a History of Conflict? Carnegie Europe. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/11/08/in-south-caucasus-can-new-trade-routes-help-overcome-history-of-conflict-pub-85729

Killough, A. (2008). Armenia in Need of an Alternative Export-Import Route. The Jamestown Foundation.  https://jamestown.org/program/armenia-in-need-of-an-alternative-export-import-route/

Saha, D., Giucci R., Lücke, M., Kirchner, R., Movchan, V., Zachmann, G. (2018). The Economic Effect of a Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Berlin Economics.  https://www.ifw-kiel.de/experts/ifw/matthias-luecke/the-economic-effect-of-a-resolution-of-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-on-armenia-and-azerbaijan/

Notes:

  1.  Saha, D., Giucci R., Lücke, M., Kirchner, R., Movchan, V., Zachmann, G. (2018). The Economic Effect of a Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Berlin Economics.  
  2.  De Waal, T. (2021). In the South Caucasus, Can New Trade Routes Help Overcome a History of Conflict? Carnegie Europe.
  3.  Killough, A. (2008). Armenia in Need of an Alternative Export-Import Route. The Jamestown Foundation.  

Chess: World Blitz Championship: Aronian in clear first after Day 1

panorama
Armenia – Dec 30 2021

GM Levon Aronian, the Armenian star-player who recently moved to and now represents the United States, finished day one of the World Blitz Chess Championship with 10/12 and in clear first, Chess.com reports.

Behind him are Egyptian GM Bassem Amin, the five-time African champion with 9.5/12, and 21-year-old Iranian GM Parham Maghsoodloo, with 9/12.

GM Haik Martirosyan of Armenia finished day one with 8.5/12, sharing the 4th-13th places, the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports reported.

The World Blitz Chess Championship will conclude on Thursday. The marathon event was jam-packed with action as 179 participants in the open section played no fewer than 12 games in one day, and they will play another nine today.

RFE/RL Armenian Report – 12/29/2021

                                        Wednesday, 
More Armenian POWs Freed
Armenia - A road sign in Syunik near the scene of deadly fighting between 
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces, November 17, 2021.
Azerbaijan set free on Wednesday another group of Armenian soldiers captured 
during deadly fighting on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border last month.
An Azerbaijani government commission said the five soldiers were repatriated 
“with Hungary’s mediation” but gave no other details.
The Armenian Foreign Ministry confirmed their release. A ministry spokesman also 
identified them.
It was not clear whether the handover followed a direct contact between Armenian 
and Hungarian authorities.
Armenia froze diplomatic relations with the central European nation in 2012 
after the Hungarian government extradited to Azerbaijan an Azerbaijani army 
officer who hacked to death a sleeping Armenian colleague in Budapest in 2004. 
The officer whom a Hungarian court sentenced to life imprisonment in 2006 was 
pardoned, rewarded and promoted by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.
Unlike other European Union member states, Hungary has openly supported 
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry 
reaffirmed that support three days after the outbreak of last year’s 
Armenian-Azerbaijani war.
A total of 32 Armenian soldiers were taken prisoner during the November 16 
fighting on the border which left at least 13 troops from both sides dead. 
Azerbaijan freed eleven POWs on December 4 and ten others on December 19.
For its part, the Armenian military detained two Azerbaijani servicemen on 
December 18. They both were freed two days later.
Iran To Open Consulate In Strategic Armenian Region
Armenia - Mount Khustup overlooking the town of Kapan, June 4, 2018. (Photo 
courtesy of Kapan.am)
Iran announced on Wednesday that it will open a consulate in Kapan, the 
administrative center of Armenia’s southeastern Syunik province bordering the 
Islamic Republic.
The Iranian Embassy in Yerevan said on its Twitter page that Iran’s government 
approved a relevant proposal made by the Foreign Ministry in Tehran. It gave no 
reasons for the decision.
The embassy posted several photographs of Syunik’s historic monuments and other 
landmarks.
Reacting to the development, an Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman told the 
Armenpress news agency that Yerevan is planning to open a consulate in an 
unspecified Iranian city. He did not comment further.
Sandwiched between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan exclave, Syunik connects the 
rest of Armenia to Iran through mountainous roads used not only for 
Armenian-Iranian trade but also cargo shipments to and from other parts of the 
world.
Armenia lost control over one of those roads after a controversial troop 
withdrawal ordered by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian following last year’s war 
over Nagorno-Karabakh. In September this year, Azerbaijan set up checkpoints 
there to tax Iranian trucks and other vehicles. The move triggered unprecedented 
tensions between Tehran and Baku.
An influential Iranian cleric accused Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in 
October of trying to “cut Iran’s access to Armenia” with Turkey’s help. More 
than 160 members of Iran’s parliament likewise issued a joint statement warning 
against “any geopolitical change and alteration of the borders of neighboring 
countries.”
Visiting Yerevan last week, a conservative Iranian lawmaker, Mahmoud 
Ahmadi-Bighash, reportedly warned that Tehran is strongly opposed to any 
redrawing of borders in the South Caucasus. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein 
Amir-Abdollahian made similar statements this fall.
Aliyev has repeatedly threatened to forcibly open a “corridor” to Nakhichevan, 
drawing strong condemnation from Armenia.
Yerevan says that Azerbaijani troops advanced a few kilometers into Syunik in 
May and November. The Azerbaijani side denies crossing the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
border.
Minister Noncommittal About Resignation Pledge
        • Sargis Harutyunyan
Armenia - Economy Minister Vahan Kerobian speaks with journalists during a 
Russian-Armenian business forum in Yerevan, September 20, 2021.
Economy Minister Vahan Kerobian signaled on Wednesday that he has no plans to 
step down despite Armenia’s failure to achieve double-digit economic growth 
promised by him earlier this year.
Kerobian offered a rosy outlook for the Armenian economy in April as it began 
recovering from last year’s deep recession primarily caused by the coronavirus 
pandemic.
“I’m not quite happy with month-on-month economic growth in March,” he told 
reporters at the time. “Instead of 7-7.5 percent projected by us, only 3.8 
percent [growth] was registered, according to preliminary data. But that will 
still be enough to ensure our double-digit economic growth by the end of this 
year.”
He declared that he will resign if the Armenian economy does not expand at a 
double-digit rate in 2021.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said in July that the economy is on course to 
grow by 6 percent. Earlier this month, the Central Bank of Armenia forecast a 
GDP growth rate of just 4.2 percent.
Kerobian was asked about his resignation pledge when he spoke with journalists 
on Wednesday.
“Clearly, if the prime minister or his political team is unhappy with my work 
they won’t wait for my resignation,” he replied.
Pashinian appointed the 45-year-old businessman as economy minister in a cabinet 
reshuffle in November 2020. Kerobian was the chief executive of Armenia’s 
largest food delivery company until then.
Kerobian has repeatedly put an optimistic spin on economic developments in the 
country over the past year, prompting criticism from opposition members and 
media commentators. He claimed on December 16 that economic growth this year has 
been “faster than expected” and that Armenians are now “better off than one or 
two years ago” despite a significant increase in the cost of living.
According to government data, annual inflation in Armenia rose to 9.6 percent in 
November, the highest rate in many years.
Electricity Prices In Armenia Raised
        • Robert Zargarian
Armenia - A newly constructed electrical substation, October 24, 2019.
Public utility regulators raised electricity prices in Armenia by an average of 
about 10 percent on Wednesday amid higher-than-expected inflation.
The Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) signaled the impending price 
hikes earlier this month. It warned that the Armenian energy sector will operate 
at an annual combined loss of 23.8 billion drams ($49 million) if the existing 
tariffs are not revised upwards.
In a December 20 statement, the PSRC cited the need to repay $270 million in 
loans used for the recently completed modernization of the Metsamor nuclear 
plant. It also pointed to Armenia’s contractual obligation to enable Russia’s 
Gazprom energy giant to recoup investments made in a large thermal-power plant 
located in the central town of Hrazdan.
The statement revealed that the Armenian and Russian governments have reached an 
agreement that commits Yerevan to providing the Hrazdan plant with $31.8 million 
annually for the next ten years.
“Those obligations must be fulfilled,” Ashot Urikhanian, a senior PSRC official, 
said on Wednesday. “Or else, we will have very serious problems.”
Urikhanian also stressed that in exchange for this subsidy Russia’s Gazprom 
giant will keep the wholesale price of its natural gas for Armenia “stable” for 
the next ten years. The gas price currently stands at $165 per thousand cubic 
meters, which is well below the international levels.
Armenia -- A thermal power plant in Hrazdan.
The PSRC’s decision means that electricity tariffs will rise by 4.7 drams (about 
1 U.S. cent) per kilowatt/hour on average on February 1. The daytime price paid 
by most Armenian households currently stands at almost 45 drams (9 cents) per 
kilowatt/hour.
The regulatory body said low-income families making up 11 percent of the 
population will not pay more for electricity. Other individual consumers will 
see their electricity bills rise by between 3 and 7 percent depending on the 
monthly amount of energy use. The steepest price rise was set for businesses.
The new tariffs and their knock-on effects could further push up the cost of 
living in the country. According to government data, consumer price inflation 
there rose to 9.6 percent in November, the highest rate in many years.
Little wonder then that many Armenians are reacting angrily to the PSRC’s 
decision.
“They should just hand out ropes to people and tell them to hang themselves,” 
said one woman in Yerevan. “We can barely afford food, and they are now making 
electricity more expensive.”
“We should hope for the better but there is no future,” said another.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2021 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
 

Asbarez: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Allocates Over $140,000 to Armenian Schools in Lebanon

The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation’s Armenian Communities Department logo

The Armenian Communities Department of the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation has allocated more than $140,000 to the 16 Armenian schools in Lebanon. This follows the donation of 650 tablets and 50 laptops to the schools at the beginning of 2021.

Since its establishment, the Armenian Communities Department has paid special attention to the Armenian schools in the Middle East. In recent years, the Foundation has developed a comprehensive strategy for Lebanon, with a particular focus on the Armenian community schools.

Currently, Lebanon is facing one of the worst economic crises in its history. In response, the Foundation has temporarily suspended The School Grant Program it launched in 2020. Instead of supporting three schools to develop comprehensive educational projects, it is supporting all schools to meet immediate needs.

The current support provided to Lebanon is in addition to the Foundation’s other initiatives in the country: scholarships, special education, teacher training, publications and funding for cultural initiatives by youth.

For further information visit the Armenian Communities Department’s website.

Georgian parliament speaker Kakha Kuchava resigns

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 18:32,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS. Georgian parliament speaker Kakha Kuchava has resigned, ARMENPRESS reports, citing TASS, Chairman of the Georgian Dream Party Georgian dream party Irakli Kobakhidze informed.

“The party held a meeting of the political council today, where several important personnel issues were discussed. First of all, I would like to inform you that the Speaker of the Parliament Kakha Kuchava has decided to resign”, Kobakhidze said.

He said that the ruling party will nominate Shalva Papuashvili, the party’s public relations secretary, as the new Speaker.



Perspectives | Don’t water it down: The role of water security in the Armenia-Azerbaijan war

EurasiaNet.org
Dec 22 2021
Nareg Kuyumjian Dec 22, 2021

Just three months after the end of last year’s war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, President Ilham Aliyev traveled to the Lachin district for a photo-op at the Gulabird hydropower plant, in territory that Baku had retaken as a result of the war. Fast forward another three months, and the most serious post-war flashpoint became Sev Lich, a borderland reservoir that Azerbaijani troops surrounded.

The role that water resources have played in post-war politics should come as no surprise. The rivers of this region, and the South Caucasus’s greater Kura-Aras river basin flowing into the Caspian Sea more broadly, have played a significant – yet overlooked – role in the pre-war, wartime, and post-war conflicts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

Climate change and regional hydrological patterns give the lands in and around Nagorno-Karabakh a uniquely vital role in providing water to the surrounding region, which is particularly prone to water scarcity.

Scientists have projected alarming climate-induced water vulnerabilities in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia expects a 52 percent decrease in rainfall by 2040, while Azerbaijan’s diminishing water supply is projected to lead to a 77 percent decrease in crop yield over the same period – the worst in the region. The impacts of climate change have been and will continue to be felt most profoundly downstream in the Kura-Aras basin, where river flow is the lowest and agricultural demand the highest.

In this downstream region, Nagorno-Karabakh serves as a key source of water. It is home to the headwaters of eight major rivers, four major dams, and 33 hydropower plants. As depicted in the map below, the region is home to six major rivers – three tributaries of the Lower Kura (Tartar, Khachen, and Karkar) and five tributaries of the Lower Aras (Vorotan, Voghchi, Hakari, Ishkhan, and Chkhpor) – and four major dams.

Dam (completion date): (20) Meghri (planned); (21) Sarsang (1976); (22) Madagiz (1975); (23) Khachen (1964); (24) Khudaferin (1971); (25) Maiden Tower/Mil-Mugan (planned).

Yet, despite its strategic water resources, the region’s legal water norms have not been updated since the 1962 Arpa Agreement brokered by the Soviet Union. This is emblematic of the significant lack of water norms across the region. While the region shares the 188,400 square-kilometer Kura-Aras river basin as its main source of freshwater, no water management agreements have been signed among the riparian states since the collapse of the Soviet Union (with the exception of an agreement signed between Iran and Azerbaijan in 2016). Rather, states rely on 15 outdated Soviet-era water agreements signed bilaterally between the USSR, Turkey, and Iran that are marred with questions of enforceability and have proven unsuitable to today’s climatic and geopolitical challenges. For these reasons, the Kura-Aras has been classified as a “high-risk of conflict river basin” by both scholars and international organizations.

Accordingly, the water factor has been almost completely left out of mediation efforts around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The situation has been exacerbated by the fact that Azerbaijan is much more dependent, in multiple ways, on the region’s water supply than is Armenia.

First, unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan depends on the lower Kura-Aras for 70 percent of its drinking water. More generally, the country receives about 75 percent of its freshwater supply from outside its borders and thus is highly reliant on upstream water resources.

Second, this region’s water is a major input for Azerbaijan’s main agricultural lowlands. The Tartar River, for example, flows through Nagorno-Karabakh to irrigate 100,000 hectares in Azerbaijan’s climate-vulnerable agricultural regions of Barda and Tartar.

Third, Azerbaijan places a high importance on Nagorno-Karabakh’s water as a source of hydropower, which can reduce the country’s domestic natural gas consumption and free more of that resource for export through the recently commissioned Southern Gas Corridor. Gas now represents 82 percent of Azerbaijan’s electricity mix, but exporting more would both drive up revenue while helping the country achieve its domestic emissions targets.

Azerbaijan’s dependence on water has repeatedly exacerbated water relations with Armenia before, during, and after the Second Karabakh War.

In 2016, Azerbaijanis and European officials accused the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh of “deliberately depriving” Azerbaijan of water via its control of upstream water resources. The summer before the second war, Azerbaijan experienced dire water shortages, and officials blamed neighboring countries, including Armenia and Georgia. The problem was widely covered in Azerbaijani media and Aliyev publicly addressed the issue, demanding that all “relevant bodies […] showing indifference to this issue should be punished.” When the war started, some observers identified the water problems as contributing to Aliyev’s decision to launch the offensive.

Wartime developments, too, highlighted the strategic nature of water resources.

On the northeastern front, Azerbaijani forces advanced until the Madagiz Dam (map, 22) on the Tartar River and the Khachen Dam (map, 23) on the Khachen River. The fact that, by the November 9 ceasefire, the new line of contact ran along these two dams demonstrates the importance of water as a military objective during the campaign.

Heavy fighting in the vicinity of a fourth major dam, Khudafarin (map, 21), sparked apparent concern from Iran; the dam straddles the border between the two countries.

The ceasefire agreement stipulated the return of all territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh that Armenian forces had controlled since the first war between the two sides in the 1990s; that included Kelbajar, the source of both the Tartar and Hakari rivers, two major tributaries of the Kura and Aras, respectively.

After the war, post-war Azerbaijani rhetoric has celebrated its newly regained water resources and has heavily promoted its plans to invest in hydropower potential. The Gulabird ceremony is a symbol for what is to come. “We will restore all the hydroelectric power stations,” Aliyev said during his February visit to the plant. Immediately following the ceasefire, Baku began negotiations with Tehran over Khudafarin.

While it would be too much to claim that water is a main driver of the conflict, not recognizing the significance both Armenia and Azerbaijan give to the limited water resources would be remiss.  

Weak norms in the water relations between the two countries have repeatedly lent themselves to the military escalation of the conflict and pose the same risk moving forward.

The ceasefire agreement that ended the fighting makes no mention of water. But the Azerbaijani incursion around Sev Lich, and recent water shortages in the de facto capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert, highlight the continuing tension that unresolved water issues create.

The conflict continues to harbor many unresolved issues. The Armenian side continues to await the return of prisoners being held by Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan is pushing for a quick demarcation of the international border between the two countries. Hanging over it all is the unresolved status of Nagorno-Karabakh itself. In the meantime, the lack of clarity around water means the conflict will continue to be vulnerable to inflammatory hydropolitics.

 

Nareg Kuyumjian is a recent graduate of Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service with a B.S. in International Relations and a certificate in Eurasian, Russian and Eastern European Studies. 

Asbarez: Baku Urges Google Maps to Remove Armenian Names from Karabakh Map

The government of Azerbaijan has demanded that Google remove the Armenian names of places in Artsakh from its Maps application, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry reported Thursday.

“We would like to bring to your attention that in addition to including the official names of Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region in the Azerbaijani language within the Google Maps application, the issue of using fake names in the Armenian language has been raised before Google via official diplomatic channels,” said Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Leyla Abdullayeva, who was referring to names of cities and towns in Artsakh currently being occupied by Azerbaijan.

According to her, a letter was sent to the company’s management regarding the “distortion of the names of the territories of Azerbaijan,” and a list of “official geographical names” of the relevant territories was submitted to the company.

“Moreover, we would like to recall that in May of this year we presented a national report prepared by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan at the annual session of the UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN),” added Abdyllayeva, who explained that the report contained a list of 4,589 settlements officially standardized and approved in Azerbaijani, English, and Russian, “as well as the names of 125 geographical places located and identified in our territories affected by the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.”

“Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Conference on Standardization of Geographical Names do not allow changes in standardized geographical names by any competent public authority of any state, and such changes cannot be recognized by the United Nations,” said Abdullayeva, who urged Azerbaijanis to appeal to Google since “this application is based on the principle of individual requests and approaches of users.”