ARMED SEPARATISM SHOWCASED IN SOUTH OSSETIA
By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
The Jamestown Foundation
Sept 22 2005
On September 19-20 in Tskhinvali, South Ossetian authorities led
celebrations of the 15th anniversary of the declaration of secession
from Georgia. Although the September 20, 1990, declaration and some
subsequent documents speak of “independence” and a “sovereign state,”
the authorities in practice seek outright annexation to Russia via
North Ossetia. A giant billboard just outside Tskhinvali, showing
Russian President Vladimir Putin with the caption, “Our President,”
in effect advertised that program during the festivities.
Yevgeny Trofimov (chairman of the Russian Duma’s Nationalities
Committee), Konstantin Zatulin (who is also director of the
government’s Institute on CIS Affairs), and other Duma deputies
attended the celebration, along with the Abkhaz de facto leader
Sergei Bagapsh (arriving directly from Moscow) and delegations from
Transnistria and Karabakh. These delegations, as well as guests from
North Ossetia, crossed the Russia-Georgia border unlawfully through
the Roki tunnel, which is controlled by Russian troops.
Ossetian troops with some 20 tanks and other armored vehicles,
anti-aircraft installations, and 10 infantry battalions took part
in a military parade in Tskhinvali’s central Stalin Street and
Stalin Square. The “defense ministers” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
Maj.-Generals Anatoly Barankevich and Sultan Sosnaliev — both seconded
by the Russian military to these posts — attended the parade.
The Russian “peacekeeping” commander, Maj.-General Marat Kulakhmetov,
pre-notified Tbilisi of some of the movements of those troops and
hardware toward Tskhinvali and conceded that those movements were
unlawful. However, his troops did nothing to stop this massive
breach of multiple agreements among Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia,
and the OSCE on force-reduction and demilitarization measures in the
“security zone.”
South Ossetia’s de facto leader Eduard Kokoiti signed with Bagapsh
a “treaty” on friendship and cooperation between Abkhazia and
South Ossetia — the type of move intended to suggest that the two
territories’ secession from Georgia is irreversible: “Our celebration
will demonstrate to the world that we are full-fledged democratic
states.” However, they made no secret of the shared goal for their
territories to become eventually parts of Russia.
Kokoiti signed an agreement with Russia’s North Ossetian republic
leader, Teimuraz Mansurov, to create a commission on “special
relations” and draft a comprehensive agreement to that effect. The
document proclaims the goal of “striving to preserve the unity of
Ossetia.” “There can be no other option than unification,” Mansurov
declared. In a similar vein, Kokoiti told the press conference, “We see
our future only in a single political, economic, and cultural space
with Ossetia and Russia.” Kokoiti also made a speech on “Ossetian
self-determination” in Russian. He and others at the celebration
summarily dismissed Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s offer
of autonomy and devolution of powers to South Ossetia as a “publicity
exercise for international consumption,” thus avoiding discussion of
the offer on its merits.
Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a protest with Russia’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs over Mamsurov’s actions in Tskhinvali.
“Inasmuch as the Russian side is fully responsible for actions of the
executive branch, Georgia regards the step taken by the head of North
Ossetia as an unfriendly move by Russia that encourages separatism.”
Parliament chairwoman Nino Burjanadze in turn “ask[ed] the
international community: Do we really need a peacekeeping force
under whose nose the separatist authorities are staging military
parades? A peacekeeping force that sits idly by while two separatist
presidents are proffering threats?” The parliament’s international
affairs committee chairman, Kote Gabashvili, noted that Russia is
now engaged in an ongoing annexation of South Ossetia after having
supported their secession. The Georgian parliament is now drafting a
resolution calling for basic changes to the “peacekeeping” operations
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
On September 21 in the evening, three projectiles were fired from
grenade-launchers into Tskhinvali, injuring seven persons, most of
whom were released from ambulatory care that same evening, Kulakhmetov
announced. Both he and Russia’s MFA statement did not blame any side
for the incident. The festivities were not affected.
Georgia’s Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili and parliamentary
defense committee chairman Givi Targamadze — who were visiting
nearby Georgian villages that day — rejected any suggestions that
Georgians were responsible. They, as well as State Minister for
Conflict Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava, noted that only Georgia’s
adversaries were interested in provoking such incidents. Saakashvili
promised an investigation and declared that Tskhinvali residents’
safety was “a matter of honor” to him.
In his speeches on September 14 at the summit of world leaders in
New York and on September 18 in Tbilisi, Saakashvili decried the
“intensive annexation” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia “with direct
support from outside,” and vowed that Georgia would never accept such
“despicable annexations” of parts of its territory.
The Tskhinvali events demonstrated also the OSCE’s irrelevance
regarding South Ossetia. The organization has only five or six military
observers, dual-based in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, who are pathetically
under equipped with transport and communications, and thus unable
to detect most breaches of the agreements on force-reduction and
demilitarization in the “security zone.” The OSCE interprets its
mandate as being confined to the “security zone” around Tskhinvali,
which forms only a small part of South Ossetia’s territory. The
Mission declines to monitor Java, where Ossetian troops and their
heavy weaponry are stationed for quick deployment in Tskhinvali.
Politically, the Mission failed to react to the September 19
demonstration of military force, just as it had failed in June
2004 to react to the expedition of armed “volunteers” from Kuban,
Abkhazia, and Transnistria to South Ossetia and their exercises
with Ossetian troops. As custodian of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the OSCE would be obligated
to respond at least declaratively to the ongoing annexation of
Georgia’s territories and the parades of CFE-banned combat hardware
(“unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment”). However, the OSCE
Mission — like the organization itself — is hostage to Moscow’s
veto in Vienna and thus unable to act unable to act in Tskhinvali.
(Rustavi-2 TV, Interfax, Russian TV Channel One, September 18-21)