A process of redistributing the pie begins within the government

As far as I understand, the process of “handing over” Tigran Avinyan has been gently started. A few days ago, I referred to a statement made by Avinyan after the election. You can read it at the link above attached to this post.


The result of the parliamentary election brought Tigran Avinyan out of the dangerous status of the so-called “monopoly owner of illegitimacy” within the ruling system. If after 2023, Tigran Avinyan had a vestige of electoral legitimacy, then after the 2026 election, essentially, the entire ruling force lost its electoral legitimacy.


It significantly eased Tigran Avinyan’s situation in the leadership, and that’s why he was essentially not interested in whether PAP will enter the parliament or not.


Against this background, another hot scandal at the session of the Yerevan City Council of Elders, which unfolded largely at the instigation of the ruling power and its coalition partners, is notable. And the whole point is that in any arrangement, the “barrel” of public indignation inevitably rolls in the direction of Avinyan, for completely understandable and objective reasons.


The whole point is that the process of redistributing the pie is starting within the government. Here, an extra “eating mouth” is naturally not desirable. But this is not even the main problem within the government. Everyone can imagine at what cost Nikol Pashinyan declared an absolute victory, the expressions on his face standing in the background at midnight on June 7 are a witness. And this means that the risk of “sacrifices” by non-governmental organizations will be extremely high.


In that sense, it is obvious that Tigran Avinyan is considered a “realization zone” at a high level.


Political analyst Hakob Badalyan




Verelq: The CC has charged Ishkhan Saghatelyan

The Investigative Committee of the Republic of Armenia has indicted Ishkhan Saghatelyan, deputy of the “Hayastan” faction, whose apartment was searched this morning.


“According to the report received from the enforcement service in the RA investigative committee, the execution warrant issued by the RA anti-corruption court on January 5, 2026 prohibited I.S. and his wife from taking any action related to the management of their properties. In addition, according to the court’s decision, an injunction in the amount of 258 million 146 thousand 843 AMD should be imposed on I.S. and on properties owned by L.Kh.


During the enforcement proceedings, on February 2, 2026, IS refused to submit a “Declaration on the composition, amount and location of property, income and property rights, including claim rights”.


On April 28, 2026, I.S. submitted a declaration, in which, among other things, he mentioned property that is subject to compulsory confiscation. A foreclosure has been placed on this property.


On the basis of the received report, a criminal proceeding was initiated under Article 509, Part 1, Clause 2 of the Criminal Code (illegal act against property under embargo).


In addition, on the basis of the report submitted by the investigator during the preliminary investigation of the criminal proceedings, another criminal proceeding was initiated under the features of Article 510, Part 1 of the Criminal Code (avoidance by the debtor of submitting a declaration on the composition, quantity and location of the property and property rights owned by him). The mentioned criminal proceedings have been joined.


On June 23, 2026, at the place of residence of I.S., two vehicles owned by his wife were searched, during which cash in the form of foreign currency and gold jewelry were found.


The investigation is ongoing.”

Armenia: Political Pluralism, Democratic Governance, and the Challenges of the

A new briefing note released by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation’s International Secretariat examines political developments in Armenia following the country’s June 7 parliamentary elections.

The report argues that the post-election environment has been marked by increasing political polarization, escalating rhetoric directed at opposition figures, legal disputes surrounding the election results, and growing concerns regarding democratic governance, political pluralism, and the equal application of the law.

According to the briefing, a series of criminal investigations, administrative measures, travel restrictions, and public statements by senior officials have raised questions among critics regarding the treatment of opposition parties and the role of state institutions in the political process.

The report also examines broader debates surrounding Armenia’s ongoing negotiations with Azerbaijan, constitutional reform, the future of Artsakh-related advocacy, and the relationship between domestic political developments and regional security concerns.

The briefing further analyzes the legal challenges currently before Armenia’s Constitutional Court, the conduct of election-related investigations, allegations of selective law enforcement, and the increasingly polarized political climate identified by both domestic observers and international monitoring organizations.

Executive Summary
The period surrounding Armenia’s June 7, 2026, parliamentary elections has been marked by an unprecedented escalation in official rhetoric targeting opposition leaders, opposition voters, civil society critics, and political opponents. At the same time, a series of law-enforcement actions, criminal proceedings, travel restrictions, and controversial administrative decisions have raised serious concerns regarding equality before the law, the presumption of innocence, political pluralism, and the independence of state institutions.

While Armenian authorities have justified many of these measures as part of efforts to combat electoral corruption and protect national security, critics argue that the cumulative pattern demonstrates the selective application of legal mechanisms against opposition actors while allegations involving ruling-party representatives receive limited scrutiny or enforcement.

Concern has arisen from the increasing securitization of political discourse following the elections. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan publicly argued that the more than 500,000 votes cast for the leading three opposition parties did not reflect genuine support for their political positions and warned that creating such an impression could endanger the peace process. Critics argue that this approach increasingly portrays certain forms of political dissent— including opposition parties, Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh)-related activism, criticism of the government’s Azerbaijan policy, and other influential public voices—as potential threats to national security and regional stability.

International election observers assessed Election Day positively overall and stated that voters were presented with a genuine choice among political alternatives. At the same time, ODIHR and OSCE observers reported a highly polarized political environment, allegations of pressure on public employees, concerns regarding the use of administrative advantages by incumbent authorities, arrests of opposition supporters during the campaign, and rhetoric portraying political opponents as threats to peace and security. These observations provide important context for understanding the legal disputes, political tensions, and allegations of selective enforcement that continued after the elections.

The authorities’ extensive election-crime enforcement campaign became one of the most controversial features of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Official figures indicate that at least 125 criminal proceedings were initiated and 248 individuals prosecuted in election-related cases, with more than 220 detentions and over 100 custodial or house-arrest measures imposed.

While presented as an anti-corruption effort, the overwhelming concentration of investigations against opposition actors, combined with repeated public assertions by senior government officials that opposition support was largely the product of vote-buying, led critics to argue that criminal law was being used not only as a law-enforcement tool but also as a means of shaping the political environment and delegitimizing opposition participation.

Critics have also pointed to tax audits, regulatory actions, proposed state interventions affecting opposition-linked enterprises, employment-related pressure, and other administrative measures as evidence that economic and administrative instruments are increasingly being employed alongside criminal proceedings. These developments have unfolded against the backdrop of ongoing negotiations with Azerbaijan, including disputes over constitutional reform, the status of forcefully displaced Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), regional connectivity arrangements, and other unresolved issues related to the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.

Particular controversy arose after Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan linked the electoral performance of opposition forces to heightened security risks and publicly stated that a June 2026 meeting between senior Armenian and Azerbaijani officials was necessary to “manage” threats allegedly created by the election results. Critics interpreted these statements as evidence that domestic political developments are increasingly being viewed through the prism of Azerbaijani expectations and demands, and that pressure on opposition figures, veterans, and advocates of the Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) cause is being justified on national-security grounds.

Similar concerns have been raised regarding the increasingly confrontational relationship between the government and the Armenian Apostolic Church, which critics view as part of a broader effort to marginalize influential institutions and public voices opposing aspects of the government’s policy toward Azerbaijan and the future of Artsakh.

The post-election crisis has also acquired significant legal and geopolitical dimensions. Seven political forces have challenged the official election results before the Constitutional Court, alleging irregularities that may have affected the composition of the National Assembly and contesting decisions of the Central Electoral Commission, including the invalidation of results in three polling stations and the refusal to conduct repeat voting.

The Constitutional Court has accepted all seven applications, consolidated them into a single proceeding, and scheduled oral hearings for 26 June 2026. At the same time, Armenia has become the focus of increasing geopolitical competition, with the European Union and the United States reinforcing support for Armenia’s current political trajectory while relations with Russia continue to deteriorate amid expanding trade restrictions and growing political tensions.

Critics argue that these external dynamics have become increasingly intertwined with domestic political developments, debates regarding Armenia’s future security orientation, and the government’s approach to negotiations with Azerbaijan.

The developments described below do not concern isolated incidents. Rather, they reveal an increasingly consistent pattern in which political disagreement is framed as criminality, opposition support is portrayed as illegitimate, and domestic dissent is increasingly treated as a potential threat to Armenia’s security and peace agenda.

Critics argue that state institutions are being used not only to advance partisan political objectives but also to marginalize political, religious, social, and intellectual actors whose views are perceived as complicating the government’s approach to relations with Azerbaijan, the peace process, and the future of the Artsakh issue.

Click to read the entire briefing note.

Asbarez: UCLA Promise Armenian Institute Announces 2026-27 Grant and Fellowshi

LOS ANGELES — The UCLA Promise Armenian Institute announced the selection of the following individuals to receive research support during 2026-2027. PAI grants and fellowships are designed to support research across all academic fields, with an emphasis on or connection to Armenia or Armenians.

PAI Postdoctoral Fellowships
Kristine Aleksanyan (Ph.D., Yerevan State University 2022) will pursue a research project entitled “Automated Administrative Decision-Making in Public Administration: Accountability, Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights Protection.”

Under the mentorship of Professor Stephen Gardbaum, holder of the Stephen Yeazell Endowed Chair at the UCLA School of Law, Dr. Aleksanyan’s research will focus on how automated administrative decision-making, such as that associated with Artificial Intelligence tools, challenges traditional principles of administrative and constitutional law, particularly accountability, judicial review, and the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
Astghik Soghoyan (Ph.D., Yerevan State University, 2021) will pursue a research project entitled “Mythopoetics of the Armenian Romantic Novel (1850–1900): Narrative Form, National Imagination, and Cultural Memory.”

Under the mentorship of Professor Peter Cowe, holder of the UCLA Nareketsi Endowed Chair in Armenian Studies, Dr. Soghoyan’s research will examine the mythopoetics of the Armenian Romantic novel in the last half of the nineteenth century, approaching myth as a structuring principle of narrative form rather than as inherited content. 
  
Post-Candidacy Ph.D. Fellowships  
Nora Bairamian (Ph.D. student, UCLA Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures) will pursue her doctoral research entitled “Readings Between the Lines: Ottoman-Armenian Literature of the Periphery.” (partial fellowship)

Under the mentorship of her advisor, Professor Peter Cowe, holder of the UCLA Nareketsi Professor in Armenian Studies, Bairamian’s dissertation examines the experience of the Ottoman-Armenians of the eastern provinces as narrated through the writings of provincial authors Mgrdich Khrimian, Karekin Srvandztiants, Melkon Giurdjian, Tlgadintsi, and Rupen Zartarian. 
 
Faculty Research Grants 
Prof. Movses Pogossian (Distinguished Professor of Violin; Founder and Advisor, Armenian Music Program, UCLA) will pursue a project entitled, “Music of Soviet Resistance: Tigran Mansurian and his Musical Friends.”

This is a recording project devoted to composers who defied the cultural mandates of the Soviet regime following the Stalin era. Focusing on works by composers such as Tigran Mansurian, who challenged official prescriptions of Socialist Realism by pursuing bold, experimental directions in sound and structure, this musical project seeks to bring this repertoire to wider audiences through a high-quality commercial recording and public release on the respected New Focus Recordings label.
 
 
Faculty/Scholar Travel Grants  
Prof. Artur Davoyan (Associate Professor, Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering) will pursue a travel project titled “Strengthening ties between UCLA and Armenian physics and engineering communities.”  

This endeavor seeks to connect UCLA with six institutions in the Republic of Armenia to identify talent, inform them of UCLA’s research capabilities, and explore collaborative opportunities across fields ranging from space engineering to quantum physics, with the aim of establishing long-term partnerships in the form of joint proposals, visiting graduate student recruitment, and sharing research infrastructure, where applicable.
 
Dr. Kristine Martirosyan-Olshansky (Director, Research Program in Armenian Archaeology and Ethnography, UCLA Cotsen Institute of Archaeology) will pursue a travel project titled “Archaeological Investigations at Masis Blur: Advancing Research on the Neolithic Southern Caucasus in Near Eastern Perspective.” 

This project aims to continue archaeological excavations at Masis Blur (Armenia)—an 8000-year-old settlement—which have been ongoing since 2012 and have produced major discoveries bearing on early village life in the Armenian Highlands. 

Student Research or Travel Grants
Emma Bertoutian (Undergraduate Student, UCLA Department of Anthropology) will receive a travel research grant to participate in the Masis Blur Archaeological Project in Armenia, under the supervision of Dr. Kristine Martirosyan-Olshansky. 

This project aims to provide archaeological experience through participation in the Masis Blur (Armenia) archaeological project, thereby enhancing knowledge of domestic architecture in the Neolithic agricultural communities of the Armenian Highlands.

Sofia Gevorgian (Undergraduate Student, UCLA Political Science/Middle Eastern Studies) will receive a travel research grant to present her research project entitled, “Lost in Translation: Linguistic Barriers to Nagorno-Karabakh’s Lasting Ceasefire,” at the National Conference on Undergraduate Research in Richmond, VA. 

This study explores the role of translation in the stability of interstate treaties, specifically examining how discrepancies between state-sanctioned and independent translations of the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire declaration challenge its interpretation and, by extension, its implementation.

Julian Kaptanian (Ph.D. Student, UCLA Department of History) will receive a travel research grant to pursue a project entitled, “Mother Armenia: Reproductive Politics Across Armenia’s Three Republics from 1918 to 2018.”

This project explores how women and motherhood in Armenia have long existed at the crossroads of empires. By tracing how global assistance influenced obstetric care and medical attitudes over time, the study shows how reproductive politics has become entangled with broader imperial, neoliberal, and Diasporic priorities.

“The new border division of interests and spheres of influence will show the South

June: 23, 2026

Before and after the June 7 elections in Armenia, the entire CP elite talked about a “hybrid war against Armenia from the North”, mostly accusing the Armenian opposition of collaborating with Russia against Armenia.

This conversation continues even after the June 7 elections, although Nikol Pashinyan declares that he has friendly relations with the Russian president, has met with him many times and had phone conversations. And recently he announced that on August 15 he will participate in the session of the EAEU intergovernmental council. However, he does not say why, for example, he does not ask the Russian President why he is “waging a hybrid war against Armenia”.

After the elections in Armenia, what will be the direction of the foreign political vector of Armenia, is it possible that Russia will be pushed out of the region in general?

Head of YSU Political Institutes and Processes Chair, Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor Garik Keryan speaking about this issue, he said: he sees such a tendency, but he cannot say that this tendency has gained such dominance that it will be so.

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“What is related to Armenia and the South Caucasus depends on the end of the Iranian and Ukrainian wars.

Second, the end of these two wars will lead to the formation of a new world order, in which the United States, China, and Russia will be key actors, of course, in different positions: Russia with a weaker role, the United States and China with a greater role. I have no doubt that such a three-centered world order will bring new agreements in terms of the division of spheres of influence and interests.

The new border division of interests and spheres of influence will also bring the answer to the question of which sphere of influence the South Caucasian countries remain in.” 168.am-Garik Keryan said in a conversation with

According to the political scientist, if Armenia is left out of the zone of Russian influence, then the Russian presence here will be reduced to a minimum. If the division of the world turned out in such a way that only Armenia remained in the zone of Russian influence, then Armenia’s clear participation in Eurasian Russia-centric structures, especially EAEU and CSTO, will be restored.

“We will not have a clear answer to this question until, as I already said, until those two wars are over, the formation of a new world order depends on the results of those wars. Do we know how the Ukrainian crisis will end? For example, we also don’t know the role of Iran in the region, now there are many experts who say that Iran is becoming the number one superpower in the Middle East, based on the fact that it will dominate all its neighbors if the United States fulfills its commitment and leaves. After this, can Turkey, which is the strongest country in the southern wing of NATO, dare to act like Iran? Maybe 1 year is still necessary for us to see the end of the Iranian and Ukrainian crises,” emphasized our interlocutor.

Garik Keryan also does not rule out the influence of the EU in the region in cooperation with the United States, nor is it ruled out that in a certain geopolitical situation Turkey, as a NATO ally, can gain supremacy in the South Caucasus.

“Of course, a question may arise, what will happen to the EU, Brazil, India, and the others? These will also maintain their role, but not on the front line, as, for example, the United States and China are, but in the tripartite system there will be sub-systems, allies, or regional independent or independent units,” emphasized Garik Keryan.

What else can Pashinyan do, convert to Islam? Netanyahu is a coward. Rusas

June: 23, 2026

168TVof “Trigger” the guest of the program former head of the Israeli “Nativ” special service, military-political analyst Yakov Kedmi.

Key international and regional issues were discussed during the program. Particular attention was paid to the statement of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, about the relays allegedly located on the territory of Belarus, which Russia uses to direct drones to targets in Ukraine. The experts considered the possible reaction of Russia and Belarus to such statements, the risks of further escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, as well as the situation surrounding the attacks on Moscow and Crimea.

A significant part of the conversation was devoted to the conflict between Iran and the United States, its future development prospects, US-Israel relations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statements regarding maintaining the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, as well as the domestic political situation in Israel, the upcoming elections, and the political risks for the current Prime Minister.

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The ongoing processes in the South Caucasus, the situation surrounding the parliamentary elections in Armenia, the importance of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Moscow after the elections, as well as the role of Russia and Turkey in the current geopolitical processes of the region were also discussed.

During the discussion, the perspectives of Armenia’s cooperation with Russia, CSTO and the European Union were considered, as well as the possible consequences of various foreign policy scenarios for the country.

In this context, the working meeting of the Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan Hikmet Hajiyev and the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia Armen Grigoryan held in Dilijan, its possible impact on the negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the further development of the regional agenda, were discussed.

Hayk Derzyan




The license to organize a casino of “Onira Club” has been revoked

The license to organize the “Onira Club” LLC casino (Shangri La) belonging to the family of “Prosperous Armenia” party leader Gagik Tsarukyan was declared invalid.


RA Minister of Economy Gevorg Papoyan announced this on his Facebook page and published the attached decision.


From the document published by the minister, we learn that the reason is the inconsistencies of the data in the reports on financial flows submitted to the supervisory body, which were qualified as false and distorted.


In particular, the discrepancy is related to the readings of the counters of the gaming machines. The minister’s decision is subject to immediate implementation. The company can appeal it to the Administrative Court within two months.


 




“Telecom Armenia”-“Azertelecom”. What is behind the agreement?

“Telecom Armenia”-“Azertelecom” agreement. technical news or a broader infrastructural process? 


The internet transit agreement signed between the Armenian “Telecom Armenia” and the Azerbaijani “Azertelecom” companies is about regional digital infrastructures, channel diversification, mutual transit, but also about national security, controllability and public trust.


Confirmed fact


According to public information, the parties have signed a bilateral agreement, which provides for the transit and delivery of Internet traffic through the territories of Armenia and Azerbaijan on a commercial basis.


The Armenian side emphasizes that “Telecom Armenia” will provide transit to Azerbaijan with its infrastructure. The Azerbaijani side, in its turn, presents the same agreement as providing a new path for Armenia’s international internet connection through the territory of Azerbaijan.


In other words, the fact is the same, but the emphasis of the public presentation is different.


The difference in emphasis


In Armenian communications, the agreement is presented as an opportunity for mutual transit and expansion of Armenia’s transit potential.


In the Azerbaijani communication, it is best placed in the strategy of Azerbaijan to become a regional digital hub.


This is not a trifle. In the region, infrastructures are no longer just economic issues, but also instruments of influence, dependence, control and political positioning.


Armenia’s possible interest


If the process is managed correctly, Armenia can benefit in three directions.


get additional diversification of external Internet channels,


to strengthen the role of Armenia as a country providing transit digital services,


form a backup channel, reducing dependence on limited destinations.


In this sense, the transaction itself cannot be evaluated as negative just because the other party is an Azerbaijani company.


Azerbaijan’s possible interest


At the same time, the interest of Azerbaijan should also be seen.


With this agreement, Azerbaijan can get additional transit flexibility, strengthen the communication capabilities of Nakhichevan and other destinations, as well as present its “digital corridor” and “regional hub” strategy from a stronger position.


In other words, this is not a story of one-sided interest. This is a process of mutual benefit on the one hand, and interdependence on the other.


The security issue


Traffic transit does not yet mean access to data content. With modern encryption, most internet content is protected.


But it does not eliminate all risks.


The transit operator can see or influence some technical level data: routes, IP addresses, traffic volumes, time patterns, and in some cases metadata.


Therefore, what is required here is not emotional noise, but a very clear security architecture.


The problem of transparency


At the moment, a number of key questions remain open in the public arena.


what are the boundary junction points


what bandwidth are you talking about


can the traffic of Armenian end consumers ever be directed through the territory of Azerbaijan,


which government agencies have assessed the security component of the transaction,


What control and protection mechanisms are provided?


These are not questions of excessive suspicion, but of responsible state thinking.


Overall rating


This agreement can be useful for Armenia if it serves to diversify channels, increase transit capacity of Armenia and does not create opaque or one-sided dependence on Azerbaijan.


But the same agreement can become risky if it is implemented without sufficient transparency, public accountability and explanation, as well as without measurable guarantees of national security.


Here, the most healthy approach is neither to reject the deal unequivocally, nor to welcome it unconditionally.


The most healthy approach is to demand clarification, control, technical security and state responsibility.


Because telecommunication transit is not only a business. It is critical infrastructure.


And in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is also a matter of national security.


Former SRC Chairman Davit Ananyan




Minor earthquake recorded in Armenia’s northeast

Armenia09:49, 22 June 2026
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A magnitude 2.1 earthquake hit near the town of Ijevan, the Seismic Protection Service reported on Monday.

According to the Seismic Protection Regional Service, the quake was recorded 20 km northeast of Ijevan at a depth of 10 km at 09:03 (05:03 GMT) local time.

It was felt at a weak intensity of 2–3 MSK across Tavush Province, particularly in Ijevan and Noyemberyan, as well as the villages of Koghb, Achajur, and Voskepar.

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Published by Armenpress, original at 

Armenian athlete wins gold, sets national record in 3000m at Balkan Championsh

Sports14:01, 22 June 2026
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Armenia’s Yervand Mkrtchyan has won the gold medal in the 3000-meter run at the Balkan Athletics Championships held on June 20–21 in Volos, Greece. Mkrtchyan finished the race in a time of 7:52.75, which is also a new Armenian national record.

Armenia’s Razmik Ghazaryan won silver in the triple jump with a result of 16.20 m.

Earlier, Yervand Mkrtchyan won the 1500-meter race at an international tournament held in France, clocking 3:38.99.

Published by Armenpress, original at