- Robert Zargarian
An opposition party running in Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections said on Friday that college students in the Armavir province were ordered to attend a campaign rally held there by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian.
The Wings of Unity party’s leader, Arman Tatoyan, publicized purported audios of such instructions at a news conference in Yerevan. They apparently feature Lusine Grigorian, an Armavir-based activist of the ruling Civil Contract party who teaches at a regional state college.
“Dear guys, tomorrow at five o’clock we have to gather in the square, this applies to both of your groups,” Grigorian can be heard telling her students.
“I have been instructed to say this and I am instructing you, guys,” she says. “Don’t let it happen that I go and stand in the square and see that neither of my two groups is there. Look, I have to look my superiors in eye and you must look me in the eye.”
“I don’t know why, but it has been instructed to make sure that there are as many of you out there as possible,” she says in another recording.
Grigorian denied any wrongdoing when she was contacted by RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.
“I didn’t give anyone any instructions, it’s a slander. People are trying to get me in trouble for political motives,” she said, refusing to comment further.
Tatoyan did not say when the audios were recorded. He portrayed them as further proof of Pashinian and his party abusing their government levers for electoral purposes. Pashinian campaigned in Armavir on Friday. He ended his campaign trip with a rally held in the provincial capital of the same name.
The recordings were released two days after teachers and students of several public schools in the neighboring Aragatsotn province interrupted classes to attend Pashinian’s campaign rallies. An Armenian election-monitoring group said that they were illegally forced to do so by school principals and local government officials.
Responding to the resulting uproar, the premier said on Thursday he has told four principals to tender their resignations and wait for the findings of an “internal inquiry.” Scores of other schoolchildren were present at his campaign meetings in Armavir held during school classes.
The Office of the Prosecutor-General told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service it will look into the Armavir recordings only if Tatoyan appeals to it “in a manner defined by the law.”
“Had the opposition done such a thing, they would have immediately taken measures and arrested everyone,” complained Tatoyan.
The opposition leader, who served as the country’s human rights ombudsman from 2016-2022, has repeatedly accused the ruling party of abusing its administrative resources since the official start of the election campaign. The Hayastan alliance, a larger opposition group led by former President Robert Kocharian, made similar allegations on Friday.
“There are reports that employees of state and local government bodies are being forced to vote for the ruling party in the June 7 elections under threat of dismissal,” Hayastan said, urging them to call a special hotline opened by it.
No Civil Contract members or supporters have been prosecuted on relevant charges to date. Law-enforcement authorities have arrested dozens of opposition activists and supporters on charges of buying votes or paying people to attend opposition rallies. Virtually all of them are linked to billionaire Samvel Karapetian’s Strong Armenia alliance widely regarded as Pashinian’s number one election challenger.
The Anti-Corruption Committee reported on Friday more such arrests condemned by Strong Armenia as politically motivated.
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Turkey and Armenia restart trade as EU urges border re-opening
Turkey has announced the start of bilateral trade with Armenia, a move welcomed by the EU in a statement on Tuesday from the European External Action Service (EEAS).
The EU said the announcement followed a recent meeting of a bilateral working group from the two countries focused on restoring rail connections between Turkey and Armenia, which took place on 28 April 2026.
The EEAS said the start of bilateral trade forms part of a wider normalisation process between the two neighbours.
Rail links and the border
The EU also encouraged Turkey and Armenia to continue working together towards re-opening their shared border, the EEAS said.
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Smart divorce with Russia: what price will Armenia pay
Despite the pro-Western rhetoric of Pashinyan’s team, the numbers show that since 2018, Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia has not only not decreased, but has increased several times
Vladimir Putin offered Armenia a “smart divorce”: he put the country before a choice between the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU. What does this mean for Yerevan? What would be the price of “separation” from Russia?
Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a “smart divorce” with Armenia sounded like an ultimatum, putting the country’s leadership before a difficult choice: whether to maintain its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union or finally turn to the EU.
Many in Armenia perceived Putin’s words as increasing pressure on Yerevan and as a clear sign that the times of backroom diplomacy and tacit compromises are over.
End of the nuances and shadow of Ukraine
Although Armenia continues to participate in all integration associations under the auspices of Moscow, it has long since distanced itself from Russia. Yerevan has taken a course of rapprochement with Brussels and openly declared its intention to join the EU, including inscribing this in legislation. In Yerevan, this process is called “diversification”, while for Moscow it is a geopolitical turn.
The catalyst for the sharp intensification of the Kremlin’s rhetoric was two unprecedented diplomatic events for the region: the meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) held in Yerevan in early May and the EU-Armenia summit. Moscow was particularly irritated by the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was also present at the ENP forum.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reaction was not long in coming – he suggested that Yerevan hold a referendum on joining the EU. And in the event of choosing the European vector – “intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce”, which was accompanied by the following unambiguous hint: “We see what is happening now in Ukraine. But how did it all start? With Ukraine’s attempt to join the EU”.
Let us recall that a month earlier, at a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the Russian president stated that Armenia’s parallel membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the EU is incompatible. The prime minister replied that future participation in both blocs would be impossible, but for the time being there is compatibility. And when the time comes for the final choice, the decision will be made by the Armenian people.
“Interstate relations are not a marriage”
Yerevan reacted with restraint to Moscow’s proposal for a “smart divorce”, trying to reduce tension. Prime Minister Pashinyan said that for the authorities, the issue of choosing between the EEU and the EU is not on the agenda. He rejected the metaphor of “divorce”, emphasizing that in interstate relations Armenia is guided by interstate logic and remains a full member of the EEU.
At the same time, Pashinyan acknowledged the existence of “discomforts” in relations with Russia, calling them part of the “inevitable transformation”. The election program of the ruling “Civil Contract” party before the parliamentary elections on June 7th states that Yerevan intends to continue to develop “mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation” with Moscow.
The leader of the opposition bloc “Armenia” Robert Kocharyan, who has a reputation for long-standing friendly relations with Vladimir Putin, called the policy of the Armenian authorities dangerous and noted that playing with the EU could lead to Russia “losing patience”. He reminded that the socio-economic well-being of a huge number of citizens critically depends on relations with Russia.
Will Armenia withstand a rupture with Russia?
Despite the pro-Western rhetoric of Pashinyan’s team, the numbers show that since 2018, Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia has not only not decreased, but has increased several times. Trade and especially exports to Russia have increased many times, while supplies to EU markets have decreased by five percent. Experts estimate that the loss of the Russian market will be a “severe shock” for the country.
In addition, Armenia is currently practically totally dependent on Russian gas. Its only alternative is the Iranian pipeline, which is also owned by the Russian “Gazprom”. But the quantities supplied by it cover only 15-17 percent of consumption.
Are the claims about the destructive consequences exaggerated?
Armenian economist Hayk Gevorgyan uses mathematical arguments to refute claims about the destructive consequences of the separation between Armenia and Russia. “Russia’s share in Armenia’s foreign trade is 35 percent, and the remaining 65 percent falls on other countries, including the EU. Therefore, the negative effect of leaving the EEU can only affect this one-third.” The expert also emphasizes that a large part of this 35 percent is re-export, which does not affect GDP.
As for the sale of agricultural products, Gevorgyan notes that the sector is modernizing and exports can be reoriented to Europe and other countries, as is already the case. The expert told DW that due to Armenia’s membership in the EEU, it has to buy some goods from Russia at very high prices – such as sugar, while outside the economic bloc this would be possible at much lower prices.
Commenting on gas dependence, Gevorgyan expressed doubts that Moscow would sharply raise prices, since the internal distribution is carried out by the Russian company “Gazprom Armenia” itself. “The presence of “Gazprom” in Armenia is a rather important detail for Russia itself, and it is unlikely that the decision to double or triple the price will be made easily. If the price jumps by a few percent, Armenia will already have to reconsider its own relations with “Gazprom”, he says.
Therefore, the expert believes that the catastrophic scenarios are greatly exaggerated, and Yerevan also has potential alternative solutions – neighboring countries Iran and Azerbaijan, which also produce gas.
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‘Use longer and give new life’: introducing circular economy in Armenia
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Trump’s Corridor in South Caucasus Nine Months On: Vagaries and Vulnerabiliti
BY HRAIR BALIAN
On 8 August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration at the White House establishing the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity. The agreement aimed to open a corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik region, with reciprocal connectivity benefits for Armenia.
The corridor concept has deep roots — over a century of Azerbaijani and Turkish ambitions for unbroken land connectivity between their two countries, with Armenia as the geographic obstacle. The modern impetus came from Article 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire ending the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. For years, negotiations deadlocked over naming rights, jurisdiction, and control. The TRIPP deal broke that impasse by having Armenian officials retain legal border control while a private third-country company conducts checks — an idea previously floated under earlier administrations but given new branding and White House fanfare by Trump’s team.
Crucially, TRIPP has already achieved something underappreciated: it deferred Azerbaijan’s otherwise imminent military seizure of the corridor. President Aliyev had openly warned the corridor would be established “whether Armenia wants it or not.” U.S. engagement postponed that threat indefinitely.
What Was Agreed — and What Was Not
Nine months in, the most striking feature of TRIPP is how little has been operationally resolved. A January 2026 TRIPP Implementation Framework established a “TRIPP Development Company” — 74% U.S.-owned, 26% Armenian — to develop 43 kilometers of rail, road, fiber optic, and energy infrastructure through Syunik over an initial 49-year term. But the TIF is notably thin: no construction timetable, no dispute resolution mechanism, and — most strikingly — an explicit disclaimer that it imposes no legal obligations on either the U.S. or Armenia.
The security architecture is also ambiguous. Armenia formally retains sovereignty, but private contractors may assume day-to-day security responsibilities. The use of a U.S. intermediary company between Armenian and Azerbaijani customs officials is the central innovation — but the ongoing U.S.–Israel war against Iran makes deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border highly problematic.
Sovereignty erosion risks lurk in the Special Purpose Vehicles to be created under the development company. History consistently shows that states lose effective control of transit infrastructure not because they lack legal authority, but because exercising it becomes prohibitive once commercial and arbitration structures are in place.
Winners and Losers
Azerbaijan is the clearest winner: it obtains the direct Nakhchivan link it has sought since 2020, without military action. Turkey’s pan-Eurasian strategic ambitions are advanced. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, mineral access, and a signature foreign policy achievement.
Armenia’s gains are conditional and asymmetric. It faces a structural reciprocity gap: Azerbaijani cargo and passengers will enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Yerevan interprets “reciprocal benefits” to mean comparable access through Azerbaijani territory; Baku interprets it as overall mutual benefit — not identical arrangements. No mechanism currently exists to enforce Armenian reciprocal access, and no timeline has been committed to by Baku.
Armenia’s financial returns — a 26% equity stake, customs duties, and fees — are mentioned but not quantified. Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has stated plainly: if the railway section to Gyumri is not included, TRIPP loses its relevance. The financial model only functions if Armenia becomes a genuine east–west transit hub, not merely a service corridor for Azerbaijan.
Structural Choke Points
Two structural vulnerabilities could derail the entire project.
First, Armenia’s railway network has been under a 30-year concession to South Caucasus Railway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, since 2008. Russian Railways is in severe financial crisis ($51 billion in debt), and mandatory investment commitments have remained largely on paper. Pashinyan has formally requested Moscow to accelerate restoration of the Soviet-era rail segment foundational to TRIPP and has threatened to withdraw that segment from the concession if Russia fails to deliver. Armenia could legally do so, but the geopolitical complexity of compelling Moscow is considerable.
Second, TRIPP is legally entangled with a peace treaty that has been initialed but not signed. Azerbaijan insists Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, before signing. Baku itself maintains constitutional provisions that imply claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversial nature. Full border demarcation is years away, and the entire TRIPP corridor runs through this non-demarcated zone. The draft peace agreement contains no reference to the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, or the 19 Armenian hostages held in Azerbaijani jails.
The Missing Half: Turkey
TRIPP’s full economic promise to Armenia cannot be realized while the Turkish border remains sealed after 33 years. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has been explicit: the Kars–Gyumri railway is not a footnote to TRIPP — it is its western terminus. In April 2026, Turkish and Armenian officials met in Kars to establish a joint working group on reopening the line, but Turkey’s position remains that normalization awaits a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Turkey is also constructing a parallel railroad on its territory. Armenia is the structurally weakest of the three parties in this triangular relationship.
The EU’s Absence
TRIPP is a bilateral deal witnessed by a U.S. president, not a multilateral framework — which structurally sidelines the European Union despite its deep strategic interest in the Middle Corridor’s success. The EU has welcomed the project rhetorically and is investing in Armenia through separate instruments (Resilient Syunik, Global Gateway) but is not a co-investor in TRIPP’s governance structure.
This is a missed opportunity. The EU brings deep experience in cross-border infrastructure governance through TEN-T and Global Gateway, large-scale financing capacity through the EIB and EBRD, and institutional continuity that does not depend on any single leader’s attention span. A 2026 European Commission study found the TRIPP route would cut travel times by up to 25% compared with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad — meaning Brussels has already done the technical homework. A U.S.–EU co-management model — with Washington providing political guarantee and security, and Brussels providing bulk financing, technical governance, and institutional continuity — could address TRIPP’s two most glaring vulnerabilities: its dependence on Trump personally, and the absence of legally binding commitments.
The Iran Variable
The U.S.–Israel war against Iran is simultaneously strengthening TRIPP’s strategic rationale and threatening its physical implementation. With Hormuz shipping disrupted and Iran’s transit role compromised, the Middle Corridor’s value has sharply increased — cargo takes 12–15 days via the corridor versus 40 days by sea. But deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border is now difficult; site survey visits have already been postponed; and the commercial companies the U.S. hoped to attract are reassessing security risks. The same small U.S. team — led by Steve Witkoff — responsible for TRIPP is now primarily consumed by the Iran crisis.
Meanwhile, Russia is capitalizing on regional uncertainty. Azerbaijan is hedging — Aliyev recently visited Georgia to signal the Tbilisi route remains viable — and there are signs of Kremlin optimism that the Iran war has at least temporarily buried TRIPP.
Conclusion: A Corridor Without a Foundation?
TRIPP has achieved real, if fragile, results: it has substituted for a Russian-controlled corridor, deferred Azerbaijani military pressure on Syunik, and initiated the first genuine normalization of Armenian Azerbaijani relations in a generation.
But the project is built on compounding fragilities. Nine months in, not a single meter of construction has occurred on Armenian soil. There is no signed peace treaty, no finalized operating company contract, no resolved Russian railway concession, and now a war literally across the border. The governing Implementation Framework explicitly disclaims legal obligation on either party — an extraordinary admission for a project of this scale.
Armenia’s structural position remains asymmetric. It provides the territory, absorbs the sovereignty risk, hosts U.S. security personnel near the Iranian border, and depends on political processes entirely outside its control — a signed peace agreement, an open Turkish border, Azerbaijani reciprocity — for the promised dividends to materialize. Azerbaijan gets its corridor. Turkey gets its logistics hub. The U.S. gets its minerals and its trophy deal. Armenia gets a conditional promise and a 49-year commitment.
The deeper question TRIPP poses has not changed since 8 August 2025: is this a genuine crossroads of peace, or a corridor for everyone else’s prosperity? The answer lies in the details that remain stubbornly unresolved — the security contract, the railway concession, reciprocal access, the Armenian hostages in Azerbaijani jails, and the Turkish border sealed for 33 years.
Hrair Balian, JD, DoL, has served in leadership positions at the UN, OSCE, the International Crisis Group, and The Carter Center, working on conflict transformation in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, North & South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East & Africa. He has served as Adjunct Professor at Emory University, School of Law.
BY HRAIR BALIAN
On 8 August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration at the White House establishing the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity. The agreement aimed to open a corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik region, with reciprocal connectivity benefits for Armenia.
The corridor concept has deep roots — over a century of Azerbaijani and Turkish ambitions for unbroken land connectivity between their two countries, with Armenia as the geographic obstacle. The modern impetus came from Article 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire ending the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. For years, negotiations deadlocked over naming rights, jurisdiction, and control. The TRIPP deal broke that impasse by having Armenian officials retain legal border control while a private third-country company conducts checks — an idea previously floated under earlier administrations but given new branding and White House fanfare by Trump’s team.
Crucially, TRIPP has already achieved something underappreciated: it deferred Azerbaijan’s otherwise imminent military seizure of the corridor. President Aliyev had openly warned the corridor would be established “whether Armenia wants it or not.” U.S. engagement postponed that threat indefinitely.
What Was Agreed — and What Was Not
Nine months in, the most striking feature of TRIPP is how little has been operationally resolved. A January 2026 TRIPP Implementation Framework established a “TRIPP Development Company” — 74% U.S.-owned, 26% Armenian — to develop 43 kilometers of rail, road, fiber optic, and energy infrastructure through Syunik over an initial 49-year term. But the TIF is notably thin: no construction timetable, no dispute resolution mechanism, and — most strikingly — an explicit disclaimer that it imposes no legal obligations on either the U.S. or Armenia.
The security architecture is also ambiguous. Armenia formally retains sovereignty, but private contractors may assume day-to-day security responsibilities. The use of a U.S. intermediary company between Armenian and Azerbaijani customs officials is the central innovation — but the ongoing U.S.–Israel war against Iran makes deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border highly problematic.
Sovereignty erosion risks lurk in the Special Purpose Vehicles to be created under the development company. History consistently shows that states lose effective control of transit infrastructure not because they lack legal authority, but because exercising it becomes prohibitive once commercial and arbitration structures are in place.
Winners and Losers
Azerbaijan is the clearest winner: it obtains the direct Nakhchivan link it has sought since 2020, without military action. Turkey’s pan-Eurasian strategic ambitions are advanced. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, mineral access, and a signature foreign policy achievement.
Armenia’s gains are conditional and asymmetric. It faces a structural reciprocity gap: Azerbaijani cargo and passengers will enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Yerevan interprets “reciprocal benefits” to mean comparable access through Azerbaijani territory; Baku interprets it as overall mutual benefit — not identical arrangements. No mechanism currently exists to enforce Armenian reciprocal access, and no timeline has been committed to by Baku.
Armenia’s financial returns — a 26% equity stake, customs duties, and fees — are mentioned but not quantified. Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has stated plainly: if the railway section to Gyumri is not included, TRIPP loses its relevance. The financial model only functions if Armenia becomes a genuine east–west transit hub, not merely a service corridor for Azerbaijan.
Structural Choke Points
Two structural vulnerabilities could derail the entire project.
First, Armenia’s railway network has been under a 30-year concession to South Caucasus Railway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, since 2008. Russian Railways is in severe financial crisis ($51 billion in debt), and mandatory investment commitments have remained largely on paper. Pashinyan has formally requested Moscow to accelerate restoration of the Soviet-era rail segment foundational to TRIPP and has threatened to withdraw that segment from the concession if Russia fails to deliver. Armenia could legally do so, but the geopolitical complexity of compelling Moscow is considerable.
Second, TRIPP is legally entangled with a peace treaty that has been initialed but not signed. Azerbaijan insists Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, before signing. Baku itself maintains constitutional provisions that imply claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversial nature. Full border demarcation is years away, and the entire TRIPP corridor runs through this non-demarcated zone. The draft peace agreement contains no reference to the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, or the 19 Armenian hostages held in Azerbaijani jails.
The Missing Half: Turkey
TRIPP’s full economic promise to Armenia cannot be realized while the Turkish border remains sealed after 33 years. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has been explicit: the Kars–Gyumri railway is not a footnote to TRIPP — it is its western terminus. In April 2026, Turkish and Armenian officials met in Kars to establish a joint working group on reopening the line, but Turkey’s position remains that normalization awaits a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Turkey is also constructing a parallel railroad on its territory. Armenia is the structurally weakest of the three parties in this triangular relationship.
The EU’s Absence
TRIPP is a bilateral deal witnessed by a U.S. president, not a multilateral framework — which structurally sidelines the European Union despite its deep strategic interest in the Middle Corridor’s success. The EU has welcomed the project rhetorically and is investing in Armenia through separate instruments (Resilient Syunik, Global Gateway) but is not a co-investor in TRIPP’s governance structure.
This is a missed opportunity. The EU brings deep experience in cross-border infrastructure governance through TEN-T and Global Gateway, large-scale financing capacity through the EIB and EBRD, and institutional continuity that does not depend on any single leader’s attention span. A 2026 European Commission study found the TRIPP route would cut travel times by up to 25% compared with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad — meaning Brussels has already done the technical homework. A U.S.–EU co-management model — with Washington providing political guarantee and security, and Brussels providing bulk financing, technical governance, and institutional continuity — could address TRIPP’s two most glaring vulnerabilities: its dependence on Trump personally, and the absence of legally binding commitments.
The Iran Variable
The U.S.–Israel war against Iran is simultaneously strengthening TRIPP’s strategic rationale and threatening its physical implementation. With Hormuz shipping disrupted and Iran’s transit role compromised, the Middle Corridor’s value has sharply increased — cargo takes 12–15 days via the corridor versus 40 days by sea. But deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border is now difficult; site survey visits have already been postponed; and the commercial companies the U.S. hoped to attract are reassessing security risks. The same small U.S. team — led by Steve Witkoff — responsible for TRIPP is now primarily consumed by the Iran crisis.
Meanwhile, Russia is capitalizing on regional uncertainty. Azerbaijan is hedging — Aliyev recently visited Georgia to signal the Tbilisi route remains viable — and there are signs of Kremlin optimism that the Iran war has at least temporarily buried TRIPP.
Conclusion: A Corridor Without a Foundation?
TRIPP has achieved real, if fragile, results: it has substituted for a Russian-controlled corridor, deferred Azerbaijani military pressure on Syunik, and initiated the first genuine normalization of Armenian Azerbaijani relations in a generation.
But the project is built on compounding fragilities. Nine months in, not a single meter of construction has occurred on Armenian soil. There is no signed peace treaty, no finalized operating company contract, no resolved Russian railway concession, and now a war literally across the border. The governing Implementation Framework explicitly disclaims legal obligation on either party — an extraordinary admission for a project of this scale.
Armenia’s structural position remains asymmetric. It provides the territory, absorbs the sovereignty risk, hosts U.S. security personnel near the Iranian border, and depends on political processes entirely outside its control — a signed peace agreement, an open Turkish border, Azerbaijani reciprocity — for the promised dividends to materialize. Azerbaijan gets its corridor. Turkey gets its logistics hub. The U.S. gets its minerals and its trophy deal. Armenia gets a conditional promise and a 49-year commitment.
The deeper question TRIPP poses has not changed since 8 August 2025: is this a genuine crossroads of peace, or a corridor for everyone else’s prosperity? The answer lies in the details that remain stubbornly unresolved — the security contract, the railway concession, reciprocal access, the Armenian hostages in Azerbaijani jails, and the Turkish border sealed for 33 years.
Hrair Balian, JD, DoL, has served in leadership positions at the UN, OSCE, the International Crisis Group, and The Carter Center, working on conflict transformation in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, North & South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East & Africa. He has served as Adjunct Professor at Emory University, School of Law.
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Asbarez: New Novel ‘Never Hide from the Devil,’ Tells Armenian Tale of Courag
Inspired by a true story of resistance during the Armenian Genocide, this stirring coming-of-age novel is a parable of courage and impossible choices in the midst of unimaginable horror.
The government wants them dead.
Fourteen-year-old Suren Simonian, an Armenian, lives as most boys his age do in the city of Van, eastern Anatolia. He goes to school, gawks at boys’ fistfights, and does his best to avoid the Turkish gendarmes. Most days, he spends with his Turkish best friend, Hamza.
But in spring 1915, rumors spread through Van of Turkish massacres of Armenian villages. Now Turkish troops have massed outside Van with one goal—to exterminate the city’s Armenians.
As Suren struggles to understand what it means to be a man, he knows one thing for sure: When everything you’ve known and loved is at stake, the only answer is to fight back. You can never hide from the devil.
In a Starred Review, Kirkus Reviews writes the novel is “heart-wrenching, thought-provoking, and painfully timely.”
Dr. Khatchig Mouradian, Columbia University, author of “The Resistance Network” says, “The horrors perpetrators commit are only half the story of genocide. The other half is the resistance of its victims. N.T. McQueen delivers a powerful novel of courage and defiance in the face of annihilation.”
Marsha Skrypuch, author of “Making Bombs for Hitler” and the “Kidnapped from Ukraine” trilogy said its “written with short and compelling chapters, this novel plunges the reader with authenticity into this little-known act of defiance during the 20th century’s first genocide.”
Eric Z. Weintraub, author of “South of Sepharad” wrote: “Through the eyes of a young boy, McQueen crafts a devastating and unforgettable portrait of the 1915 Defense of Van—a story of resilience against impossible odds that delivers the history of the Armenian Genocide to a new generation.”
N.T. McQueen is an avid writer and dedicated college lecturer. With a master’s degree in fiction from California State University, Sacramento, McQueen has brought unique perspectives on human nature to readers in his captivating novels “Never Hide from the Devil“ (Cennan, 2026), “The Cry of Dry Bones“ (2021), and “Between Lions and Lambs“ (2011). His writing has been featured in North American Review, Stonecoast Review, Entropy, Sunlight Press, Atticus Review, Dappled Things, Grief Digest Magazine, and Foreword Magazine. He lives in California with his wife and daughters and enjoys fishing, traveling, and a tasty cup of coffee. The novel is now available from Cynren Press.
Support IALA’s work by purchasing it at their Bookshop.org storefront.
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Armenia industrial output up 13.4% in Q1 2026
Armenia’s industrial production rose 13.4% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026 to 748.8 billion drams, driven by strong growth in mining and quarrying and moderate gains in manufacturing and utilities, according to the Statistical Committee.
In March, industrial production declined by 2% compared to February but rose by 7% year-on-year. Industrial output in March amounted to 256 billion 521.4 million drams at current prices.
Mining and quarrying accounted for 60 billion 969.5 million drams of the March total. In the first quarter, output in the sector increased by 36.8% year-on-year to 163 billion 889.9 million drams. In March, production rose by 17.7% month-on-month and by 28% year-on-year.
Manufacturing output increased by 9.5% year-on-year in the first quarter to 458 billion 410.6 million drams. In March, output fell by 9.6% from February but rose by 1.3% from a year earlier, amounting to 155 billion 815.5 million drams.
Electricity, gas, steam, and air supply rose 7% in the first quarter to 118 billion 171.7 million drams, including 37 billion 172.5 million drams in March. Output increased 6% month-on-month and 7.9% year-on-year in March.
Water supply, sewerage, waste management, and recycling grew 4.1% year-on-year in the first quarter to 7 billion 528.6 million drams, including 2 billion 563.9 million drams in March. The sector rose 4.2% month-on-month and 2.9% year-on-year in March.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Tsarukyan calls for elected governors and restoration of agriculture ministry
Prosperous Armenia party leader and business magnate Gagik Tsarukyan has called for a shift toward elected regional governance, arguing that governors should be chosen by the public rather than appointed.
Speaking at a campaign event in Noyemberyan, Tavush, ahead of the upcoming June 7 parliamentary elections, Tsarukyan also emphasized the need to restore Armenia’s Ministry of Agriculture.
“The governor should be elected. The people should see that this person is an organizer, is concerned, understands things, and is someone who [goes the extra mile],” Tsarukyan said.
Speaking about the restoration of the Ministry of Agriculture, he said the move would ensure that farmers have a place to turn to for solving their problems, and that the ministry would also plan in advance and provide appropriate support within the framework of seasonal work.
Tsarukyan is Prosperous Armenia’s candidate for prime minister in the parliamentary elections.
The current Ministry of Economy of Armenia also carries out the functions of the former Ministry of Agriculture following their merger in 2019.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Central Bank of Armenia: exchange rates and prices of precious metals – 14-05-
The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 14 May, USD exchange rate up by 0.15 drams to 368.78 drams. EUR exchange rate down by 0.05 drams to 431.73 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate up by 0.0075 drams to 5.0201 drams. GBP exchange rate up by 0.35 drams to 498.26 drams.
The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.
Gold price down by 9 drams to 55438 drams. Silver price up by 36.62 drams to 1027.9 drams.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Verelq: The announcements of the Trump-Jinping meeting deserve attention
Both sides’ statements at the Trump-Jinping meeting naturally deserve attention. For example, Trump announced that the US intends to establish economic relations with China based on the principle of full reciprocity and parity.
Does this mean that the US president is abandoning the logic of economic sanctions, or is the statement just a diplomatic form, and in terms of content, Trump does not intend to maintain reciprocity and parity?
There is also a certain warning in Xi Jinping’s speech, which says that it is not necessary to allow the US-China relationship to fall into the “Thucydid’s trap”, when the struggle of the superpowers ends in a conflict.
The footnote of this review is remarkable, if we consider that the concept of “Thucydides’ trap” is defined in the sense that the newly forming power starts to oppose the already existing superpower. Perhaps Xi Jinping’s hint to Trump is that China is no longer an opposition to the US and is essentially not afraid of being a disproportionate victim in the event of a conflict.
Trump stated that personal contacts with Xi Jinping regularly helped to overcome complications. Trump also stated that Xi Jinping is a strong leader, and although many people don’t like him saying that, he will say again that Xi Jinping is a strong leader. “I always tell the truth,” Trump said.
Analyst Hakob Badalyan
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