Author: Emil Lazarian

A1 Plus | 20:39:14 | 08-04-2004 | Social |
PROMPT RESPONSE GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
A prompt response group for human rights protection was formed in Armenia.
Free Tribune for Civil Initiatives, Civil Society Institute, Helsinki
Committee of Armenia, Caucasus Center for Peacemaking Initiatives, Helsinki
Citizens` Assembly Vanadzor Office, Speech Freedom Support Fund, Journalists
‘ Club “Asparez” Gyumri, have decided to establish such a group.
The organizations have made the above decision since they assess the
situation in the country as a state terror and intention to create fearful
atmosphere in the republic.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Newark Star Ledger, NJ
April 8 2004
Oriental rugs
Thursday, April 08, 2004
BY BETH D’ADDONO
Nothing finishes off a room like an Oriental rug. Hand-made and
carefully crafted, each one has a story to tell and can speak volumes
against your polished hardwood floors and favorite furnishings.
Whether a rug is the finest heirloom quality silk or has more humble
beginnings, it still can add style and flair to just about any room.
There are literally hundreds of styles of rugs from exotic places
like Turkey, India, Iran and Tibet, but choosing an Oriental rug
doesn’t have to be one of the inscrutable mysteries of the Far East.

“Don’t let the names confuse you,” said Paul Mobasseri, the
Iranian-born manager of Oriental Rug Weavers Outlet in Green Brook.
“Each rug is named, not for the place where it’s made, but for the
village where its original design comes from — places like Bijar and
Tabriz in Persia, now known as Iran. But the important thing is to
look at a lot of rugs and then buy what you like.”
Buying a fine Oriental is like introducing a piece of history and
culture to your home. The tradition of rug weaving is a rich one.
Fragments of flat-woven carpets have been discovered in ancient
Egyptian tombs, dating back some 4000 years. The weaving of pile rugs
is generally associated with nomadic sheep-herding tribes in the
Middle East and parts of central Asia, long before 2000 B.C. “The
rearing of sheep, the prime source of carpet wool, is a traditional
nomad occupation,” according to the Web site “Add to
this the necessity of thick coverings for people having to endure
extreme cold, and it’s likely the craft of weaving developed to
replace the use of rough animal skins for warmth.”
What started out of necessity continued as a reflection of cultural
tradition and aesthetics. Antique Persian rugs are generally the most
expensive on the market, but many Persian designs are being produced
successfully elsewhere in the world, especially India. Everything
from the quality of the wool and density of the weave — counted by
the number of knots tied per square-inch — to the type of dye and
detail of design influences a rug’s value.
Depending on its quality, a 6 x 9-foot rug can take 3,000 man-hours
to produce, which accounts for higher prices on some types of
Oriental rugs.
In general, silk rugs are the most expensive, followed by a mixture
of silk and wool and 100 percent wool, which are considered the most
durable.
At Oriental Rug Weavers Outlet, prices can range from $850 to $20,000
for an 8 x 10 rug, depending on the quality of the wool, sharpness of
the design and density of the pile.
“A beautiful Oriental rug adds tremendous character to a room,” said
Marilee Schempp of Design I in Summit. Schempp recently redid a
dining room for a client in Chatham, using a 9 x 12 $12,600 Tibetan
rug from Tufenkian Carpets in Hackensack as the room’s anchor and
touchstone for color.
How do you know what size rug to buy? Mobasseri recommends using a
sheet or newspapers as a pattern, trying the dimensions on for size
until it looks right in the space. If you’re buying a rug for the
dining room, anticipate a four-foot border around the table, allowing
chairs to stay on the rug at all times. A reputable rug dealer will
let you bring a rug home to try in your room for a day or two. This
is truly the only way you’ll know for sure if the rug is for you.
About the only rule when it comes to placing an Oriental rug in a
room is that generally you want to center a rug with a prominent
center medallion. Other than that, rugs can complement existing
prints or other runs in adjacent rooms. Colors should harmonize, but
patterns don’t have to match for a rug style to work.
“Once you’ve established your budget, then it’s just a matter of
finding a rug that you fall in love with,” said Joyce Gibson, manager
for Tufenkian Carpets’ Hackensack showroom. Gibson recommends
building a room around a rug, instead of trying to match a rug to
existing paint color and furnishings.
In general, rugs with curving or curvilinear designs enhance formal
and traditional room settings, while geometric patterns work well in
more rustic or modern décor. Tufenkian Carpets specializes in rugs
produced in Tibet and Armenia, including commissioned designs by
Barbara Barry, Clodagh, Kevin Walz and Vincente Wolf. Company founder
James Tufenkian, produces most of the rug patterns, inspired by
traditional designs.
Prices for an 8 x 10 can range from $2,200 up to $13,000 and up. If
you want to spend more, you can also custom design a rug to fit your
world — a feature that has turned celebs like Goldie Hawn and Kelsey
Grammer into Tufenkian customers.
Once you’re ready to shop, spend some time at several different rug
stores, comparing styles and quality. Check out the price range for
the style of rug that you love most. Patronize an established and
reputable store that offers a wide variety of styles and price ranges
and will allow you to take a rug home to try out in the room.
What you don’t want to do is go cross-eyed counting the knots on the
back of the rug. “Don’t get caught in the knot count trap,” said
Gibson. “Some rug designs demand a looser, coarser weave. In general,
the higher the knot count, the more detail in the design. But the
bottom line is the value of good design and color and what you fall
in love with — that’s what ultimately sells a rug.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Azer Tag, Azerbaijan State Info Agency
April 8 2004
COE SECRETARY GENERAL APPROVES RELATIONS WITH MILLI MAJLIS
[April 08, 2004, 15:37:14]
Chairman of the Milli Majlis Murtuz Alasgarov met Council of Europe
Secretary General Walter Schwimmer, who is staying in Azerbaijan on
an official visit, April 7. He expressed to the guest his gratitude
for the support his organization has been providing for Azerbaijan to
integrate into Europe. The Chairman reminded that after joining the
Council of Europe, Azerbaijan has signed over 40 Conventions,
protocols and other documents of this structure. He pointed out as
well that Azerbaijan had passed a number of laws concerning human
rights protection, established Ombudsman institute and Constitutional
Court, as well as had drawn up the draft Law `On Tele- and Radio
Broadcasting’ and submitted it for European experts’ consideration.
Chairman Murtuz Alasgarov let the COE Secretary General know that the
Parliament has recently passed the Law `On Fight against Corruption’,
while a number of other ones are now under intensive elaboration, and
pointed out that Azerbaijan had been conscientiously honoring its
commitments to the Council of Europe.
The parties as well touched upon the political prisoners’ issue. It
was mentioned that under the Decrees of Pardon issued by nationwide
leader of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev and the Head of State Ilham
Aliyev, the important steps had been taken to discharge those whom
the Council of Europe called political prisoners. As a result of the
32 Decrees on Pardon issued in 1995-2003 by President Heydar Aliyev,
and 7 laws on amnesty passed by the Milli Majlis, 716 have been
discharged, and cases of 11 are now under court examination.
According to the Chairman, for the short period, President Ilham
Aliyev has issued two Decrees on Pardon of December 2003 and March 17
2004 discharging over 100 men. Therefore, Azerbaijan has fulfilled
its commitment to the Council Europe.
The meeting also focused on the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh. Mr. Murtuz Alasgarov pointed out with regret the
same approach by some international organizations to both aggressor
and subject of the aggression, displaying double standards policy on
the issue. He reminded on destruction of Azerbaijan cultural
monuments and over 900 populated areas.
COE Secretary General Walter Schwimmer has given appositive
assessment to the relations between the Milli Majlis and the Council
of Europe saying the goal of the organization was to render necessary
assistance to Azerbaijan. He pointed out the recommendations of the
Venice Commission and OSCE Bureau of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights concerning the Election Code, and expressed hope that
Azerbaijan would make use of the recommendations during Parliamentary
elections to be held in Azerbaijan in November 2005.
Mr. Schwimmer noted that one of the main Council of Europe’s clauses
is indepencence of mass media and freedom of expression, and welcomed
the law on alternative military service to be shortly passed in
Azerbaijan.
He noted as well that he had always welcomed the Decrees on Pardon
issued by President Heydar Aliyev, and stressed the two new Decrees
signed by the Head of Azerbaija Ilham Aliyev created good basis for
the independent experts to complete their reports.
The COE Secretary General announced he was going to visit one of the
encampments, and that existence of over 1 million refugees terrified
him. He expressed opinion that the issue must be in the constant
focus of the Europe’s attention, `The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is
the problem of not only Azerbaijan or region but also the whole
Europe,’ he said. Mr. Schwimmer stressed that this conflict
contradicted the principles of the Council of Europe.

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief
=================================================
Wednesday 7 April 2004
TURKMENISTAN: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY, APRIL 2004
In its survey analysis of the religious freedom situation in Turkmenistan,
Forum 18 News Service reports on the almost complete lack of freedom to
practice any faith, apart from very limited freedom for Sunni Islam and
Russian Orthodox Christianity with a small number of registered places of
worship and constant interference and control by the state. This is despite
recent legal changes that in theory allow minority communities to register.
All other communities – Baptist, Pentecostal, Adventist, Lutheran and other
Protestants, as well as Shia Muslim, Armenian Apostolic, Jewish, Baha’i,
Jehovah’s Witness and Hare Krishna – are currently banned and their
activity punishable under the administrative or criminal law. Religious
meetings have been broken up, with raids in March on Jehovah’s Witnesses
and a Baha’i even as the government was proclaiming a new religious policy.
Believers have been threatened, detained, beaten, fined and sacked from
their jobs, while homes used for worship and religious literature have been
confiscated. Although some minority communities have sought information on
how to register under the new procedures, none has so far applied to
register. It remains very doubtful that Turkmenistan will in practice allow
religious faiths to be practiced freely.
TURKMENISTAN: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY, APRIL 2004
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service
Despite legal changes in March that – at least theoretically –
allow minority religious communities to register for the first time since
1997, Turkmenistan retains one of the harshest systems of state control
over religious life of any of the former Soviet republics. Under the highly
restrictive 1996 religion law, only two religious faiths were able to gain
registration: communities of the state-sanctioned Sunni Muslim Board and
the Russian Orthodox Church. Amendments to the religion law enacted in
October 2003 made all unregistered religious activity de jure illegal and a
criminal offence. Unregistered religious activity was already being de
facto treated as criminal activity. Baptist, Pentecostal, Adventist,
Lutheran and other Protestant churches, as well as Shia Muslim, Armenian
Apostolic, Jewish, Baha’i, Jehovah’s Witness and Hare Krishna communities
are among those whose activity is banned and punishable under the
administrative or criminal law.
The surprise legal changes this year came at a time when Turkmenistan’s
government was under heavy international pressure over its human rights
abuses. Key United Nations bodies had already condemned Turkmenistan’s
record and this was due to come up again at the UN Commission on Human
Rights in Geneva, which opened on 15 March. The legal changes were heralded
by a decree from President Saparmurat Niyazov on 11 March, the same day
that the president met the visiting United States Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe, who had raised human rights concerns. A
parallel decree issued at the same time eased exit requirements, a second
key foreign concern.
The presidential religion decree abolished the requirement to have 500
adult citizen members before a community could apply for registration with
the Adalat (Fairness or Justice) Ministry, explicitly allowing
“religious groups of citizens” to register “independently of
their number, faith and religion”. However, Adalat Ministry officials
immediately stressed to Forum 18 that unregistered activity remains a
criminal offence.
The decree was followed up by amendments to the religion law, published on
24 March. The new law requires that “religious groups” must have
between five and fifty adult citizen members to register, while
“religious organisations” must have at least fifty. In theory at
least, this removes the obstacle to registering non-Sunni Muslim and
non-Orthodox communities.
Religious groups – especially those that have suffered years of
persecution – were divided over the apparent liberalisation. Many
were sceptical that a government that had persecuted them for so long could
have had a genuine change of heart. But others were determined to at least
try to register. Among groups which immediately sought information about
the registration process from the Adalat Ministry or the government’s
Gengeshi (Council) for Religious Affairs were a number of Christian
communities – including the Catholics, New Apostolic Church, Greater Grace,
Church of Christ and Adventists – and the Baha’i community. The Russian
Orthodox Church also signalled to Forum 18 that it might wish to register
more parishes. However, many religious leaders stressed that until their
communities have registered successfully they will not be convinced that
anything has changed. One Jehovah’s Witness representative in Russia
– who maintains close contacts with fellow believers in Turkmenistan
– told Forum 18 that they believe there is “no realistic
chance” that their communities will get registration.
Serious questions were raised about the sincerity of the government’s moves
when, on 29 March, President Niyazov told officials of the Gengeshi –
which runs the Muslim community for the government – that he was
handing over three new mosques to it and that no further mosques would be
allowed. This appears to bar both Sunni and Shia Muslim communities that
have been denied registration from taking advantage of the relaxation of
the harsh registration requirements.
Even on the day the president issued his decree a Jehovah’s Witness in the
capital Ashgabad [Ashgabat] was summoned to the Gengeshi, where seven
officials – including a mullah – pressured him to renounce his
faith. He refused and was eventually allowed to leave, but he was sacked
from his job, leaving his family with no breadwinner. Two days later more
than twenty Jehovah’s Witnesses attending a meeting in a private home in
Ashgabad were taken to the police station and interrogated and threatened
by police and secret police officers. In other March incidents, police
confiscated a Bible and other religious literature from a Jehovah’s Witness
(who was also threatened with rape), and extracted money for a fine from
another Witness which he claimed to have already paid last year. On 24
March secret police officers raided the home in the town of Balkanabad
[Nebitdag] of a Baha’i, accusing him of “provoking schism” in
society by his faith and threatening to confiscate his home. Believers are
disturbed that these incidents have taken place when, officially, religious
policy is claimed to be being relaxed after a long period of persecution.
In the past few years, religious meetings have been raided (with a spate of
raids against Protestant and Hare Krishna communities during summer 2003
and intermittently since then), places used for worship have been
confiscated or demolished and believers have been beaten, fined, detained,
deported and sacked from their jobs in punishment for religious activity
the government does not like. Some believers have been given long prison
sentences in recent years for their religious activity (most of them
Jehovah’s Witnesses) or have been sent into internal exile to remote parts
of the country.
Jehovah’s Witness sources have told Forum 18 that at least five of their
young men are serving imprisonment for refusing compulsory military service
on grounds of religious conscience (Turkmenistan has no provision for
alternative service). The most recent known prisoner is Jehovah’s Witness
Rinat Babadjanov, sentenced in February in Dashoguz to several years’
imprisonment. Another Witness, Kurban Zakirov, is serving an eight-year
sentence on charges the Jehovah’s Witnesses say are trumped up.
Turkmenistan’s restrictions on religious activity come despite
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion (repeated in the March
presidential decree) and its obligations to maintain such freedom of
religion as a member of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and a signatory to international human rights conventions.
Turkmenistan has pointedly failed to respond to repeated requests from the
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Professor
Abdelfattah Amor, to be allowed to visit the country or to respond to
enquiries about specific incidents.
With an authoritarian ruler, President-for-life Niyazov (who likes to call
himself “Turkmenbashi” or Father of the Turkmens), Turkmenistan
already suffers from an absence of political and social freedom. State
control was tightened even more in the wake of a failed assassination
attempt on the president in November 2002, which some observers believe may
have been staged to provide a pretext for repression. Niyazov’s rule is
characterised by a grotesque cult of personality, with ever-present statues
and portraits. Works he allegedly wrote – especially the Ruhnama
(Book of the Soul), which officials have likened to the Koran or the Bible
– are compulsorily imposed on schools and the wider public. Russian
Orthodox priests and Sunni Muslim imams are forced to quite approvingly
from the Ruhnama in sermons, and to display it prominently in places of
worship.
Turkmenistan’s deliberate isolation from the outside world and the punitive
measures taken against those engaged in unauthorised religious activity
make religious freedom reporting very difficult. Believers often fear
retribution for reporting their difficulties, and so Forum 18 is unable to
give the names or identifying features of sources within the country.
Religious activity is overseen by the secret police’s department for work
with social organisations and religious groups. This department, formerly
the sixth department of the National Security Committee (KNB), is one of
the six or seven main departments of the State Security Ministry (MSS) and
was created when the KNB was restructured in late 2002. The social and
religious affairs department of the secret police is believed to have 45
officers at the headquarters in Ashgabad, with a handful of officers in
each local branch.
Local MSS secret police officers regularly summon Muslim and Orthodox
clerics to report on activity within their communities. Some believers have
told Forum 18 that the MSS also runs “spies” in each Muslim and
Orthodox community, sometimes as many as half a dozen. In addition to their
spies – who attend the religious community solely at MSS behest to
gain information – there might be another ten or fifteen believers
who are regularly interviewed by MSS officers and forced to reveal details
of the community’s religious life.
The MSS secret police and the ordinary police also try to recruit spies in
unregistered religious groups, such as with the attempted recruitment of a
member of a Baptist church they had detained in June 2003 in Turkmenabad.
The Gengeshi for Religious Affairs – which is headed by an imam,
Yagshimurat Atamuradov – has nominal responsibility for religious
affairs, and has a headquarters in Ashgabad and branch offices in each of
Turkmenistan’s five velayats (regions). The Gengeshi’s main job appears to
be approving clerical appointments in the Sunni Muslim and Orthodox
communities. “Imams are chosen by the Gengeshi and are then approved
by the president,” one source told Forum 18. Niyazov confirmed this in
March 2004, when he instructed Gengeshi officials to make sure they
appointed all imams, warning them not to allow local believers to do so.
The Adalat Ministry officially registers religious organisations, although
until now it has had little work to do on this as so few applications have
been approved anyway. Shirin Akhmedova, the official at the ministry in
charge of registering religious organisations, told Forum 18 in March that
152 religious communities currently have registration, 140 of them Muslim
and 12 Russian Orthodox. She admitted that far more religious communities
had registration before 1997, when the harsh restrictions on registration
came in (there were some 250 registered Muslim communities alone, as well
as communities of many other faiths).
Unregistered religious communities face regular raids by MSS secret police
officers, backed up by ordinary police officers, officials of the local
administration and local religious affairs officials, who work closely
together in suppressing and punishing as criminal all unregistered
religious activity.
Even the two officially-recognised faiths – the Sunni Muslim Board
and the Russian Orthodox Church – face government meddling and
require government approval for the nomination of all officials. In January
2003 President Niyazov ousted the Chief Mufti, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, an
ethnic Uzbek who had led Turkmenistan’s Muslims for the previous ten years,
and replaced him with the 35-year-old Kakageldy Vepaev, someone widely
believed to be more pliant.
In the wake of his dismissal, Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah apparently lived
quietly in his home town of Dashoguz until mid-January of this year, when
he was arrested, apparently accused of being an accomplice in the apparent
November 2002 assassination attempt. An MSS-compiled “confession”
allegedly written in prison by the chief plotter, Boris Shikhmuradov,
alleged that the former chief mufti had been a key associate with the code
name “Rasputin”. Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah was sentenced to 22
years’ imprisonment at a closed trial in Ashgabad on 2 March. It remains
unclear whether he was punished for his lack of enthusiasm for the
president’s book the Ruhnama, for taking part in the plot, or as a
prominent member of the Uzbek minority.
Vepaev has taken over Nasrullah’s role in enforcing the president’s
religious policy. His dual role – as a Muslim leader and a state
official (he is also one of the deputy chairmen of the Gengeshi for
Religious Affairs) – became all too apparent during the crackdown on
Protestant and Hare Krishna communities in spring 2003: he personally took
part in raids on Protestant churches in Ashgabad and in follow-up meetings
at hyakimliks (local administrations) when church members were questioned
and threatened. In a similar move, local mullahs have frequently been
involved in raids on local religious minorities elsewhere in the country,
threatening them and calling them to renounce their faith and, if they are
ethnic Turkmens, to “return” to their ancestral faith.
Sunni Muslim mosques are reported to have seen attendance slump as, in
response to government orders, imams placed copies of the Ruhnama in
mosques with equal prominence as copies of the Koran. At least one mosque
has been closed down after its imam refused to put the Ruhnama in a place
of honour. The grand mosques constructed on the president’s orders –
and with state funds – are likewise reported to be largely empty, as
Muslims decline to regard them as places of worship. Imams are, at least in
theory, required to recite the oath of loyalty to the president and country
at the end of the namaz (daily prayers). President Niyazov told Muslims in
2000 that they were to renounce the hadiths, sayings attributed to the
Prophet Muhammad which do not appear in the Koran but are valued by devout
Muslims.
Devout Muslims have expressed concern about the government-sponsored
ousting of imams who have theological education in favour of those who have
never been formally educated in Islam. In the past, imams were educated in
neighbouring Uzbekistan, but that appears to have come to a halt. Even in
areas dominated by Turkmenistan’s ethnic Uzbek minority, such as in the
Dashoguz [Dashhowuz] region of north-eastern Turkmenistan, the authorities
have ousted ethnic Uzbek imams and replaced them with ethnic Turkmens.
One source told Forum 18 that the decline in the level of education among
practising imams has led to a growth in respect for the artsakal, a
traditional religious leader. “They have preserved their authority and
people go to them for weddings and funerals,” the source reported.
“The authorities don’t attack them.”
Government tolerance of Sunni Islam has not extended to Shia Islam, which
is mainly professed by the ethnic Azeri and Iranian minorities in the west
of the country who are traditionally more devout than ethnic Turkmens. Shia
mosques failed to gain re-registration during the compulsory round of
re-registration in 1997 after the adoption of the much harsher law on
religion and, judging by the president’s remarks in March, appear unable to
apply for registration now. An unregistered Shia mosque in the Caspian port
city of Turkmenbashi [Türkmenbashy] was raided last December as local
Shias commemorated the death of the former Azerbaijani president Heidar
Aliev.
The president’s dislike of Shia Islam has also extended into history. Among
the accusations levelled at the 78-year-old writer Rahim Esenov was that he
had correctly portrayed Bayram Khan, a sixteenth-century regent of the
Mughal Empire and the hero of one of his novels, as a Shia rather than a
Sunni Muslim. Niyazov had warned Esenov in 1997 to amend his text, but the
writer had refused to comply. Detained earlier this year, national security
officers repeatedly asked him about why Bayram Khan was depicted as a Shia.
Freed from prison in March under international pressure, Esenov awaits
trial accused of inciting social, religious and ethnic hatred under Article
177 of the criminal code
The Russian Orthodox Church, which is nominally under the control of the
Church’s Central Asian diocese led from the Uzbek capital Tashkent by
Metropolitan Vladimir (Ikim), is in fact under the direct control of the
Ashgabad-based priest Fr Andrei Sapunov, widely regarded with suspicion by
members of the Orthodox Church and other Christian faiths who have suffered
from his actions.
In an echo of the practice in Sunni Muslim mosques, Orthodox priests
reportedly received instructions from the end of 2000 to quote from the
Ruhnama in sermons and to “preach to us about the virtues of living in
Turkmenistan and of the policies of Turkmenbashi,” one parishioner
complained.
Close to President Niyazov, Fr Sapunov frequently deploys the extravagant
personal praise of the president required of all officials. Many Orthodox
regard such statements as close to blasphemy. Some Orthodox have told Forum
18 that they have evidence he passes information received in the
confessional to the secret police.
In addition to his duties in the Church, Fr Sapunov is also one of the
deputy chairmen of the Gengeshi for Religious Affairs, with particular
responsibility for Christian affairs. This gives him an official power of
veto over the affairs of other Christian denominations. He is also
well-known in the secret police, even to local officers outside Ashgabad.
During numerous raids on Protestant churches in different regions, secret
police officers have told the Protestants that they must gain permission
from Fr Sapunov before they can operate.
The 1996 religion law specified that an individual religious community
needed 500 signatures of adult citizen members before it could apply for
registration. Officials repeatedly declared (although it was not specified
in the law) that these 500 had to live in one city district or one rural
district. This made it all but impossible for any new religious community
to register, even if the government wished to allow it to. Most religious
communities – including many mosques – lost their registration
and had to close down in the wake of the new law. Most Islamic schools were
also closed. It is so far unclear if the Adalat Ministry will register all
those communities that now wish to register under the new religion law.
Article 205 of the Code of Administrative Offences, which dates back to the
Soviet period, specifies fines for those refusing to register their
religious communities of five to ten times the minimum monthly wage, with
typical fines of 250,000 manats (363 Norwegian kroner, 44 Euros or 48 US
dollars at the inflated official exchange rate). Fines can be doubled for
repeat offenders. Many believers of a variety of faiths have been fined
under this article, including a series of Baptists and Hare Krishna
devotees last year after the series of raids on unregistered religious
meetings.
There is a Catholic mission in Turkmenistan, based at the Vatican
nunciature in Ashgabad. However, at present Catholics can only hold Masses
on this Vatican diplomatic territory. The priests have diplomatic status.
One of the biggest religious communities that has been denied registration
is the Armenian Apostolic Church. An estimated fifteen per cent of those
who attend Russian Orthodox churches are said by local people to be
Armenians, although the Armenian Church is of the Oriental family of
Christian Churches, not of the Orthodox family. “Sapunov told parish
priests to accept Armenian believers,” one local Orthodox told Forum
18. However, the Orthodox Church would stand to lose a sizeable proportion
of its flock were the government to allow the Armenian Church to revive its
activity.
The one surviving pre-revolutionary Armenian church – in the Caspian
port city of Turkmenbashi – is said to be in a “sorry state of
repair”. The Armenian ambassador to Turkmenistan has repeatedly sought
permission for it to be restored and reopened as a place of worship but in
vain. When the Armenian priest last visited from neighbouring Uzbekistan he
had to conduct baptisms and hold services in the Armenian embassy in
Ashgabad. Some Armenians expect that the new law will allow the community
finally to register and regain its church.
Religious parents – Muslim, Christian and members of other faiths –
face a dilemma over whether to send their children to state-run schools.
With the Ruhnama playing a major role in the school curriculum from the
very first year, together with recitation of the oath of loyalty to the
country and president, many religious parents do not wish to subject their
children to blasphemous practices. The oath of loyalty, which is printed at
the top of daily newspapers, reads: “Turkmenistan, beloved homeland,
my native land, both in my thoughts and in my heart I am eternally with
you. For the slightest evil caused to you, let my hand be cut off. For the
slightest calumny against you, may my tongue lose its strength. In the
moment of treachery to the fatherland, to the president, to your holy
banner, let my breathing cease.”
After the adoption in July 2002 of the law on guarantees of the rights of
the child, the unregistered Baptist Church complained bitterly about
Article 24 part 2 which declared: “Parents or the legal
representatives of the child are obliged … to bring him up in a spirit of
humanism and the unshakeable spiritual values embodied in the holy
Ruhnama.” Pointing out that officials are promoting the Ruhnama as
“the last word of God to the Turkmen people”, the Baptists
declared: “In practice this law is a direct infringement on the
freedom of conscience of citizens professing faith in Jesus Christ or
another faith not recognised by the state.”
Orthodox Christians echo the Baptists’ concerns, telling Forum 18 that the
issue has put Russian Orthodox priests in a difficult position.
“Worried parents have come to their priests,” one Orthodox
Christian reported. “The priest can’t tell his parishioners not to
send their children to school. All he can do is tell them to do as their
conscience dictates.” Some parents have begun to teach their children
privately at home.
The obstructions to travel abroad have made it difficult to take part in
international gatherings. In March border guards took two female Jehovah’s
Witnesses off the aeroplane at Ashgabad airport while on route to a
Jehovah’s Witness meeting in Kiev. They were barred from leaving the
country.
Believers who want to receive information from fellow-believers abroad face
virtually insurmountable obstacles. Access to the Internet is possible only
via state providers that exert strict control over what information can be
accessed. The majority of international religious websites are simply not
accessible by an Internet user in Turkmenistan. Moreover, a special
computer program searches emails for coded words that could be used to send
“unreliable information”, while “a suspicious message”
will simply not reach the addressee.
Religious literature is no longer published in Turkmenistan. Mosques and
Russian Orthodox churches often have small kiosks where a limited quantity
of literature is available. A typical Orthodox church bookstall might have
a few prayer books, small icons and calendars, with the Bible available
only erratically – and often, at about 12 US dollars, too expensive
for the badly-paid local people. Supplies of religious literature and
articles to Orthodox churches are equally erratic, with no official
distribution of books, icons, candles and baptismal crosses.
Orthodox believers trying to receive alternative information are in a more
difficult situation than Sunni Muslims. Under a September 2002 presidential
decree, direct subscription to Russian newspapers and magazines, including
religious publications such as the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, is
banned in Turkmenistan. Even Orthodox priests do not receive the Journal
regularly, being forced to rely on old copies they pick up when they are
visiting Moscow or Tashkent.
Of the Russian television channels, only a few hours a day of the ORT
channel are broadcast, and then only with a day’s delay after programmes
have been approved by a censor. Currently there are a number of broadcasts
on Russian television covering Orthodox issues. The broadcast of Russian
cable programmes is forbidden in Turkmenistan, so that unlike in other
Central Asian states, local Orthodox believers cannot use this as an
alternative source of religious news.
Officials have not simply restricted themselves to banning the receipt of
political information from the former metropolis. Purely religious
communications between local Orthodox believers and Russia have inevitably
also been obstructed. As Turkmenistan has become even more isolated from
Russia, individual Orthodox believers have become more isolated from the
Moscow Patriarchate.
Religious literature is routinely confiscated from members of unregistered
religious minorities during police raids on their homes or as they return
to the country from foreign travels.
With sweeping measures against religious groups in the wake of the harsher
religion law in 1996, the denial of registration to most religious
communities in the 1997 re-registration drive, the expulsion of hundreds of
foreigners, mainly Russians, engaged in religious activity (including
Muslims, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Hare Krishna
devotees), the confiscation or demolition of unauthorised places of worship
(including Ashgabad’s Adventist church in November 1999), the sacking of
believers from their work (especially Jehovah’s Witnesses and Protestants)
and a climate of fear only slightly tempered by the promised registration
of minority faiths, the Turkmen authorities have succeeded in all but
wiping out public religious activity except in a small number of registered
Sunni Muslim and Russian Orthodox places of worship.
All other religious activity has of necessity to be shrouded in secrecy,
with believers having to hide their faith and worship from the knowledge of
intrusive state officials. In response to the pressure, all unregistered
communities have seen the numbers of their active members fall. Yet despite
the severe controls and the threat of punishment, the remaining believers
practice their various faiths as best they can while waiting for better
times.
The changes to the law this year show that concerted pressure on the
Turkmenistan authorities from outside has led to a public change of the
proclaimed policy. However, for religious believers to see real and not
spurious change, the Adalat Ministry will have to register all religious
communities that apply for registration without discrimination;
unregistered religious activity will have to be decriminalised (including
abolishing articles of the criminal and civil code which punish
unregistered religious activity); believers in prison for their faith will
have to be freed; there will have to be an end to police and security
ministry raids on private homes where believers are meeting for worship;
there will have to be an end to interrogations of and fines on believers;
those fined for practising their faith will have to be compensated;
believers who have been fired from their jobs for their membership of
minority religious communities will have to be reinstated; those
responsible for raiding religious meetings and beating and otherwise
punishing believers for the free exercise of their faith will have to be
brought to legal accountability; and believers will have to be able to
enjoy the right to publish and distribute whatever religious literature
they wish to and organise and take part in religious education freely. Only
if the authorities meet these obligations will believers in Turkmenistan
believe that the situation has changed irrevocably for the better.
A printer-friendly map of Turkmenistan is available at
;Rootmap=turkme
(END)
© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved.
You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
F18News
Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Radio Free Europe, Czech Republic
April 7 2004
World: Freedom House Report Highlights Countries With Democratic
Deficits
By Breffni O’Rourke
The U.S.-based pro-democracy organization Freedom House has issued a
report that examines the problems and hurdles facing democratic
development in 30 countries. The report concludes that Uzbekistan is
one of the most repressive countries in the world. It also says
democratic efforts in Kyrgyzstan have stalled, as they have in
Armenia and Ukraine. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are described as
having authoritarian systems.
Prague, 7 April 2004 (RFE/RL) — Freedom House, an organization that
monitors democracy around the world, today published a list of
countries that it claims need help to achieve democracy — or to
further improve it.
The New York-based group says its list of 30 countries is the first
of its kind. It is aimed not just at criticizing the countries named
but also at drawing the international community’s attention to the
fact that they need assistance.
In presenting the report — called “Countries at the Crossroads” —
Freedom House’s Executive Director Jennifer Windsor said “these
countries are at key transition points and to ignore their needs
creates a risk of both individual backsliding and regional democratic
deterioration.”
The list includes Afghanistan and Pakistan; the Central Asian nations
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan; in the Caucasus, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia; and in Europe, Ukraine. Several Arab states
are also mentioned, such as Bahrain, Qatar, and Yemen.
— In Afghanistan, the report finds that the “rule of the gun largely
supersedes the rule of law.” It says that extra military support is
urgently needed to stabilize the country outside the capital Kabul,
and that the rights of Afghan women remain at Taliban-era levels in
some regions.
— In Pakistan, it says the growing role of the military in
government and civil life is a major obstacle to democratic reform,
and that promises of reform have not so far shown results.
— In Kazakhstan, the report finds an authoritarian system with
limited scope for political competition.
— Kyrgyzstan, it says, has experienced initial democratic openings
that have since stalled or eroded.
— The report sees Uzbekistan as being among the most politically
repressive states in the world, having perpetrated what it calls
“gross violations” of human rights and religious freedoms.
Turning to the Caucasus, the Freedom House report finds that:
— In Armenia, the limited democratic reforms that were undertaken
have gradually eroded, and stalled, and are in danger of complete
reversal.
— In Georgia, before November’s ouster of President Eduard
Shevardnadze, the situation was rated the same as in Armenia.
— In Azerbaijan, there is an authoritarian system with limited scope
for political competition.
— In Ukraine, the limited democratic reforms that were undertaken
have gradually eroded, and stalled, and are in danger of complete
reversal.
“I think the key question is what happens to U.S. policy — for how
long the U.S. is going to go on supporting authoritarian regimes in
Central Asia while trying to spread democracy in the Middle East?” —
Political analyst Heather Grabbe of the Centre for European
ReformFreedom House’s inclusion today of Uzbekistan as one of the
most repressive regimes comes after the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) announced yesterday that it was
banning most loans to Uzbekistan because of continued political
repression and lack of economic reform.
EBRD President Jean Lemierre said the bank will stay engaged to push
for reforms but can no longer conduct business as usual in
Uzbekistan.
EBRD spokesman Jeff Hiday — speaking in London before yesterday’s
decision — gave the methodology on which the bank based its
decision. It set criteria against which Uzbekistan’s performance
could be measured.
“The environment in Uzbekistan has been particularly challenging. So
we set seven benchmarks. And we sought for Uzbekistan to demonstrate
progress on these benchmarks. The extent to which they made progress
would determine the extent to which we continue to invest in the
country,” Hiday said.
The watchdog organization Human Rights Watch today praised the EBRD’s
decision, calling it “unprecedented” and “principled,” and describing
Uzbekistan’s rights record as “appalling.”
Human Rights Watch spokeswoman Vanessa Saenan said in Brussels that
the EBRD should apply its benchmark system to other countries, as
well.
“There are several other countries out there, particularly in Central
Asia and the Caucasus, where a similar approach to that taken with
respect to Uzbekistan would be warranted,” Saenan said.
Another Human Rights Watch spokeswoman, Veronika Leila in Geneva,
listed those countries, saying such benchmarking could become a
standard method for measuring progress in democratic and economic
reforms.
“It would be Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan. In the
South Caucasus, we are talking about Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In Europe, it would not be unwarranted to take a similar approach
with respect to Ukraine. So we are really hoping that the [EBRD],
after this experience with Uzbekistan, will become more forceful and
serious about its political mandate, as it has really demonstrated
that it is able to ‘operationalize’, if you wish, its political
mandate, which makes clear that it was set up to engage those
countries in the region which do respect democracy and human rights,”
Leila said.
Leila called on the United States and the European Union to take a
harder line with countries like Uzbekistan, which are allies but
which do not observe human rights. She noted that the U.S. government
must soon issue its periodic certifications for Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, confirming that they are making progress on rights
commitments so that aid can be continued.
She said these two countries are plainly not making progress.
Political analyst Heather Grabbe of the Centre for European Reform in
London said that much will depend on what the United States does.
“I think the key question is what happens to U.S. policy — for how
long the U.S. is going to go on supporting authoritarian regimes in
Central Asia while trying to spread democracy in the Middle East? It
doesn’t really make sense, and obviously the U.S. agenda has a huge
impact on the role of the international organizations,” Grabbe said.
Grabbe said it’s an important moment for international donors to
consider the conditions they attach to their financing. But she also
said there was a persistent lack of consensus within the
international community on how to deal with repressive regimes.
The complete Freedom House survey can be found on the Internet at
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Daily speculates on Azeri campaign against opening of Turkish-Armenian border
Zerkalo, Baku
6 Apr 04

The Baku government has orchestrated a protest of Azerbaijani
reporters in Turkey against the opening of the Armenian border,
Azerbaijani daily Zerkalo has reported. The Azerbaijani leadership is
attempting to exert pressure on Turkey ahead of President Ilham
Aliyev’s visit to this country later this month, the newspaper
said. But Turkey seems to have made up its mind to lift the blockade
of Armenia since this country itself has serious problems with
Yerevan. On the other hand, there is European pressure, and Ankara is
ready to pay the highest price for EU membership, the daily said. The
sooner Turkey becomes an EU member, the better for Azerbaijan. Turkey
could then influence EU decisions relating to Azerbaijan, Zerkalo
said. The following is the text of the report by R. Mirqadirov in
Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo on 6 April headlined “Time to stop
viewing relations with fraternal Turkey through rose-coloured
spectacles”; subheadings inserted editorially:
Azerbaijan tries to exert pressure on Turkey
Contradictions in relations between two fraternal countries have
become visible ahead of the Azerbaijani president’s official visit to
Turkey. For the first time after gaining independence Azerbaijan is
not solving existing problems amicably through diplomatic channels,
but is trying “to exert pressure” on the Turkish government through
“public opinion” and that is a fact.
At the initiative of the independent TV company ANS, as a circulated
statement reads, on 6 April a group of journalists from leading media
outlets will go to the Turkish-Armenian border to stage an action
under the slogan “Turks must support Turks”. The rally-goers are even
planning to form a symbolic “live impassable border” between Turkey
and Armenia. The action will end in Ankara.
To all appearances, some opposition forces in Turkey will back this
action as they believe that the [Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip]
Erdogan government is making inadmissible concessions for the sake of
EU membership. It is not a coincidence that the rally-goers will call
on the Turkish government not to yield to “pressure from some
countries” and not to open the border with Armenia. It would not be
very difficult for Ankara to sort out problems with individual
countries. Things are different with the EU which has been insisting
on the opening of the border. The Erdogan government is prepared to
pay the highest price for Turkey’s EU membership.
Given the aforesaid, it is difficult to imagine that the group of
journalists “from the leading media outlets leave for Turkey” without
“permission” especially ahead of [Azerbaijani President] Ilham
Aliyev’s first visit to Ankara as president. It is clear that this
demarche of the two countries’ public, which has been organized by the
Azerbaijani side and which will most probably involve Turkey’s
opposition forces, is unlikely to create a favourable atmosphere in
the forthcoming talks between Ilham Aliyev and Erdogan. Thus, the
Azerbaijani government is deliberately aggravating relations with the
Erdogan government to some extent. But is it worth doing so?
Let us start with the positive aspect. For the first time ever the
Azerbaijani government is trying to use resources of the
non-government sector to implement a specific foreign policy task. It
is a pleasing aspect on its own.
Opening of border formality
Let us now talk about the essence of the problem. If the Azerbaijani
government tries to use public pressure to prevent the opening of the
border and, in doing so, almost jeopardizes Ilham Aliyev’s forthcoming
visit to the fraternal country, this means that all other diplomatic
means have failed to settle this problem, i.e. the opening of the
border with Armenia is already a settled issue and this is all only
formalities.
Is this in the interests of the Azerbaijani government? Obviously,
no. No matter who says what, Azerbaijani society will most probably
assess the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia as a major
foreign policy failure of the new Azerbaijani president. Ilham
Aliyev’s opponents will recall that international organizations
demanded that Turkey open the border with Armenia in the past as
well. But Ankara did not do so during [late Azerbaijani President]
Heydar Aliyev’s tenure.
Armenia to get political rather than economic dividends
But this is not the whole story. The opening of the border and
establishment of normal economic and diplomatic relations between
Armenia and Turkey will naturally strengthen the position of the
incumbent Armenian leadership, on the whole, and [Armenian President]
Robert Kocharyan in particular.
Armenia will not receive economic dividends from the opening of the
border at the beginning. First, the Armenian market is too small for
serious Turkish investors. Second, the opening of the border is one
issue, but the establishment of serious economic relations is
completely different. But one could “unofficially” regulate the level
of economic relations as well. Third, Armenia is far behind from
regional integration processes and major economic projects. That is
why, it is unlikely that anyone in Armenia could seriously hope for
the rapid improvement of the internal economic situation after the
opening of the border with Turkey.
As for political dividends, the Armenian government will obviously get
them. First, Armenia will speak everywhere about the failure of the
blockade policy. Second, Kocharyan will receive certain trumps in the
struggle with the pro-Western part of the opposition which has accused
him of the isolation policy and has already announced nationwide
rallies against the incumbent regime starting on 9 April. Kocharyan
will prove his ability to end the country’s isolation without
concessions in such principled issues as the Karabakh problem.
Turkey plays own game
What about Turkey? Ankara has been trying to speculate on the Karabakh
problem for a long period, claiming to revise its relations with
Yerevan only after the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
and liberation of all occupied Azerbaijani territories. Many people in
Azerbaijan have been gladly trusting this, forgetting that Turkey
itself has serious problems with Armenia. These are, first of all,
the problem of the so-called “genocide” and western territories,
i.e. Armenia insists on the international recognition of “the
genocide” and has territorial claims to Turkey. Having these problems,
it would be stupid of Turkey to establish normal relations with
Armenia.
Incidentally, the recognition of “the genocide” is not only an issue
of “restoring the historical truth” as the Armenian government claims,
but it can have quite specific negative financial consequences for
Turkey. Having recognized “the Jewish genocide”, Germany is still
paying to the descendants of Nazi concentration camp victims. These
prospects could be excessive for the Turkish economy which is hardly
stable and prosperous, unlike the German one.
But today Turkey has made serious concessions in the Cyprus issue for
the sake of its EU membership. The Cyprus issue is more important for
the Turkish government and the entire Turkish people rather than the
Karabakh problem. That is why, one should not be under a delusion and
think that Turkey will reject EU membership because of Azerbaijan. But
Turkey should solve its own problems with Armenia after all.
Zerkalo has learnt from informed Turkish diplomatic channels that
Yerevan and Ankara have recently had intensive unofficial diplomatic
contacts. In exchange for the opening of the border, Ankara has been
trying to achieve Yerevan’s guarantee that it will remove the
so-called “genocide” issue from the agenda. Incidentally, it is not
quite necessary that Armenia should give up the idea of the official
recognition of the genocide at the state level. Yerevan should not
simply exaggerate this issue in the future.
Thus, Ankara is trying to solve its own problems, but pretends that it
is allegedly forced to sacrifice Azerbaijan’s interests to EU
pressure.
Azerbaijan should back Turkey’s EU membership bid
But we already must stop looking through rose-coloured spectacles and
see the practical side of the issue. Let Turkish society itself think
about the worth of opening the state border with Armenia without
certain guarantees for the settlement of the problems existing between
Ankara and Yerevan.
Ankara must realize that the EU is not in a hurry to see Turkey as its
member. Turkey is a big country in terms of human resources and
territory, which has the key geopolitical location and many serious
economic problems. Brussels realizes very well that Turkey’s
membership will create many problems for the EU itself. From this
viewpoint, the South Caucasus countries have better chances to become
EU members than Turkey.
At the same time, Azerbaijan should have an interest in Turkey’s EU
membership, the sooner, the better. At least, Turkey could then
directly influence EU decisions and even block those which are
unfavourable for Azerbaijan’s interests. It will be then possible to
judge whether fraternal ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey are strong
enough.
On the other hand, as soon as Turkey becomes an EU member, it will be
obliged to have the same level of relations both with Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian opposition leader vows to respond in kind to force
A1+ web site
6 Apr 04

At a press conference given by the National Unity Party today,
Artashes Gegamyan answered questions from reporters.
[Unspecified journalist] What kind of assistance do you expect from
the Council of Europe, the USA and Russia?
[Gegamyan] Armenia is a member of the Council of Europe and the
OSCE. These organizations have adopted the Geneva Convention on Human
Rights and Basic Freedoms which has been signed by Armenian President
Robert Kocharyan. We hope those countries will tell us and urge us to
honour what we have signed.
[Journalist] What will the National Unity Party do, if all the roads
leading to the city and the Freedom Square are blocked on 9 April?
[Gegamyan] The same as yesterday, I can only see a geometric
progression of things. At least 11 political parties, nine of which
are members of the Justice bloc, will join us.
[Journalist] However, what will you do if the rally does not take
place?
[Gegamyan] Don’t worry, they simply don’t not know that we knew about
everything well in advance. I don’t know why but I think Robert
Kocharyan will tender his resignation within the next few days.
[Journalist] Have you discussed the question of giving guarantees to
Kocharyan?
[Gegamyan] Your question is rather tricky. We give guarantees to any
citizen provided he has not committed any crimes. The law will prevail
in the country.
[Journalist] What do you mean when you say that the authorities rely
on criminal elements?
[Gegamyan] Open the second page of Aravot [Tomorrow] newspaper, look
at the picture of Gro from Artashat, who is not an academician but a
criminal element.
[Journalist] It is expected that more people will turn up [for rally]
on 9 April. Do you think, eggs will again be thrown?
[Gegamyan] Certainly, they will without fail try to stir up mass
disorder. We shall do everything we can to avoid that. By doing so
they will further incite the situation. If people before were more or
less apathetic and indifferent, since yesterday they have been feeling
quite angry. Students, for example, were not at all allowed to attend
lessons.
[Journalist] Have the authorities taken any steps to meet you?
[Gegamyan] No, there was no such initiative. Only what you already
know. I mean yesterday’s statement by the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation – Dashnaktsutyun.
[Journalist] Does that mean that you are planning to avoid
disturbances on 9 April?
[Gegamyan] We will respond in kind. We shall use words in response to
words, but if they resort to force, we shall respond in kind.
[Journalist] This is what they want.
[Gegamyan] That is right, but [Defence Minister] Serzh Sarkisyan and
[President] Robert Kocharyan see only blood, although hardly anybody
saw them in battlefields.
[Journalist] Do you have any statements from embassies? Do you know
their reaction?
[Gegamyan] Yes, do not worry, justice will prevail.
[Journalist] What will you do, if suddenly someone opens fire in the
air and panic starts. Have you drawn up any mechanisms as it is
difficult to guide panic-stricken people?
[Gegamyan] Yesterday standing in between blocked roads, I told people
that loathsome persons might fire. Naturally, I will go first.
[Journalist] Will Robert Kocharyan not fire on people?
[Gegamyan] He will do worse. He will rouse the feeling of fear in
people. This is more dangerous than firing in the sky. Do you think a
man from Dilizhan was injured incidentally in the rally? By this, they
plant fear in parents so as they do not let their children out of home
in the future.
[Journalist] It was broadcast yesterday that the opposition had
destroyed cameras. Why did you do that?
[Gegamyan] This despicable lie was circulated by Aylur [TV]. If
someone dares to “sneeze” at Public TV’s camera, a criminal case would
be brought against him. Aylur is guided by the principle of Goebbels’
propaganda: one should circulate mean lies to be believable.
[Journalist] Will there be a procession on 9 April?
[Gegamyan] The Justice bloc and the National Unity Party are currently
planning to hold a meeting on 9 April.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ArmenPress
April 7 2004
KOCHARIAN MEETS WITH RURAL COMMUNITY LEADERS
YEREVAN, APRIL 7, ARMENPRESS: Armenian president Robert Kocharian
met today with around 20 heads of rural communities who arrived in
Yerevan from across the country, to discuss, as Kocharian’s press
office said “the current state of things in their communities and
their problems and hear their views about what the government should
do to help resolve them.”
Kocharian was also quoted as saying that the country has all
possibilities for sustainable and effective development. He added
that the improved local-self management legislation is a good tool to
foster larger involvement of rural communities in development
projects.
Community leaders were reported to condemn opposition’s attempts
to artificially stir up strained domestics situation, pledging their
support to all programs of the president aiming at sustainable
development of the country.
The president and community leaders exchanged their views on a
wide range of problems, which are of great concern for rural
settlements. President Kocharian also vowed tax privileges to farmers
whose orchards were destroyed by snaps of cold that descended on
Armenia lately.
President Kocharian had another working meeting today with health
minister Norayr Davidian, who briefed him on what has been done in
this sector in the first three months of the year and on future
plans.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ArmenPress
April 7 2004
US TO REPLACE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIRMAN
BAKU, APRIL 7, ARMENPRESS: US Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Reno
Harnish, was quoted by local news agencies as saying that his
government will replace the current US co-chairman in the OSCE’s
Minsk group. Harnish announced the news during a Tuesday meeting with
Azeri defense minister Safar Abiyev, saying that US Secretary of
State’s senior adviser for the Caspian basin issues, Steven Mann,
will take over the chairman’s post to succeed Rudolph Perina who has
been the third US chairman of the Minsk group, succeeding to Linn
Pasko and Carry Cavanaugh.
OSCE’s Minsk group was established to facilitate a peaceful
solution to the Karabagh conflict.
The United States, Russia and France are the chairmen of the group
coordinating mediation efforts.
Harnish was quoted as saying that the replacement is to give a new
impetus to the talks for a quick and long-lasting solution. Abiyev
reiterated that a “just solution is possible if all occupied Azeri
lands are liberated and given back,” adding also that Azerbaijani
army is prepared to develop military cooperation with the USA.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

DIVIDE AND CONQUER? THE RUSSIAN PLAN FOR OWNERSHIP OF THE CASPIAN SEA
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Winter, 2004
By Ben N. Dunlap (FNa1)
Abstract:
The search for alternative sources of oil has renewed U.S. interest in
the Caspian Sea. Bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central
Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea contains
up to thirty-three billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The legal
status of the Caspian has remained unresolved since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, however. In the early 1990s Russia joined with Iran
to argue for common ownership of the sea by all five states, aiming
for veto power over Western involvement in the region. Now, Russia
argues for dividing the seabed (and the oil and gas underneath it)
into national sectors, while leaving most of the surface waters for
common management and use. The Russian solution offers political and
economic benefits to both Russia and the United States in the short
run, but may be an unsound basis for long-term stability in the
Caspian region.
INTRODUCTION
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United
States, fears about U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil have
intensified. (FN1) With three-fifths of the world’s oil reserves
concentrated in the Persian Gulf, the United States and other Western
nations have increased efforts to ensure the continued availability of
oil elsewhere in the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack or a
destabilizing conflict in the region. (FN2) As a result, the search
for alternative sources of oil has renewed U.S. interest in the
potentially oil-rich Caspian Sea. (FN3) Bordered by Russia,
Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea contains an estimated seventeen to
thirty-three billion barrels of proven oil reserves. (FN4) In the
early 1990s, U.S. oil companies Amoco and Chevron pioneered the
development of Caspian oil reserves off the coasts of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. (FN5) The U.S. government championed the construction of
a new oil pipeline to bypass Russia and Iran by transporting Caspian
oil to Western markets via Azerbaijan and Turkey. (FN6) Uncertainty
about the Caspian’s legal status, however, has hindered development of
the sea’s oil reserves. (FN7) Soviet-Iranian treaties governed the
Caspian’s use in the Soviet era, but since the breakup of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the new Caspian states have failed to agree on how to
divide its vast resources. (FN8) In the early 1990s, Russia joined
with Iran to argue for common ownership of the sea by all five states,
aiming for veto power over Western involvement in the region. (FN9)
Now, Russia argues for dividing the seabed (and the oil and gas
underneath it) into national sectors, while leaving most of the
surface waters for common management and use. (FN10) More importantly,
Russia has signed bilateral treaties with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
effectively dividing the northern part of the seabed 7 into Russian,
Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani national sectors. (FN11) Iran insists
that the old Soviet- Iranian treaties are still in force and refuses
to sign or recognize any bilateral treaties carving up the sea until a
new multilateral convention is concluded by all five Caspian
states. (FN12)
This Note examines Russia’s proposed solution for the Caspian’s legal
status and its implications for U.S. interests in the region. Part I
provides a brief history of Caspian oil and an overview of post-1991
attempts to resolve the Caspian’s legal status. Part II discusses
proposed legal solutions, with special attention to Russia’s proposal
and its legal validity. Part III analyzes the implications of
Russia’s proposed resolution for Russia, Iran, and the United
States. Part IV concludes that the Russian solution offers political
and economic benefits to both Russia and the United States in the
short run, but may be an unsound basis for long-term stability in the
Caspian region.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Short History of Caspian Oil
Caspian oil fields began producing oil near Baku, Azerbaijan in 1871
and accounted for half the world’s still limited production in
1900. (FN13) The Soviets expanded their extraction operations, but
never fully explored the 700- mile-long Caspian Sea for new oil
fields, in part because they lacked the technology to exploit
effectively the reserves they found. (FN14) Following the breakup of
the Soviet Union in 1991, discovery of significant oil reserves in the
Caspian basin cast the region in a new light. (FN15) Early estimates
were as high as 659 billion barrels, or two-thirds of the world’s
known reserves. (FN16) Most of the oil discovered is located off the
coasts of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. (FN17) Azerbaijan
8 and Kazakhstan, in particular, have concluded deals with foreign oil
companies to extract Caspian oil and transport it to world
markets. (FN18) Firms in the United States have acquired seventy-five
percent of Kazakhstan’s onshore Tengiz oil field, while a consortium
including Italy’s ENI, British Gas, ExxonMobil, France’s TotalFinaElf,
and Royal Dutch Shell is developing the newly discovered offshore
Kashagan field. (FN19) British Petroleum (BP) is leading the
Azerbaijan International Operating Company’s efforts to discover,
extract, and transport oil located off Azerbaijan’s coast. (FN20)
Chief among those efforts is the construction of a new pipeline from
Baku, Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, Georgia, to Ceyhan, Turkey, which
U.S. policymakers hope will serve as the main export pipeline for
Caspian oil. (FN21)
In addition to U.S. and Western European firms, Russia’s largest oil
company, LUKoil, is currently a consortium member in Kazakh extraction
and transport projects and is negotiating a possible investment in the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. (FN22) Until recently, LUKoil also
held a stake in a sizable Azerbaijani oil field. (FN23)
B. Caspian Geopolitics
Drawn by cheap oil and the Caspian’s strategic location at the
crossroads of east and west, regional and world powers have converged
on the Caspian region to stake out and defend their political and
economic interests. (FN24) In particular, the United States, seeking
to diversify its energy supply and bolster the independence of the
former Soviet states in the region, has been adamant in its support
for multiple pipelines to transport Caspian oil to Western markets.
(FN25) U.S. policies for Caspian oil development benefit primarily
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and United States’ 9 NATO ally, Turkey, by
routing the BTC pipeline through those countries. (FN26) The BTC
pipeline will also benefit Kazakhstan if plans to export Kazakhstani
oil through it come to fruition. (FN27) As a result, throughout the
1990s, U.S. pipeline diplomacy alienated Russia and fueled Iran’s
fears of a long-term U.S. presence in the region that would exclude it
from any future development of Caspian oil. (FN28)
The strategic importance of the Caspian is underscored by security
concerns in the region. (FN29) To the northwest, Russian forces
continue to battle separatists in Chechnya. (FN30) To the west, an
uneasy peace holds in Nagorno-Karabagh, the predominantly Armenian
enclave in Azerbaijan that was the scene of horrific ethnic warfare in
the early 1990s. (FN31) To the east, Tajikistan suffered a protracted
civil war in the 1990s. (FN32) Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both have
faced incursions by Islamic militant terrorists in recent
years. (FN33)
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been particularly
concerned about nonstate actors and the threat of terrorism in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. (FN34) Proximity to the markets of Europe
and Iran and the porous borders of the former Soviet states make the
Caspian a convenient conduit for narcotics produced in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, and for weapons destined for sale to terrorists and
insurgents throughout Central Asia. (FN35) U.S. policymakers also fear
that the Caspian could become a smuggling route for weapons of mass
destruction. (FN36)
C. Legal Status of the Sea
1. UNCLOS and the Law of Inland Lakes Neither the international law of
the sea nor the law of inland lakes applies directly to the Caspian
Sea. (FN37) The Caspian is landlocked and has traditionally been used
only by the states that border it. (FN38) It is therefore unlike the
waters governed by the law of the sea, which are open to navigation by
all states. (FN39) Yet, its size, salt water, and hydrocarbon- rich
seabed also distinguish it from most lakes under international
law. (FN40) Both the law of the sea and the law of lakes have been
useful, however, in shaping the solutions that the littoral states
have advocated. (FN41)
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
essentially provides for the extension of a maritime state’s land
borders 200 miles into the sea. (FN42) The first twelve miles are
equivalent to a state’s sovereign territory on land, while the
remainder is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which the state
enjoys exclusive fishing and mining rights. (FN43)
Application of UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea would be complicated by the
sea’s dimensions, since the EEZs of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for
instance, which are situated less than 400 miles apart across the sea,
would overlap. (FN44) In such cases, boundaries are usually drawn at a
point halfway between the two coastlines. (FN45) Thus, UNCLOS would
provide for division of the water and seabed into national sectors
roughly proportional to the length of each maritime state’s
coastline. (FN46) According to one calculation for such a division,
Kazakhstan would 1 control 29.9% of the Caspian; Azerbaijan, 20.7%;
Turkmenistan, 19.2%; and Russia and Iran–only 15.6% and 14.6%,
respectively. (FN47)
Not surprisingly, in the 1990s Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan argued in
favor of applying UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea, aiming to push ahead with
big oil projects off their coasts. (FN48) In recent years, however,
they have come to support the Russian proposal, which incorporates the
UNCLOS concept most important for their interests–division of the
seabed into proportional national sectors. (FN49) If the Caspian were
treated as a lake, ownership of its mineral resources would not differ
substantially from an arrangement under UNCLOS. (FN50) Rather, the key
difference would lie in the use of its surface waters. (FN51) The
surface waters of international lakes, unlike those of seas, can be
used exclusively by the states bordering them. (FN52) Russia has
borrowed this principle for the “common waters” element of its
proposed solution. (FN53)
2. Soviet-Iranian Treaties and the “Condominium” Principle
Much of the current legal dispute regarding the Caspian focuses on
treaties signed in 1921 and 1940 by the Soviet Union and Iran. (FN54)
The treaties provide for exclusive use of the Sea by the Soviet Union
and Iran, but cover only fishing and navigation rights, not mining
rights. (FN55) The 1940 treaty further stipulates a ten-mile fishing
zone extending from each state’s shoreline. (FN56)
Iran argues that the Soviet era treaties provide for common management
of the seabed and waters outside the ten-mile zone, according 2 to the
“condominium” principle. (FN57) Under such an arrangement, any oil
exploration and drilling operations undertaken in the Caspian would
have to meet the approval of all the bordering states. (FN58) As a
result, Iran suggests that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
should suspend their oil and gas producing activities in the Caspian
until a new multilateral agreement is reached. (FN59) Russia also
argued for this approach in the early 1990s, but it has recently begun
supporting a division of the seabed and common management of the
surface waters. (FN60)
3. Recent Developments: Russia’s Proposed Solution In 1998, Russia
moved closer to the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani positions by accepting
division of the seabed into proportional national sectors, but still
insisted on common management of the surface waters. (FN61) In the
spring and early fall of 2002, Russia signed agreements with
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan recognizing national sectors based on lines
drawn in the middle of the sea halfway between each state. (FN62)
Russian diplomats have also succeeded in persuading Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to support Russia’s “divided bottom, common waters”
position in multilateral negotiations on the sea’s status among the
five states. (FN63) Thus, there is now general agreement among Russia,
Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan on both the principle and the method of
dividing rights to the seabed and the oil beneath it. (FN64) For
Russia, coming to advocate this position has meant dropping any
“Soviet” claims to the oil-rich areas off the coast of Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, and giving up its struggle to block the BTC oil
pipeline. (FN65) 3 Russia has made these concessions for several
reasons. (FN66) Most significantly, under President Vladimir Putin’s
leadership, Russia has become more engaged in the negotiation process
and sought to maximize Russia’s share of economic wealth and
diplomatic influence in the Caspian. (FN67) Also, Russia has repaired
its pipelines to Western markets, built a new pipeline that bypasses
the troubled republic of Chechnya, and completed a joint project with
Kazakhstan to transport oil through a new pipeline that crosses
Russia. (FN68) Furthermore, Russian oil companies, such as LUKoil,
have pushed the Russian Foreign Ministry to make a deal with Russia’s
neighbors so that they can proceed with their own extraction
activities in the Caspian. (FN69) LUKoil is already working in
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and in new oil fields discovered off
Russia’s Caspian shores. (FN70) Russia has also proposed an oil
export deal with the United States and become a partner in the
U.S.-led “war on terror.” (FN71)
In contrast to Russia, Iran has shown little willingness to
compromise. (FN72) In addition to common management of the entire sea
and seabed, Iran’s negotiators have proposed an alternative solution:
division of the sea into five equal national sectors (twenty percent
each)–a position which none of the other states supports. (FN73)
Moreover, Iran has recently attempted to force concessions from the
other Caspian states by demonstrating its potential as a
spoiler. (FN74) In July 2001, an Iranian gunboat chased two BP survey
ships from a disputed oil field in the southern Caspian. (FN75) BP
immediately suspended all activity under its contract with Azerbaijan
in the disputed oil field. (FN76) Both the United States and Russia
protested the Iranian action. (FN77) The July 2001 incident
underscored Iran’s isolation, and events since then have demonstrated
the extent to which the other Caspian 4 states have aligned themselves
with Russia. (FN78) Following the unsuccessful April 2002 Caspian
Summit in Turkmenistan, at which Iran alone insisted on an equal
division of the sea, President Putin ordered large-scale military
exercises on the Caspian for August 2002. (FN79) Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan also took part in the exercises, but Iran was pointedly
excluded. (FN80)
II. DISCUSSION
A. Russia’s Legal Arguments
Russia’s current legal argument regarding the status of the Caspian
Sea can be described as a “divided bottom, common waters”
approach. (FN81) Russia advocates dividing the seabed into national
sectors corresponding roughly to the amount of shoreline controlled by
each state, but leaving the surface waters, outside a fifteen-mile
territorial band, to be managed by all the states in common. (FN82) To
resolve disputes arising over claims to overlapping oil fields, Russia
proposes developing sharing agreements on a bilateral basis. (FN83) To
codify this argument permanently, Russia has concluded bilateral
treaties with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. (FN84) These
treaties cover the northern part of the sea, effectively dividing it
into Russian, Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani national sectors. (FN85)
The legal effect of these bilateral treaties in the absence of a new
multilateral convention is not entirely clear, since it hinges on
whether the old Soviet-Iranian treaties remain in force, as Iran
argues 5 they do. (FN86) If the Soviet era treaties dissolved along
with the Soviet Union in 1991, or if they never effectively governed
ownership of the Caspian, then the new bilateral treaties between
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan should be governing law in the
Caspian. (FN87) If, however, the old Soviet era treaties are still in
force, then Iran may have a legal foothold for its argument that no
new bilateral treaties are valid in the absence of a new multilateral
agreement. (FN88)
B. Iran’s Legal Arguments
Iran contends that the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties will
remain in force until a new multilateral convention is agreed upon by
all five littoral states. (FN89) Furthermore, Iran demands that any
new multilateral agreement provide for common management of both the
surface waters and the seabed, or, alternatively, for division of the
sea into equal national sectors–twenty percent each. (FN90)
Iran’s legal argument concerning the treaties has four main
weaknesses. (FN91) First, it gives great weight to general
Soviet-Iranian treaties that make little mention of the Caspian, and
are completely silent about division or ownership of the
seabed. (FN92) Second, it argues for a common ownership regime of the
Caspian’s resources when in fact such a regime is not explicit in the
treaties. (FN93) Such a common ownership regime would, therefore, have
to be inferred, but neither the Soviet Union nor Iran treated the
Caspian as joint property during the Soviet era. (FN94) Third, the
Soviets engaged in oil extraction activities outside the ten-mile
exclusive fishing zone stipulated in the treaty, with no objection
from Iran. (FN95) Some have suggested that Iran’s silence about de
facto divisions during the Soviet era should preclude it from raising
objections 6 to national divisions today. (FN96) Finally, Iran has
refused to recognize the continued validity of the 1921 and 1940
treaties in other areas they governed, such as security. (FN97)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Implications for Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan
If Russia’s proposed solution becomes codified as international law–
either as a system of bilateral agreements, or as the basis for a new
Caspian convention–Russia will likely be the biggest winner for
several reasons. (FN98) First, playing a visible role in securing a
legal regime will allow Russia to be seen as a stabilizing force in
the region. (FN99) Second, Russia’s close cooperation with Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan on this narrow legal question will facilitate
reciprocal cooperation from those states on problems Russian leaders
care deeply about, such as the instability in Chechnya. (FN100) Third,
division of the seabed into national sectors helps influential Russian
oil companies to pursue development of recently discovered reserves in
the Russian sector, as well as to engage in joint activities with
Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani counterparts. (FN101) Finally, the “common
waters” approach will give Moscow a free hand to patrol the Caspian
and fight what it calls crime and terrorism as it deems
necessary. (FN102)
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have traditionally been cautious in their
bilateral relations with Russia regarding the Caspian. (FN103)
However, the chief advantages of the Russian solution for Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan are the clarity of sovereign rights, and, at least in
the short 7 run, cooperative relations with their Russian
neighbor. (FN104) Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan would no doubt prefer a
multilateral legal regime codifying the seabed boundaries, which would
make abrogation by any one party more difficult. (FN105) Nonetheless,
given their interest in securing their rights sooner rather than
later, and Iran’s intransigence, a system of bilateral treaties may be
the best solution Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani leaders can hope for at
the present time. (FN106)
B. Implications for the United States
The “divided bottom, common waters” approach offers several benefits
for U.S. interests. (FN107) The chief priorities of U.S. policy toward
the Caspian region continue to be the security of energy transport
routes, independence of the former Soviet Caspian states, and
isolation of Iran. (FN108) A Caspian legal regime that creates
definite boundaries and gives each border state sovereign control over
the resources in its national sector will favor these
interests. (FN109) A multilateral agreement based on clear national
sectors for the seabed and common management of most of the surface
waters would also be an encouraging sign for U.S. investors in the
region. (FN110) The actual borders would have to be drawn, and
disputes resolved over overlapping claims to oil and gas fields lying
between two sectors, but the series of bilateral agreements already in
place would help demarcate borders. (FN111) The U.S. government has an
additional stake in the success of some Caspian investment projects,
having provided risk insurance to the corporations investing in the
BTC pipeline through U.S. government financial institutions, including
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the
Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank). (FN112)
The United States also has important security concerns in the Caspian
region with regard to its “war on terror.” (FN113) Russian
predominance in the Caspian region may have distinct advantages for
the United States in this respect. (FN114) Both the United States and
Russia, for instance, have strong interests in keeping terrorists away
from pipelines and oil-rigs, although they may disagree on the best
means for doing so. (FN115) Moreover, Russia’s security interests will
ensure its engagement in the region for the foreseeable future, while
Russia’s proximity to and familiarity with the region make it better
positioned than the United States to act on issues of mutual
concern. (FN116)
Nevertheless, for the long run, the United States should consider
carefully the implications of Moscow’s taking on a role as a
unilateral military and police power in the Caspian. (FN117) Such a
course may be expedient while U.S. and Russian interests overlap, but
it will be difficult to intervene if Russian leaders begin to act on
interests that conflict directly with those of their neighbors and
partners. (FN118)
C. Implications for Iran
For Iran, the Russian-backed, “divided bottom, common waters” approach
offers several disadvantages. (FN119) First, it will deny Iran key
economic opportunities. (FN120) The plan effectively excludes Iran
from any significant development of the Caspian’s oil and gas, since
the fourteen percent share that would be allocated to Iran contains
the least proven oil and gas reserves and the deepest water. (FN121)
Meanwhile, proactive treaty- making by Russia, Azerbaijan, and
Kazakhstan is rapidly closing off Iran’s ability to bargain for things
it desires most, such as securing support for a future oil export
route south through its territory. (FN122)
9 Second, Iran also fears instability in the region. (FN123)
Specifically, Iran has concerns that any strengthening of Azerbaijan
will embolden Iran’s significant ethnic Azerbaijani population,
possibly leading to political and social upheaval in the northern
parts of the country that border Azerbaijan. (FN124) Furthermore,
Iran’s feelings of insecurity may be exacerbated by tacit U.S. support
for Russia’s legal solution for the Caspian. (FN125) The possibility
of a large U.S. military presence on Iran’s border, depending on
future events in Iraq, will heighten feelings of insecurity in Tehran.
(FN126)
Iran may yet win some concessions in a final agreement on the
Caspian’s status, but given the current situation, that scenario looks
unlikely. (FN127) In the absence of a multilateral agreement involving
all five Caspian states, it is difficult to see how the bilateral
treaty system created by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan will
prevent further conflict arising over the disputed oil fields in the
southern part of the sea. (FN128) If Iranian leaders decide they have
nothing to lose, they may seek to disrupt other states’ activities in
the Caspian. (FN129) Iran would not have to engage in actual
hostilities to have an impact on the economic activities of the
Caspian states. (FN130) As the BP incident proved in July 2001,
foreign oil executives have a low tolerance for political uncertainty
in the region. (FN131)
CONCLUSION
Russia’s proposal for resolving the Caspian’s legal status is likely
to emerge as the defining legal framework for the sea–either as part
of a new Caspian convention or as a system of bilateral treaties. As
such, Russia’s plan offers important benefits to both Russian and
U.S. economic and political interests in the short term. However, it
may be an unsound basis for long-term security and strategic
interests. In particular, future events in Iran and Russia may have a
profound impact on the viability of the Russian-proposed solution.
Developments in Iranian domestic politics could affect Iran’s
willingness to recognize a Caspian treaty regime that excludes its
interests. The power struggle between President Mohammed Khatami’s
moderate administration and the hard-line clerics who control Iran’s
foreign policy raises questions about the possibility of a leadership
change and its effect on Iran’s relations with its Caspian neighbors.
Another potential problem with Russia’s proposed legal regime is that
its success or failure is directly linked to the maintenance of good
relations among the Caspian states. Neither Russia’s rapprochement
with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, nor its antiterror partnership with
the United States is a significant departure from the country’s
Russia-first foreign policy. Rather, both developments indicate a
pragmatic approach to pursuing Russia’s national interests. As those
interests change in the coming years, they will likely diverge from
the interests of their neighbors and those of the United States.
The “divided bottom, common waters” approach is essentially a
political solution to a legal problem. In the next several years, it
will help foster cooperation and get the oil flowing. In the longer
run, however, a number of events, such as leadership changes in Russia
or Iran or new trouble in Chechnya, may undermine the political
foundation of any agreement based on the Russian plan.
(FNa1). Ben N. Dunlap is the Solicitations and Symposium Editor of the
Boston College International & Comparative Law Review.
(FN1). Addicted to Oil, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 9.
(FN2). Id.; A Dangerous Addiction, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at
15.
(FN3). See Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Presidents Launch Construction
of Oil Pipeline, RADIO FREE EUROPE — RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 18, 2002),
at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, Presidents Launch Construction); Lucian
Pugliaresi, Energy Security: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?, Caspian
Studies Program (Jan. 2001),
(FN4). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, COUNTRY ANALYSIS
BRIEFS: CASPIAN SEA REGION, at
(Aug. 2003)
(hereinafter D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION).
(FN5). See Fiona Hill, Pipeline Dreams in the Caucasus, in CAUCASUS
AND THE CASPIAN SEMINAR TRANSCRIPTS (SDI Project ed., 1996),
(hereinafter Hill, Pipeline Dreams).
(FN6). Id.; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA
REGION: OIL EXPORT OPTIONS, at
(July 2002)
(hereinafter D.O.E., EXPORT OPTIONS); Lelyveld, Presidents Launch
Construction, supra note 3.
(FN7). See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA
REGION: LEGAL ISSUES, at
(July 2002) (hereinafter D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES).
(FN8). See id.; see also Geoffrey Kemp, U.S.-Iranian Relations:
Competition or Cooperation in the Caspian Sea Basin, in ENERGY AND
CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS 148-49 (Robert Ebel & Rajan
Menon eds., 2000) (hereinafter ENERGY AND CONFLICT); Peter Rutland,
Paradigms for Russian Policy in the Caspian Region, in ENERGY AND
CONFLICT, supra, at 177.
(FN9). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; see also Kemp, supra
note 8, at 148-49; Rutland, supra note 8, at 177.
(FN10). Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina na vstreche glav
prikaspiiskikh gosudarstv (Russian President Vladimir Putin, Address
at the Summit of Caspian Heads of State), available at
(Apr. 23, 2002) (hereinafter Putin Address).
(FN11). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; Sergei Blagov,
Kazakhstan Pushes for Trilateral Caspian Deal, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
Oct. 10, 2002, at
(hereinafter
Blagov, Kazakhstan).
(FN12). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7.
(FN13). See Hill, Pipeline Dreams, supra note 5; Bruce R. Kuniholm,
The Geopolities of the Caspian Basin, 54 MIDDLE E. J. 546 (2002),
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File.
(FN14). D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN15). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN16). Id.
(FN17). D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA REGION: RESERVES AND PIPELINES
TABLES, at http:// (July
2002).
(FN18). D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN19). Jan H. Kalicki, Caspian Energy at the Crossroads, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File.
(FN20). Id.
(FN21). See id.; D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN22). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, KAZAKHSTAN: MAJOR
OIL AND NATURAL GAS PROJECTS, at
(June 2002)
(hereinafter DEP’T OF ENERGY, KAZAKHSTAN); Michael Lelyveld,
Iran/Azerbaijan: U.S. Rejects Military Involvement in Caspian Dispute,
RADIO FREE EUROPE — RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2002), at
(FN23). ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, AZERBAIJAN:
PRODUCTION- SHARING AGREEMENTS, at
(June 2002)
(hereinafter DEP’T OF ENERGY, AZERBAIJAN).
(FN24). See generally Kuniholm, supra note 13; Robert Ebel & Rajan
Menon, Introduction to ENERGY AND CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 4-10.
(FN25). Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 5.
(FN26). See id. at 8-9.
(FN27). See id.
(FN28). See id.; Kemp, supra note 8, at 158.
(FN29). See Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 7.
(FN30). The Lost Cause of the Caucasus, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 2, 2002,
at 25.
(FN31). Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 7.
(FN32). Lena Jonson & Roy Allison, Central Asian Security: Internal
and External Dynamics, in CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY: THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 13- 14 (Lena Jonson & Roy Allison eds., 2001).
(FN33). Id.
(FN34). See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JOINT PRESS STATEMENT BY THE
U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING GROUP ON COUNTERTERRORISM, http://
(July 26, 2002) (hereinafter
D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT); B. Lynn Pascoe, Security, Stability,
Prosperity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line States, Remarks Delivered
at the International Conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Yale
Center for the Study of Globalization, at
(Sept. 20, 2002).
(FN35). Martha Brill Olcott, Drugs, Terrorism, and Regional Security:
The Risks from Afghanistan, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee,
(Mar. 13, 2002).
(FN36). See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: U.S. ASSISTANCE TO
TURKMENISTAN–FISCAL YEAR 2002, at
(June 6, 2002); Kalicki,
supra note 19.
(FN37). See Brice M. Clagett, Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil
Resources in the Caspian Sea Under the Rules of International Law,
CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAG.,
(1995); Bernard H. Oxman, Caspain Sea or Lake: What Difference Does It
Make?, CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAG.,
(1996).
(FN 38). See Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN39). See Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN40). See Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN41). See id.
(FN42). See Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN43). Faraz Sanei, Note, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline
Diplomacy, and the Prospects for Iran’s Isolation from the Oil and Gas
Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran’s Legal Options with Its Geopolitical
Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 681, 790 (2001).
(FN44). See Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN45). See id. The exact method of division was disputed even after
UNCLOS, however, particularly by states that were not parties to the
convention. See id.
(FN46). Sanei, supra note 43, at 790.
(FN47). Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN48). See Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Current Development, Ownership of Oil
and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 183, 187
(2000).
(FN49). See Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii,
Departament Informatsii i Pechati, Interviu spetsialnogo
predstavitelia Prezidenta Rossii po uregulirovaniiu statusa
Kaspiiskogo moria, zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del V.I.
Kaliuzhnogo (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dep’t of Information
and Press, Interview of the Special Representative of the President of
Russia for Regulation of the Status of the Caspian Sea, Deputy Foreign
Minister Viktor I. Kalyuzhny), at (May 23, 2002)
(hereinafter Kalyuzhny Interview).
(FN50). See Clagett, supra note 37.
(FN51). See Oxman, supra note 37.
(FN52). See id.
(FN53). See id.; Lelyveld, Russia: Will a New Formula for Sharing
Caspian Riches Work?, RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 28,
2001), at http://
(hereinafter
Lelyveld, Sharing Caspian Riches).
(FN54). D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; see Sanei, supra note 43,
at 768-87.
(FN55). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 769-70.
(FN56). Id.
(FN57). See Abbas Maleki, Caspian Sea and Foreign Policy of Islamic
Republic of Iran, JOMHURI ESLAMI (Tehran), Oct. 23, 2001, at 3,
http:// Iran’s Share of the Caspian Sea
(Interview with Mehdi Safari), TEHRAN PERSIAN DAILY, Apr. 18, 2002, at
2, http:// (hereinafter Safari
Interview). See also generally Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra
note 37 (describing the “condominium” principle in international law).
(FN58). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87; Safari Interview, supra
note 57.
(FN59). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87; Safari Interview, supra
note 57.
(FN60). See BRENDA SHAFFER, PARTNERS IN NEED: THE STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP OF RUSSIA AND IRAN 51 (2001).
(FN61). Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 187.
(FN62). Steven Lee Myers, Carving Up the Caspian, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2002, at A13; Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11.
(FN63). Lelyveld, Sharing Caspian Riches, supra note 53; Kalyuzhny
Interview, supra note 49. Turkmenistan favors division of the seabed
into national sectors, but is unwilling to commit to the method of
division proposed by Russia. See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49.
(FN64). See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49.
(FN65). See Carol Saivetz, Caspian Geopolitics: The View from Moscow,
7 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 53, 54-55 (2000).
(FN66). See Fiona Hill, Russia: The 21st Century’s Energy Superpower?,
20 BROOKINGS REV. 28 (2002) (hereinafter Hill, Superpower).
(FN67). See Saivetz, supra note 65, at 57-59.
(FN68). D.O.E., EXPORT OPTIONS, supra note 6; Kalicki, supra note 19.
(FN69). See Hill, Superpower, supra note 66.
(FN70). DEP’T OF ENERGY, AZERBAIJAN, supra note 23; DEP’T OF ENERGY,
KAZAKHSTAN, supra note 22; see Hill, Superpower, supra note 66.
(FN71). See Brenda Shaffer, The U.S. Needs Russia to Help Contain
Iran, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at 13.
(FN72). See Maleki, supra note 57.
(FN73). See id.
(FN74). Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: A Delicate Balance Prevails, RADIO
FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (July 16, 2002), at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, Delicate Balance).
(FN75). Id.
(FN76). Id.
(FN77). Id.
(FN78). Jean-Christophe Peuch, Caspian: ‘Militarization’ of the
Sea–Myth or Reality?, RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (June 10,
2002), at
(FN79). Id.
(FN80). Michael Lelyveld, Russia: Are Moscow’s War Games in Caspian
Muscle Flexing?, RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 7, 2002), at
(FN81). Putin Address, supra note 10.
(FN82). Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Russia Proposes Wider Offshore Zone
for Dividing the Sea, RADIO FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 28, 2002),
at
(FN83). See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49.
(FN84). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11; Michael Lelyveld,
Caspian: Azerbaijan, Iran Seek New Phase in Border Dispute, RADIO FREE
EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2002), at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, New Phase).
(FN85). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11; Lelyveld, New Phase,
supra note 84.
(FN86). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 777-80, 786-87.
(FN87). See id.
(FN88). See id.
(FN89). Maleki, supra note 57, at 3.
(FN90). Id.
(FN91). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN92). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN93). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN94). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN95). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN96). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note
37. But cf. Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87.
(FN97). See SHAFFER, supra note 60, at 63 n.46.
(FN98). See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49; Hill, Superpower,
supra note 66.
(FN99). See Saivetz, supra note 65, at 59.
(FN100). See Sergei Blagov, Russia’s Asian Policy Gains Momentum, ASIA
TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 14, 2002, at
Asia/DK14Ag01.html (discussing Kazakhstan’s cooperation with Russia in
counterterrorist operations); Daan van der Schriek, Moscow Hostage
Crisis Encourages Closer Russian-Azerbaijani Relations, at
(Oct. 30, 2002) (discussing Azerbaijan’s clamp-down on Chechen
activity in its territory and the recent Azerbaijani-Russian
rapprochement).
(FN101). See Hill, Superpower, supra note 66.
(FN102). See Peuch, supra note 78.
(FN103). See generally Hooman Peimani, Russia Navigates Another
Caspian Rapid, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 8, 2002, at
Asia/DJ08Df05.html.
(FN104). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11.
(FN105). See, e.g., Peimani, supra note 103.
(FN106). See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11.
(FN107). See Michael Lelyveld, U.S.: Official Disputes Iranian Success
with Caspian Project, RADIO FREE EUROPE — RADIO LIBERTY (Oct. 18,
2002), at
(FN108). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN109). See id.
(FN110). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; Michael Lelyveld,
Iran/Azerbaijan: U.S. Rejects Military Involvement in Caspian Dispute,
RADIO FREE EUROPE–RADIO LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2002), at
(hereinafter Lelyveld, Caspian Dispute).
(FN111). See D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7; Lelyveld, Caspian
Dispute, supra note 110.
(FN112). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN113). See Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones, U.S. Engagement
in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Staying Our Course Along the Silk
Road, Remarks at “Central Asia: Its Geopolitical Significance and
Future Impact” Conference, University of Montana, at
(Apr. 10, 2003).
(FN114). See D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT, supra note 34; Lelyveld, Caspian
Dispute, supra note 110.
(FN115). See D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT, supra note 34; Lelyveld, Caspian
Dispute, supra note 110.
(FN116). See, e.g., Saivetz, supra note 65, at 58-59.
(FN117). See generally Jonson & Allison, supra note 32; Kemp, supra
note 8, at 148-49.
(FN118). See Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN119). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 824; Maleki, supra note 57;
D.O.E., LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 7.
(FN120). See D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4.
(FN121). Id.
(FN122). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 832.
(FN123). See BRENDA SHAFFER, BORDERS AND BRETHREN: IRAN AND THE
CHALLENGE OF AZERBAIJANI IDENTITY 1-7 (2002); Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN124). See SHAFFER, supra note 123, at 1-7; Kuniholm, supra note 13.
(FN125). See Kemp, supra note 8, at 158.
(FN126). See Sanei, supra note 43, at 824.
(FN127). See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89. But cf. Sanei, supra
note 43, at 786-87.
(FN128). See Peimani, supra note 103.
(FN129). See id.
(FN130). Lelyveld, Delicate Balance, supra note 74.
(FN131). See id.
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