Author: Emil Lazarian

2023 ended with positive notes for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, but the new year has so far failed to maintain the momentum. Despite a successful prisoner exchange, and Armenia’s endorsement of Azerbaijan’s COP29 candidacy, recent statements from the respective governments have presented a mixed picture. While the Azerbaijani side has not indicated any setbacks in the ongoing talks yet, the Armenian government has criticized the recent statements by the Azerbaijani leader as unconstructive for the peace process.

Complicating matters further, disagreements have intensified regarding the possible regulations along the Zangezur corridor. The latest developments highlight a disparity in the visions of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan for this corridor. Unfortunately, these developments suggest that the obstacles in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty talks may be more fundamental, potentially leading to indefinite delays in the process.

The interview of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev with local TV channels on January 10 was the cause that sparked the extensive discussions. Despite President Aliyev’s explicit denial of any intention by his government to invade Armenian territory, Armenian officials, experts, social media users, and some Western officials fueled a fearmongering campaign, alleging Aliyev’s intent to invade Armenia. The situation escalated to the point where the High Representative of the European Union, Josep Borrel, and the spokesperson of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Peter Stano, warned Azerbaijan against such actions, threatening Baku with “severe consequences”.

What is perplexing is why European officials are joining this campaign, when it is evident that such a military operation could yield counterproductive outcomes for Baku. Leaders in Azerbaijan, being widely known for their pragmatic foreign policy approach, comprehend this reality and have consistently refuted any intentions or preparations for such an invasion. Nevertheless, the statements from Brussels, combined with anti-Azerbaijani resolutions from the European Parliament and the French Senate, have already had adverse effects on EU-Azerbaijan relations, eroding trust between the two sides.

This is accompanied by escalating disagreements among the three signatories of the 10 November 2020 trilateral statement (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia), particularly regarding the final provision pertaining to the reopening of regional transportation links. The statements released by each side in January underscored their divergent positions. Azerbaijan advocates for an unimpeded passage without customs and security checks for passengers and cargo through what it refers to as the Zangezur corridor, connecting the western part of Azerbaijan to Nakchivan. In stark contrast, Armenia firmly rejects this proposal, which had been otherwise envisioned in the trilateral statement.

Interestingly, Russia also advocates for customs and security checks on this route, but with a condition – insisting that Russia’s border guards oversee these measures. A similar discord arises over the responsibility for ensuring security on this route, with Russia and Azerbaijan expecting Armenia to comply with the trilateral statement and accept the deployment of Russia’s border guards. However, Yerevan rejects this provision as well. Given the opposition of the United States to the deployment of the Russian border guards, the issue turns out to be another act in the theater of geopolitical rivalries between Russia and the West, rather than a matter between the two directly involved countries.

This disagreement has evolved into a significant impediment, especially after President Aliyev’s declaration on 10 January that Baku will not consider opening Azerbaijan’s borders with Armenia elsewhere unless the Zangezur corridor is operational. This raises the question of whether Baku would be willing to sign a peace treaty with Armenia without reaching an agreement on the Zangezur corridor. Considering the current circumstances and the importance Baku places on this corridor, the answer to this question appears to be in the negative.

Nevertheless, there have been also one important development over the past month which gives a glimmer of hope that the two countries are still on the path of reconciliation. It is related to an apparent understanding between Baku and Yerevan that the remaining legal hurdles for the peace treaty should be eliminated. As it has been emphasised for a long time, Armenia’s existing constitution contains a territorial claim against Azerbaijan and Turkiye, calling for unification of Karabakh with Armenia and naming the eastern part of Turkiye as “Western Armenia”. In 2021, President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan referred to this fact as a challenge to the peace efforts in the region. “There is a territorial claim against Türkiye in the Constitution of Armenia. They should abandon that. They need to revise and re-adopt their constitution… they must give up their claims against Türkiye and Azerbaijan”, said Aliyev in an interview with a Turkish media channel.

The call for a new constitution by the Armenian premier is therefore interpreted as a breakthrough to this challenge. On January 19, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, explaining the need for a new constitution, stated that it would maintain the present parliamentary system. He underscored “external security” and “internationally recognized sovereign territory” as the main elements on the agenda that will be addressed in the constitutional reform. It is however likely that the process for Armenia adopting a new constitution will take a long time  – another reason why we may expect delays in the peace talks,

In conclusion, the recent complexities surrounding the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process suggest a more profound and enduring challenge than initially anticipated. Disagreements over the Zangezur corridor, exacerbated by geopolitical interests, have become significant obstacles. While a potential breakthrough as a result of the prospect of Armenia’s constitutional reform offers a glimmer of hope, the path to a comprehensive peace treaty remains fraught with hurdles, hinting at potential indefinite delays in the process.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has filed a criminal complaint against Armenian writer and linguist Sevan Nişanyan for his remarks about the Islamic call to prayer (adhan), Turkish Minute reported, citing the Gazete Duvar news website.

“I know of no other attack as disgusting as the adhan over loudspeakers. [It is] rape, harassment at the level of grabbing people’s private parts. This is one of the most horrible aspects of life in Turkey,” Nişanyan said on Sunday in his weekly livestream on YouTube where he answers questions from his fanbase.

The complaint, filed with the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, alleges that Nişanyan’s remarks on Sunday constitute an insult to Islamic religious values and symbols as well as a provocation of public division and tension.

According to the state-run Anadolu news agency, the complaint filed by the Diyanet claims that Nişanyan’s comments “crossed the boundaries of respect” and incited “hatred” with a “hostile attitude” towards the Islamic faith and values.

The complaint calls for Nişanyan to be prosecuted for “insulting public officials in the performance of their duties” and “inciting the public to hatred and hostility.”

Nişanyan, a 66-year-old writer, is known in Turkey for his controversial views. In 2014 he was imprisoned in Turkey on charges of illegal construction. He claims this was in response to his criticism of restrictions on freedom of _expression_ in the country. After escaping from a low security prison in 2017, Nişanyan applied for asylum in Greece but was deported in January 2022 due to what Athens said were problems with his residence permit. After a short stay in Armenia, he now lives in Montenegro.

Nişanyan’s previous conviction in Turkey for blasphemy in connection with a 2012 blog post defending an Islamophobic film has added to his controversial status.

On 19th September 2023, Azerbaijan finally took back the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, fully reversing its defeat in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War of the early 1990s. To mark the beginning of this new era in Azerbaijani history, the country’s elective dictator, Ilham Aliyev, announced snap Presidential “Elections” for 7th February 2024. Aliyev is seeking a new mandate after 20 years in power. 

The result may be a foregone conclusion: the result of his 2013 election victory was accidently released the day before the polls opened. Elections in Azerbaijan are more coronation than competition, and after his military success and swaggering indifference to international law and human rights, he is more popular than ever at home. The question is why Aliyev feels he needs a new domestic mandate right now? 

The answer was revealed in a rambling three-hour television interview with selected journalists in Baku on January 10th. There was a lot of self-aggrandisement in his answers to a string of fawning questions. (You cannot entirely blame the journalists for their submissiveness: eight have been arrested by the authorities in the last two months alone.) 

Amid Aliyev’s celebration of the seizure and ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, there was a clear indication that he may not be finished in his ambition “to fully restore the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan”. He made calculated attacks on Armenia, France, the UN, EU and anyone else not signed up to his historic mission to achieve “justice”, or who might oppose his ambitions for “waging”, as he put it, “political and diplomatic war at the international level.”

Geography is the key to why Aliyev has not finished “waging war”. His country remains split, with the large enclave of Nakhichevan separated from the main part of Azerbaijan by a 35km wide strip of Armenia. At present, the Azeris can only reach Nakhichevan over ground via Iran. There are also eight border villages to which the Azeris lay claim. 

Aliyev himself has formally agreed on several occasions that the demarcation and delimitation of borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia should be based on the 1991 December Alma-Ata Declaration (in Prague in October 2022, for example, and then again in Sochi in October 2022 and Brussels in July 2023).

Now, following military success, he is making outlandish demands to go back to maps from 1918 when the Soviet Union drew the borders between its Socialist Republics. 

“It is no secret that in the 20th century the lands of Azerbaijan were given to Armenia in parts”, he stated ominously on 10th January; “The city of Yerevan was handed over to Armenia […] But it was actually an Azerbaijani city, which was demolished and destroyed.”. This was “a huge historical crime”, he added. This was followed by more and more land being given by the Soviet government to Armenia. The implication is clear: he wants this territory “returned” to Azerbaijan. 

There is also unfinished business is the Zangezur Corridor which is a transport link demanded by Baku between the main part of Azerbaijan and the autonomous region of Nakhichevan. One of those gifts of land was the ceding of West Zangezur to Armenia. If you take the 1918 or pre-World War One maps as the basis for future negotiations, then the President is claiming not just a corridor but the region to be historically part of Azerbaijan. That is also why he does not want the technical process of delimiting the border, i.e. agreeing the precise position of the border line, to be completed before a peace treaty, many of these “historic” claims would not stand up to scrutiny. 

In positioning Azerbaijan for the maximum land grab possible, Aliyev also disregards his obligation to honour the tripartite agreement brokered by Russia that ended the fighting in the Second Nagorno Karabakh war in 2020. Russia was meant to provide security guarantees for that agreement and has failed to do so. 

The government of Azerbaijan undertook to agree a ceasefire and cessation of all hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone; guarantee the safety of traffic along the Lachin corridor for citizens, vehicles, and goods in both directions. Azerbaijan ended the ceasefire in April and closed the Lachin corridor in September 2023, after ethnically cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of over 100,000 Armenians. 

The Azeris now want Russian FSB protection for the route Zanzegur Corridor and no border checks for Azeri citizens entering Armenian territory, a clear violation of Armenian sovereignty and international law. Only the weakest of the three signatories to the agreement, Armenia, has attempted to keep to its terms and uphold international law. 

Aliyev’s 10th January interview made clear that the President’s view of international law informs the Azerbaijan government’s attitude to the existing peace deal and will inform their approach to future negotiations: “If you look at my speeches, I have repeatedly said that international law does not work. These mechanisms are deployed only for the weaker countries. Bigger states ignore them. Under such circumstances, countries that demand justice, and rightly so, must secure this justice themselves.” 

He speaks from a position of strength. Russia is keeping out of the conflict, with some commentators suspecting an energy deal with Baku as Armenia reorients itself to the West. Turkey stands squarely behind Aliyev. The UK issued strong words but remains an ally of the regime in Baku. 

After Macron failed to get sanctions against Baku through the UN, Aliyev attacked French Imperialism in Algeria and revelling in the speed of the military operation in September, stated that: “I think this should be a lesson not only for Armenia, but also for those standing behind it [ie the French]– that we do not tolerate a language of threats and being treated with arrogance”.  The EU is divided and its most effective negotiator, Council President Charles Michel, is standing down early.

Our current age is one in which dictators act with impunity, and do not hide the fact. They boast about the irrelevance of international law while seeking endorsement for their regimes in elaborate electoral farces. After Aliyev secures victory on 7th February, he will be at his most dangerous, with a mobilised and heavily-equipped military and a geopolitical situation conducive to the realisation of his remaining territorial ambitions through force. 

For its part, Armenia is trying to sound the alarm: its Ambassador to the UK briefed the House of Lords on the risks this week. Aliyev claims the conflict between the two states is not a geopolitical issue, but it is one. The trade routes that cross the region and the spillover of the Ukraine war make it the crucible of the Eastern flank of the unfolding war between Russia and NATO. 

Professor Brian Brivati is a Senior Honorary Policy Fellow at Centre for Public Understanding of Defence and Security, Exeter University

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