Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 11 2004
Turkey’s EU Membership and the Armenian Question
View: Sedat Laciner
Some radical groups in Europe link Turkey’s EU membership with the
Armenian question and advocate that Turkey should not become an EU
member before it addresses the Armenian demands. The question spans
over a large area from the events that are argued to have taken place
during Ottoman times, interpreted differently by Armenians and Turks,
to the problem of terrorism and the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh. It
can be understood that the problem cannot be solved at once. Even
though the emergence of Armenia in the international scene as an
independent state has brought expectations that there is a chance for
solution , in due course it has become evident that there are some
psychological problems at the root of the problem. The initiatives
taken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the US on the international stage have been disabled by
some radical groups. The manipulative efforts of this narrow group of
people make it extremely difficult for convergence to occur. They
have established a virtual industry of enmity and argue that Turkey
should accept their allegations without any debate and claim that
otherwise dialogue between Turkish and Armenian peoples and states is
impossible. However, the true problem can be said to stem from the
security / threat perceptions in Armenia and the prejudices against
the Turks among the diaspora Armenians:
As a country of 2.5 to 3 million, Armenia is surrounded by a Turkish
population over 100 million and has lived through a perceived
`Turkish threat’ for over a decade. Unfortunately, various radical
groups and some countries have fueled this perception. This is such
that even though no Armenian territory is invaded, conversely,
Armenia occupies a fifth of Azerbaijan’s territories, these fears
still linger on and some important circles in Armenia advocate an
increase in the defense budget against the so-called Turkish threat.
The case of the Armenian Diaspora is even more tragic: The Armenian
Diaspora is twice the size of Armenia’s population and these people
are scattered all across the world. As there was no independent
Armenian state for a long time, these people drew closer to radical
groups in order to promote Armenian interests. Moreover, by
underlining cultural and religious differences, they avoided
assimilation in other societies. One instrument that was used in
avoiding assimilation was the `Turkish threat’. The common feelings
against the Turks united the Armenian diaspora societies and they
enjoyed of being part of a society, nation and race. Though an
independent Armenian state was established the Armenian Diaspora was
not changed in nature and continued to use victimization and
historical hostilities as a uniting factor. Interestingly the
Diaspora with its financial and political superiority has dominated
the Armenia’s domestic politics. It can be argued that the Armenian
Diaspora in Europe and the US with the Karabakh Armenians are the
most significant group who radicalize Turkish-Armenian relations.
Etyem Mahcupyan, a Turkish Armenian columnist, criticized the
Diaspora Armenians in an international conference held in France in
November 2004:
`You do not want a solution, but revenge… The diaspora makes politics
by using the deaths and the past sufferings. But the politics is for
the living people… The Armenians in diaspora oppose Turkey’s entry to
the EU. It means that they do not sincerely wish Turkey’s acceptance
`genocide’. They prefer to make politics by using the deaths and the
past… Opposing Turkey’s EU membership is not Armenia’s and Turkey
Armenians’ interest.’
Hrant Dink, another Turkish Armenian, argued in the same conference
that the Armenian diaspora has not been able to change itself:
`The Armenian diaspora usually claim that Turkey and its policies on
Armenian issue cannot be changed. They are wrong. As a matter of fact
that the diaspora do not change. The world has changed. Turkey has
been changing. However the diaspora cannot catch the change. Normally
the diaspora has to be in the change and must support the change and
democratization process in Turkey. Today the European Armenian
diaspora, the French Armenians in particular, oppose Turkey’s EU bid.
They must question their anti-Turkey campaigns, because Turkey’s
entry to the EU changes and democratizes Turkey. If Turks and
Armenians will find a solution, it will be in Turkey’s EU process.’
As it can be seen from this account, an important part of the
Armenian question is historical and cultural prejudices and a
perception of threat rather than an actual one is preeminent.
The efforts to improve Turkish-Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have
continuously hit this barrier since 1992: For example, the US
government admits that in implementing its Caucasian plans, the
Turkish-Armenian dispute has always served as an obstacle. The EU has
much to drawn on the US’s endeavors to foment Turkish-Armenian
friendship since Armenia’s independence. The US has applied many
different ways which included pressurizing Turkey, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan; implementing economic sanctions against Azerbaijan;
forcing the sides to the negotiating table; increasing economic aid
to Armenia on an unprecedented scale; using Azerbaijani oil as a
motive for convergence. However, as it was previously stated, it has
proven impossible to break down the prejudices and psychological
barriers on all sides, especially on the Armenian side. The most
effective way to break this deadlock is the genuine guarantee by a
credible power that all three countries can accept. The US’s
guarantees have not fulfilled any of the three, and mostly Armenia.
However, the EU’s position can be different:
Turkey’s EU membership and the EU’s assurances towards the region
would prove tangible and suitable for the region. Moreover, both
Armenia and Azerbaijan will seek full membership next and will live
through this promise, traversing a serious divide.
The most promising aspect of this picture is that all sides give
priority to EU membership. A government that is keen on EU membership
is in power in Turkey. Moreover, the current Erdogan government’s
foreign policy is based on an understanding that can be epitomized as
`zero problem with neighbors’ and `win-win policy’. According to this
understanding, Armenia and Turkey can mutually benefit from closer
association. That is, Armenia’s loss is not Turkey’s gain. In the
same light, there is a serious transformation on the Armenian side.
The government is the same and is led by a `hawk’, Robert Kocharian,
and makes caustic remarks every now and then. However, following
September 11, it is observed that Armenia can no longer sustain a
policy that is mostly military in nature and is closely based on
military cooperation with Russia, Iran, and Syria at the expense of
the US. Even though Armenia terms these policies as `complementary
foreign policy options’ and argues that it satisfies all countries
and groups, international conjuncture does not allow this to go on
and that Armenia is now in a serious quest for new a option. For the
first time since independence, EU membership began occupying a
serious position in Armenia. There is a significant increase in the
number of those who express that Armenia’s future lies in the EU. In
short, just like Turkey, Armenia also aims to become an EU member.
The similarity in their goals will ease the tension in the two
countries’ relations. It is unavoidable for the two countries,
members of the same organization, to come to a better understanding
and stop perceiving each other as a threat. In this respect, Turkey’s
EU membership can abate Armenia’s fears. For at the center of the
fear fed by the radicals in Armenia is the understanding that Turkey
is an intractable power and can lay great harm to Armenia. Even
though this is mere fantasy, this is how reality is understood.
Turkey’s EU membership will at first alleviate this fear. For no EU
member can singularly pursue aggressive policies. Moreover, Armenia
will come to understand that Turkey, seeking EU membership, will
refrain from pursuing an aggressive policy towards Armenia.
In this respect, it is unrealistic and ill-willed to argue that
Turkey’s EU membership will negatively affect Turkish-Armenian
relations. Those who advocate this statement argue that the two
countries do not have diplomatic contacts and with EU membership,
Turkey would have less use of Armenia and will become even less bound
in its dealings with Armenia. However, even at Turkey’s present
economic and political position, it is not in dire need of Armenia.
Turkey is not a country to sustain great economic losses, even if the
borders remain closed for centuries. Despite this fact, it was Turkey
for the past 14 years that has taken the steps for convergence and to
hold, bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral meetings. Even though
the Karabakh question involves Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey
endeavored arduously to bring the two countries together.
Secondly, there is no economic embargo or sanction in practice:
Thousands of Armenians work in Istanbul, Turkey and the Turkish
international airports are open to civilian Armenian planes. As a
matter of fact that the Turkish-Armenian trade volume is over 200
million dollars though the Turkish-Armenian border is closed. All
these events signal that Turkey has a clear intention to establish
diplomatic relations with Armenia, improve relations, and even move
beyond from neighborly relations to lifting the borders between the
two countries’ markets.
In this respect, Turkey has three simple requests from Armenia:
1) To expressly recognize the borders of Turkey and Armenia’s
neighbors and the declaration that these borders will be respected,
2) To end the occupation of one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territories and
to stop resorting to violence in solving problems,
3) To stop situating the events of 1915 that Armenia claims to have
taken place at the center of its relations with Turkey.
As it can be seen, these requests are both quite easy to fulfill and
based on the basic principles of the UN, NATO, and the EU, namely,
respect for borders and the unchangeableness of borders through
violence. In view of how the EU considered Northern Cyprus to be
under occupation and imposed a harsh embargo on the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), denying recognition, not even admitting it
as a political entity and how severe NATO’s response was towards
Serbian aggression, Turkey’s response towards the occupation of
one-fifth of Azerbaijan by Armenia can be considered to be quite
innocent and even moderate.
As with the Armenian side’s interpretation of 1915, suffice to say
that people are entitled to their opinions. Some radical Armenian
groups interpret the Armenian insurgency of 1915 in the Ottoman
Empire as `genocide’ and demands Turkey to recognize this as such or
be denied EU membership. It is not right to think that just because
some Armenians think that should Turkish-Armenian relations remain
frozen for eternity. Genocide is a legal term and its scope is
determined by international legal treaties. As much audience is
granted to one side, the other side of the equation also deserves to
be heard. More importantly, while the past is dealt with, the
construction of the future should also paid attention. From here
onwards, the radical Armenian groups can interpret the 1915 the way
they want but if there is a desire to improve relations with the
Turks, the insult-like remarks against Turkey and the Turkish people
need to be avoided when talking about events that happened almost a
century ago. Dialogue can start from the most debatable subject, not
the most problematic one.
To sum up, it can be said that Turkey’s most problematic relationship
in the region is with the Armenians and that despite its
well-intended efforts, progress has been limited. As there are two
sides in the Turkish-Armenian dispute, the EU and other Western
countries have had an obstructive effect in the Caucasus. Armenia’s
reluctance to join the regional strategy of Western institutions and
countries due to its security perceptions both isolates Armenia and
plunges it into harder situations and bars the West from implementing
its strategy. In this context, a healthy Caucasus policy should aim
at Turkish-Armenian convergence. This can only be achieved through
Turkey’s EU membership that will bring Armenia closer to EU
institutions. With Turkey’s EU membership, Armenia will approach
Turkey with less suspicion and prejudice and new channels of dialogue
will spring by the EU. As the only EU member in the region, Turkey
will assume a role aiming to increase stability and cooperation even
further and change its policies against Armenia from one of
adversaries to that of bringing Armenia closer to the EU system.
In concluding the Armenian question, a useful point to mention is
Turkey’s Armenians. Some Armenian lobby groups in Europe talk about
the minority rights in Turkey and demand accession to be held back
until improvement in this area comes about. First of all, these
claims, not shared by Turkish-Armenians and the Istanbul Armenian
Patriarchate, are not reflective of the truth. Even if it is accepted
for one moment that there is an element of truth in these arguments,
it will be seen that as Turkey converges with the EU, its
self-confidence grows and demonstrates significant progress in the
field of minority rights. The great effort spent by Mesrob II, the
Patriarch of Istanbul, supporting Turkey’s EU membership and his
touring of Europe to persuade EU members is quite telling. Also, a
survey conducted among Istanbul’s Armenians that yielded a pro-EU
rate of 60 percent is also very important in showing the support for
Turkey’s EU membership among Armenian citizens.
Dr. Sedat LACINER
Director International Strategic research Organization (ISRO), Ankara