WHO IS AT THE TURN OF INTERESTS? US, RUSSIA AND NEW REALITY ON THE BORDER WITH IRAN
Regnum, Russia
April 24 2006
An unprecedented stir is up over Nagorno Karabakh. It seems that the
Armenian-Azeri presidential meeting in Rambouillet, on February 10-11,
has broken the very logic and the very format of the peace talks,
the OSCE Minsk Group has been mediating for as many as 15 years so far.
The remarkable meeting of Robert Kocharyan and Ilham Aliyev in France,
when the sides – as the Armenian President said – failed to agree
on “one key issue,” was followed by a meeting of the mediators in
Washington on March 9 – a rendezvous that gave the process quite an
sudden turn. For some unknown reasons, the OSCE MG co-chairs began
acting autonomously, and the Russian co-chair Yuri Merzlyakov –
the most passively of all. US Assistant Secretary of State for
Europe and Eurasia Daniel Fried visits the region on March 13-16 and
March 20 the co-chairs meet in Istanbul without Merzlyakov. Then,
the Armenian and Azeri FMs are invited to Washington, and Fried’s
deputy Matthew Bryza visits Yerevan and Baku. In the meantime, the
Armenian FM goes to Moscow, while the US and French co-chairs come
to Yerevan and Baku. Then comes the climax: the visit of the Iranian
DM to Baku, the consultation of the regional (Turkey, Azerbaijan,
Georgia) ambassadors of Russia and the Russian Deputy FM in Yerevan
(Moscow makes a kind of diplomatic gesture by holding such a meeting in
Yerevan), and the preparations for Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Washington.
This chronology will help us to see what may happen in the Karabakh
peace process in connection with the growing activity of the US and
the prospects of the key regional factor – the Iranian nuclear problem.
Much has been said and written about Washington’s plans and
specific efforts to involve Iran’s neighbor Azerbaijan in its future
anti-Iranian coalition and to use that country’s territory as a base
for its relevant actions. The US has been and is making these efforts
with persistence it would better apply for better purposes. For the
first time, US sources said that the final agreement on the matter
was reached during the “noiseless” visit of US Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld to Baku on April 12, 2005. They obviously hurried with
the news as Baku was stalwartly resisting. Baku’s motives are clear
and come from its full insight into Washington’s plan to put Tehran
down. With all mercantile interests put aside, the Bush administration
just wants Baku to be an accomplice in its in-depth destabilization
of the whole Black Sea-Caspian Sea region. Whatever its outcome,
this operation will be hardly pleasant for the South Caucasus –
and hardly short – considering the US’ endless campaign in Iraq.
But this is obviously the least concern for Washington, who is already
so keen on its Great Game that it no longer sees states and nations
around. Even more, since recently – more precisely, after the scandals
over the tortures in Abu Ghraib, CIA jails in some “democratized”
countries and phone tapping in the US – the Bush administration began
acting bluntly. They are no longer bothering with the fading-out
democracy flag – now their stakes are on the power of arms and bucks.
The interweaving aspects of the Karabakh and Iranian problems give
experts a certain foreboding: the almost simultaneous escalation of
diplomatic activity over the problems, the magic-like up-and-downs
in Azeri-Iranian relations, Tehran’s changeability towards Yerevan
and Baku, the unambiguous statements of the Iranian DM in Baku (he
expressed hope in Baku on April 20 that in Washington Azeri President
Ilham Aliyev will explain to the Americans that they should think
over their attitude towards Iran and said that Iran is ready to
help Azerbaijan to settle the Karabakh conflict) – all this looks
like somebody is trying to mix these two problems and to serve this
fire-damp mixture on one plate to the Azeri leadership.
If so, we should also think about what trumps the US may have promised
to Azerbaijan in exchange for its “anti-Iranian loyalty.” In fact,
there might be several promises: not to interfere in the internal
political affairs of that country, to help to return the territories
controlled by the Armenians and, later, to solve the Karabakh problem
itself – and also, probably, to become the security guarantor and
the stable buyer of the Azeri oil and to do everything possible for
the international markets not to notice the catastrophic shortage
of that oil. i.e. to do its best to involve Kazakhstan in the oil-
and gas-transit projects of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Quite a lot, as
we see. We can’t be sure, but the US may offer another attraction
for Azerbaijan’s national consciousness – the factor of Southern
Azerbaijan and the possibility of territorial enlargement at the
expense of Iran. This may seem a utopia, at the first glance, but
who could imagine some ten years ago that there would be a de facto
Kurdish state in the north of Iraq? But how to act in case of failure
– how to solve the ensuing conflict with Iran? Here Azerbaijan has
little choice.
Let’s note that though bigger than Armenia’s, Azerbaijan’s military,
diplomatic and human resources are still not enough for it to solve
the Karabakh problem independently from the general geo-politics.
Today, it’s, in fact, all the same for the Azeri authorities how the
problem will be solved. What they actually care for is the internal
political stability, and the Karabakh problem is the key threat to it.
Meanwhile, it was the father of the present Azeri president, Haydar
Aliyev, who first said that “Karabakh is lost for us.” On July 22,
2002, while receiving the founders of the Baku Press-Club in his
palace, Aliyev made a number of avowals. The full text of Aliyev’s
interview was published by Zerkalo daily on July 23, 2002. In
particular, Aliyev said that as the first secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR “he did much to help
Nagorno Karabakh to develop, but, at the same time, he tried to change
the local demography.” “Nagorno Karabakh asked for an institute. I
decided to open one, but on condition that it would have three sectors
– Azeri, Russian and Armenia. We opened the institute and began sending
Azeris from nearby districts there rather than to Baku. We also opened
a big shoe factory. Stepanakert had no sufficient labor force, so we
began sending there Azeris from places around the region. By doing this
I tried to increase the number of Azeris and to reduce the number of
Armenians,” Aliyev said. He also noted that “when I left Azerbaijan,
the situation there got worse – Armenia’s influence grew bigger, and
our authorities did nothing and missed the moment.” “When in Feb 1991
I was elected deputy from Naxcivan and came to Baku and said in the
parliament that Nagorno Karabakh was already lost,” Haydar Aliyev said.
Returning to our topic, let’s try to describe the consequences the
war in Iran may have for Armenia.
The armed crisis in Iran, the preventive strikes on or the military
invasion of the US and the “accomplice-countries” in that country and
the possible consequences this may have for Armenia are a question that
can knock out any Armenian politician. They in Armenia have no answer
to this question – they just well realize how serious this threat
is. The possibility of a US-Azeri or any other conspiracy over the
Karabakh-Iranian problem as a whole is an even bigger trap for the
Armenians. We can hardly imagine them to rule out this possibility
at all. The region is too small, and there is just one step from
Iran (and, most importantly, from its regions where the ethnic Azeri
majority is several times bigger than the whole population of Armenia)
to Karabakh.
Yes, it’s not calm in Armenia, and not only because of the
daily shuttle visits of US politicians and diplomats. In fact,
any destabilization will reveal the real balance of forces in the
region and will blow up the whole foreign political doctrine of
Armenia. The country will have to instantly choose which camp to
join. The situation is going beyond short-term predictability, which
means the end of the epoch of complimentarity – a wait-and-see policy,
a policy of balance between the interests of macro-players.
Yerevan seems to have already taken the first steps in this
direction… not without Moscow. In the chronology we give in the
preamble shows that after the usual OSCE MG format broke up and the
Russian co-chair went into the shadow, it was only the Armenian FM
that visited Moscow. But this was overshadowed by an unprecedented
meeting of the Russian ambassadors to Georgia, Azerbaijan and
Turkey and Russian Deputy FM Grigory Karasin in Yerevan. Even in
calmer times such a meeting would look intriguing. The N1 topic
before and after the military exercises in Nagorno Karabakh was
the Armenian-Russian military cooperation. Apr 19 the chief of the
general staff of Armenia’s armed forces Mikayel Haroutyunyan said that
“Armenia and Russia should conduct joint exercises more frequently and
should involve the Karabakh armed forces therein.” In the meantime,
Armenian Defense Serzh Sargsyan said in an interview to Krasnaya
Zvezda newspaper that Armenia would welcome the training of Russian
military students in highland conditions.
Such statements during military exercises in Nagorno Karabakh can’t
but have a serious implication. The region is facing hard times, and
for Armenia things are even harder. The fact is that it’s Azerbaijan
and not Armenia the US is talking with – including about the Karabakh
problem. Even more, the US has already made it clear that it is
concerned over the growing presence of Russia in the South Caucasus.
On April 14, the chairman of the subcommittee on foreign operations
Jim Kolbe said that the US is actually concerned for Russia’s
growing presence in the South Caucasus. And where is Russia present
most of all? Certainly, Kolbe’s hint was at Armenia. But the US’
concern is in no way for Russia’s economic growth in Armenia, and
it’s quite remarkable that the statement was made in Baku. Earlier
the UK special representative Bryan Fall clearly said that there
are states and organizations who would not object to replacing the
Russian military bases in Armenia.
Is a local war in Karabakh possible? It is – as war is still regarded
as one of the possible ways to resolve the dragging conflict. But
who will it benefit? The benefits are many, but they depend on what
the beneficiaries want. Let’s consider some of the possible scenarios:
The US involves Azerbaijan in a local war with Armenia and deploys
its military bases in the Azeri territory to protect its oil-gas
interests and, at the same time, pressures on Iran from the north.
This scenario fits well into the US’ strategic plan of Iran’s
military-political encirclement.
The US persuades Azerbaijan and Armenia into starting a new local
war and actively puts it down to Armenia’s disadvantage, thereby
showing Yerevan the inutility of the Russian presence. This scenario
will allow the Americans to force the Russians further out of the
South Caucasus. Objectively, if Azerbaijan attacks Armenia, Russia
will have to help its strategic partner and CSTO ally. But given
Armenia’s communication blockade and Russia narrow operation scope
(due mostly to the US’ efforts in Georgia), the Russian help may prove
ineffective. This may urge Armenia to change its national security
course towards the Atlantic system.
The mediators in the Karabakh peace process (the US, Russia and France)
and the parties to the conflict agree to start a local war for giving
back to Azerbaijan the territories occupied by the Armenian side,
and, as Armenian FM Vardan Oskanyan put it, “for legalizing the
self-determination of Nagorno Karabakh” – with no internal political
shocks in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thereby the mediators keep their
promise to resolve the conflict in 2006.
Azerbaijan goes into battle voluntarily, with no coercion, to see
itself and to show to its people the final of the conflict. This is
the least probable scenario – for this adventure will bring Azerbaijan
to nothing but a new long bloodshed with Armenia and new instability
in the region.
The US and Russia are beginning to re-share the region again – Russia
gives OK to the US’ strikes on Iran, the US uses the region as a base,
but agrees not to torpedo Russia’s policy and economic interests in the
South Caucasus. This is also quite possible, especially as Iran has,
in fact, rejected all Russia’s initiatives to solve the nuclear problem
and may in the future become Moscow’s real rival in the region, an
alternative energy policy-maker and a potential nuclear bomb-owner. On
the other hand, Russia needs the US’ non-interference in its relations
with the post-Soviet republics, especially with Ukraine and Georgia.
Conclusion
In fact, there may be a few more scenarios. In any of them a new war
in Karabakh will lead to a new reality in the whole region.
Obviously, the US and Europe have quite different positions on Karabakh
– the US is openly trying to use this factor in its own plans and
projects and to slow down the flow of solutions by the European
mediators. Washington needs the Karabakh conflict at this crucial
historical point. In fact, it wants to use the Karabakh factor in its
plans against Iran by implicating Baku in something that may end in a
catastrophe for the whole region. Experts perfectly see that the US’
key priority is Iran and all the other factors and countries will be
made subservient to it.
Speaking of Russia, we should keep in mind that in the present
historical period its regional policy is based on two platforms –
Iran and Armenia. Russia still is dominant over the balance of forces
in the conflict zone and, knowing this, one can hardly imagine how
the US will come to terms with Azerbaijan. Possibly, in cooperation
with Russia. However, the key question here is in what cooperation?
The MG co-chairs are visiting the region separately, their states
are at variance on Iran and, obviously, on Armenia, too. Can a new
war reconcile them? Or, perhaps, they can still agree by harmonizing
their positions on Armenia? There is, at least, one fact that gives
us such hope – Azerbaijan is getting involved in the anti-Iranian
processes separately from its strategic ally Turkey. Today Ankara is
very busy with the Kurdish problem, which is being actively kindled
by the selfsame US. While Baku is weighing the “pros” and “cons,”
the Turkish army is planning a big campaign in the south-east of its
own country. The headquarters of the Turkish land troops are being
moved closer to the borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria for organizing
the large-scale decisive blow on the Kurdish armed units.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress