Author: Emil Lazarian

ARMENIAN MEDIA, RIGHTS GROUPS DEMAND ARRESTED EDITOR’S RELEASE
By Emil Danielyan
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Czech Rep.
July 5 2006
Armenia’s leading newspapers, media associations and human rights
groups expressed serious concern on Wednesday about the arrest of
the editor of an independent newspaper critical of the government
and said he must be set free pending trial.
In a joint statement published by their papers, the editors of “Azg,”
“Aravot,” “Chorrord Ishkhanutyun,” “168 Zham,” “Iravunk,” “Haykakan
Zhamanak,” and “Taregir” said they have reason to believe that the
case against Arman Babajanian of “Zhamanak Yerevan” is politically
motivated.
Babajanian, 30, was detained in his office June 26 and promptly charged
with forging personal documents to avoid compulsory military service
in 2002. Prosecutors investigating the case say he confessed to the
charges before being remanded in a two-month pre-trial custody by a
court in Yerevan.
In a statement issued from his prison cell on Friday, Babajanian
presented himself as a victim of “political persecution” ordered by the
“illegal regime” governing Armenia. However, he did not say whether
he indeed pleaded guilty to the charges or thinks they are unfounded.
Babajanian’s colleagues demanded that he at least be released from
pre-trial detention. They said the prosecutors’ refusal to do so
suggests that “the main target of this ‘show’ is not military draft
dodgers but the heads of media not controlled by the authorities.”
The leaders of six non-governmental organizations involved in human
rights and press freedom advocacy expressed similar concerns in a
separate statement which described Babajanian’s arrest as a form
of government “pressure on an independent media outlet.” “We are
urging [the prosecutors] to change the coercive measure, especially
considering the fact that Arman Babajanian has already demonstrated
his readiness to cooperate with the investigating body and has no
intention to obstruct the investigation,” they said.
A spokeswoman for the Prosecutor-General’s Office argued earlier that
individuals accused of draft in Armenia are usually kept in custody
before trial.

ARMENIA AND IRAN WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT OF COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE
PanARMENIAN.Net
06.07.2006 13:23 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The centuries-old cultural and historical ties of the
Armenian and Iranian peoples and common interests of the two countries
form a solid basis for further expansion and development of relations
between Armenia and Iran, Armenian President Robert Kocharian stated
at a meeting with Iranian FM Manuchehr Mottaki in Teheran July 5. The
urge of the two countries to develop comprehensive political dialogue
at the highest and high levels was underscored at the meeting. Mutual
understanding is reached on the need to strengthen economic cooperation
forms, especially trade and mutual investment. The Iranian party was
for implementation of agreements reached before, reports Irna.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

A STORM IS BREWING IN THE EAST DESPITE TEMPORARY GAS TRUCE
By EBR Staff Writer
Energy Business Review
July 6 2006
The January 2006 Russia-Ukraine gas deal has been temporarily extended
to the autumn; a temporary truce largely driven by Russia’s position as
chair of the G8. There are two events on the horizon with potentially
serious implications for the reliability of gas supplies to Europe:
Yulia Tymoshenko’s appointment as Ukrainian prime minister, and
Turkmenistan’s decision to hike gas prices to Russia.
‘Content Last year, Russia sparked a crisis in European gas supply
by seeking to unilaterally end a long-term gas contract with Ukraine
and raise prices to international levels. In November 2005 Russia
proposed a price rise from $50 per 1,000 cubic meters to $160, but the
following month it suddenly raised the price to international levels
(around $230 per 1,000 cubic meters). This was twice the amount paid
by Armenia, Georgia and the Baltic states, and much more than the
existing $50 special rate effectively reserved for pro-Russia former
satellites such as Belarus.
AdvertisementRather than phase-in price increases or go to
international arbitration as requested by Ukraine, state-controlled
Gazprom said it would simply turn gas supplies off on January 1, 2006,
if Ukraine did not comply. Ukraine did not comply and continued to
take gas out of transit pipelines pursuant to its original agreement,
bringing accusations of theft from Gazprom.
Some 80% of Europe’s Russian gas is transported across Ukraine, and
when the taps did get turned off, seven European countries reported
30% drops in gas pressure within hours.
Russia under pressure
These events were bizarrely timed by Russia to coincide with its
chairmanship of the G8, with a specific focus on energy security. The
EU ratcheted up diplomatic pressure for the dispute to be resolved and,
immediately after the US weighed in, a deal was reached on January 4,
2006. This was accomplished by blending much cheaper Turkmen gas with
Russian gas, to produce an overall price to Ukraine of $95 per 1,000
cubic meters.
Gas prices under this new contract were scheduled to come up for
review on July 1. Up to the day before the deadline Russia had not
decided whether it would raise rates or not. At the same time Ukraine’s
outspoken former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko has been waiting in
the wings, making dramatic declarations about the need to scrap the
contract altogether. The brewing storm has been averted at the last
minute through an agreement between the departing administration in
Kiev and Moscow: the terms of the January agreement are to be extended
to the end of Q3 2006.
There can be little doubt that the ‘energy security’ G8 meeting
in St. Petersburg on July 15, at which Russia is the chair, is the
driving factor by this sudden capitulation by Russia and Gazprom.
This new agreement, however, is a truce and not a resolution of the
dispute. The task of setting in place a long term agreement remains
unresolved. To this end, two interwoven variables could yet combine
to create potentially serious disruptions in future gas supplies
to Europe.
The Tymoshenko factor
First, Ukraine’s former firebrand prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko is
on the cusp of re-forming a government, and she has already called
for a revision of the Russia-Ukraine gas contract. The January
compromise gas deal was only possible because Ms Tymoshenko had
earlier been replaced as Ukraine’s premier. During and after this
spring’s national elections, she repeatedly called for the January
gas deal to be called off.
The returning Ms Tymoshenko is dedicated to forcing RosUkrEnergo out
of the Ukraine-Russia pact. In 2004, in the dying days of former
president Leonid Kuchma’s government, this murky company secured
a sweetheart intermediary role carrying Gazprom-secured gas from
central Asia to Ukraine, through Gazprom pipelines, to sell on to
Ukraine’s NaftoGaz Ukrainy.
The commercial rationale for RosUkrEnergo’s role is unclear. But
the company’s original involvement as monopoly gas supplier to
Ukraine was set up under President Kuchma’s pro-Russia, pre-Orange
Revolution government, just before it orchestrated massive electoral
fraud in a bid to hold on to power through presidential candidate
Victor Yanukovich. The company is consequently seen by many, and most
importantly Yulia Tymoshenko, as a vestige of that regime. This has
direct implications for the security of gas supplies to western Europe.
Turkmenistan turns tables
Ironically, Russia is now in the position that Ukraine was last year.
Turkmenistan, having learned from Russia’s hard ball strategy, has
stated that it wants to raise the price at which it sells its gas to
RosUkrEnergo (from $65 per 1,000 cubic meters to $100), otherwise it
will cut off supplies. It threatens to do this by September, at which
point the current 30bcm supply contract with Gazprom is expected to
be fulfilled.
Negotiations with Gazprom have recently broken down, and a Ukrainian
delegation immediately began talks to negotiate a new deal. Such a deal
would reduce Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas and break Gazprom’s
monopoly on central Asian gas (though Ukraine will nevertheless have
to use Russian pipelines to transport the gas).
This unresolved dispute threatens to intensify in the near future,
with serious consequences to secure gas delivery through Russia and
Ukraine to Europe.
The saving grace in all this potential turmoil is Russia’s chairmanship
of the St Petersburg G8 summit on July 15. Russia’s desire to calm
tensions and prove itself a responsible energy leader is driving its
current stance.
And so, notwithstanding the focus of the current G8 summit, the next
few months will see feuds over the structure and price of major gas
contracts escalate, with potentially serious ramifications on the
security of gas supply.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TEMPLE MOUNT – NOT LISTED IN THE LAND REGISTRY
By Nadav Shragai
Ha’aretz, Israel
July 6 2006
Tel Aviv architect Tuvia Sagiv, an amateur but well-known researcher
of the history of the Temple Mount, no doubt did not imagine that
his influence would go as far as the Oval Office of the president
of the United States. However, according to Dr. Shmuel Berkovits,
an attorney who has written a new book about the holy places, Sagiv
is the source for former president Bill Clinton?s proposal to divide
sovereignty over the Temple Mount vertically, from top to bottom. At
the end of December 2000, Clinton proposed that the Palestinians get
the sovereignty over the level of the mosques while the Jews make do
with sovereignty over the depths of the mount, the Western Wall and
the Holy of Holies.
Sagiv combed the Temple Mount with radar equipment and infra-red
cameras that were operated from helicopters flying above and alongside
the site. Relying on these tests, he claimed that the Temple had lain
at a depth of 16 meters below the water fountain between Al-Aqsa Mosque
and the Dome of the Rock, and that what is known as the Western Wall
is not the western wall of the temple but rather part of the wall
that was built by the Emperor Adrianus around the Roman shrine that
he built on the Temple Mount after the conquest of Jerusalem and its
destruction in the second century. Sagiv proposed breaking open a
giant gate in the Western Wall through which Jews could go to reach
the level of the Temple, under the level of mosques.
Sagiv’s revolutionary approach is not in keeping with accepted
scholarly opinions. Most of the important archaeologists and rabbis
to this day believe that the Holy of Holies is not situated deep
under the ground but rather at ground level as we know it at present,
exactly at the spot where the rock is located in the Dome of the Rock.
Berkovits, in his new book, “How Dreadful is This Place,” recounts
the history of Sagiv’s theory, which was submitted more than 10
years ago to Ariel Sharon when he was still an opposition member of
the Knesset. At that time, Sagiv proposed to Sharon that it would
be possible to solve the problems of Jews and Moslems praying on
the Temple Mount by dividing the use of the site lengthwise rather
than breadthwise. Some time later, the U.S. Embassy asked Sagiv to
furnish them with an expository copy of his proposal, and in this
way the idea made its way into the hands of Clinton.
In any event, Berkovits is of the opinion that even if Sagiv’s idea
were more acceptable, the Palestinians would never agree to Israeli
sovereignty over the depths of the mount, both because of their
historic fear that the Jews would undermine the foundations of the
mosques and knock them down to rebuild the Temple, and because of
their anxiety lest the Jews dig there and find the remnants of the
Temple, proof that it existed on the Temple Mount, contrary to the
Palestinians’ claims about this.
“No holy buildings”
Holy sites are more or less Berkovits’ profession. He is a
world-renowned expert in the field, and he has been doing research
for 25 years, as well as teaching and consulting on these topics. He
is a member of the Jerusalem Institute of Israel Studies, serves
as an adviser to the Armenian Christian community, to the Museum of
Tolerance and the Diaspora Yeshiva. His doctoral thesis was put at
the disposal of the Israeli team at the Camp David peace talks with
Egypt in 1978 as the central reference document about the holy sites.
His previous book, “The Wars over the Holy Places,” won first prize
in 2001, in the field of Israeli security, from the Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies.
Academics and experts in international law will find a great
deal of interest in the analyses and the legal innovations in his
new book which deals with sanctity, politics and law in the holy
places in Jerusalem and in Israel in general. He even received an
enthusiastic foreword from the former president of the supreme court,
Meir Shamgar. (The two sit together on the committee for prevention of
the destruction of antiquities on the Temple Mount). But the general
public will be more interested in those holy cows that Berkovits is
not afraid to slaughter, and not always with academic caution.
The most obvious example is his attitude toward the affair of the
burning of the synagogues at Gush Katif. Berkovits states: “The
Israeli government and the Israel Defense Forces are keeping secret
the information, as if it was a military secret, that before the IDF
withdrew from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, the army chaplaincy
removed the sanctity of all the synagogues and religious study centers
in the Gaza Strip so that the buildings which the Palestinians looted,
burned and destroyed in the settlements that were evacuated were no
longer synagogues but merely regular buildings.”
Berkovits says he posed a question to the army chaplaincy on this
matter but received an evasive answer, and the military chaplains
were prepared only informally to tell him of these developments.
In his book, Berkovits cites, for the first time, the full halakhic
ruling written by Chief Rabbi Yona Metzger in which he gives the
details of the required halakhic procedure to remove a synagogue’s
sanctity. The most substantive stage of this procedure comes when
there is an act of sale, and the central role is supposed to be that of
the chief chaplain of the IDF. In his halakhic opinion, Rabbi Metzger
sats the state must assign its rights according to the property laws
to the army chief rabbi, and he is the one who must later carry
out the sale to the state treasury. At the time of expropriation,
Metzger instructed, the state must make a legal commitment to give
something in return for the buildings whose sanctity has been removed,
and for buildings that serve for other religious purposes (such as
ritual baths). This commitment, he says, will serve as a payment for
the sale “and will lead to the implementation of the removal of the
sanctity.” Berkovits also refers to another, albeit less painful,
sham, presented to the Israeli public in 2001 : the negotiations in
Taba between representatives from Israel and from the Palestinian
Authority, which devoted a great deal of time then to the status of
Jerusalem’s Old City and the Temple Mount. The foreign minister at
the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami, and Yossi Beilin, declared that there had
been progress in all the issues and stated that we had never been so
close as then to signing a peace agreement. The person who revealed
that this was a bluff was none other than Ben-Ami himself. The book
quotes him as saying: “It was a week before the elections and this
is a legitimate act. It would have been stupid not to take advantage
of it.” The former prime minister, Ehud Barak, also refers to this
display as “groundless.”
Berkovits also does not hesitate to apparently contradict earlier
publications about the Taba talks, such as that of Dr. Menahem Klein
in his book “Shattering a Taboo.”
Klein wrote in this book that, at the Taba talks, “Israel agreed
to place the neighborhoods close to the Old City (such as Silwan,
a-Tur, Ras el-Amud, and Sheikh Jarrah) under Palestinian sovereignty,
and that the Palestinians agreed that neighborhoods like Gilo, East
Talpiot, French Hill and Ramot would be part of Israel.” Berkovits’
book, “How Dreadful is This Place'” offers a different version,
that of attorney Gilad Sher, who headed the Israeli negotiating team
to the talks. Sher contends that the sides did not really conduct
negotiations and did not arrive at any real agreement on that at all.
All the same, Berkovits points out that the very fact that the Israeli
side agreed to the Clinton document (although with reservations)
gives the impression as if there was some type of agreement.
The big denial
The book devotes space to the great show of denial the Muslims have
initiated in the past few years about everything to do with the
existence in the past of the Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount, and
it brings examples to illustrate that this is not how things were in
the past. A guide to the Temple Mount, put out by the Supreme Muslim
Council in 1924, states explicitly that “the identity of the Temple
Mount as the site of the holy shrine of Solomon is beyond any kind
of doubt.” Berkovits’ book also quotes texts from the Palestinian
historian Aref al-Aref (1892-1973). Al-Aref was the partner of the
Grand Mufti Haj Amin el-Husseini in the leadership of the Palestinian
National Movement at the beginning of the Mandatory period, and in
his book, “A Detailed History of Jerusalem,” he writes: “The Wailing
Wall is the exterior wall of the temple that was reconstructed by
Herod … and the Jews visit there frequently and, on particular,
on Tisha B’Av [the anniversary of the destruction of the Temple]. And
when they visit the wall, they remember the glorious and unforgettable
history and they begin to weep.”
Berkovits returns to a finding he mentioned in the past and makes it
more concrete – about claims that the Western Wall is holy to Islam
because that is where Mohammed tied his winged horse, Al-Burak. Until
the middle of the 19th century, various places in the Harm el-Sharif
[as the Muslims call the Temple Mount] compound were mentioned as
the place to which he tied his horse, sometimes the eastern wall,
sometimes the southern wall, but never the Western wall. Berkovits
assumes that the Muslims’ eventual decision to choose the Western wall
was a reaction to the fact that, at the beginning of the 19th century,
the Jews started to bring chairs, tables and Torah scrolls with them
when they came to pray in the plaza in front of the Western wall. He
also cites a long list of proofs of the existence of the Temple on the
Temple Mount. Among the interesting details, and the lesser known ones,
on this list are two Greek inscriptions from the Second Temple period
that were found in the vicinity of the Lions’ Gate that prohibit the
entry of foreigners beyond the barrier that surrounds the Temple,
and threaten trespassers with the penalty of death in the following
language: “A foreign person shall not enter inside the partition that
surrounds the Temple or to the court that surrounds it, and whoever
is caught will pay with his life and his fate is death.”
Incidentally, a photograph of the inscriptions appears in the complete
guide to the Temple Mount archaeological excavations that was published
a few years ago by Dr. Eilat Mazar, and they are mentioned in the
description of the Temple by Josephus in his book “The Jewish War.”
Berkovits, in his book, proposes a series of changes in Israeli
legislation relating to holy sites, following the author’s discovery
that there is no definition of the term “holy place.” It also points to
a hitherto unknown fact that could have far-reaching implications in
the argument over the High Court of Justice’s right to hear petitions
about implementing the right of Jews to pray on the Temple Mount: In
the most famous case on this subject, known as “the High Court ruling
on nationalist groups,” the High Court ruled that Israeli courts do
not have the authority to discuss whether the right to prayer can
be implemented at holy sites altogether, and at the Temple Mount in
particular. With this in mind, all the petitions dealing with the
implementation of the Jews’ right to pray at the Temple Mount over
some 30 years have been rejected. But in a different case, known as
“the High Court ruling on women at the Wall,” the High Court ruled
that it has the authority to discuss the right to pray at the Western
Wall, and in this ruling it effectively overturned its own ruling in
the case on the nationalist groups.
In the last chapter, a fascinating issue is examined. It transpires
that the Temple Mount and most of the Western Wall are not registered
in any way in the Israel Land Registry (“Tabu”) and the issue of who
their earthly owners are, has not yet been decided. At the same time,
and contrary to what is generally thought to be true, Israel has
constantly refrained from expropriating the Western Wall so that this
will not be interpreted as a relinquishment of the other walls of the
Temple. One part of the Western Wall was expropriated and registered
in the Land Registry as property owned by the State of Israel. The area
in question is between the southwestern corner of the Western Wall and
as far as the “Makhama” building [deep beneath which lie the tunnels
from the Second Temple period], along the entire height of the wall.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

“EUROPEAN TURKEY” IN THE CAUCASUS
Sergey Markedonov for RIA Novosti
RIA Novosti, Russia
July 5 2006
Few people know that Henrik H. Kroner, Secretary General of the
European Movement International, was in Yerevan, the capital of the
South Caucasian republic of Armenia, in May 2006. He visited the
Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex in Yerevan and laid a wreath to the
victims of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey in 1915.
The European Movement was created to “contribute to the establishment
of a united, federal Europe founded on the respect for basic human
rights, peace principles, democratic principles of liberty and
solidarity and citizens’ participation.”
Henrik Kroner wrote in the book of honorary guests of the Memorial
that such crimes as the Armenian genocide must not be allowed to
happen again. He wrote that the European Union’s values were in favor
of future unification.
He said in the museum that the EU was resolved to prevent a repetition
of such tragedies, and that Turkey would not be admitted to the Union
unless it assumed responsibility for its past crimes.
The process has barely begun and will last years, he said, and Ankara
will eventually have to do as requested.
Kroner’s visit to Yerevan almost coincided with a serious discussion
on criminal liability for the denial of responsibility for the genocide
against Armenians, held in the National Assembly of France.
Deeply offended, Turkey recalled its ambassador “for consultations,”
while the advocates of criminal liability for the denial of
responsibility for the genocide and the supporters of the “democratic”
principle of discussing this delicate issue rallied in the streets
of Paris.
In short, the issue of the Armenian genocide remains a European
headache. However, the issue of admitting Turkey to the EU is usually
considered from two aspects: Turkey’s ability to accept European
values, and the EU’s ability to absorb new members and spread European
values to them.
Experts are analyzing not so much the essence of integration as
the timeframe and speed with which Turkey could acquire “European
registration.”
But the European future of Turkey is not limited to the political
struggle of Brussels bureaucrats, or discussions of where Europe ends
and Asia begins. The “Europeanization” of Turkey is an acute problem
of Caucasian geopolitics, which has a direct bearing on the issue
of genocide.
Firstly, the Europeanization of Turkey is related to the painful
aspect of the “big Caucasian game”, or relations between Turkey
and the “Armenian world”, which is not limited to Armenia. Other
important parts of this “world” are the self-proclaimed republic of
Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian diaspora, which seriously influences
public opinion in Armenia and many other countries, notably the United
States, France and Russia.
These parts of the “Armenian world” are divided over the future of
Armenian-Turkish relations. During the rule of Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
the first president of Armenia (1991-1998), the Yerevan authorities
and the diaspora quarreled more than once over the recognition of
the 1915 Armenian genocide. Ter-Petrosyan was not ready to soften
his attitude to the tragedy in the name of better relations with his
country’s western neighbor.
Although Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, is pursuing a
harsher policy towards Turkey, Yerevan has withdrawn its territorial
claims against it.
But not all parts of the “Armenian world” are prepared to regard
the issue of genocide without territorial claims, restitution, or
compensation for the property lost during the 1915 tragedy.
Tigran Martirosyan, a prominent Armenian political analyst, said:
“The current demands of the Armenian people [part of the “Armenian
world”] regarding Western Armenia [modern Turkey] are based on
the international requirement on clearing up the consequences of
genocide. This norm proceeds from the statutes of international
[military] tribunals, UN General Assembly resolutions, and the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[adopted on December 9, 1948 and enforced on January 12, 1951].”
Secondly, Turkey’s accession to the EU should outline the post-conflict
settlement in the Caucasus and the region’s development as a whole. The
decision will also bear on Russia’s presence in the South Caucasus.
Apparently, the main problem in relations between Turkey and Armenia
(and the “Armenian world”) is the recognition of the Armenian
genocide in 1915. Many people regard Turkey’s interpretation of the
1915 tragedy as a genocide (not a civil war, massacre, or deportation
of Armenians, as modern Turkish historians prefer to write about it)
as proof of Turkey’s “Europeanization”. But Turkish historians and
political experts on the Armenian problem have other arguments.
Professor Halil Berktay said: “This is a very serious issue, and it
represents a mistake on the part of Turkey, which seems unable to
make a decision on its political and legal attitude to the Ottoman
Empire. Turkey has not fully accepted the fact that it freed itself
from Ottoman rule and created a modern republic in its place. This
is a very serious contradiction. The republic is not responsible for
those events.”
“The Turkish Republic can say that it was established in 1923,
whereas the Armenian tragedy took place in 1915,” the professor said.
“The army and state institutions of the Turkish Republic are not
responsible for those events. The Turkish Republic is a new state.
>>From a legal point of view, it is not the successor to the Ottoman
government or the reformist Young Turks of the Ittihad ve Terakki
(Unity and Progress) party.”
Other Turkish researchers of Armenian-Turkish relations call for
cleansing the 1915 problem of political complications and “leaving
the issue to historians.” But many Turkish academics, officials and
politicians regard statements like the one made by Professor Berktay
as excessively liberal.
Taner Akcam, the first Turkish historian to describe the 1915 tragedy
as a genocide, is currently a professor at a U.S.university.
Turkey could make a point of “bidding farewell to its past,” using the
“liberal” historians’ idea that the republic is not a legal successor
to the previous regimes to denounce the “Ottoman past” that made the
Armenian genocide possible (the absence of legal succession has been
a key ideological precept of the Turkish Republic since the rule of
its founder, Kemal Ataturk).
Moreover, Ankara could accept the gesture of Yerevan, which has
abandoned its territorial claims to Western Armenia, now part
of Turkey. It could solve the problem by acknowledging the 1915
Armenian genocide. The point is to separate the territorial problem
(and restitution) from the request for accepting responsibility for
the Armenian genocide.
One might think that Turkey’s admission to the European Union would
make the territorial claims of the “Armenian world” history, since
the EU is categorically against territorial re-divisions even in the
name of “historical justice.”
But the situation is not that simple. The Turkey of Kemal Ataturk,
which rejects the heritage of the “anti-popular Ottoman regime,” is
mostly pursuing an old foreign and domestic policy. I am referring
to its policy regarding Cyprus, relations with Greece, Bulgaria,
Armenia and the former-Yugoslav territory, and its attitude towards
ethnic minorities (the Kurd issue).
Throughout the 20th century Turkey cleverly played on contradictions
between great powers to strengthen its position in the world. During
Kemal Ataturk’s revolution, the Turks smartly used contradictions
between Soviet Russia and the Entente. During the Cold War, they used
the left-wing threat in Greece and Cyprus to solve the Cyprus problem
in their favor.
This is why Armenia and the “Armenian world” are concerned about
the European future of Turkey, which has fully used NATO resources
disregarding the high standards of “European security.” We can also
assume that Turkey will use EU resources to advance its foreign
policy ambitions.
No country has yet been excluded from the EU. Will Turkey, if it
engages in unacceptable behavior, become the first outlaw? And if it
is, what foreign policy strategy will the authorities in Ankara adopt?
As an EU member, Turkey will use its European “privileges,” notably
the cover of “European interference,” to pursue an active policy in
the Caucasus. Acting not so much on behalf of united Europe, as in the
pursuit of its self-serving goals, Turkey will use democratic rhetoric
to try to minimize Russia’s “imperial” influence in the region.
Unlike other members of NATO and the EU, Turkey has its own national
interests in the Caucasus. Just as in 1918-1920, Azerbaijan has
become Turkey’s main partner in the South Caucasus. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan’s independence on December 16, 1991, and helped it during
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. In 1993, it closed the border
with Armenia but, unlike in 1918-1920, stopped short of a full-scale
military intervention. In 1994, Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev
spoke in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey about strategic
relations. In the 1990s, Turkey acted as Azerbaijan’s agent in NATO
and other international organizations.
Military cooperation is a major part of Azerbaijani-Turkish
relations. Since 1996, Turkish military advisers have been working
in Azerbaijan, and the Azerbaijani military has been trained in Turkey.
Turkey has been energetically promoting relations with Georgia since
the early 1990s, despite such minor political differences as the
Abkhazian problem and the repatriation of Meskhetian Turks. In 1998,
the Georgian Defense Ministry and the Turkish General Staff signed a
memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, which provides
for Turkey’s assistance in the training of Georgian officers. The
two countries are also promoting transportation and communications.
Turkey may turn the Armenian genocide into an element of political
bargaining. As a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, Turkey will most
likely do this, pledging to accept responsibility for the crime of a
genocide if pressure is put on Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. It may
encourage the EU to pressure Armenia into forcing the self-proclaimed
Karabakh republic to accept abstract and far-fetched peace plans of
international structures.
On the other hand, Turkey may suggest “an exchange of confessions”
between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On March 26, 1998,
Azerbaijani President Geidar Aliyev issued a decree “On the
Azerbaijani Genocide.” March 31 was declared the Day of the Azerbaijani
Genocide. The decree mentioned the “dismembering” of the Azerbaijani
nation, the “re-division of historical [Azerbaijani] territory” and
the “occupation” of Azerbaijan as a result of the Golestan (1813) and
Turkmanchai (1828) peace treaties that ended two Russo-Persian wars.
The Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, Armenia and the Armenian nation
have been accused of the Azerbaijani genocide. Turkey may presumably
pledge to assume responsibility for the Armenian genocide if Armenia
accepts responsibility for the Azerbaijani genocide. If Yerevan
rejects the offer (which it will most certainly do), Turkey would
redirect the EU wrath from itself to Armenia.
In short, the Europeanization of Turkey, which may be positive to
a degree, would also create problems for Armenia and the “Armenian
world”. Turkey may devise all kinds of unacceptable conditions for
admitting responsibility for the 1915 Armenian genocide.
As for Europe, the advocates of integration, acting in accordance
with the principle of political correctness and for the noble purpose
of bringing an Asian country into the lap of European democracy,
may sacrifice the interests of Armenians, just as they sacrificed
the interests of Serbs in Croatia and Kosovo, and of Greeks in Cyprus.
Sergey Markedonov is head of the department of ethnic relations at
the Institute of Military and Political Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.

GARABAGH CONFLICT HURDLE TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: GERMAN FM
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
The unresolved status of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Upper (Nagorno)
Garabagh conflict complicates European Union integration for the entire
South Caucasus region, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
said after meeting his Azeri counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov in Berlin
Wednesday. He called on the parties to the conflict to accept the
needed compromises to reach peace.
Other issues discussed at the meeting included bilateral ties,
economic relations and Azerbaijan’s integration into NATO.
In a news conference after the meeting, the ministers praised the level
of ties between the two countries. Mammadyarov said the Azeri-German
trade turnover has doubled over the past few years, saying Germany
is the largest partner of Azerbaijan in Western Europe.
Steinmeier said energy issues were in focus during the discussions
as well. “Azerbaijan, as an energy exporting and transit country,
plays a special role in ensuring European energy security. It is a
reliable and important partner of Europe in this respect,” the German
official said.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

AZERI, ARMENIAN CLERICAL LEADERS TABLE GARABAGH
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
The negotiated settlement to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Upper (Nagorno)
Garabagh conflict was discussed by the Caucasus Clerical Office
chairman, Sheikh Allahshukur Pashazada and the Armenian Catalicos
Garegin II on the sidelines of a summit of world clerics in Moscow
on Wednesday.
Garegin II said Azerbaijanis and Armenians are neighbors and
both should aspire to live in the conditions of peace and mutual
understanding.
“I am sure that the problems faced by our nations could be solved
only by peaceful means. Meetings and forums like this will positively
affect the development of civilized relations between them,” the
Armenian cleric said.
The summit participants adopted a declaration in conclusion of
discussions. A copy of the document will be forwarded to the leaders
of the upcoming G8 summit in St. Petersburg to be presided by Russian
President Vladimir Putin.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

AZERBAIJAN, ARMENIA ‘LIKELY TO CONCEDE’ UNDER INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, ANALYST SAYS
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
The latest statements by the OSCE mediators brokering settlement to
the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Upper (Nagorno) Garabagh are
aimed to put pressure on the sides, an Azeri analyst says.
“I believe there is good chance that the parties will make concessions
under pressure,” Leyla Aliyeva said while commenting on a statement
issued by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen that outlined the core
settlement principles and caused a great deal of debate.
Aliyeva added, however, that the statements aimed simply to study
public opinion, and that a strong public reaction to this would reduce
the possibility of compromises.
“The statements are also a tool to put pressure on the two
presidents. The co-chairs are thus trying to say that we have done
everything in our power and the responsibility is now yours. This
could be considered as pressure, because if a leader does not accept
concessions, it is usually frowned upon in the international arena,”
the analyst said.

AHMADINEJAD MEETS ARMENIAN LEADER
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
Armenian President Robert Kocharian visiting Iran met with his
counterpart Mahmud Ahmadinejad on Wednesday.
The private and broad meetings focused on expanding bilateral ties and
a number of economic projects, including one on building a high-voltage
electricity line to fully provide Armenia with electric power.
Armenia and Iran signed several agreements in conclusion of the talks.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NEW US ENVOY TO ARMENIA DUE IN TWO WEEKS
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
July 6 2006
Baku, July 5, AssA-Irada
The new US ambassador to Armenia Richard Hoagland will arrive in
Yerevan immediately after his approval to the post in two weeks,
the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the new co-chair of
the OSCE Minsk Group (MG), Matthew Bryza, has said.
“Hoagland is well-versed on the Caucasus history. As for the current
ambassador John Evans, he is an outstanding envoy and it is wrong to
say that he is being recalled or even being estranged from diplomatic
service. This is not true,” the American official said.
“Ambassadors serve the president and should follow his policy. US
President George Bush’s policy on the mass killings of Armenians is
very clear, as he points out in his annual addresses,” said Bryza.
“If someone disagrees with it, they are at liberty to make their own
decisions, but these should not be divulged. Certainly, our job is
also to advise him, but we must support his policy when it comes to
public statements.”
The decision to replace Evans came after he called for recognition
of the “genocide of Armenians” that allegedly took place in Ottoman
Turkey at the dawn of the last century during a meeting with the
Armenian community in California in February 2005.
US officials had never used the “genocide” term before.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress