Author: Emil Lazarian

WRITE ABOUT CYPRUS AND A GREEK RESPONDS
By Nevval Sevindi

Zaman Online, Turkey
June 24 2006

When I wrote my latest article, "Reality Behind Greek Cypriot
Mischief." There was no round of applause for me as a hero, nor did
letters pour in from patriotic souls.

No sooner was the English translation of the column was placed on
the web’ an avalanche of derogatory letters from the Greeks began to
pour in. "When will you talk about Turkish mischief?" some said, while
others called me a nationalist and a provocateur. How ironic it is that
these two traits are loved by our academicians and columnists! I was,
frankly speaking, moved by the "politeness" of the people who referred
to my column as "sounds of dog barking," and others who offered the
advice: "Drinking and writing do not mix, you drunken writer." I have
witnessed how the Greeks use the Armenian allegations of genocide as
weapon against Turkey. They attribute Turkey’s independence success
to assistance from Western countries rather than to the leadership
of Ataturk. Greeks must be suffering from amnesia, to not remember
that it was the Western countries that invaded Anatolia.

They are too vein to admit plain truths. I advise those who insistently
call Turks "nationalists," to investigate the evidence of Greek and
Armenian nationalism.

One Greek claims, "Show me a country that borders Turkey, and is
not at war with Turks." He is convinced that we are embroiled in
conflict with the Greeks, Bulgarians, Russians and Iranians. Our
refusal to take sides with the US, our 40-year allies, in the Iraq
war is ignored. As far as I understand, the Greeks, who referred to
the Ottoman state as "a bunch of murderers," never think of critiquing
themselves, whereas, Westerners always tell us to face "the facts" in
the Armenian and Kurdish issues. There are those who claim we Turks
set Izmir on fire. Let’s read what American Donald Whitthal and the
commander of USS Arizona say on this subject, "From where I stood —
between customs building and Palace Hotel — I witnessed the killings
of thirty people with their hands handcuffed and on their heads. This
atrocity was the work of Greek soldiers…" They add, as soon as
Greek soldiers landed, they killed the civilians they came across. The
commander relating how civilians were stabbed with bayonets, states,
"Most of the cruelty took place while Turks were under arrest."

A British officer notes in his report, "Greeks plundered Turkish
villages, killing villagers trying to escape." The Allied Investigation
Commission states that Greek soldiers and civilians alike caused
chaos in the city, committing assaults, murder and robbery. The
Greeks attacked the Ottoman state without any legal grounds and
were defeated. Why are they angry? The Greek cruelty was not only to
Muslims but also to the Jewish population of Izmir. Since Jews were
seen as Turkish allies, many of them were killed or exiled while hatred
was fanned by anti-Semitic prejudices. It is an historical fact that
the Greeks at times raided Jewish camps searching for "child-eating"
Jews. Thanks to the British and other western allies, we have records
of these bloody events. The principal reason for the Cyprus conflict
is blunder committed by the European Union by admitting Greek Cyprus
to the union at the expense of its own laws. Without touching this
main reason, the EU is dancing syrtaki with the Greeks and wants us to
dance with them If the West so respects its laws, then why should it
grant membership to a ‘country’ beset with border conflicts? Because
it will serve to block Turkey’s entry to the union. Now, the EU is
beating around the bush.

It cannot steer clear to keep a straight path. An expert on hypocrisy
and double standards, the West is playing the three monkeys and not
keeping its promises.

Those who read-only my column superficially may conclude that Greeks
are our enemies, and that Turkey should not join the EU. These are
emotional reactions. The fact is that we are not enemies of anyone and
have an optimistic view of things, but we pay a heavy price for our
good intentions. Secondly, joining EU is our right, thus we should do
so. It is now the Union’s move, after long years of our sacrifice to
meet the criteria put to us, including customs agreement. However, if.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ROBERT GUEDIGUIAN SUR LA TERRE ARMENIENNE

La Croix , France
24 juin 2006

Pour son nouveau long metrage, Robert Guediguian quitte les docks
de Marseille. Dans Le Voyage en Armenie, le cineaste a choisi de
se tourner vers l’Armenie de ses origines. L’idee lui a ete offerte
par sa femme, l’actrice Ariane Ascaride, qui a imagine une histoire
autour d’un père brouille avec sa fille (elle tient d’ailleurs ce
rôle). Se sachant gravement malade, ce dernier souhaite revenir sur
la terre de ses ancetres et en leguer quelque chose a sa fille. Le
realisateur a saisi l’occasion, sans doute influence par un recent
sejour en Armenie, lors d’une retrospective de ses films. La-bas, les
Armeniens lui avaient reclame une oeuvre sur leur pays, signifiant leur
"besoin d’etre visible, d’exister".

–Boundary_(ID_iOE8eU5ZC5nTgnVsR 7gwrw)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

LES NEGOCIATIONS ENTRE L’UNION EUROPEENNE ET LA TURQUIE SONT-ELLES UN JEU DE DUPES ?
L’analyse d’Alexandrine Bouilhet

Le Figaro, France
24 juin 2006

Les negociations entre l’Union europeenne et la Turquie ont franchi une
etape decisive, la semaine dernière, a Luxembourg. Les deux parties
contractantes ont clos le premier chapitre – consacre a la science
et a la recherche – des negociations d’adhesion.

Techniquement, le pas est insignifiant. Ce domaine comporte très
peu d’"acquis communautaire", c’est-a-dire peu de lois europeennes
a transposer dans le droit national turc.

La Turquie participe deja aux programmes scientifiques communs, comme
Euratom ou Eureka ; elle peut deja utiliser les fonds de Bruxelles
alloues a ces projets. Son merite en la matière est donc reduit.

"C’est comme si on faisait passer un examen d’anglais a quelqu’un
de parfaitement bilingue", resume-t-on a Bruxelles. Lors du Conseil
europeen, Jacques Chirac a minimise l’evenement. "On a ouvert un
chapitre, d’accord, mais les negociations pourront toujours etre
remises en question si la Turquie ne remplit pas ses obligations…",
a-t-il commente. N’en deplaise aux turco-sceptiques, la Turquie
a marque un point important sur le plan legal et politique. L’UE
est avant tout une communaute de droit. Après neuf mois passes dans
l’antichambre, la Turquie peut se targuer d’etre entree dans le vif du
sujet communautaire. A Luxembourg, elle a mis ses pions sur la première
case du vaste jeu de l’oie europeen, qui compte 35 cases ou chapitres,
correspondant aux 80 000 pages de legislation. A la fin du jeu, quand
toutes les cases sont remplies, le pays candidat entre, en principe,
dans l’UE. Pour la Turquie, qui n’a jamais ete consideree comme un
candidat comme un autre, s’agit-il de veritables negociations ou d’un
jeu de dupes ? A Bruxelles comme a Ankara, rares sont ceux qui ne se
posent pas la question, au moins en silence.

D’autant que le fin mot de l’adhesion turque reviendra, on le
sait, aux Francais, appeles a approuver, par referendum, tous les
futurs elargissements de l’Union, a l’exception de la Bulgarie,
de la Roumanie et de la Croatie. Le premier test pour la Turquie,
comme pour l’Europe, sur le serieux des negociations, interviendra
a l’automne quand seront examines les chapitres "marche interieur"
ou "transports", qui exigent la libre circulation des biens et des
personnes. Si Ankara refuse toujours d’ouvrir ses ports aux bateaux
greco-chypriotes, l’UE va-t-elle interrompre d’un coup ses pourparlers
avec la Turquie ? C’est un risque que le premier ministre, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, semble pret a prendre, a en croire ses dernières declarations
a Istanbul. Lorsqu’ils ont ouvert les negociations d’adhesion avec
Ankara le 3 octobre 2005, les Vingt-Cinq ont exige une normalisation
des relations turco-chypriotes avant la fin de l’annee 2006. Si
le blocage persiste, le Conseil europeen de decembre se saisira du
dossier. La question chypriote, plus que la reconnaissance du genocide
armenien, pèse lourdement sur la candidature de la Turquie. En cas,
probable, de non-reconnaissance de Chypre dans les six prochains mois,
Bruxelles se prepare a interrompre les negociations au moins sur les
chapitres concernes : marche interieur, douanes, transports. L’examen
des autres chapitres continueraient, laissant la porte ouverte a
la Turquie.

"Techniquement, nous nous arrangerons pour que le train soit toujours
sur les rails, mais politiquement ces negociations deviendront de
plus en plus difficiles a vendre a l’opinion", pronostique un expert
bruxellois. Avec son droit de veto, Chypre peut tout faire derailler.

Arbitre des negociations, la Commission est le plus fidèle allie de la
Turquie. "Parfois, elle en rajoute meme un peu trop !" plaisante un
diplomate italien. A Bruxelles, le "desk" Turquie est pilote par un
Suedois, turco-enthousiaste, lui-meme chapeaute par un Britannique,
Michael Leah, pour qui l’elargissement reste la meilleure et la plus
moderne des politiques de l’Union, garante de paix et de prosperite
sur le continent. Parmi les Vingt-Cinq, la Turquie peut compter sur
l’appui de nombreux pays et pas des moindres : la Grande-Bretagne,
la Suède, la Finlande, la Belgique, l’Italie et tous les nouveaux
Etats membres. Meme si elle se doit de rester neutre, la presidence
finlandaise de l’Union, qui commence le 1 er juillet, devrait tout
faire pour eviter la rupture sur la question chypriote. Et la Turquie,
membre eminent de l’Otan, peut toujours s’appuyer sur Washington,
comme elle l’a fait le 3 octobre 2005. Face a ce bloc solide, le
camp "anti-Turquie" est plus faible et plus fluctuant. Bruxelles y
range l’Autriche, les Pays-Bas, le Danemark, Chypre et la France de
l’après-29 mai. Pourtant, la ligne francaise reste ambiguë, partagee
entre l’Elysee, favorable a l’entree de la Turquie pour des raisons
strategiques, et le Quai d’Orsay, souvent plus sceptique. Pour Jacques
Chirac, la Turquie doit entrer dans l’Europe pour que celle-ci ne
reste pas un "club chretien". Pour nombre de diplomates francais au
contraire, l’adhesion de la Turquie risque de "denaturer" le projet
europeen. Cette attitude double rend la position francaise souvent
illisible par l’opinion, sauf pour les experts du dossier qui ont
appris a decrypter le jeu de Paris. "En coulisse, les diplomates
francais sont les plus pinailleurs, avec les Chypriotes, constate un
negociateur. Ils font monter la pression jusqu’au bout, mais dès qu’on
frôle la rupture, ils se rangent en faveur d’Ankara. Du coup, Chypre se
retrouve isolee, seule contre tous, et elle doit ceder." Dans le jeu
diplomatique europeen, la France est moins decisive que l’Allemagne,
qui a toujours vote en faveur de la Turquie. "En Allemagne, la
Turquie est un dossier de politique interieure plus que de politique
etrangère", note un diplomate, en faisant allusion aux 2,7 millions
de Turcs qui vivent en Allemagne, dont 550 000 avec le droit de
vote. En France, la Turquie restera un dossier de politique etrangère,
jusqu’a ce qu’elle entre dans le champ du referendum, attendu dans
dix ans au minimum, c’est-a-dire a la fin du jeu de l’oie europeen.

–Boundary_(ID_YQkut46D/NGmFlOU7NQTrQ)- –

NEW DANISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

Nouvelles d’Armenie, France
3446
June 25 2006

Documents From The Danish National Archivies

Distributed with permission of the principal researcher, Matthias
Bjørnlund
========================== ==================================

DOCUMENT 1

1915-07-03-DK-001

The minister in Constantinople (Carl Ellis Wandel) to the foreign
minister (Erik Scavenius)

Source : Danish National Archives, Foreign Office, Group Cases
1909-1945. Dept. 139, Gr. D, No. 1, "Turkey – Inner Relations".

Package 1, to Dec. 31, 1916

No. LXX [70]

Constantinople, July 3, 1915.

Confidential.

Mr. Foreign Minister,

In my earlier reports I have already several times had the opportunity
to mention the hatred that the Young Turk government has been showing
with less and less ambiguity against the aliens in Turkey since
the beginning of the war and the abrogation of the capitulations,
and particularly against the Christians.

In spite of the repeated promises that the Grand Vizier has given
to the Apostolic delegate [Monseigneur Angelo Marie Dolci] and to
the mission chiefs, many of the monasteries and other religious
institutions that have been seized have not yet been reopened, and
they are still being treated with the utmost arbitrariness, often
under the pretext of military necessity.

The Catholic church in Bebek by the Bosporus has even been placed
at the disposal of the local Muslims, who have converted it into
a mosque ; and property belonging to the Holy See in Kadikeui,
near Constantinople, has been taken over in order to establish a
Muslim school.

All of these violations, though, amount to nothing compared to a
very vital step, that I have learned today has been taken by the
government to remove the protected status which the Catholics have
enjoyed in Turkey from old times.

The government has established a non-clerical council, made up of 12
Catholic Ottoman subjects – naturally chosen among followers of the
government – who must choose a chairman among themselves.

This council is supposed to administer the Catholic church in Turkey
(i.e., the Latin, not the Greek, Armenian, etc.), and will thus become
some sort of a new Patriarchate.

This way, the representative of the Papal delegate and of the
countries that have Catholic interests in Turkey will be robbed of any
opportunity of attending to such interests and that all monasteries and
churches, and everything that the Catholic church owns in this country,
will be administrated by this new council and seized by the Caliphate.

Not surprisingly, the Papal delegate has refused to receive the 12
newly appointed gentlemen in corpore.

In Catholic circles, there had been hope that under these circumstances
the German ambassador, who represents so many millions of Catholics,
and the representative of the "Apostolic king" [i.e., the Austrian
ambassador Johann Pallavicini] would have a moderating influence on
the Young Turk government, but this seems not to be the case.

The German ambassador says that it must be due to a misunderstanding
if one thinks that Germany or any other power has any influence
here, because the Turkish government disregards the daily efforts
he makes to direct its attention to the many unwise acts by which it
makes itself still more hated, and the Austrian-Hungarian ambassador
expresses himself in a similar way, in that he, among other things,
complains about the arrogant way the Turks try to give the impression
that the advancement of the Austrian armed forces first and foremost
is caused by the Turkish victories against the allied forces at the
Dardanelles and elsewhere.

With the highest esteem I remain, Mr. Minister, yours faithfully

[Wandel]

—————————- ————————————————– —

DOCUMENT 2

1915-09-04-DK-001

The minister in Constantinople (Carl Ellis Wandel) to the foreign
minister (Erik Scavenius)

Source : Danish National Archives, Foreign Office, Group Cases
1909-1945. Dept. 139, Gr. D, No. 1, "Turkey – Inner Relations".

Package 1, to Dec. 31, 1916

No. CXIII [113]

Constantinople, September 4, 1915.

Confidential.

Mr. Foreign Minister,

In continuation of my most respectful reports No. LXXVIII [78] of
July 22, No. LXXXVII [87] of July 31, and No. IC [99] of August 18,
I have the honor of reporting that the persecutions of the Armenians
are continuing with great intensity, in spite of the promises made
by the government here, and of which I have already reported.

At the reception Monday the 16th of August, the German ambassador
once again brought up these persecutions with the Grand Vizier,
and asked him to induce his government to cease, – especially when
it comes to the Armenian Catholics who have never participated in
revolutions or interfered with politics and still are subjected to
the most persistent persecutions.

Even the Gregorian Armenians, who have distanced themselves from
all nationalist ideas to the extent that they have abandoned their
mother tongue and have embraced the Turkish language as their own,
are being persecuted.

The promises which the Grand Vizier gave to the German ambassador
were not kept, and when the persecutions and killings continued, His
Holiness Monseigneur Paul Pierre XIII, the Armenian-Catholic Patriarch,
turned to the resident Spanish minister and asked him, in the name of
Catholic Spain, to try to turn once more to the Grand Vizier to obtain
that at least the safety of the Catholic Armenians were respected.

The Spanish minister, who consented and, using the words of the
Patriarch, objected to the Grand Vizier at the reception last Monday,
tells me that His Highness, after having listened to him, showed his
surprise about what had happened, and that he, when the minister
firmly claimed that he had proof that the cruelties mentioned had
actually taken place, noted it and promised to immediately order that
the Armenian Catholics were spared.

However, both the minister and the Patriarch are convinced that these
terrible persecutions will not cease, among other things because the
central government has no power over the provincial authorities,
who, when it suits them, do not obey the orders they receive from
Constantinople, and – last not least – because the Germans in their
opinion only pretend to protest against the persecutions and killings.

It is obvious, they say, that the Germans are interested in the
extermination of the Armenians and in the Greeks fleeing, who fear
that the same thing should happen to them, so that they (the Germans)
without effort can take over Turkey`s trade and become the only
Europeans with a foothold here.

The authorities in the provinces and the Young Turks, they say, do
not consider the German ambassadors’ application to the government
as serious.

I shall briefly allow myself to give an account of the important and
sad communications of the latest developments, that has been given
to me by completely reliable and truthful source, and which is of
such a nature that it will cause general regret everywhere in the
Christian world.

The Turks are vigorously carrying through their cruel intention,
to exterminate the Armenian people.

In Brussa they have forced the well-to-do Armenians to pay the police
300 Turkish pounds (approximately 5000 Danish kroner) a person to be
allowed to stay in the city, and yet the next day they have banished
them from the city with their wifes and children.

Where these unfortunate people are now, and what fate they have met
after they have had to leave their homes, it is not possible to learn
even for the closest family.

In Adana the governor has ordered the posting of a proclamation which,
in a French translation I have received from the Patriarchate, goes
as follows :

"1) Jusqu`a la fin du mois courant les armeniens se trouvant dans la
ville meme d`Adana doivent avoir ete expedies au fur et a mesure et par
groupes. 2) Les proprietaires des fabriques sises a Mersina et a Adana,
ainsi que les employes de celles-ci qui travaillent pour le compte
du Departement Militaire, son exemptes pour le moment : ils ne seront
pas expedies et seront employes comme auparavant dans leur travaux.

3) Les familles dont les soutiens ou les maris sont en service
militaire ne seront pas expedies.

4) Tout le monde doit, a partir d`aujourd`hui, regler et mettre en
ordre ses affaires et se tenir pret a l`ordre de monter en chemin
de fer.

5) Il ne sera fait aucun cas de recours, qui seront faits faits pour
une demande de prolongation de delai ou d`autres empechements. 6)
L`expedition se fera quartier par quartier. 7) Il ne sera permis
pour chaque famille que le transport d`une quantite de meubles de
150 kilos seulement.

8) Pour les familles composees de plus 6 personnes, grandes ou petites,
il sera permis le transport de 200 kilos de meubles.

9) La population musulmans de la ville et de la banlieue est obligee
de fournir, pour cette expedition, les moyens de transport.

10) La commission nommee pour s`occuper des moyens de transport,
a commence deja ses travaux.

11) Les familles qui se seraient procure elles-meme leur moyens
de transport, sont autorisees, en vertu des pièces qui leur seront
delivrees par les Commissaires de Police, a se rendre directement a
Badjou et de la a Alep.

12) Par le train qui sera prepare le samedi 15 du mois courant,
seront expedies les quartiers de Akdje, Nesjid, Saradjen, Kharab,
Bagtche, Tchoukour, Kassab Bekir, Yarbachi, Tcinanli et Karan.

13) A partir de demain la population de ces quartiers devra absolument
s`adresser a la Commission d`inscription placee sous la presidence de
Adil Bey dans le Commissariat de Police et après s`etre fait inscrire,
devra prendre une pièce scellee et legalisee.

14) Ceux qui d`après l`inscription de leur etat civil, sinon du nombre
des habitants de ces quartiers et qui actuellement resident ailleurs,
leurs domiciles actuels ne seront pas pris en consideration, mais
ils seront obligee d`aller se faire inscrire avec les habitants des
quartiers auxquels ils appartiennent, et de partir, dans la meme
journee, avec les habitants de leur quartier d`origine.

15) Pour l`expedition soit des familles de militaires, soit des
personnes qui se trouveraient habitant dans d`autres quartiers, il
sera tenu compte, pour principe d`operation, de l`enregistrement de
leur etat civil.

16) Toutes les operations qui ne seront pas faites par inscription,
ne seront pas prises en consideration.

17) La population de ses quartiers devra, au matin du jour designe
ci-haut a 12 heures a la turque, avec ses bagages, tel qu`il est
dit a l`Art. 7 et avec les membres de la famille, se trouver a
la Nouvelle Station. 18) On doit se rendre a Alep par la voie de
Osmanieh-Radjou. 19) Une Commission speciale etant envoyee a Osmanieh,
sur la presentation des pièces, conformement a l`Art. 13, distribuera
a chaque famille, dans la mesure possible, des moyens de transport
et organisera les expeditions par groupes.

20) A l`arrivee a Osmanieh la susdite Commission fera diligence pour
l`installation et le bien-etre des groupes : par consequent chaque
quartier devra faire par l`intermediarie de leur Mouhtar respectif,
recours a la susdite Commission.

21) La quantite des personnes employees dont le sejour a ete decide,
avant etre notifie aux bureaux de la Police et de la Gendarmerie,
il sera procede, par les dits bureaux, a la separation et au maintien
de ceux-ci.

22) La sera delivre par la direction de la police, aux personnes
ainsi exemptees, des documents reguliers et legalises, concernant
leur maintien.

23) Si parmi la population des quartiers qui ont ete avisees, il se
trouvait des personnes, qui, a partir de demain, ne se presenteraient
pas et ne se feraient inscrire, ou qui ne se trouveraient pas
presentes a la Nouvelle Station au jour indique pour le depart soit
le samedi 15 du mois courant a l`heure indique ou qui chercheraient a
trouver des ruses ou des pretextes, les Mouhtars et les Conseils des
vieillards sont obliges de prevenir les Autorites et si les habitants
et le Mouhtar auraient contrevenu a tout cela, ils seront consideres
comme ayant agi contre l`Autorite Militaire et les ordres de l`etat
de mobilisation et seront immediatement deferes a la Cour Martiale
et dans les 24 heures une sentence sera donnee et executee.

24) Les ordres formelles, comme il convent, ayant ete donnes a tous les
bureaux. Il est preferable de travailler a completer ces preparatifs
plutôt que de perdre du temps a chercher des pretextes et a faire
des demarches inutiles. Août 1915.

In a letter received here from the bishop of Erzerum, Monseigneur
Melchisedechian, it is stated that the parish of Khodirtchour, which
was made up of 12 villages, has been completely evacuated, and that
no one knows what has happened to the vanished population.

That same prelate, on July 17 this year, reported that he himself
had been forced to set out for an unknown destination, and nothing
has been heard of him since.

The former bishop of that same district, Monseigneur Ketchourian,
at the same time travelled to Constantinople, but disappeared along
the way.

The bishop of Karput, Monseigneur Israëlian, on June 23 reported to
the Patriarchate that he had been ordered to leave the town for Aleppo
with all of his parishioners within 48 hours, and it has later been
learned that this bishop and all the clergy that accompanied him have
been attacked and killed between Diarbekir and Urfa at a place where
approximately 1700 Armenian families have suffered the same fate.

The whole of the population in the abovementioned parish are considered
lost.

The population in the parishes of Diarbekir and Malatia has also been
driven out of their villages, and it is not known what has happened
to the bishops Tchelebian and Khatchadourian and their parishioners.

The sad message has also been confirmed that the archbishop of Mardin,
Monseigneur Maloyan, and approx. 700 of his Catholic parishioners
have been killed, and that the population in the town of Tallermen,
which was purely Catholic, has been completely exterminated.

Reports are completely lacking on what has happened to the bishop
of Mouch, Monseigneur Topuzian, and his parishioners, but there is
reason to believe that they too have been killed.

It is feared that a similar fate has befallen the clergy and
parishioners of Gurin.

In the parish of Sivas, the only village to have been spared is
Pirkinik, where the archbishop, Monseigneur Ketchedjian, has escaped
to. He, and one cleric that accompanied him, are the only survivors.

Trebizond, Samson, [illegible], Marsivan, and Amassia have been
completely evacuated, and there is no knowledge of what has happened
to the 47 clerics of these towns.

Tarsus, Hedzin, and Mersina have suffered the same fate.

In Angora, all of the men have been abducted from the town, and the
women have been forced to marry Muslims ; approximately 6000 men,
approximately 70 clerics, and the bishop, Monseigneur Gregoire Bahaban,
have been shot on the road to the place of banishment.

In the city of Ismid, the government has ordered that the Armenian
Catholics who had been banished to Eskicheir should be allowed to
return to their homes, but the governor would not let them enter
the city, and sent them back. The same thing has happened in many
other places.

Even here in Constantinople Armenians are being abducted and sent to
Asia, and it is not possible to get information of their whereabouts.

The Patriarchate has calculated that half of the Armenian-Catholic
hierarchy has been lost ; 7 bishops, approximately 100 priests, 70
other clerics, and thousands upon thousands of their parishioners
have disappeared.

The Church formerly consisted of 16 districts (Constantinople, Mardin,
Diarbekir, Karput, Malatia, Sivas-Tokat, Mouch, Erzerum, Trebisond,
Angora, Cesaree, Brussa, Adana, Marache, Aleppo, and Alexandrie [=
Alexandrette]), and according to the latest information only Marash,
Aleppo, and Cesaree have been spared outside of Constantinople.

The fate that thus has befallen the Catholic Armenians, have with
even greater cruelty befallen all the other Armenians, in that the
aim of the government, as I have already had the honor to report,
is to completely exterminate the Armenian people.

With the highest esteem I remain, Mr. Minister, yours faithfully

[Wandel]

—————————- ————————————————– —

DOCUMENT 3 1915-09-22-DK-001

The minister in Constantinople (Carl Ellis Wandel) to the foreign
minister (Erik Scavenius)

Source : Danish National Archives, Foreign Office,Group Cases
1909-1945. Dept. 139, Gr. D, No. 1, "Turkey – Inner Relations".

Package 1, to Dec. 31, 1916

No. CXXV [125]

Constantinople, September 22, 1915.

Mr. Foreign Minister,

In my earlier reports I have already tried to demonstrate how H. M.

the Sultan rules, and how the Committee is managing.

I have tried to demonstrate that Turkey has been incautious in giving
up its neutrality, given that the country`s position will be very
difficult if the war ends with a victory of one of the groups of
Great Powers.

Regarding the fate of the country if the Entente powers win, Mr.

Foreign Minister is far better informed than I ; the matters that I
have the opportunity to observe will only have a minor influence in
the event of such an outcome, and I therefore prefer to deal with
the question of what will happen in the event of a victory for the
Central Powers.

If the Central Powers are victorious, and the Balkan coalition is
not being reformed against the "German danger," Turkey will in all
probability be faced with the choice of either giving up the major
parts of its political and economic independence to the benefit of
Germany, who will then gain firm ground here, or to enter into a
probably rather hopeless struggle for independence against its mighty
ally, and when this choice is to be made, the matters that I observe
daily could be decisive.

There is already full awareness in the German embassy here, that a
serious conflict between Germany and Turkey, who in a future union
undoubtedly will demand an equal status, hardly will be avoidable,
even at best, if the chauvinists remain in power. Some remarks made
to me recently by the embassy`s advisory specialist in Balkan policy
is certainly indicative thereof.

When I, after having expressed my admiration for the great and
outstanding achievements of the German diplomatic and military missions
to the benefit of Germany`s interests, added that I still found it
hard to forgive German Balkan policy that it, by strengthening and
flattering the Committee, has helped bring about its arrogance and
xenophobia to such an extent that the government here has become
thoroughly intractable, he answered that, from the German position,
this was readily regretted.

"But you must not forget," he said, "that we had no other option ;
we needed Turkey`s help – it was for us a matter of life and death,
and we had to let things slide."

By and large, there can therefore hardly be much doubt about where
it goes from here ; since the foreign warships (station ships) left
the roadstead of Constantinople, the presumptuousness of the Young
Turks has been ever increasing, and there can probably be no talk of
moderation in thought and principles before the ships return.

A thorough study of the prospects in the event of a victory for the
Central Powers, though, faces many difficulties, since it is almost
impossible to obtain reliable information about the composition and
practical circumstances of the true, but irresponsible, government
of the country – the Committee. The history of the Committe has not
yet been written, and the persons who know it dare not speak out.

Considering the topicality of the subject, I will still try to give,
based on what I learn here, a short description of the Committee
and its men – who make up a kind of directorate, consisting of 15-20
members, that decides the actions of the government – and of the change
in its policy since July 1908, when it intervened for the first time
in the fate of the country with a firm grip and, measured with the
standards of this country, [became] a uniquely thorough organization.

The distinctive feature of the Young Turk Committee has always been,
and still is, its organizational strength. Without this firmness,
the Committee would not have been able to withstand being persecuted
by despotism, and to even grow in strength to such an extent that
it could topple the old regime. This organizational firmness, which
the Committee created in its earliest days when it toiled with its
great work of liberation, it has kept since that time, for better
or for worse, and when in power it has, aided by that firmness,
been able to get away with unpunished abuses similar to that of
the toppled despotism, [and,] aided by it, it could regain power by
determined action when it had been dethroned. And the Committee is
not only equipped with this organizational strength, it also is and
has always been the only Turkish political organization in possession
of this quality ; all the other parties, that have been formed since
the introduction of the constitution, have lacked it – and they have
quickly succumbed.

An effect of this state of things is that the top positions of the
Committee are no longer held by the theorists who originally drew
up the program of the Committee, but by its political-organizational
leaders, those men who have worked in the service of the organization
from the beginning, not as great idealists or founding statesmen,
but as organizers who use all means to further the well-being of their
organization. This fact also explains that the Committee now, albeit
under much the same leaders as in its earliest years of struggle,
actually fights for a completely different program than then it had –
it is not the ideals, but power that has been and is being fought for.

Among the men in the leadership of the Committee, one first of all
has to mention the present leader of the government, interior minister
Talaat Bey, without doubt a significant politician.

Talaat Bey, former telegraphist in the provinces, was working for
the Committee from its earliest days, and he came to the forefront
immediately after the revolution as one of the leaders of Turkish
politics, but only after 1909 did he and other Young Turk leaders
become direct members of the government – Talaat Bey as interior
minister – to replace the old Pashas, who still for some time had
been allowed to remain in office as puppets. It was Talaat Bey who,
when the Committee had been toppled by "the liberating officers"
(in the Spring of 1912), led the secret effort of the Committee
to regain power, and he who, together with his friends, in effect,
by nationalistic demonstrations, forced Kiamil [Kamil] Pasha, the
then Grand Vizier, to engage in the unfortunate war against the
Balkan states (the end of 1912), instead of accepting to effectively
implement the reforms demanded by the Powers. And once again, it was
Talaat Bey who, together with Enver Pasha, was the leader behind the
new coup d`etat, that once again brought the Young Turks to power –
in accordance with Talaat`s plan at the exact moment when the Kiamil
cabinet sent the note to the Great Powers, where it gave up Adrianople
as a result of the urgent requests of those Powers. Kiamil Pasha`s
abandonment of the holy Adrianople would have put the men of the coup
d`etat in a more flattering light as national liberators who toppled
the cabinet that had unnecessarily surrendered parts of the country,
but, as chance would have it, the toppled cabinet had not delivered
the note of reply to the Powers (it had been sent, but because of an
editorial error it was called back before the delivery to the Austrian
ambassador), and it was the new Young Turk ministry that was left with
responsibility for the decision. It was luck – the internal struggle
of the Balkan states – and not foresight that saved Talaat and the
Committee`s power and regained Adrianople for Turkey.

Since then, Talaat has more and more become the centre of the Young
Turk Committee. The military members – and especially Enver Pasha
– have had to focus on the defence of the country, and the entire
government has slipped into the hands of Talaat Bey, who actually is
both minister of the interior, of finance, and of foreign affairs.

Close to Talaat is his friend Halil Bey, chairman of the deputy chamber
and of the Committee, Bedri Bey, prefect of the security police in
Turkey (in the Spring of 191[ ?] he had been condemned to death for
having shot a military police officer, had later escaped from prison,
been pardoned, and made chief of public security), Nazim Bey, the
Committee`s chauvinist secretary general and leader of the daily
administration of the Committee, Midhat Chukri Bey and Behaeddine
Chakir Bey, also pronounced chauvinists, Hussein Djahid Bey, former
editor of the Committee`s organ "Tanin," and Djavid Bey, the former
finance minister, who took care of the great loan in France in 1914,
from a Jewish family that converted to Islam, originally school
inspector in the provinces, etc., etc.

A person completely preoccupied at the moment by the military events
is Enver Pasha, the officer who, together with Niazi Bey who was
killed shortly after, in June 1908 raised the rebel banner with his
troops in Albania, and thereby originated the revolution itself,
after which he became military attache in Berlin, a nomination that
surely has had a great impact on the relationship between Germany and
Turkey. After having returned to Turkey he became chief of staff for
the 10th Army Corps, was an active participant in the coup d`etat in
1913, and led the triumphant expedition to Adrianople. As a reward
he was, albeit relatively late, made minister of war in January 1914,
and thereby gained all of Turkey`s military power in his hand, after
the Committee had fired all the old generals and high ranking officers,
who enjoyed popularity with the troops, and replaced them with Enver
Pasha`s new proteges.

Another influential military member of the Committee was until lately
Enver Pasha`s co-suitor to the military leadership, Djemal Pasha, the
former military commander of Constantinople, named Pasha the same day
as Enver, decorated with the Osmanieh Order at the same time as Enver,
and finally, on Enver Pasha`s advice, made traffic minister to limit
his influence, but later, after urgent request, made marine minister,
a capacity in which he worked with great force on the renewal of the
fleet right until the beginning of the war, when he left Constantinople
as chief of the army that was sent to Egypt. From this time on, Djemal
Pasha has naturally been unable to participate in the governing of
Turkey, and the Marine Ministry too has been in the hands of Enver.

Among other people who have left their mark on the work of the
Committee during the past time, besides from the "liberator" Mahmoud
Chevket Pasha who was murdered in June 1913, must be mentioned Azmi
Bey, who, together with the then military commander of the city,
Djemal Pasha, and in connection with Talaat Bey, led the terror
regime as Chief of Police in the capital after the killing of Mahmoud
Chevket Pasha, but who on the Russian embassy`s firm demand was sent
to Konia shortly thereafter as governor, furthermore Hadji Adil Bey,
the present governor in Adrianople, mentioned in my report No. CXXIII
[123] of yesterday, and finally 2 men, who have eventually distanced
themselves from the Committee because they could not follow it in its
lust for power and its abuse : Rahmy Bey, the governor of the vilayet
Aidin (Smyrna), who, as also mentioned in my earlier reports, several
times has opposed the Committee`s orders when he found them unjust,
and Ahmed Riza Bey, who became the only important opponent of the
Committee`s autocracy in the last parliamentary session. Riza Tevfik
Bey, an influential member in the early days of the Committee as the
original intellectual protagonist of the Committee, and very esteemed
by all sides, also by the opponents of the Committee, was already at
an early stage repulsed by the way the rulers realized his ideals,
and was already in 1910 among the opponents of the Committee.

The Committee for Union and Progress took control under the motto :
Equal rights for all Ottomans. But to achieve the unity, that was at
the beginning of the Committe`s title, in the vast and ethnographically
tangled empire, there had to be created both an Ottoman sense of unity
shared by all peoples of the empire, and be raised guarantees that
this new "Ottomanism" would also be led by the Young Turk members
of the Committee in the future, both be created equal rights for all
Ottoman citizens, without consideration for nationality and religion
(the idealistic demands of the revolution), and made sure that the new
Ottomanism would still become a purely Turkish movement. The struggle
between these demands lasted for some time, until the Committee
immediately after the end of the Balkan war threw one of the demands
(equal rights for all Ottomans) overboard and decided to go forward
along the road of Turkification, the road that is characterized by
the anti-Greek boycott in the Spring of 1914 that affected those
Greeks who were Ottoman subjects just as well as the Greek subjects,
the simultaneous persecutions of the Greeks in Asia Minor and Thrace,
and, later that same year – with German assistance – the declaration
of Jihad, which was favoured by the World War and the subsequent
abrogation of the capitulations, and which finally has led to the
xenophobic and nationalistic policy, whose effects I have lately looked
closely upon several times in my reports, and whose main purpose at the
moment is the extermination of the Armenian population of the empire.

Mr. Foreign Minister will maybe realize from this account, in spite of
its faultiness, that it does not seem to be men with great political
refinement and experience, or with good knowledge, who now rule Turkey,
but people whose foolhardiness and irrepressable force of will and
action has replaced the former inertia, which was the strength of
the old Pashas before 1908, and Germany, should the occasion arise,
will have to realize that they are not manageable.

They are chauvinists and xenophobes, more or less true fanatics and
enthusiastic desperados ; for some of them there can be no doubt about
their integrity, but the common perception is that it will continue
down that same road that has already led to so many serious conflicts.

After the Greeks and the Armenians, the Jews and the Germans will most
likely be next, and it is very probable that the present government
will, at a given moment, prefer to play va banque and put everything on
the line, rather than understand that wise compliance and a compromise
for practical reasons can be preferable to a policy that almost can
be characterized as national suicide.

With the highest esteem I remain, Mr. Minister, yours faithfully

[Wandel]

—————————- ————————————————– —

DOCUMENT 4

1916-04-27-DK-001

The minister in Constantinople (Carl Ellis Wandel) to the foreign
minister (Erik Scavenius)

Source : Danish National Archives, Foreign Office, Group Cases
1909-1945. Dept. 139, Gr. N, No. 1, "Armenia"

No. LXXXXVIII [98]

Constantinople, April 27, 1916.

Confidential.

Mr. Foreign Minister,

The Papal minister [Angelo Marie Dolci] yesterday turned up in the
local Spanish legation [in Constantinople] accompanied by a German
Catholic priest who had arrived here from the Turkish Vilayet of Angora
in Asia Minor, where he has witnessed the treatment that has befallen
the local Armenian Catholic congregation, and which he introduced to
the [Spanish] minister, whom they asked to intervene and protest to
the Porte in the name of Catholic Spain.

The reason for their turning to the Spanish legation, they said, was
because the German and Austrian embassies had such a relationship
with the Turkish government that they, in order not to [offend]
it, had to show so much consideration that they really could not
energetically plead the cause of the Armenians.

When one bears in mind that the two embassies mentioned represent
24 and 34 million Catholics respectively, and that the leader of the
Catholic Centrum of the German Reichstag [Matthias Erzberger] in these
very days is here in Constantinople on an official visit as a guest
of the Turkish government, and that the local German ambassador,
Count Metternich, himself is a Catholic, one can conclude by this
request how careful the German diplomacy in Turkey is now acting,
and the extent to which it weighs Germany`s political considerations
over all other considerations.

Even though, as it appears from my report No. CXIII [113] of September
4 last year, 13 of the 16 Catholic congregations that existed among
the Armenians in Turkey outside of Constantinople have disappeared
completely, without anyone having knowledge of what has happened to
all of the clergy, the Catholic Centrum of the German Reichstag does
not seem to dare to attempt any forceful intervention on behalf of
its unfortunate, persecuted co-religionists.

While describing the state of things, I shall not refrain from adding
that it is very possible that even a vigorous German diplomatic
intervention on behalf of the Armenians would not move the Turkish
government to refrain from its project, because the great effort that
the local American embassy, which does not have to show the same
kind of consideration as the German and Austrian embassy, has done
to save the Armenians, has, the American Charge d`Affaires [Phillips]
tells me, been fruitless, and this has in all probability, after what
I only later have learned, also been one of the contributing factors
to the departure of the American ambassador [Henry Morgenthau].

With the highest esteem I remain, Mr. Minister, yours faithfully

[Wandel]

—————————- ————————————————– —

———————————————- ———————————-

DOCUMENT 5

1916-03-14-DK-001

The minister in Constantinople (Carl Ellis Wandel) to the foreign
minister (Erik Scavenius)

Source : Danish National Archives, Foreign Office, Group Cases
1909-1945. Dept. 139, Gr. N, No. 1, "Armenia"

1 enclosure.

No. LVIII [58]

Constantinople, March 14, 1916.

Mr Foreign Minister,

In continuation of my report No. LIV [54] dated the 10th of this
month concerning the persecutions of the Armenians, I have the honor
to report that the latest pieces of information received here state
that the general removal of the Armenian population, which has already
taken place in all the other Vilayets of Asia Minor except for the
Vilayet Aidin (Smyrna), has now also begun in the Vilayet of Castamuni,
in which the Armenians hitherto have not been disturbed.

The governor of the Vilayet of Castamuni, who has not used the
authority given to him to have the Armenian population removed,
has been dismissed, and in his place the governor up till now of the
Vilayet of Angora, who has been more zealous, has been appointed.

I use the opportunity to send an enclosed official announcement from
today concerning the execution of 4 Armenians, who were hanged in
Stambul yesterday morning.

With the highest esteem I remain, Mr. Minister, yours faithfully

[Wandel]

Enclosure : "Lloyd Ottoman", March 14, 1916 :

Pendaisons

Du commandement de la place :

Par decision de la cour martiale sont condamnes a la peine capitale
: Les nommes Horen veledi Hatchadour Beremian, forgeron habitant
la quartier Kouyoumdji a Adapazar, Kirkor veledi Ohannès, Kabian,
locataire de l`hôtel Ararat et du casino habitant dans le quartier
Abdal de la meme ville, le bijoutier Karabet veledi Ohannès Patokian,
du village Bagdjedjik (Ismidt), convaincus d`avoir fait partie du
comite revolutionnaire armenien et d`avoir neglige de remettre,
durant le delai prescrit, aux autorites les bombes cachees dans leur
maison ; ainsi que le converti Mehmed Chakir bin Minas alias Abdullah,
de Brousse coinvancu d`avoir complote contre le gouvernement ottoman
et d`avoir fait l`espionnage contre le gouvernement pou le compte du
gouvernement Anglais et le nomme Adem effendi de Monastir, agent de
police, convaincu d`avoir assassine par premeditation Ali Riza bey,
merkez m’mour du poste Tcinili a Scutari.

Cette decision de la court martiale ayant ete sanctionnee par irade
imperial, l`execution a eu lieu hier matin. Les quatre premiers
condamnes ont ete pendus sur la place de Bayazid et l`agent de police
Adem effendi pres du debarcadère de Scutari.

# # #

———————————————– ———————-
Translations of reports from the archives of the Danish foreign
ministry documenting the Armenian genocide were by Matthias Bjørnlund.

Copyright Matthias Bjørnlund and Wolfgang Gust,

website :

email : [email protected].

–Boundary_(ID_rwZ53vZAMhF /il0yEaQK7Q)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

A1+

ONLY NKR HAS THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ABOUT COMPROMISE
[04:54 pm] 23 June, 2006

The coming elections will be another opportunity for the politicians
to make use of the Karabakh conflict for their interests, announced
Shavarsh Kocharyan, the head of the National Democratic Party
administration.

According to him, despite anything the Karabakh conflict must not be
treated that primitively.

Considering the change of the foreign policy of the country in
connection with the Karabakh conflict urgent, Kocharyan said,
«Azerbaijan is trying to prove to the world that Armenia is an
aggressor and the RA authorities cannot introduce changes to their
foreign policy». In this respect Shavarsh Kocharyan considers
the organization of the coming elections in compliance with the
international standards extremely important.

As for the RA authorities speaking about giving territories, Shavarsh
Kocharyan considers it ridiculous. «Only NKR has the right to speak
about compromise».

–Boundary_(ID_F85SBA+Ps8Cq9pzx dcLpjw)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Panorama.am

17:55 23/06/06

ARTHUR BAGHDASARYAN: BRAVO, WOMEN!

70 percent of Orinats Yerkir are women. The leader of the party
signifies women’s role largely. This is conditioned by the fact that
women make a large portion among the voters as well. "It is impossible,
that a party that has so many women in its lines, does not win. Bravo,
women!" Arthur Baghdasaryan, Orinats Yerkir Chairman told OY Women
Union 5th conference. He admires women who unlike men never left the
party lines.

According to OY leader, 200-300 people left OY since his resignation
from the post of NA Chairman. At the same time, 8000 new members have
joined 70 % of who are again women.

Margarita Petrosyan, the re-elected Union chairwoman, reported
that they have mainly dealt with women problems in health, social
and political fields. Regional head women also delivered speeches
praising their leadership.

"In August we will start talks with different healthy political
forces. In fall the party will hold its conference where we will
announce our party priorities and our understanding of how Armenia
should develop," Baghdasaryan said. /Panorama.am/

Siting of the newly created NGO of the "United Javakh" to be held in Akhalkalak

ArmRadio.am
24.06.2006 12:23

The first sitting of the newly created NGO of the "United Javakhk"
democratic alliance will be held today in Akhalkalak. Reference will
be made to issues of concern of the population, particularly questions
of reinforcement of political stability, defense of human rights and
elimination of socio-economic backwardness.

Special attention will be paid to providing the right to use Armenian
equally with Georgian in Armenian settlements.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ONLY 54 OF 191 UN MEMBERS ADOPTED DUAL NATIONALITY

Lragir.am
24 June 06

The Committee of External Relations held hearings on the topic
"Dual Nationality. International Law and Experience", inviting the
representatives of political parties. Armen Rustamyan, Chair of the
Committee of External Relations, announced in the beginning that the
aim of the hearings is to elucidate the conception of dual nationality
worked out by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.

Levon Mkrtichan, the minister of education and culture, introduced
the conception. According to Levon Mkrtichyan, the adoption of dual
nationality will solve the problem of the right of the Armenians to
live and create in their motherland. "The goal of all Armenians will
be contained in the law." However, it is necessary to observe justice,
equal rights, prevention of discrimination and iravachaputiun. Levon
Mkrtichyan noticed that the rights and duties of dual nationals,
namely eligibility and military service are regulated by international
conventions.

The head of the Constitutional Court of Armenia Gagik Harutiunyan,
who made a speech immediately after Levon Mkrtichyan, reminded that
there are about ten international conventions on dual nationality,
but Armenia has not joined any of them. Only 54 of the 191 members
of the United Nations adopted dual nationality. Some of these 54
countries adopted only elements of dual nationality. "In Armenia
debates on dual nationality are one-sided, and make a fetish out
of the institution of dual nationality." By the way, concerns about
dual nationality are expressed in international conventions, and a
convention adopted in 1963 is entitled "Convention on the Reduction
of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases
of Multiple Nationality". The goal of this convention was to reduce
dual nationality.

The head of the Constitutional Court thinks that along with debates
on dual nationality in Armenia pseudo-terms such as a passive
citizen, a citizen with rights but no duties are increasingly
being used. Moreover, Gagik Harutiunyan says, "It is very wrong,
romantic and ingenuous to think that thanks to adoption of dual
nationality millions of dollars will be annually flowing into
the state budget." Especially that presently we lack a conception
of Armenia-Diaspora relations. Gagik Harutiunyan thinks thus the
question is distorted, therefore the question of dual nationality
cannot be viewed from the economic aspect. And the countries with a
smaller population than the potential dual citizens "should forget
about dual nationality and independence at all."

Member of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and others who support
dual nationality, namely Paruyr Hairikyan, National Self-Determination
Union, Communist Frunzeh Kharatyan, Shirak Torosyan, the Hzor Hayrenik
Party, admit that the United States, Russia and Holland are on the
path of restriction of dual nationality, and that the adoption of dual
nationality contains threats. They note, however, that everything
can be regulated by the law. In answer to the remark whether "it is
better not to establish a threat and not to adopt dual nationality",
Armen Rustamyan, ARF, said, "Hence, if you have a headache, you’d
netter not have a head." Paruyr Hairikyan thinks dual nationality
will save all the Armenians who refuse citizenship of Armenia and
become citizens of other countries.

The All-Armenian Movement and the Ramkavar Party are for improving
relations with the Diaspora for Armenians to live with dignity
everywhere, preserve their language, writing, religion, remain
Armenian, direct the potential of the Armenian gene towards Armenia
and change the attitude towards the Diaspora. The ways to reach this
is another issue. In this way dual nationality will not solve these
problems, thinks Hovanes Igityan, All-Armenian Movement.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

HOW TO COMMUTE
Aram Abrahamian

Aravot.am
23 June 06

The RA President Robert Kocharian meeting the OSCE representative
of the freedom of the press Miklosh Harashti, expressed his opinion
that TV companies were too much in our country. /Mr. Harashti himself
has declared about it/. I think it is a sincere anxiety and positively
characterizes our president. Every good leader must worry about working
load of his subordinates and make efforts for avoiding of too large
working load. In this case the point of anxiety is the chief of the
President’s personnel Armen Gevorgian who is responsible for the
control and censorship of 17 TV companies. Mr. Gevorgian, leaving
his important state activities /in particularly elite construction/,
have to phone to the leaders of 17 TV companies and do "censorship
remarks" when the oppositionist says wrong things to the address of
the president or unpleasant news are broadcasted in the report. Or
the opposite the "flight of our economyÂ" isn’t praised so much. And
more it is also under Mr. Gevorgian’s control and just he gives a
license or refuse the appearance of any oppositionist. And there can
be a question from where Mr. Gevorgian can get that information.
Whether there are 17 TV sets in his room. Certainly, no. But
fortunately there are a lot of careful citizens in Armenia. And just
the leaders of those TV companies are among those citizens. They phone
Mr. Gevorgian and complain; " You forbid us but Kirakos has appeared
in the air of another TV Company and said such things addressed to
the boss…" Indeed Mr. Gevogian gains sympathy and the number of TV
Companies should be reduced.

Certainly there is another way. An angel suddenly appeared in half
of the action in one of Vasili Aksjonov’s novels who entered Party
bureau dictating the
following decision ; to separate art from the state. Perhaps an angel
appears in Baghramian street and dictate an order to the president,
to separate TV Companies from the authority. Unless no president will
sign such an order.

Indeed TV companies are too much. They gave all frequencies to their

–Boundary_(ID_hVsoeczpd60G9EBqWXexEQ)–

Today, Azerbaijan
June 24 2006

Matthew Bryza: "We hope to see a similar democratic reforms in
Armenia we are starting to see in Azerbaijan"

24 June 2006 [15:00] – Today.Az

Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for
European and Eurasian affairs, recently gained a second job title:
he has replaced Steven Mann as the U.S. cochair of the OSCE MG with
moderating negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno
Karabakh.

Bryza spoke on July 22 with RFE/RL Armenian Service head Harry
Tamrazian and RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service correspondent Kenan Aliyev
about the prospects for a resolution of the Karabakh conflict, Russia’s
role in the South Caucasus, and America’s strategic priorities in
the region.

RFE/RL: Your post — deputy assistant secretary — is more senior
than those occupied by previous U.S. cochairs of the Minsk Group.

Does that mean the United States is paying more attention to the
Karabakh question? Could that in turn mean that there is a sense the
sides are coming closer to resolving this conflict?

Matthew Bryza: I wouldn’t read too much in particular into the fact
that you now have a deputy assistant secretary, rather than someone
who wasn’t, doing this. A lot of this just depended on personalities
and my own background. I’ve been so deeply involved in the region for
a long time. It made sense that I would be the person to pick this up,
because it was time for Ambassador Mann, coincidentally, to move on
to his next assignment. So that’s all. I wouldn’t read anything more
into it. I’m just very happy that I’ll be able to play a more active
— and, in fact, daily — role on this conflict and make sure those
efforts are integrated with all the other broader things I’m trying
to do in the Caucasus.

RFE/RL: You have said in recent statements that there is a framework on
the table that makes an agreement on Karabakh possible. You have also
said that next year the political calendar will be more complicated
in Armenia, and therefore the presidents should do something this
year while there is still a window of opportunity.

First of all, what kind of framework is that? And do you still believe
there is room for a resolution this year? Some experts say the issue is
already very complicated today, even before we get into the elections
next year.

Bryza: It is complicated today. We see how complicated the situation
is based upon the fact that the presidents haven’t gotten to the
point where they’ve agreed to this framework that’s on the table.

That gets back to the first part of your question. What we have is
a framework agreement, as we described today here at the OSCE — as
Ambassador Mann did, and Ambassador [Yury] Merzlyakov [the Russian
cochair] and Bernard [Fassier, the French cochair] as well — we
have a framework agreement that would call for the removal, or the
withdrawal, of Armenian troops from those territories in Azerbaijan
where they currently are. That’s on the one side. On the other side
we have a normalization of Armenia’s ties — economic, diplomatic —
and other features having to do with peacekeepers and international
economic assistance to the Karabakh region, and economic development.

So there’s a package proposal on the table that, in the end,
would involve as well a vote at some point on the future status of
Karabakh. So that’s kind of the basic outline of the proposal on the
table, and we would very much encourage the presidents to accept this
framework. Which requires a lot of political courage, which I’ve said
publicly before.

RFE/RL: Have you noticed any sign that the two sides may be softening
their positions? Did they appear more willing to consider the framework
agreement you’re describing during their talks in early June at a
Black Sea summit in Bucharest than they were when they meant for
talks in February with the French president in Rambouillet?

Bryza: Put it this way: At Bucharest, they talked throughout the whole
meeting to each other, really went through the issues in detail, and
[they] haven’t issued any negative statements really since. So I’m
not sure how to interpret that. I know what I hope, what the cochairs
hope: The cochairs hope that this reflects political will on the part
of the presidents to really get serious about some tough compromises
each side will make. I’m not sure if that’s where they are, and the
cochairs talked today about taking a bit of a pause throughout the
summer to find out whether or not the presidents do in fact have that
sort of political will.

RFE/RL: What is the next step for the cochairs? Are you planning to
bring the presidents together again after the summer?

Bryza: At this point, as I was saying, the cochairs have decided to
take a pause throughout the summer. We will reconvene in September,
October, to report back here [to Vienna, the headquarters of the
OOSCE], I hope. But we’re taking some time off in terms of trying
to facilitate meetings between the presidents. It’s really up to
the presidents now to decide whether or not they want to take the
politically difficult and challenging decisions that are critical to
bringing the framework agreement home. So we’re giving them some space,
and we want them to demonstrate that they really do have the political
will to take these next difficult steps. That doesn’t mean we’re
quitting the process. That doesn’t mean we’re walking away from it. I
myself still have to make my first trips in this capacity to Yerevan
and Baku, and you can bet that I’ll be encouraging the presidents to
take these tough decisions. And there will be opportunities at major
international gatherings this summer to discuss this issue.

RFE/RL: At the turn of the year, there were a lot of optimistic
statements — from you as well as others — that the Karabakh conflict
could be resolved in 2006. We’re now halfway through the year. Are
you still optimistic about 2006?

Bryza: I don’t know. My optimism, if you look carefully at my
statements, was about the fact that there is a framework on the
table that provides a workable foundation for a just and lasting
settlement. I was optimistic that the Minsk Group negotiators had
gotten the two presidents as close as they could get to an agreement
without the presidents taking some very difficult decisions and
making some very difficult compromises. We are still in that same
place. I don’t know if that’s optimistic or pessimistic. But the
Minsk Group itself has decided that there’s no sense in us trying to
arrange another round of presidential meetings or trying to broker
an agreement, because we have taken the process as far as we can,
and all that’s left to do is for the presidents to make these tough
decision. Is that pessimistic? I don’t know if it is. It depends on
what the presidents themselves decide to do next. If they decide that
they simply don’t have the political will to keep going, well, that’s
a pessimistic outcome. But we just don’t know where the presidents
are right now. We’re encouraging them, we’re nudging them by taking
a step back. Nudging them to show that they have this political will.

RFE/RL: Russia does not always play what some would consider a
constructive role in the South Caucasus, particularly with regard to
the "frozen conflicts" in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. But Russia has been very cooperative with the United
States on Nagorno Karabakh. Some Russian officials, like Sergei Ivanov,
have occasionally said there should be no Karabakh resolution imposed
from abroad. But otherwise the relationship has been constructive. How
would you evaluate relations between the United States and Russia
with respect to Karabakh in particular, and the Caucasus in general?

Bryza: First, let me say you made a statement of fact with which I
agree. We are working quite well with Russia on Karabakh. Our level
of cooperation has not been as significant when it comes to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and Transdniester. I don’t work on Transdniester
[a separatist region of Moldova], but I was just in Abkhazia and I
think there is a lot of room for much better cooperation — and I
would argue that the Georgian side has shown a significant amount of
goodwill and a readiness to work on significant confidence-building
measures. I would also say the United States has worked hard to keep
the Georgians as constructive and moderate as possible, and I hope
our Russians colleagues and friends will do the same in terms of
encouraging the Abkhaz to be constructive and moderate. I saw today
that [Sergei] Bagapsh, the leader of the authorities of Abkhazia,
issued a rather incendiary statement, threatening to put mines along
the Line of Contact between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. That’s
the last thing that needs to be happening right now.

We don’t see that happening in the case of Karabakh. I leave that to
analysts like yourselves to figure out why that may be. Geographic
differences, perhaps? Where Karabakh is placed? I don’t know what the
reason is. Maybe it’s because the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
themselves have demonstrated a commitment to work in a constructive
way — although I would argue the Georgians have done so as well. But
we are working quite well with the Russians, and especially with
the Russian cochair, Ambassador Merzlyakov. He’s a creative and
constructive diplomat whom I’ve known for a long time, ever since we
worked together on Caspian energy issues.

RFE/RL: Your predecessor, Ambassador Mann, said repeatedly that
September 11th created pressure to resolve the Karabakh conflict in
order to put an end to one source of instability in the region. Even
so, high-level involvement on the part of the United States has
not materialized. How does Nagorno Karabakh fit into U.S. security
interests?

Bryza: I think Steve [Mann] is right to say that any time we have
an area that could become a gray area on the map, where nefarious
transactions or transit of goods and materials could transpire because
of legal grayness. That’s a potential threat. Where does Karabakh
fit into our broad national security calculus? Well, hopefully there
will be a discussion of it at the G8 [summit of the eight leading
industrialized nations, to be held in mid-July in St.

Petersburg]. The G8, one could argue, may be the world’s most elite
grouping of states and political leaders. So if we have a discussion
on Karabakh at the G8 — along with a discussion of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Transdniester — that would imply it figures pretty
prominently on our agenda. But we’re still working out the agenda of
the G8.

RFE/RL: So it’s not yet clear if Karabakh will be included? The
"Washington Post" has reported that the Georgian and Moldovan conflicts
would be discussed, but Karabakh will not be.

Bryza: I don’t believe that will be the case. We are working with our
secretary of state — we have already recommended to her that she
raise all of those conflicts at the ministerial [meeting in Moscow
on June 29]. Undersecretary [Nicholas] Burns has already made that
suggestion a couple of times. And so we would like to make sure all
of those conflicts are on the agenda.

RFE/RL: There is always the lingering possibility that the conflict
could resume. Both sides have made attempts to raise their military
budgets. That is particularly the case with Azerbaijan. How would the
international community react to either side attempting to shift the
balance of power away from the status quo?

Bryza: You’ve put me in that classic situation of having to answer a
hypothetical question. So I won’t answer that question directly. What
I will say is what I’ve been working on with my friends in the
government of Azerbaijan — because that’s the side where you most
often hear those sorts of threats; that’s a fact — and what I feel
the government of Azerbaijan doing as well is focusing on the positive
aspects of Azerbaijan’s burgeoning wealth that’s going to come from
the energy sector. It’s really quite unhelpful to make statements
that imply that this increased wealth is going to lead to purchases
of arms and military threats. It’s quite constructive, however, to
talk about how this wealth can open new channels of cooperation, how
such wealth would provide Azerbaijan an opportunity to invest in the
well-being of the region, [how it could] help develop Karabakh, all
the territories, create the opportunities for business, for commerce,
and for the ethnic Armenians and Azeris to come together and get to
know each other, and therefore, over time, to reduce the level of
tension and the level of animosity surrounding the status question of
Karabakh. So I guess what I’m saying is there’s really no reason to
expect that armed conflict will come out this. It’s really unwise even
to talk about it, and we urge the sides not even to think about it.

RFE/RL: The United States clearly has strategic interests in
Azerbaijan, not least Caspian oil. Does the United States look at
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the context of its energy interests?

Bryza: Throughout the Caucasus, we have three sets of strategic
interests. These are valid in all three countries. Yes, we have energy
interests, and we’re not embarrassed to say that energy is a strategic
interest. We have pure security interests, or traditional security
interests — meaning fighting terrorism, fighting proliferation,
avoiding military conflict, and restoring (or preserving, in some
cases) the territorial integrity of the states of the region. What
I really mean is, resolving the conflicts, in the case of Georgia,
within Georgia’s international boundaries; in the case of Karabakh, our
official line is we support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. And
then we have a third set of interests: in the internal reform of
each country — democratic and market economic reform, for all the
reasons the [U.S.] president has articulated, based on our belief
that stability only comes from legitimacy. And legitimacy requires
democracy on the political side and prosperity on the economic side,
and you only get both — democracy and prosperity — through serious
reform. So all three sets of interests are being pursued by us at
any one time.

In Armenia, obviously the significance of energy is not the same as in
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a producer. Keep in mind that we Americans
will consume little if any of that energy produced in Azerbaijan. The
energy produced in Azerbaijan matters in terms of its contribution
to global energy diversity, especially for our European allies. So
it’s diversity we care about — diversity of supply, which leads to
energy independence. When it comes to Armenia, energy is similarly
important in terms of making sure that Armenia has independent or
multiple sources of energy supply so that it feels independent,
and therefore more stable, and more willing to negotiate in good faith.

So that’s a long answer to say that of course energy is part of
our strategic calculus. But that’s not what’s driving us. We’re
looking for balance. And we do recognize, however, that, God forbid,
if there was a resumption of conflict [over Karabakh], that that
would undermine the entire investment climate across the Caucasus,
all three countries. And we certainly don’t want that.

RFE/RL: The relationship between Turkey and Armenia, which is
also crucial to regional stability, is slowly showing signs of
improvement. Is the United States actively engaged in trying to help
make ties between Ankara and Yerevan warmer?

Bryza: We are working, consulting, talking, strategizing with our
friends in both Turkey and in Armenia. When it comes to Armenia, I
think it’s clear that the Armenian side is willing and ready to move
toward normalization. I think the same is true in Turkey. Besides just
encouraging the sides to get together and find a common language,
I can tell you that what we’ve tried to do over the last few years
is try to develop this particular framework for Karabakh that’s
on the table. Because if the sides are able to implement what the
framework indicates — meaning, again, the withdrawal from the
territories in Azerbaijan where Armenian troops are present, and
then the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia — then full normalization of Turkish and
Armenian relations follows naturally. Another way to put it is,
all of our diplomatic efforts with regards to Karabakh also aim at
normalizing Turkish and Armenian relations.

RFE/RL: A question on the issue of Russian military bases in Armenia:
Some military hardware was recently moved from Georgia to Armenia.

There are essentially no Russian troops in Georgia and Azerbaijan,
but there is a significant presence in Armenia. How does the United
States view that? Will you ask the Armenian government to ask the
Russians to withdraw?

Bryza: First of all, let’s be clear that there are Russian troops in
Georgia. They have not all withdrawn yet from [military bases at]
Akhalkalaki or Batumi. They are on the way, the heavy equipment is
moving. And there will be Russian troops in the context of the CIS
peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for some time, depending
on how the discussions go between Russia and Georgia. When it comes
to the movement of the heavy equipment from Akhalkalaki to Gyumri
[site of a Russian base in Armenia], no, we’re not asking Armenia
to press for the removal of those Russian bases. We didn’t ask the
Georgians to do that. We respect the sovereignty of our friends, be
they Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia, and it’s up to those sovereign
governments to take their own decisions. We simply welcome the fact
that Russia and Georgia have agreed mutually that Russian bases will
close down. That was Georgia’s expressed ambition. Russia agreed.

That’s simply a good thing. But it’s not for us to try to encourage
the removal of the bases.

RFE/RL: Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia have had truly democratic
elections in the past 10 years. So can we say these governments have
the mandate, the popular support, to make the difficult decisions
outlined in the framework agreement?

Bryza: Certainly they have the mandate if they build popular support.

I think that’s the most important next step. I’ve been talking about
the fact that the presidents need to take tough decisions. And to
get to the tough decision, they need to prepare their populations for
a compromise. That’s another way of saying they either build, or do
have, that mandate. You raise a good question about the legitimacy of
a government depending on its elections. I would argue that the pace
of democracy in both of those countries isn’t a disaster. A lot more
work needs to be done. But in the case of Azerbaijan’s [parliamentary]
elections [in November 2005], there were some significant improvements
in this last round of elections. But they didn’t go as far as we
would like.

RFE/RL: How serious is the United States about promoting democracy in
Azerbaijan? We see your serious efforts in Georgia, and we see the
results. But in Azerbaijan, the international community seriously
criticized the elections, but the United States decided to invite
President Ilham Aliyev to Washington. What makes Aliyev different,
for example, from an autocratic leader like Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko?

Bryza: I categorically reject the statement that the United States
isn’t serious about democracy in Azerbaijan. As President Bush
said in his second inaugural address, long-term security requires
democracy. It’s the thirst for political and economic freedom that is
the most powerful motivating factor in international politics. That
really is the source of long-term stability. We fool ourselves if we
think that we can achieve our long-term interests in any country —
be they energy interests or security interests — and turn away from
democracy. You talked about September 11. Well, the great lesson we
learned from September 11 is that we were wrong, as the president
has said, for 50 years. We looked at the Middle East and said
‘these countries are too strategically important for us to focus
on democracy.’

So we understand that long-term security and therefore the ability
to achieve our energy interests requires democracy. In Azerbaijan,
we have pressed very hard on democracy. You said the international
community was critical of the Azeri elections — well, we’re part of
that community, and our statements were critical. However, we have to
make a judgment at some point whether or not we think the trend in
a country is positive or negative. And we don’t have unidimensional
relations with countries, either. I talked about three sets of
interests. Just because Azerbaijan hasn’t gone as far as we would
like on democracy doesn’t mean we’re going to ignore our energy
interests or our military interests. That’s not to say that our
energy interests or our military interests or our counterterrorism
interests are driving us to ignore democracy. I said before, we have
to pursue a balance. Why would we freeze out President Ilham Aliyev
from contact with our president forever because we think he needs to
do more on democracy? That doesn’t make sense. Our president made a
judgment. His judgment was that we could do more to elicit democratic
reform in Azerbaijan by embracing Ilham Aliyev right now rather than
freezing him out. That’s because we do feel the trend on democracy
is positive, even if Azerbaijan hasn’t gone as far as we wish.

So, finally, I’d say there is simply no similarity between Lukashenka
and Aliyev. We just don’t feel there is at all. Ilham Aliyev, we
believe, is working to modernize the political system of Azerbaijan,
to create democracy in the context of Azerbaijan’s culture and
traditions — which the president said is necessary, because democracy
looks different in every country. That said, they haven’t gone far
enough. And we will continue to press President Aliyev — and his
opposition as well — to behave constructively, to build and strengthen
democratic institutions as we pursue our full range of interests.

RFE/RL: Ilham Aliyev has been to Washington; Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili has been invited to the White House just ahead
of the G8. Are there any plans to invite Armenia’s President Robert
Kocharian as well?

Bryza: We obviously don’t look at balancing presidential meetings
like that, but there’s no reason not to want President Kocharian
to come to Washington. Let me just say I hope we can see a similar
series of positive steps on democratic reform in Armenia as we
hope we are starting to see in Azerbaijan. Maybe we’re wrong about
Azerbaijan. Maybe we’re overly hopeful. But we think things are
moving in a positive direction. And we hope to see more of that from
Armenia. We signaled our support for Armenia, quite dramatically,
with the Millennium Challenge Account [a development fund set by the
United States, whose recipients — including Armenia — are chosen
using competitive, reform-based criteria]. That is, in many ways,
one of our highest forms of stating that we seek a partnership with
a country, to help it move forward on democratic reform. So we began
that program this year. When we began it, we issued a letter saying
we really had problems with the way the constitutional referendum
was conducted in November [2005], and we’re waiting to see positive
changes implemented. So that’s kind of the key to the next steps in
our relationship.

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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress