Author: Emil Lazarian

RA DEPUTY PROSECUTOR GENERAL: WE IMMEDIATELY
RESPOND TO VIOLATIONS OF PRIVATIZATION LAWS
YEREVAN, AUGUST 4, NOYAN TAPAN. Based on a report submitted by the
National Assembly Control Chamber, the RA Prosecutor General’s
Office registered a number of mistakes made by the government
during the implementation of the 2001-2003 program on state property
privatization. However, as the Deputy Prosecutor General of the RA
Gevorg Danielian stated at the August 4 press conference, there are
no sufficient grounds for opening criminal cases on the basis of the
facts the report contains. He said that the NA Control Chamber’s report
on implementation of the 2001-2003 privatization program was sent on
May 16 of this year by the NA Speaker to the RA Prosecutor General’s
Office. According to G. Danielian, after studying this report, the
Prosecutor General’s Office found some inaccuracies in the information
of the Control Chamber. In his words, the NA lawyers “sometimes
present exaggerated figures, but as a result of working with experts
of the prosecutor’s office, they often change their opinion.” Asked
if he sees any intent in the activity of the NA Control Chamber,
G. Danielian replied: “Even if there is a political implication,
it has no bearing to us.” According to him, the prosecutor’s office
is interested only in the legal aspect of the matter. “In general,
we immediately respond to violations of the laws on privatization,”
he assured.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

STUDENTS’ PROGRAMMING SUMMER SCHOOL TO BE ORGANIZED IN TSAGHKADZOR ON AUGUST
6-12 WITH PARTICIPATION OF STUDENTS OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION OF
ARMENIA AND GEORGIA
YEREVAN, AUGUST 4, NOYAN TAPAN. The Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) State
University (RAU) and the Enterprise Incubator Foundation organize on August 6-12
the Students’ Programming Summer School with participation of leading students’
programming teams of institutions of higher education of Armenia and Georgia.
The opening of the program will take place on August 6 in the “Adigaz”
resting house of Tsaghkadzor. As Noyan Tapan was informed by the RAU, the main
goal of the school is to prepare the Olympic teams of institutions of higher
education of Armenia for the International Programming Olympiad. Competitions,
experimental olympiads, courses will be held in the school, Sergey Kuznetsov,
Doctor of physics-mathematics sciences, Professor invited from the Moscow
State University will read lectures. The summer school will allow students’
teams of Armenian institutions of higher education to do together group works, to
widen relations and establish new acquaintances as well as to have exchange
of experience.

VARTAN OSKANIAN RECEIVES DIASPORAN ARMENIAN TEACHERS
YEREVAN, AUGUST 7, NOYAN TAPAN – ARMENIANS TODAY. RA Minister of
Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian had a meeting on August 4 with the
delegation of Diasporan Armenian teachers who undergo retraining in
Armenia. As it was mentioned in the information submitted to Noyan
Tapan by the Foreign Ministry’s Press and Information Department,
on behalf of the delegation, Suren Danielian, the Director of the
“Spyurk” (Diaspora) educational-scientific center addressed their work
of gratitude to Minister Oskanian. V.Oskanian, in his turn, welcame
the teachers on the occasion of their visit to Armenia and of the
effective implementation of the program, emphasizing the importance
of the education sphere in the sense of keeping the Armenian identity
abroad, of improvement of the state, society in Armenia. The Minister
presented in details the main programs of the “Armenia-Diaspora”
conference to take place in the current year and primary tasks
connected with the rural regions. He also touched upon the regional
political problems, pointing out the outcome of the NKR problem,
issues connected with opening of the Turkish border and the military
actions in Near East. The Foreign Minister responded the delegation’s
questions during the meeting. Reference: “Diasporan Armenian Teachers’
Training in Armenia” state program has functioned since 2000. It is
the practical implementation of one of issues attached importance to
by the “Armenia-Diaspora” first conference.
The program has been sponsored by His Holiness Karekin II Catholicos
of All Armenians already for two years. 67 teachers from 12 countries
participate in the mentioned courses. Lessons are held in the building
of the Gevorgian Academy of Etchmiadzin. Famous specialists both from
Armenia and Diaspora are invited to deliver lectures.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS INCREASE BY 37 IN YEREVAN IN FIRST HALF YEAR
YEREVAN, AUGUST 7, NOYAN TAPAN. 291 traffic accidents were fixed in
Yerevan in January-July as result of what 32 people died, 306 people
were injured.
Vrezh Gabrielian, the Deputy Chief of the RA Territorial Administration
informed about it at the August 7 press-conference. He mentioned
that compared with the first half year of the previous year, traffic
accidents increased by 37 cases, number of deaths by 2. According to
V.Gabrielian, the main reason of increase of traffic accidents is the
increase of the number of cars in the capital. It was also mentioned
that 726 cases of poisoning from domestic gas, food and alcohol were
fixed in the first half of this year. According to V.Gabrielian,
it is more by 120 cases compared with the same period of time of the
previous year.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

THE CURIOUS CASE OF ORHAN PAMUK
Harvard Political Review, MA
Aug. 7, 2006
By RYDER KESSLER
Turkey learns a valuable lesson – but will its citizens get the
message?
In September 2005, the Turkish government charged internationally
renowned author Orhan Pamuk with “insulting Turkishness” when he
called for Turkey to face up to a legacy of genocide. The charges
carried a possible jail sentence of up to three years. Four months
later, Turkey suddenly dropped the charges. The apparent about face
has been interpreted by some as an attempt to evade international
scrutiny of its less-than-democratic policies. Others see it is a
true step forward in Turkey’s quest to adapt to the standards set
forth by the European Union, whose ranks Ankara hopes to join.
Both views are right, to a point. Turkey is learning that it must
uphold internationally recognized standards of freedom of the press,
but it faces two internal obstacles to lasting change: a deep-seated
custom of sweeping discomforting issues under the rug and citizens
averse to European-style criticism of their nation.
Article 301: Democratic Censorship Since 1999, when it officially
became a candidate country for the EU, Turkey has been struggling to
adapt its policies to Europe’s demands.
Two issues have proven to be especially difficult Turkey’s attempted
Europeanization: its refusal to discuss the alleged Armenian genocide
of 1914-1915 and the killing of Kurdish separatists since 1984.
These sensitive subjects have led to a multitude of arrests under
the country’s Article 301, which forbids insults against any branch
of government. The law has been liberally applied, one of its many
victims being Pamuk, who was charged after he told Swiss newspaper
Tages Anzeiger in February 2005 that “a million Armenians and 30,000
Kurds were killed in these lands, and nobody but me dares talk about
it.” The comments were taken by the government as insulting to the
nation and to the character of Turks; Turkey maintains that neither
the deaths of ethnic Armenians in the early twentieth century, nor
the deaths of Kurdish separatists, qualifies as genocide.
The fact that relatively innocuous comments about decades-old
conflicts led to such a high-profile author’s indictment shows just
how much Turkey fears the consequences of a dialogue on its alleged
atrocities. First, separatists could be emboldened by a perceived
show of weakness if Turkey changes its stance. Second, it could weaken
its position in relations with Armenia, whose border with Turkey has
been shut down since 1993. Moreover, the idea of “national dignity”
has retained a high place in the collective mind of the primarily
Muslim nation.
But the West does not share such values. The widespread application
of a law meant to apply to a narrow range of speech has become, from
the point of view of many international eyes, a tool of oppression.
Though the government does not directly censor the work of journalists
and others within their borders, government retribution has bred a
pervasive brand of self-censorship within the framework of democratic
laws.
The Cost of Accession: Freedom, Not Lira The EU Commissioner for
Enlargement, Olli Rehn, has made clear the costs of such a culture. In
October, Turkey became a “negotiating country,” moving beyond the level
of “candidate country.” In an article in the December 2005/January 2006
issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly, Rehn implored Turks to realize that
“the negotiation process for Turkey means nothing more or less than
Turkey adopting the values, rules and standards which are applied in
today’s Europe.”
On the issue of the Pamuk case-still impending at the time of the
article’s publication-Rehn affirmed the liberal vision that “we must
stand united in defending his fundamental democratic right to freely
express himself.”
The backlash caused by Pamuk’s indictment was not always so
kindly worded. Members of the European Parliament called the case
“unfortunate” and “unacceptable” and the international press excoriated
Turkey’s repressiveness. It was clear that the EU’s expectations were
not being met. Soon, Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul acknowledged
that the trial itself posed a threat to Turkey’s national image. That
top-level officials spoke out on the danger of the prosecution
testifies to the impact of international pressure.
So too did the events that followed: When the trial began December
5, the judge adjourned the proceedings pending the approval of the
country’s ministry of justice. But before the trial could continue,
the government reversed its position, dropping its charges completely
on January 23.
The episode taught Turkey a valuable lesson: international eyes will
stay focused on the nation for as long as it intends to join the
European Community, at which point it will have all of Europe to
report to.
Beyond Pamuk
But whether the lesson truly sunk in is another question entirely.
Five other journalists charged under Article 301 for comments also
relating to Turkey’s denial of genocide still face prison time. Their
trials, which commenced February 8, have been delayed until April.
Now that the international spotlight is off Turkey, there is a risk
that the repression of journalists and others who speak out against
the government will continue unnoticed.
But the repetition of events like the Pamuk scandal is unlikely.
European Parliament monitors will be present at all further proceedings
against the five journalists and the charges against them may even
be dropped by then. What makes the future of censorship in Turkey
unclear is that the Turkish government must report not only to the EU
Enlargement Commission, but to its people, many of whom are fiercely
nationalist and anti-European.
In an essay in the New Yorker in December 2005, Pamuk spoke of the
seeming paradox in his country amongst a growing middle class whose
economic position leads them to Western styles of life but who are
loathe to be accused of abandoning tradition: “What am I to make of a
country that insists that the Turks, unlike their Western neighbors,
are a compassionate people, incapable of genocide, while nationalist
political groups are pelting me with death threats?”
Beyond the death threats and calls from fellow journalists for Pamuk to
be forever “silenced,” there were the demonstrators outside his trial –
not protesting its undemocratic nature, but calling the defendant a
“traitor.” When the other Article 301 trials began on February 7,
nationalist lawyers nearly took over the courthouse, calling for
a new judge and fighting with riot police. Outside, demonstrators
reveled in a chorus of nationalist chants.
Ankara has learned that it must allow for free discourse if it
intends to join Europe. Though the nation may fear for its image,
a preoccupation with quelling “insults” would prove more damaging
than letting those insults be aired in the open. As it makes strides
toward EU admittance, the Turkish government will scale back the
abuse of Article 301, if not drop it from the books altogether.
But even if journalists do not suffer the retribution of their
government for unpopular comments, the imminent hatred from fellow
citizens will continue to foster a culture of fear, meaning that
self-censorship will persist. If Turkey wants its impending EU
accession to be worthwhile, Ankara must teach the lesson about free
speech that it has learned to its people.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

FROM “OCCUPIED TERRITORIES” TO “DISPUTED TERRITORIES”
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Israel
Aug. 7, 2006
Dore Gold
“Occupation” as an Accusation / The Terminology of Other Territorial
Disputes / No Previously-Recognized Sovereignty in the Territories /
Aggression vs. Self-Defense / Israeli Rights in the Territories /
After Oslo, Can the Territories be Characterized as “Occupied”?
“Occupation” as an Accusation
At the heart of the Palestinian diplomatic struggle against Israel is
the repeated assertion that the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip are resisting “occupation.” Speaking recently on CNN’s Larry King
Weekend, Hanan Ashrawi hoped that the U.S. war on terrorism would lead
to new diplomatic initiatives to address its root “causes.” She then
went on to specifically identify “the occupation which has gone on too
long” as an example of one of terrorism’s sources.1 In other words,
according to Ashrawi, the violence of the intifada emanates from the
“occupation.”
Mustafa Barghouti, president of the Palestinian Medical Relief
Committees and a frequent guest on CNN as well, similarly asserted
that: “the root of the problem is Israeli occupation.”2 Writing in
the Washington Post on January 16, 2002, Marwan Barghouti, head of
Arafat’s Fatah PLO faction in the West Bank, continued this theme with
an article entitled: “Want Security? End the Occupation.” This has
become the most ubiquitous line of argument today among Palestinian
spokesmen, who have to contend with the growing international consensus
against terrorism as a political instrument.
This language and logic have also penetrated the diplomatic
struggles in the United Nations. During August 2001, a Palestinian
draft resolution at the UN Security Council repeated the commonly
used Palestinian reference to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as
“occupied Palestinian territories.” References to Israel’s “foreign
occupation” also appeared in the Durban Draft Declaration of the UN
World Conference Against Racism. The Libyan ambassador to the United
Nations, in the name of the Arab Group Caucus, reiterated on October 1,
2001, what Palestinian spokesmen had been saying on network television:
“The Arab Group stresses its determination to confront any attempt
to classify resistance to occupation as an act of terrorism.”3
Three clear purposes seem to be served by the repeated references to
“occupation” or “occupied Palestinian territories.” First, Palestinian
spokesmen hope to create a political context to explain and even
justify the Palestinians’ adoption of violence and terrorism during
the current intifada. Second, the Palestinian demand of Israel to “end
the occupation” does not leave any room for territorial compromise in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as suggested by the original language
of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (see below).
Third, the use of “occupied Palestinian territories” denies any
Israeli claim to the land: had the more neutral language of “disputed
territories” been used, then the Palestinians and Israel would be on
an even playing field with equal rights. Additionally, by presenting
Israel as a “foreign occupier,” advocates of the Palestinian cause
can delegitimize the Jewish historical attachment to Israel. This
has become a focal point of Palestinian diplomatic efforts since the
failed 2000 Camp David Summit, but particularly since the UN Durban
Conference in 2001. Indeed, at Durban, the delegitimization campaign
against Israel exploited the language of “occupation” in order to
invoke the memories of Nazi-occupied Europe during the Second World War
and link them to Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.4
The Terminology of Other Territorial Disputes The politically-loaded
term “occupied territories” or “occupation” seems to apply only
to Israel and is hardly ever used when other territorial disputes
are discussed, especially by interested third parties. For example,
the U.S. Department of State refers to Kashmir as “disputed areas.”5
Similarly in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the State
Department describes the patch of Azerbaijan claimed as an independent
republic by indigenous Armenian separatists as “the disputed area
of Nagorno-Karabakh.”6
Despite the 1975 advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice establishing that Western Sahara was not under Moroccan
territorial sovereignty, it is not commonly accepted to describe the
Moroccan military incursion in the former Spanish colony as an act of
“occupation.” In a more recent decision of the International Court
of Justice from March 2001, the Persian Gulf island of Zubarah,
claimed by both Qatar and Bahrain, was described by the Court as
“disputed territory,” until it was finally allocated to Qatar.7
Of course each situation has its own unique history, but in a variety
of other territorial disputes from northern Cyprus, to the Kurile
Islands, to Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf — which have involved some
degree of armed conflict — the term “occupied territories” is not
commonly used in international discourse.8
Thus, the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip appears to be a special
exception in recent history, for in many other territorial disputes
since the Second World War, in which the land in question was under the
previous sovereignty of another state, the term “occupied territory”
has not been applied to the territory that had come under one side’s
military control as a result of armed conflict.
No Previously-Recognized Sovereignty in the Territories Israel entered
the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1967 Six-Day War. Israeli legal
experts traditionally resisted efforts to define the West Bank and
Gaza Strip as “occupied” or falling under the main international
treaties dealing with military occupation. Former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court Meir Shamgar wrote in the 1970s that there is no
de jure applicability of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention regarding
occupied territories to the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip
since the Convention “is based on the assumption that there had been a
sovereign who was ousted and that he had been a legitimate sovereign.”
In fact, prior to 1967, Jordan had occupied the West Bank and Egypt
had occupied the Gaza Strip; their presence in those territories
was the result of their illegal invasion in 1948, in defiance of
the UN Security Council. Jordan’s 1950 annexation of the West Bank
was recognized only by Great Britain (excluding the annexation of
Jerusalem) and Pakistan, and rejected by the vast majority of the
international community, including the Arab states.
At Jordan’s insistence, the 1949 Armistice Line, that constituted
the Israeli-Jordanian boundary until 1967, was not a recognized
international border but only a line separating armies. The Armistice
Agreement specifically stated: “no provision of this Agreement shall
in any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either
Party hereto in the peaceful settlement of the Palestine questions,
the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military
considerations” (emphasis added) (Article II.2).
As noted above, in many other cases in recent history in which
recognized international borders were crossed in armed conflicts and
sovereign territory seized, the language of “occupation” was not used
— even in clear-cut cases of aggression. Yet in the case of the
West Bank and Gaza, where no internationally recognized sovereign
control previously existed, the stigma of Israel as an “occupier”
has gained currency.
Aggression vs. Self-Defense International jurists generally draw
a distinction between situations of “aggressive conquest” and
territorial disputes that arise after a war of self-defense. Former
State Department Legal Advisor Stephen Schwebel, who later headed the
International Court of Justice in the Hague, wrote in 1970 regarding
Israel’s case: “Where the prior holder of territory had seized that
territory unlawfully, the state which subsequently takes that territory
in the lawful exercise of self-defense has, against that prior holder,
better title.”9
Here the historical sequence of events on June 5, 1967, is critical,
for Israel only entered the West Bank after repeated Jordanian
artillery fire and ground movements across the previous armistice
lines. Jordanian attacks began at 10:00 a.m.; an Israeli warning to
Jordan was passed through the UN at 11:00 a.m.; Jordanian attacks
nonetheless persisted, so that Israeli military action only began at
12:45 p.m. Additionally, Iraqi forces had crossed Jordanian territory
and were poised to enter the West Bank. Under such circumstances,
the temporary armistice boundaries of 1949 lost all validity the
moment Jordanian forces revoked the armistice and attacked. Israel
thus took control of the West Bank as a result of a defensive war.
The language of “occupation” has allowed Palestinian spokesmen to
obfuscate this history. By repeatedly pointing to “occupation,” they
manage to reverse the causality of the conflict, especially in front of
Western audiences. Thus, the current territorial dispute is allegedly
the result of an Israeli decision “to occupy,” rather than a result
of a war imposed on Israel by a coalition of Arab states in 1967.
Israeli Rights in the Territories Under UN Security Council Resolution
242 from November 22, 1967 — that has served as the basis of the 1991
Madrid Conference and the 1993 Declaration of Principles — Israel is
only expected to withdraw “from territories” to “secure and recognized
boundaries” and not from “the territories” or “all the territories”
captured in the Six-Day War. This deliberate language resulted
from months of painstaking diplomacy. For example, the Soviet Union
attempted to introduce the word “all” before the word “territories”
in the British draft resolution that became Resolution 242. Lord
Caradon, the British UN ambassador, resisted these efforts.10 Since
the Soviets tried to add the language of full withdrawal but failed,
there is no ambiguity about the meaning of the withdrawal clause
contained in Resolution 242, which was unanimously adopted by the UN
Security Council.
Thus, the UN Security Council recognized that Israel was entitled
to part of these territories for new defensible borders. Britain’s
foreign secretary in 1967, George Brown, stated three years
later that the meaning of Resolution 242 was “that Israel will not
withdraw from all the territories.”11 Taken together with UN Security
Council Resolution 338, it became clear that only negotiations would
determine which portion of these territories would eventually become
“Israeli territories” or territories to be retained by Israel’s
Arab counterpart.
Actually, the last international legal allocation of territory that
includes what is today the West Bank and Gaza Strip occurred with the
1922 League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, which recognized Jewish
national rights in the whole of the Mandated territory: “recognition
has been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with
Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home
in that country.” The members of the League of Nations did not create
the rights of the Jewish people, but rather recognized a pre-existing
right, that had been expressed by the 2,000-year-old quest of the
Jewish people to re-establish their homeland.
Moreover, Israel’s rights were preserved under the United Nations
as well, according to Article 80 of the UN Charter, despite the
termination of the League of Nations in 1946. Article 80 established
that nothing in the UN Charter should be “construed to alter in
any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or
the terms of existing international instruments.” These rights were
unaffected by UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 1947 —
the Partition Plan — which was a non-binding recommendation that
was rejected, in any case, by the Palestinians and the Arab states.
Given these fundamental sources of international legality, Israel
possesses legal rights with respect to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
that appear to be ignored by those international observers who repeat
the term “occupied territories” without any awareness of Israeli
territorial claims. Even if Israel only seeks “secure boundaries”
that cover part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, there is a world
of difference between a situation in which Israel approaches the
international community as a “foreign occupier” with no territorial
rights, and one in which Israel has strong historical rights to the
land that were recognized by the main bodies serving as the source
of international legitimacy in the previous century.
After Oslo, Can the Territories be Classified as “Occupied”? In the
1980s, President Carter’s State Department legal advisor, Herbert
Hansell, sought to shift the argument over occupation from the land to
the Palestinians who live there. He determined that the 1949 Fourth
Geneva Convention governing military occupation applied to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip since its paramount purpose was “protecting
the civilian population of an occupied territory.”12 Hansell’s
legal analysis was dropped by the Reagan and Bush administrations;
nonetheless, he had somewhat shifted the focus from the territory
to its populace. Yet here, too, the standard definitions of what
constitutes an occupied population do not easily fit, especially
since the implementation of the 1993 Oslo Agreements.
Under Oslo, Israel transferred specific powers from its military
government in the West Bank and Gaza to the newly created Palestinian
Authority. Already in 1994, the legal advisor to the International Red
Cross, Dr. Hans-Peter Gasser, concluded that his organization had no
reason to monitor Israeli compliance with the Fourth Geneva Convention
in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, since the Convention no longer
applied with the advent of Palestinian administration in those areas.13
Upon concluding the Oslo II Interim Agreement in September 1995,
which extended Palestinian administration to the rest of the West Bank
cities, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres declared: “once the agreement
will be implemented, no longer will the Palestinians reside under
our domination. They will gain self-rule and we shall return to
our heritage.”14
Since that time, 98 percent of the Palestinian population in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip has come under Palestinian jurisdiction.15 Israel
transferred 40 spheres of civilian authority, as well as responsibility
for security and public order, to the Palestinian Authority, while
retaining powers for Israel’s external security and the security of
Israeli citizens.
The 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (Article 6) states that the
Occupying Power would only be bound to its terms “to the extent that
such Power exercises the functions of government in such territory.”
Under the earlier 1907 Hague Regulations, as well, a territory can
only be considered occupied when it is under the effective and actual
control of the occupier. Thus, according to the main international
agreements dealing with military occupation, Israel’s transfer of
powers to the Palestinian Authority under the Oslo Agreements has
made it difficult to continue to characterize the West Bank and Gaza
as occupied territories.
Israel has been forced to exercise its residual powers in recent
months only in response to the escalation of violence and armed
attacks instigated by the Palestinian Authority.16 Thus, any increase
in defensive Israeli military deployments today around Palestinian
cities is the direct consequence of a Palestinian decision to escalate
the military confrontation against Israel, and not an expression of
a continuing Israeli occupation, as the Palestinians contend. For
once the Palestinian leadership takes the strategic decision to put
an end to the current wave of violence, there is no reason why the
Israeli military presence in the West Bank and Gaza cannot return
to its pre-September 2000 deployment, which minimally affected the
Palestinians.
Describing the territories as “Palestinian” may serve the political
agenda of one side in the dispute, but it prejudges the outcome of
future territorial negotiations that were envisioned under UN Security
Council Resolution 242. It also represents a total denial of Israel’s
fundamental rights. Furthermore, reference to “resisting occupation”
has simply become a ploy advanced by Palestinian and Arab spokesmen
to justify an ongoing terrorist campaign against Israel, despite the
new global consensus against terrorism that has been formed since
September 11, 2001.
It would be far more accurate to describe the West Bank and Gaza Strip
as “disputed territories” to which both Israelis and Palestinians have
claims. As U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright stated in March
1994: “We simply do not support the description of the territories
occupied by Israel in the 1967 War as occupied Palestinian territory.”
* * *
Notes 1. CNN Larry King Weekend, “America Recovers: Can the Fight
Against Terrorism be Won?,” November 10, 2001 (CNN.com/transcripts).
2. Mustafa Barghouti, “Occupation is the Problem,” Al-Ahram Weekly
Outline, December 6-12, 2001.
3. Anne F. Bayefsky, “Terrorism and Racism: The Aftermath of Durban,”
Jerusalem Viewpoints, no. 468, December 16, 2001.
4. See Bayefsky, op. cit. U.S. and European officials may use the
term “occupation” out of a concern for the humanitarian needs of the
Palestinians, without identifying with the PLO political agenda at
Durban or at the UN.
5. U.S. Department of State, Consular Information Sheet: India
() November 23, 2001.
6. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Azerbaijan, Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State,
February 25, 2000.
7. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
between Qatar and Bahrain, March 15, 2001, Judgment on the Merits,
International Court of Justice, March 16, 2000, paragraph 100.
8. The Japanese Foreign Ministry does not use the language
of “ending the Russian occupation of the Kurile Islands,”
but rather resolving “the Northern Territory Issue.”
( territory). U.S. Department of
State “Background Notes” describe the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus as the island’s “northern part [which is] under an autonomous
Turkish-Cypriot administration supported by the presence of Turkish
troops” — not under Turkish occupation.
9. Stephen Schwebel, “What Weight to Conquest,” American Journal of
International Law, 64 (1970):345-347.
10. Vernon Turner, “The Intent of UNSC 242 — The View of Regional
Actors,” in UN Security Council Resolution 242: The Building Block of
Peacemaking (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
1993), p. 27.
11. Meir Rosenne, “Legal Interpretations of UNSC242,” in UN Security
Council Resolution 242: The Building Block of Peacemaking, op. cit.,
p. 31.
12. Under the Carter administration, Hansell’s distinction led,
for the first time, to a U.S. determination that Israeli settlement
activity was illegal since it purportedly contravened Article 49 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention which stated that “the Occupying Power
shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population
into the territory it is occupying.” Subsequently, the Reagan and Bush
administrations altered the legal determination of the Carter period,
changed the U.S. voting pattern at the UN, and refused to describe
Israeli settlements as illegal, even if American political objections
to settlement activity continued to be expressed. One reason was
that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to situations like that of
Nazi-occupied Europe, which involved “forcible transfer, deportation
or resettlement of large numbers of people.” This view was formally
stated by the U.S. Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Morris Abram, on
February 1, 1990, who had served on the U.S. staff at the Nuremberg
trials and, hence, was familiar with the legal intent behind the 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention.
13. Dr. Hans-Peter Gasser, Legal Adviser, International Committee of
the Red Cross, “On the Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention
After the Declaration of Principles and the Cairo Agreement,”
paper presented at the International Colloquium on Human Rights,
Gaza, September 10-12, 1994. Gasser did not state that in his view
the territories were no longer “occupied,” but he did point out the
legal complexities that had arisen with Oslo’s implementation.
14. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’s Address at the Israeli-Palestinian
Interim Agreement Signing Ceremony, Washington, D.C., September
28, 1995.
15. Ehud Barak, “Israel Needs a True Partner for Peace,” New York
Times, July 30, 2001.
16. The present intifada violence resulted from a strategic decision
taken by Yasser Arafat, as admitted by numerous Palestinian spokesmen:
“Whoever thinks the intifada broke out because of the despised Sharon’s
visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque is wrong….This intifada was planned in
advance, ever since President Arafat’s return from the Camp David
Negotiations,” admitted Palestinian Communications Minister ‘Imad
Al-Faluji (Al-Safir, March 3, 2001, trans. MEMRI). Even earlier,
Al-Faluji had explained that the intifada was initiated as the result
of a strategic decision made by the Palestinians (Al-Ayyam, December
6, 2000).
Arafat began to call for a new intifada in the first few months of
the year 2000. Speaking before Fatah youth in Ramallah, Arafat “hinted
that the Palestinian people are likely to turn to the intifada option”
(Al-Mujahid, April 3, 2000).
Marwan Barghouti, the head of Fatah in the West Bank, explained in
early March 2000: “We must wage a battle in the field alongside of the
negotiating battle…I mean confrontation” (Ahbar Al-Halil, March 8,
2000). During the summer of 2000, Fatah trained Palestinian youths
for the upcoming violence in 40 training camps.
The July 2000 edition of Al-Shuhada monthly, distributed among the
Palestinian Security Services, states: “From the negotiating delegation
led by the commander and symbol, Abu Amar (Yasser Arafat) to the brave
Palestinian people, be ready. The Battle for Jerusalem has begun.” One
month later, the commander of the Palestinian police told the official
Palestinian newspaper Al-Hayat Al-Jadida: “The Palestinian police
will lead together with the noble sons of the Palestinian people,
when the hour of confrontation arrives.” Freih Abu Middein, the PA
Justice Minister, warned that same month: “Violence is near and the
Palestinian people are willing to sacrifice even 5,000 casualties”
(Al-Hayut al-Jadida, August 24, 2000 — MEMRI).
Another official publication of the Palestinian Authority, Al-Sabah,
dated September 11, 2000 — more than two weeks before the Sharon
visit — declared: “We will advance and declare a general intifada
for Jerusalem. The time for the intifada has arrived, the time for
intifada has arrived, the time for Jihad has arrived.”
Arafat advisor Mamduh Nufal told the French Nouvel Observateur
(March 1, 2001): “A few days before the Sharon visit to the Mosque,
when Arafat requested that we be ready to initiate a clash, I supported
mass demonstrations and opposed the use of firearms.” Of course, Arafat
ultimately adopted the use of firearms and bomb attacks against Israeli
civilians and military personnel. On September 30, 2001, Nufal detailed
in al-Ayyam that Arafat actually issued orders to field commanders
for violent confrontations with Israel on September 28, 2000.
* * *
Dore Gold is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Previously, he served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United Nations
(1997-1999). This Jerusalem Viewpoints is based on an earlier Jerusalem
Issue Brief on this subject.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

MENENDEZ COMMENDS PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION COMMEMORATING ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
Greek News, New York
Aug. 7, 2006
Washington, D.C.- U.S. Representative Robert Menendez (D-NJ) made the
following statement on passage by the House International Relations
Committee of a bill to commemorate the Armenian genocide and urge
Turkey to acknowledge the culpability of the Ottoman Empire in the
genocide and separate legislation calling on the president to ensure
that U.S. foreign policy reflects appropriate understanding of the
Armenian genocide:
Mr. Chairman, the resolutions on the Armenian Genocide that we are
voting on today ask us to do just that – to remember. They simply
ask that we remember that the Ottoman Empire brutally tortured and
murdered 1.5 million Armenians 90 years ago and that half a million
Armenians were forced to flee their country.
They ask us to honor those who survived the genocide. Although few
survivors of the Armenian Genocide are still living today, those who
endured the horrors of 1915 are heroes for all time. They ask that
we honor those who died and call for recognition of the Genocide
carried about by the Ottoman Turkish government. And they ask that
we remember, so we don’t repeat the same tragedy, anywhere, in any
country of the world.
In my view, all Americans must recognize that the atrocities
committed from 1915 to 1923 constitute genocide. We do not use that
word lightly. But the word, itself, makes a powerful statement about
the horrors suffered by the Armenian people. As Samantha Powers,
a leading expert on genocide said in a letter to the editor of
the New York Times, “The extermination of Armenians is recognized
as genocide by the consensus of scholars of genocide and Holocaust
worldwide. The failure to acknowledge this trivializes a human rights
crime of enormous magnitude.”
Today, the people of Armenia and her diaspora are proudly seeking to
rebuild their country. From the ashes of despair born of the genocide,
and from the ravages of seven decades of communist rule, Armenians
the world over are striving to secure a safe and prosperous future
for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabagh.
As Armenian-Americans join with Armenians from throughout the world
to help to rebuild their homeland, and as they seek to secure an
economically prosperous state founded on firm democratic principles,
I will stand by them. Just as this Congress, and this country, should
stand by them.
That is why I am proud to cosponsor both of the resolutions before
us today. Both of these resolutions simply ask us to remember, and
to acknowledge, the Genocide carried out by the Ottoman Empire so
that we may honor the victims.
I urge my colleagues to vote in favor of these resolutions, not only
to remember the atrocities committed in the past and to honor the
victims and survivors, but also to take fundamental steps towards
ensuring that all people, whether they are Armenian, Greek Orthodox,
Jewish, Cambodian, or Rwandan, receive protection from policies of
discrimination and hate that lead can lead to genocide.
php?name=News&file=article&sid=3783&mo de=thread&order=0&thold=0

OSCE BOMBSHELL REVEALS KARABAKH POSITION
Monday, 07 August 2006
By Karl Rahder in Baku for ISN Security Watch ISN, Switzerland
The OSCE Minsk Group’s announcement on the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave is close to Armenia’s position and spells bad news for
Azerbaijan
In the latest in a series of diplomatic bombshells to hit the South
Caucasus, Matthew Bryza, the new US co-chairman of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, announced last
week that he had bad news for Azerbaijan. In an interview remarkable
for its candor, Bryza told Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
on 26 July that as part of its overall framework for ending the
12-year stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group was urging
a referendum for Karabakh’s population to determine the enclave’s
future status.
Why this seemingly reasonable proposal is so contentious lies
at the heart of the aftermath of the bloody 1992-1994 conflict
that dismembered Azerbaijan and gave the Armenian population of
Nagorno-Karabakh something very close to sovereignty.
Bryza’s comments to RFE/RL came amid the tumult following the
Minsk Group’s previous announcements on 22 June and 3 July that were
interpreted both here and in Yerevan as an expression of exasperation
by the co-chair states (Russia, the US and France) and as a signal
by some analysts that the Minsk Group would no longer take an active
role in the negotiations.
The two announcements represented the first time the Minsk Group –
the primary international body tasked with mediating the peace talks
between Azerbaijan and Armenia – had publicly outlined its approach
to a permanent peace. It was a major departure from the secretive
talks that have been held since the end of the war in 1994.
In its 3 July statement, the Minsk Group outlined the “core principles”
of what it considered to be a basis “for the two sides to draft
a far-reaching settlement agreement.” The announcement laid heavy
emphasis on action from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian
President Robert Kocharian. It stressed that the Minsk Group believed
“it is now time for the two presidents to take the initiative for
achieving a breakthrough.”
It also chided them for “lacking” the “political will” for a
settlement.
The key premise includes the “redeployment” of Armenian troops from
territories bordering Nagorno-Karabakh, “with special modalities” for
the two territories that the Armenian side has shown no willingness
to cede: Lachin and Kelbajar.
By “redeployment” it is generally understood that the OSCE means
“withdrawal.” The Armenians were willing to give back five of the
seven districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, as long as they received
major concessions, as ISN Security Watch reported in February.
Other components include demilitarization of the territories, the
establishment of an international peacekeeping force, the return of
Azeri refugees who were forced out of Nagorno-Karabakh during the
war, and “a referendum […] at a date and in a manner to be decided
through further negotiations” to determine Nagorno-Karabakh’s final
legal status.
Defining a referendum
What was most remarkable about the 3 July statement was the word
choice in its reference to a future referendum. Any plebiscite should
“take place in a non-coercive environment,” it said, in which citizens
would have “ample opportunity to consider their positions after a
vigorous debate in the public arena.”
For the past year, the Azerbaijani government has been unambiguous
in its view that any referendum to decide Nagorno-Karabakh’s final
status would involve a vote in which the entire country participated –
something mandated by Azerbaijan’s constitution.
The outcome of such a nationwide vote is clear. It is inconceivable
that Azerbaijan’s citizens would, in the wake of a painful and bloody
war that ended with their country’s defeat, endorse the separation
of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Minsk Group’s statement on 3 July seemed to indicate that a
referendum should take place not in Azerbaijan as a whole, but only in
Nagorno-Karabakh – a position clearly supported by the Armenian side.
In his interview with RFE/RL on 26 July, Bryza appeared to confirm that
the OSCE had largely accepted the Armenian approach to a referendum
when he said the ultimate status of the enclave should be determined
by the “people of Karabakh.”
And despite the seemingly even-handed appeals to the two presidents in
the announcements, Bryza told RFE/RL after his 29 July trip to Yerevan
that Armenian President Kocharian had displayed a “constructive,
candid attitude.”
Bryza added that Kocharian accepted the OSCE’s outline of a possible
settlement, which may mean that the Minsk Group sees Azerbaijan as
the main impediment to a resolution.
In an interview with ISN Security Watch, Baku political analyst Leila
Aliyeva agreed that the Minsk Group had decided on a Karabakh-only
referendum, while speculating that the co-chair states were attempting
to pressure President Aliyev.
Aliyeva stressed that an up-or-down vote on independence that takes
place only in Karabakh was “a trap” for Azerbaijan, “as it would be
for any other state” in its circumstances.
Like a handful of other Azeri analysts, Aliyeva is not against a
referendum on principle. Such a vote might give citizens a range
of choices short of full sovereignty for Nagorno-Karabakh: “Even if
legally it was possible, the questions regarding different degrees
of autonomy within the Azerbaijani state would make more sense than
questions about secession.”
For its part, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry does not accept the
interpretation that the OSCE has adopted the Armenian view. Spokesman
Tahir Taghi-Zadeh found the 3 July Minsk Group statement perplexing:
“The co-chairs are trying to stimulate the process while being as
vague as possible. A statement like this is designed to make both
sides see what they want to see.”
Even the recent comments by Bryza leave room for more than one
interpretation, said Taghi-Zadeh: “The population of Karabakh has the
right to decide, which can only be utilized through participating
in a national referendum. Their participation, in fact, is a must,
if we want to make it a legitimate and lasting solution.”
The Karabakh-only view, if true, has major implications for Azerbaijan,
which must now make some very difficult choices.
Preparing for peace or war?
Since the failed Rambouillet summit between the two presidents in
February, the two sides have, at least in public, displayed little
flexibility, with the war option being discussed with increasing
frequency in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku.
President Aliyev said in February that the talks were at a “dead
end,” and more recently, that further negotiations in the current
framework were “hopeless” – a verdict that Minsk Group co-chairman
Bryza described as “not helpful.”
The Minsk Group’s appeal for the two presidents to “prepare their
publics for peace and not for war” is being given little emphasis in
Baku, where the options seem to be dwindling.
Azerbaijan’s military is rated by many Western analysts as both weak
and in a state of structural torpor due to years of neglect by the late
president Heydar Aliyev. One of the few distinctive differences between
father and son is the money now being lavished on the military sector.
Military expenditures in Azerbaijan for 2006 were slated to rise to
some US$600 million, but President Aliyev said publicly on 31 July
that the actual figure would rise to US$700 million, an announcement
that came a day before the arrival of the OSCE’s Bryza.
Even the lesser figure represented a doubling of the 2005 defense
budget. Aliyev says he wants Azerbaijan’s military spending to
equal the total government budget for Armenia. (According to the CIA
World Factbook, Armenia’s 2005 government expenditures were US$930.7
million.)
Having a large military – or at least a large defense expenditure
program – may serve not so much as a platform for a future war, but
rather as a bargaining chip. This strategy would be consistent with
Baku’s approach thus far, promising a number of rewards for Yerevan
if Nagorno-Karabakh is returned to Azerbaijani control.
Analyst Leila Aliyeva believes that the burgeoning military
establishment will be used as an implied threat or a deterrent.
“Most of the politicians here think that not the actual war itself,
but rather the mere existence of a strong army, might be a deterring
factor.”
When combined with the government’s economic carrot-and-stick approach
to negotiations, the modernized military might begin to look like
a very real threat, although an Armenian Foreign Ministry source
told ISN Security Watch in February, “We defeated Azerbaijan in war
twice. Do they really want to try again?”
Some analysts fear that the Minsk Group has withdrawn from the peace
process. International Crisis Group analyst Sabine Freizer reportedly
told the website Armenia Now that the region was “entering a dire
stage” with the Minsk Group acknowledging “the pointlessness of
continuing their activities.” The situation is bleak, according to
Freizer: “Now there is no peace process, even negotiations.”
Despite such interpretations, Minsk Group co-chairman Bryza has just
completed his tour of the region, with stops in Yerevan, Baku and
Nagorno-Karabakh, activities that sound inconsistent with no longer
being involved as a mediator.
Taghi-Zadeh, however, said the Minsk Group had “no intention of
disbanding.
“I mean, first they make this announcement, and then say almost
immediately that Matthew Bryza is coming to Yerevan and Baku? That
doesn’t look like they are quitting the process,” he said in a
statement.
But the involvement of other actors is not being discouraged by
the Azerbaijani government, which now may welcome other mediators
with perhaps more sympathetic views – but Taghi-Zadeh denied that
Azerbaijan would seek to replace the Minsk Group.
He said that NATO and the EU had expressed interest in serving as
mediators, but said that was “due to the region’s growing strategic
importance. We are not trying to replace the Minsk Group, but we’d
like to see efforts by others as well.”
The US embassy in Baku declined a request by ISN Security Watch for
an interview with Bryza.
Karl Rahder has taught US foreign policy and international history
at colleges and universities in the US and Azerbaijan. In 2004, he
was a Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan with the Civic Education
Project, an academic program funded by the Soros Foundations and the
US Department of State. He is currently based in Baku.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN SHOT DEAD IN CENTER OF MOSCOW
PanARMENIAN.Net
07.08.2006 14:45 GMT+04:00
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Last Sunday an unknown fired upon a man, who was
going out of a restaurant in the center of Moscow. The man was taken to
hospital with numerous wounds and died some time later. “We established
the man’s identity. It was Armen Hovsepyan, native of Armenia. The
motives are being clarified at present,” said a representative of
the prosecutor’s office. The assassin, who threw the gun away near
the crime site, managed to escape. A criminal case was initiated,
reported Interfax with a reference to the press service of the Moscow
prosecutor’s office. According to some informal data, the killing
could be caused by Hovsepyan’s business activities.

Zaman, Turkey
Aug. 7, 2006
French Ambassador Loves Rice Pudding
By Anka, Ankara
Monday, August 07, 2006
zaman.com
French Ambassador to Turkey Paul Poudade expressed his delight of
Turkish cuisines, indicating he would give his life for rice pudding.
In an interview with True Magazine, Poudade talked about the “Armenian
Matter” and the latest political fluctuations in bilateral relations
and said an “Armenian Matter” exists which requires a solution.
“The tension between Turkey and France that appeared recently was
cyclical. There was no need to focus on them too much,” Pounded said.
“I should underline that we are in full cooperation with Turkey in
all international issues, beginning with the crisis of Iran about
which we are very pleased with the initiatives of Turkey. We decided
that the French people should declare its opinion on Turkey’s full
membership with a referendum.”
In response to Esra Cepnili’s question about Turkish cuisines,
Poudade said: “I like Turkish cuisines very much. I can give my life
for a rice pudding. They make great rice puddings at Ismail’s place
on Bolu Mountain between Istanbul and Ankara. I always stop for a
rest there when I’m going or coming from Istanbul. Turkish cuisines
are extraordinary since it is a combination of Mediterranean, Middle
East and yuruk traditions. It has an incredible diversity and it’s a
constantly renewed joy, to discover the Kayseri manti or the kebabs
of the southeast in my journeys. I want to make a suggestion here:
Turkish cooks shouldn’t hesitate to change their legacy of traditions;
they should enrich them and re-create them. I am, and will always be,
a lover of Turkish cuisines.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress