Author: Emil Lazarian

KOSOVO-KARABAKH – STRATEGIC FORK: VIKTOR YAKUBYAN
Regnum, Russia
Nov 13 2006
Continuing the discussion about the role of the “Kosovo precedent” in
the resolution of the conflicts in the territory of the former USSR,
REGNUM publishes the article of the expert on the South Caucasus
Viktor Yakubyan.
Time precedent
Vladimir Putin: “The decisions on Kosovo should be of universal
nature. This is an extremely important question for us – not
only because we advocate the observance of the principles of
the international law but also because we have purely practical
interests… Not all the post-Soviet conflicts are yet resolved. We
can’t use different principles every time.”
It seems that the most symptomatic peculiarity of the “Kosovo
precedent” is a kind of “casus tempi” – the case of the time it is
developing in. This casus can be compared with the English Future In
the Past, when the event has not yet taken place but its precedent
is already being actively discussed. Despite this peculiarity, the
“Kosovo precedent” is a product of the Russian politics, and so,
it can be compared with the interests of other conflicting parties
only in the context of the Russian interest.
A precedent that has not yet taken place is ambiguous. The side
offering it for a global political discussion must be sure that it will
not be the loser in whatever outcome this precedent may bring to. And,
vice versa, the sides who are involuntarily involved in this “casus”
have the right to choose between two or more scenarios of action. At
the same time, those sides must be ready for new pressures in case of
a negative outcome for ones and a positive outcome for the others. In
such a case – just as always – the primary task of each of them will
be the ability to assert their own positions irrespective of the
presence or absence of a precedent. To reiterate, the side offering
the “potential precedent” – in this particular case, Russia – must
ensure that this precedent works out in any case.
Obviously, there are four groups of players in the “Kosovo precedent”
game:
1. The author of the “casus” – Russia.
2. The authors of the Balkan repartition and the opponents of the
Russian initiative – the US and the EU.
3. De facto independent: Kosovo, Abkhasia, Transdniestria,
Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia.
4. De facto non-integral: Serbia, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.
If for the third group the “Kosovo precedent” is acceptable only if
Kosovo is fully recognized, for the fourth group it is acceptable if
Kosovo is annexed to Serbia and subdued to Belgrade. If for the second
group it is absolutely unacceptable because it is the initiative of
Moscow, for the Russian side it is acceptable in any case as it is
a very strong lever for Russia to restore its political weight over
a vast geo-political area.
It should be noted that they in Moscow seem to perfectly realize
that none of the conditions allowing one or another group to smoothly
push its “precedent” through will be ensured – especially after the
referendum in Serbia, when the Serbs have put in their Constitution
a point saying that Kosovo is integral part of Serbia. The western
diplomacy cannot avoid the “potential precedent” as, initially, it
was exactly the West who undertook to resolve the Kosovo problem. And
this very resolution (whatever it is) will become a precedent – i.e.
they in the West will create the precedent themselves, like it or not.
It seems they like it, but, naturally, they want to turn it exclusively
into their own advantage. In the international law there have always
been problems with normative standards – for, as the fable says “the
stronger always blames the weaker,” and no law can change this. In the
last 15 years the international law has turned from “precedental” into
“situational” i.e. precedents are interpreted exclusively depending
on who the specific situation in the specific conflicting region
benefits. And there were plenty of such precedents throughout the
last Balkan crisis (by the way, it is not over yet).
In this particular case, the situation is not yet clear, and there
is still a certain uncertainty about the “frozen conflicts” in the
post-Soviet area. That’s probably why we can be sure that neither the
unrecognized republics of the third group nor the non-integral states
of the fourth group have special illusions about the “precedent.”
Thus, the “Kosovo precedent,” as it is, is especially important now
that it has not yet been played, i.e. until the situation is finalized.
Possible scenarios for Kosovo
The US and the EU planned 2006 to be decisive for the Kosovo status.
No need to prove that the interests of the Kosovan Albanians and
Serbs have been and are the least the Americans are interested in.
What they really want is to maximally correctly stop the bloody Balkan
epic by parceling Yugoslavia out into as few multi-cultural units
as possible. And exactly at the end of this project, when Kosovo was
had been brought very close to independence, Russia appeared with a
generally inconvenient argument. Before that, the process of Kosovo’s
self-determination had been artificially sped up from the formula
“first the standards then the status” to the formula “the standards
at the same time with the status.”
As of now there is no specific formula for Kosovo’s future status. In
his report the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy Kai Eide says:
“There will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future
status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue.
Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that
the time has come to commence this process.” Eide means that at the
initial stage Kosovo should be given “conditional independence,” which
will develop into full one in the course of the region’s integration
into the EU.
The Contact Group’s Nov 2005 Guiding Principles for a Settlement of
the Status of Kosovo say that Kosovo should not be partitioned or
annexed to any other country or part of a country and that the sides
should not return to the situation before Mar 1999. At the same time,
the principles do not rule out the existence of two Albanian states.
Serbia strongly objects to the prospect of Kosovo’s independence,
and the new Serbian Constitution clearly shows that. At the same time,
it is obvious that very few people in Belgrade believe that they will
be able to get Kosovo back.
The former employee of the US Department of State and Senate Jim
Jatras says that the talks between the Serbian and Kosovan leaders
will not lead to agreement as the Serbs refuse to accept Kosovo’s
independence, while the Albanians keep saying that independence is
the only acceptable way for them. When the talks come to a final
deadlock, the only possible way for the international community will
be to try to impose a ready-made settlement on Serbia, most probably,
a Contact Group recommendation, which will be finalized into a UN SC
resolution and will replace the existing resolution 1244, saying that
Kosovo is part of Serbia. Jatras notes that Russia has the right to
say a strong “no” to the new resolution and even to put a veto on it,
but he is inclined to believe that Russia will not break the West’s
agenda on Kosovo and will prefer to turn this situation into profit
in its neighboring regions. Here, too, Russia will try to avoid
unnecessary problems with the Bush administration.
Meanwhile, after the results of the referendum in Serbia, EU
spokeswoman Krisztina Nagy said that the future of Kosovo depends not
on the results of the constitutional referendum in Serbia but on the
results of the relevant UN-sponsored talks. She said that the status
of Kosovo has nothing to do with the referendum in Serbia. She noted
that the Albanians have not taken part in the voting and its results
are contrary to the Kosovo settlement talks.
Thus, this is a classic stalemate or status quo, and its breach
will result in the final exodus of Serbs from Kosovo and political
destabilization in Serbia, where quite weak authorities have shouldered
quite a heavy “constitutional” responsibility for a problem they don’t
even control. De jure independence of Kosovo will inevitably result in
a new wave of ethnic clashes, particularly, in Vojvodina, where there
are many Hungarians, and southern Serbia, with a big Albanian minority.
Reverting to the opinion that Russia can put an end to Kosovo’s
independence by saying that it will veto any resolution on this issue,
I would like to note that it will hardly benefit Moscow to show such
a stance at such a critical moment. Veto is the last argument Russia
ought to use, while the principle of “potential precedent” gives Moscow
a wide room for maneuver. It seems that, under such circumstances,
the West has nothing left but to freeze the Kosovo process for better
times for fear that it may become the author of de facto precedent.
No coincidence that the US State Department is painstakingly copying
the passages about Kosovo’s independence from the reports and
recommendations of the International Crisis Group and similar NGOs.
Jatras says that those organizations have played a decisive role in the
“colored” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (not mentioning Serbia)
and still hope to “democratize” Russia.
It should be noted that the US has got into quite an absurd
situation. On the one hand, they fear that an excessive delay in the
Kosovo process will lead to the loss of control over the situation –
when the Albanians will stop playing “democracy” and will continue
the process according to their own scenario. On the other hand, they
are witnessing a steadily growing radicalism in Serbia. For the US,
any “Kosovo precedent” is important in terms of its relations with
the Muslim world of the “Big Middle East.”
Kosovo parallels
Arkady Ghoukassyan: “If the world community is ready to recognize
the independence of Montenegro and Kosovo, I think it will be very
hard for them to explain why they don’t recognize Nagorno-Karabakh…”
There is a great deal of logic in what the president of the
unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic says. However, experience
shows that not every logic evolves into a relevant process. In fact,
even after the recognition of Kosovo, the world community may give no
explanation to Nagorno-Karabakh, but Russia has a good ground to demand
one. Moscow will get a chance to demand resolution of the conflicts
that are dangerous for its citizens and will do it according to the
generally applied scheme – by recognizing a de facto independent
state entity.
The foot-dragging of the Kosovo settlement until the resolution of
the post-Soviet conflicts is quite unpromising but most probable
scenario. In this case, the protracted status quo will lead to the
legislative consolidation of Kosovo’s de facto independence.
Particularly, the Kosovo government institutions, who are sanctioned
by the UN and OSCE and internationally recognized as an “interim”
administration, will be given the status of “permanent” authorities.
And it will become much harder to abolish those authorities than to
recognize them de jure.
The subordination of Kosovo to Serbia is an almost impracticable
scenario, which, if put into practice, will also become a precedent –
a precedent that will show that the western diplomacy has failed in
the Balkans, that the whole Balkan process was in vain and thousands
of innocent people have died for nothing.
No direct parallels are admissible between Kosovo and
Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, there are no direct parallels as such. At
the same time, there are hundreds of tiny threads that sew these two
processes together. Kosovo is not a guiding star for Nagorno-Karabakh
as Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto independence is not the result of NATO
carpet bombings but of a national-liberation war.
In fact, the “Kosovo precedent” is a classic “strategic fork” provoked
between the Balkans and the CIS and fraught with two scenarios.
The first scenario is the obvious precedent or de jure recognition
of Kosovo’s independence. This precedent will immediately bring the
post-Soviet conflicts to a new level. Grown from nothing by the
US and international organizations, the “Kosovan statehood” will
become an ace in the hands of self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria. The latter believe –
and not without reason – that their state-building achievements,
not mentioning their legal grounds, are much more substantial. The
formation of the unrecognized post-Soviet republics is the result of
the centrifugal processes following the USSR collapse. And so, this
process seems quite logical as, initially, there were absolutely no
guarantees that the Soviet empire would fall into exactly 15 pieces.
Likewise, there was no limit for the quantity of post-Yugoslav states.
The second scenario is the non-obvious precedent or delayed Kosovo
status, which, as we have already said, will be gradually crystallizing
into existing status quo. The long-term transitional status and broad
powers and legalized administrative institutions in Kosovo will, in the
long run, lead to the formation of Kosovan state, i.e. to the birth
of the selfsame obvious precedent. In this case, the unrecognized
post-Soviet states will witness the practical legalization of the
status quo that has been present in Kosovo since 1999, and this
practice will be automatically applied to even longer status quos
in Nagorno-Karabakh (1994), Abkhazia (1994), South Ossetia (1991)
and Transdniestria (1992).
The selfsame Nagorno-Karabakh will not hesitate to use both the
obvious “Kosovo precedent” – if Kosovo is proclaimed independent –
and the non-obvious “Kosovo precedent” – if the long-term status
quo is legalized. This has no connection with the quantity of oil
produced in Azerbaijan. In fact, this has connection with the global
experience of ethnic conflict resolution, when there is no precedent
of forcible subordination of de facto independent units of former
metropolises, while there are de jure recognized East Timor, Eritrea,
Montenegro, de facto recognized Kosovo and de facto independent
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria. The latter do need
beneficial precedents. However, the problem as such is not so much
about the events in the Balkans but about the survival of Armenians
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ossetians in South Ossetia and Abkhazians in
Abkhazia.
NATO in the Balkans and the chronicle of the birth of a precedent: Note
The NATO military campaign against Yugoslavia lasted from Mar 24 to
June 10 1999 (79 days). On Mar 24 1999 NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana declared that NATO was starting an operation Allied Force in
order to protect the moral values of Europe of XXI. NATO’s proclaimed
goal was to prevent a humanitarian disaster following the genocidal
policy of the Yugoslavian authorities against ethnic Albanians.
19 NATO member-states from Europe and North America took part in the
operation. The core of the Allied Force was naval and air forces
of the US, the UK, France and Germany. Belgium, Hungary, Denmark,
Spain, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey
provided their troops and territories. Neutral Albania, Bulgaria,
FYR Macedonia and Romania provided air spaces and territories.
The air forces consisted of almost 400 planes, the naval forces –
of US and NATO combat ships, deployed in the Adriatic Sea, and the
NATO permanent contingent in the Mediterranean. Some 14,000 bombs
(a total of 23,000 bombs and missiles) with a total weight of 27,000
tons were dropped during the 79 days of the operation. The US alone
dropped over 1,000 cluster bombs. A total of 2,300 bombing-missile
attacks were made on 995 facilities. Over 1,000 bombers took part in
the most intensive bombardment on May 20-21 night. On the last days,
the NATO air forces made as many as 1,000-1,200 sorties a day.
The death toll ranges from 1,200, according to the UN, to over 1,300
(400 children), according to the Yugoslav side. 6,000 people were
wounded. 250,000-300,000 Serbs fled from Kosovo together with over
700,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purely military
effect was insignificant. Despite the NATO reports that they had
destroyed lots of military facilities, it later turned out that the
aggressors brewed up just a few tanks and infantry vehicles.
The economic damage caused to Yugoslavia by the NATO operation
made up $100bln. The NATO troops destroyed almost 90 historical and
cultural monuments, over 300 schools, universities and libraries,
over 20 hospitals, almost 40,000 apartment houses, some 80 bridges.
They damaged radio and TV, the oil refinery in Panchevo, an
agricultural aircraft plant, fertilizer factories, camps of refugees
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, almost 200 medical facilities. Over
2.5 million people were left without jobs. There are still plenty
of unexploded cluster bombs in Kosovo and the Adriatic Sea. WHO
reports that 150 Kosovans were blown up in the first month after
the operation. UN experts report real ecological disasters in some
regions of Yugoslavia.
On July 10 1999 the NATO Secretary General ordered to stop the
bombings and to start deploying NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo. The
UN SC resolution 1244 of June 10 1999 empowered the UN mission to
execute civil administration in Kosovo. The same resolution approved
the deployment of NATO KFOR peacekeeping force.
On Sept 3 1999 the UN Mission in Kosovo abolished the currency law of
Yugoslavia and established customs control with FYR Macedonia. On Sept
20 the Kosovo Liberal Army was reorganized into a Kosovo Protection
Corps comprising 5,000 people, of whom 200 had the right to carry
arms. Serbs withdrew from the Kosovo interim council. On Oct 19 the
UN Mission and the KFOR dismissed the proposals of the Kosovan Serbs
to form their own cantons and to have their own protection corps. An
Interim Administration Mission was formed in Kosovo on Dec 15. The
local Serbs refused to take part in it. On Jan 12 2000 the mission was
enlarged from 14 to 35 members. The first 167 of total 400 judges were
appointed on Jan 24 2000. This marked the beginning of the formation of
the Kosovan judiciary system in line with the Criminal Code of Serbia
of 1989. On Mar 9 2000 the UN Mission started issuing passports to
Kosovo citizens. On Apr 14 the OSCE Mission formed a central electoral
commission for ensuring the conduct and control of elections.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

EU AWAITS DETAILS OF BILL ON CHARITIES IN TURKEY
Athens News Agency, Greece
Nov 13 2006
Representatives of Turkey’s numerous charitable foundations, all
falling under the domain of the state-run General Directorate for
Religious Property (Vakuf), are still awaiting to see details of a
draft bill passed by the Turkish assembly, expected to be unveiled
later on Monday.
According to reports here, European diplomats and representatives
of the EU Commission in Ankara referred to a “wait and see” attitude
on whether numerous demands by Europe and private foundations in the
country will be fulfilled with the new law.
Similar statements were made by representatives of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate, as the latter is keenly following developments in
coordination with the representatives of Jewish and Armenian groups
in Turkey.
The bill deals with all faith-linked charitable foundations, including
the very large Muslim “vakufs” in the country.
The bill was ratified by a vote of 241 in favor to 31 against, with the
opposition in the Turkish assembly strenuously opposing the bill and
calling for the postponement of beneficial provisions for foundations
and charities until Turkey becomes a full EU member-state.
Later reports also speculated over whether the Turkish president will
veto the legislation.
One of the primary demands by the EU and local communities focused
on establishing a framework for foundations that passed into the
hands of the state due to a lack of recognised and functioning boards
of directors.
Members of recognised Vakufs also want the return of properties that
after 1974 passed into the hands of third parties.
On the plus side, the draft bill reportedly foresees the right of
permanent residents of Turkey, who are not Turkish citizens, however,
to serve on the boards of foundations.
Caption: A view of the courtyard at the headquarters of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate in Istanbul, better known as the Fanar.
ANA-MPA photo / STR
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

KARABAKH EXPECTS DEMOCRATS TO CONTINUE SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN NKR
Lragir, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
Will the victory of the Democrats in the United States affect the
settlement of the Karabakh issue in any way? This is not a question
for one day. Some analysts are optimistic and they think the United
States will give greater support to Armenia. Others remind that the
same Democrats were in power in the United States 12 years ago.
Meanwhile, the Armenian community in the United States is celebrating
the victory.
Karabakh is cautious towards this victory. The speaker of the NKR
National Assembly Ashot Ghulyan congratulated Nancy Pelosi November
10. His message emphasizes the considerable moral support and
humanitarian aid that the United States gives to Nagorno Karabakh to
overcome the destruction caused by the Azerbaijani aggression, and
the active engagement of the United States in the settlement of the
conflict mediated by in the OSCE Minsk Group. “We believe that the
U.S. Congress will continue to uphold freedom and democracy and we
expect further support to strengthen and develop Nagorno Karabakh,”
runs the message.
On these days NKR President Arkady Ghukasyan is visiting the United
States. It is not known yet if he will meet with the leaders of the
Democrats. Nevertheless, Karabakh expects that the Armenians of the
United States will donate a little more money to Karabakh.

WHAT DID THE ELECTIONS GIVE TO THE AMERICAN ARMENIANS?
Khazhak Mkrtchian “Hayrenik” (“Motherland”), USA
Yerkir, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
The US congressional elections held on November 7 were analyzed from
different perspectives. The American Armenians had their criteria
for such analysis based on the impact they would have on the issues
of interest for the Armenians.
The party affiliation of individual American Armenians, the nature
of their business, the state of residence and other factors of
course determine their individual views of the elections. However,
these factors have no impact on the collective assessment of the
American Armenians. The most important factor in this case is the
elected official’s position on issues of interest for the Armenians
irrespective of whether he is a republican or a democrat.
If we look at the elections from this perspective, the Armenians might
have lost in terms of the number of officials that have a pro-Armenian
position. However, the results of the elections can overall be assessed
as positive based on several facts. The first positive development in
this respect is the resignation of Denis Hastert and Nancy Pelosi’s
becoming the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The former was known for his tendency of yielding to pressure from
the executive and excluding the issue of the Genocide recognition
from the agenda. It should be noted that the instructions Hastert
was receiving did not come exclusively from Republican sources. In
several cases the democratic executive was pressuring Hastert.
This cast some shadow on the Armenians’ optimism regarding Nancy
Pelosi. However, the Armenians’ optimism connected with Pelosi has
some ground. The latter has repeatedly taken pro-Armenian positions
and her pre-election promises inspire hope that she will stick to
her positions.
The election of New Jersey representative Bob Menendez is of special
importance for the American Armenians for two reasons. First,
Menendez took an important position during the discussion of the US
Ambassador’s candidacy. This issue is still open, therefore, Menendez’
presence is important in terms of continuing the efforts and achieving
a pro-Armenian outcome.
Second, the results of these elections further strengthened the
connection between the American Armenians and Menendez because when
the results of the exit polls questioned Menendez’ election, ARF’s
Hay Dat Committee of New Jersey took a principled position on the
issue and expressed its support to Menendez based on the latter’s
pro-Armenian position on issues of interest for the Armenians.
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts, we can state
that the results of the November 7 elections can be assessed as
positive for the American Armenians. However, in order to achieve
positive results from the elections it will be necessary to use this
historical opportunity properly, to double our joint efforts and
support the work of Hay Dat Committee that has taken up the mission
of pursuing the Armenian question.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ISTANBUL OFFICE OF TURKISH HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION APPEALED TO TURKISH INTERIOR MINISTRY TO EXAMINE MASS GRAVES UNCOVERED IN VILLAGE OF XIRABEBABA
ArmInfo News Agency, Armenia
Nov 13 2006
The Istanbul office of the Turkish human rights organization appealed
to the Turkish Interior Ministry with an open letter to examine the
mass graves of the 20th century, which have been discovered in the
village of Xirabeba of Mardin region, and to find out whether the
killed were Armenians or Assyrians.
According to Turkish mass media, the letter says that no statements
about uncovering the burial place on October 17 have been made so
far. It was said that the peasants who had found remains in a stone
quarry informed the police about that. Then the military men blocked
the entrance of the quarry but said nothing of the remains. Yet,
they said that they would start investigation on this. According to
the source, Turkish soldiers didn’t allow the journalists to enter
the quarry, and forbade the natives to show the way to the quarry.
Therefore, the human rights advocates of Istanbul insist on
investigation of the graves by an independent group of historians and
experts in forensic medicine. The authors of the letter emphasize
that the society which fails to display courage to look directly
at the sad historical events of the past is unable to successfully
finish the process of democratization.
To remind, while unearthing the grave of one of their relatives,
the dwellers of Xirabebaba discovered mass burial in the stone quarry
full of bones and skulls. The peasants supposed that they found the
remains of over 300 Armenian inhabitants killed in 1915. Professor
David Gaunt, a Swedish historian, believes that the remains discovered
in the stone quarry belong to 270 Armenians and Assyrians killed by
the order of Young Turk commander Halil Edip.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 9, No. 42, 13 November 2006
A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team
******************************************** ****************
HEADLINES:
* GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP HITS MANY LEVELS
* CANDIDATES ASSESSED FOR ASSEMBLY ELECTION
* SUPREME LEADER DEFENDS NUCLEAR STANCE, DISCUSSES ELECTIONS
* EXECUTIVE BRANCH PLANS TO MOVE TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES
* CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION RATES CORRUPTION IN IRAN
* MILITIAMEN AMBUSHED, AS INSURGENTS EXECUTED
* IRAN STILL DESIGNATED BY RSF AS ‘ENEMY’ OF INTERNET
* IRAN OFFERS ADVICE TO NEW UN SECRETARY-GENERAL
* IRANIANS REFLECT ON 1979-81 HOSTAGE CRISIS
* TEHRAN CONSIDERS, AGAIN, DISCUSSING IRAQ WITH U.S
* IRANIANS WELCOME HUSSEIN DEATH VERDICT
* BELARUSIAN PRESIDENT MEETS IRANIAN OFFICIALS
* IRAN THREATENS NORWAY OVER MEETING WITH MUJAHEDIN KHALQ LEADER
* FORMER IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS COMPLAIN OF CONDITIONS IN IRAQ
* ARGENTINA ISSUES INTERNATIONAL WARRANTS FOR HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI
AND OTHER OFFICIALS
* IRANIANS TRAVEL TO BUDAPEST TO DISCUSS DRUG ABUSE
******************************************** ****************
GOVERNMENT SHAKEUP HITS MANY LEVELS. Iran’s executive branch is
undergoing a major shakeup in what could be an effort by President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s administration to realign its economic
policy. The president has replaced two cabinet ministers, others are
facing parliamentary scrutiny, and a score of top officials have
quit. But the tremors could also reflect officials’
dissatisfaction with policy or presidential frustration over unmet
goals.
Iranian lawmakers gave a vote of confidence to
Ahmadinejad’s choice to be the new cooperatives minister on
November 5. Mohammad Abbasi, a legislator from Gorgan, is a former
university chancellor (of a branch of the Islamic Azad University)
and deputy governor-general for planning affairs in the northern
Mazandaran Province. He holds a doctorate in strategic management, a
degree often given to military personnel.
Abbasi told reporters that strengthening the cooperative-run
business sector is an important step in the realization of the
country’s fifth five-year plan, which began in 2005.
Abbasi succeeds Mohammad Nazemi-Ardakani, who, the president
said, will serve in another position. Nazemi-Ardakani was given the
portfolio when the president’s initial nominee failed to win
approval. Nepotism may have a part in Nazemi-Ardakani’s job
security. He is related by marriage to Masud Zaribafan, secretary of
the presidential cabinet and a Tehran municipal council member.
Another Minister Replaced
The same day that Abbasi was introduced to the legislature
(October 29), lawmakers approved Abdul Reza Mesri as the new minister
of welfare and social security. A parliamentary representative from
the western Kermanshah Province, Mesri succeeded Parviz Kazemi.
Ahmadinejad’s first nominee for the Welfare Ministry
portfolio failed to win approval when he came to power in 2005, and
lawmakers criticized Kazemi’s inexperience during the
parliamentary debate around his appointment. Kazemi had reportedly
suggested in his curriculum vitae that he was “reluctant” to discuss
his accomplishments, “Mardom Salari” reported on November 5, 2005.
An anonymous ministry official reportedly said when Kazemi
resigned on September 25 that he was being replaced because he
allowed subordinates to simultaneously hold leadership positions in
businesses, according to the Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA). The
source claimed Kazemi hired incompetents and the ministry did not
report on its activities satisfactorily.
There also were reports that Kazemi’s resignation was
connected with his failure to exercise sufficient control over the
Social Security Organization. Indeed, that organization’s chief,
Davud Madadi, resigned some two weeks after Kazemi did. He blamed
“present circumstances,” and said “it is not possible for me to
cooperate with the government,” the Islamic Republic News Agency
(IRNA) reported on October 8.
Disgruntled Economic Team
At the top tier of government, the appointments of
Cooperatives Minister Abbasi and Welfare and Social Security Minister
Mesri are only the most conspicuous changes.
Aftab news agency quoted an anonymous source on September 26
as saying the president has reviewed the one-year performance of each
cabinet member. The source claimed Ahmadinejad has warned Roads and
Transport Minister Mohammad Rahmati and Commerce Minister Parviz
Mir-Kazemi that they are in danger of being replaced. Aftab reported
that the ministers facing dismissal have reformist tendencies or have
failed to fulfill their promises to the president.
Other personnel changes have taken place below the cabinet
level. About 20 mid-level officials, including deputy ministers, have
either been forced to resign or have been dismissed, “Ayandeh-yi No”
reported on October 17. These changes mostly affect the economy.
In the Management and Planning Organization, three deputy
chiefs quit in mid-October — Deputy Chief of Production Affairs
Farhad Dezhpasand, Deputy Chief of Economic Affairs Ali Tayebnia, and
Deputy Chief for Fundamental Affairs Mehdi Rahmati. Two other
managers — identified as Yarmand and Daryani — were dismissed.
There were other personnel changes within the Economy and Finance
Ministry, the Petroleum Ministry, the Commerce Ministry, and at the
central bank.
Legislative Scrutiny
The president is not the only one who is unhappy with cabinet
members’ efforts. Parliamentarians have voiced dissatisfaction
about some ministers, and acted accordingly. Lawmakers will question
Interior Minister Mustafa Pur-Mohammadi, Energy Minister Seyyed
Parviz Fattah, and Transport Minister Mohammad Rahmati in the coming
week, Fars News Agency reported on October 28.
When Iranian media reported in mid-September that assessments
of the ministers’ performance had been prepared, legislator Said
Abutaleb argued that those “evaluations must certainly lead to some
changes in the cabinet,” “Mardom Salari” reported on September 16.
Abutaleb referred to the Welfare and Commerce ministries
specifically, saying the legislature would like to dissolve the
Commerce Ministry. He warned that if the president did not implement
changes, then the parliament was ready to step in by questioning and
giving no-confidence motions to the ministers.
But another legislator, Hussein Afarideh from Shirvan, called
the prospective replacements worse than the sitting ministers,
“Mardom Salari” reported on September 16.
Meanwhile, in early October, more than 50 legislators signed
a petition for the interpellation of Agriculture Jihad Minister
Mohammad Reza Eskandari.
One legislator, Dariush Qanbari, charged that Iranian
“agriculture is on the verge of collapse,” Mehr News Agency reported
on October 9. He said “farmers’ crops [were] piling up in
storehouses” while the country imports fruit from Pakistan. Qanbari
also questioned the announcement of self-sufficiency in wheat
production when “at the same time we are importing 2 million tons of
wheat every year.” He described the Agriculture Jihad Ministry as the
most inefficient and uncooperative of ministries.
But fundamentalist legislators blocked the interpellation
motion.
In mid-October, signatures were being gathered for the
interpellation of Education Minister Qodratullah Farshidi. One
legislator said there was “no doubt that the Education Minister has
had a weak performance,” but added that other cabinet members have
performed poorly and should face questioning, “Aftab-i Yazd” reported
on October 16.
Governmental obscurity and a censored media ensure that it
will be some time before the real reasons for the ministerial
resignations and dismissals emerge. But it appears that the
presidential administration’s grappling with difficult economic
issues will continue to cause turmoil in the state apparatus —
particularly if the populist president persists in efforts to fulfill
his campaign promises.
The possible imposition of economic sanctions by the UN
Security Council stemming from the nuclear controversy could only add
to President Ahmadinejad’s troubles. (Bill Samii)
CANDIDATES ASSESSED FOR ASSEMBLY ELECTION. Akbar Karami, a political
analyst in Qom, told Radio Farda on November 5 that the Guardians
Council interprets its power of approbatory supervision as a
political filter that allow only clerics who are compatible with it
to compete in elections.
Guardians Council spokesman Abbas Ali Kadkhodai announced on
November 4 that 204 of the almost 500 prospective candidates for the
December 15 Assembly of Experts election have been invited for
examinations on their ability to interpret religious law, state radio
reported. Thirty-seven people refused to be examined, and two women
took the exam.
Kadkhodai said incumbent Majid Ansari’s qualifications
could not be confirmed, but Ansari refused to participate in the
exam. An anonymous “informed source” told Fars News Agency on
November 5 that Ansari’s candidacy will be approved nevertheless.
Fars added that several incumbents — including
Urumiyeh’s Gholam Reza Hassani; the reformist Hadi Khamenei, who
is the supreme leader’s brother; and several highly experienced
seminarians who were invited for the exam — withdrew their
candidacies.
Exam results will be announced on November 13, and Assembly
of Experts candidates will have three days to appeal. The Guardians
Council will assess the appeals over a 20-day period. (Bill Samii)
SUPREME LEADER DEFENDS NUCLEAR STANCE, DISCUSSES ELECTIONS. Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei is visiting the northeastern city of Semnan, “Iran”
newspaper reported on November 9. He told tens of thousands of people
at the Takhti Stadium that mastering nuclear technology is their
right, and the international community does not oppose this. He cited
the Nonaligned Movement’s backing of Iran’s development of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as proof of this, and said it is
only the United States that opposes Iran’s pursuits, even though
Washington has said several times that it is not against Iran’s
development of nuclear technology strictly to produce energy for
peaceful uses. Khamenei also urged local residents to vote in the
December 15 elections for the Assembly of Experts and municipal
councils, state television reported on November 8. (Bill Samii)
EXECUTIVE BRANCH PLANS TO MOVE TEHRAN UNIVERSITIES. President
Ahmadinejad said on state television on 6 November that the
government will move some of the universities in the capital, Tehran,
to the suburbs. It is not yet decided whether they will be moved to
the east or the west of the city, he said. Khajeh Nasr-i Din Tusi
University has several campuses, he said, and this causes problems
for faculty, students who must commute, and contributes to the
city’s traffic problems. Allameh Tabatabai University also has
campuses in different parts of Tehran, he said, and Azad University
has south, central, and north branches in the capital. Each branch,
he continued, has faculties and buildings in different parts of the
city.
At the end of the November 5 cabinet meeting, Ahmadinejad
said two sessions were dedicated to problems of the capital and half
the time of three other cabinet sessions dealt with Tehran, state
television reported on November 6. (Bill Samii)
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION RATES CORRUPTION IN IRAN. Iran has a
rating of 2.7 in Transparency International’s Corruption
Perceptions Index 2006, which the civil society organization released
on November 6. Ten indicates a low level of perceived corruption and
zero a high level. The number is based on “expert opinion surveys.”
Finland, Iceland, and New Zealand were in first place with the
highest ratings (9.6), and the U.S. was in 20th place with a rating
of 7.3. Iran shared 105th place with Bolivia, Libya, Macedonia,
Malawi, and Uganda. Haiti ranked at the bottom — 163rd place — with
a rating of 1.8. (Bill Samii)
MILITIAMEN AMBUSHED, AS INSURGENTS EXECUTED. Khodabakhsh Baghbani,
who was taken hostage by the Jundullah insurgent group in March, was
released November 1 after payment of an 800 million rial
(approximately $90,000) ransom, “Kayhan” reported on November 2. Five
other hostages were released earlier, and one of them, Reza Laczai,
is writing his memoirs.
Jundullah is a Sunni group, and population in the
southeastern Sistan va Baluchistan is predominantly Sunni. A local
security official, identified only as Nikunam, denies that there is
anti-Sunni discrimination. “With consideration of our performance in
the region, even the elders among the Sunnis have announced
repeatedly that I make no difference between Shia and Sunnis,”
Nikunam said. “Proof of this is that there were both Shia and Sunnis
among those who were executed yesterday for plundering and disturbing
social peace.”
It was around the same time that six members of Abdulmalik
Rigi’s Sunni insurgent gang were hanged in Iran, dpa reported on
November 6, citing “Etemad.” The gang reportedly killed four people,
including a policeman, when they attacked a police car. Moreover,
they allegedly kidnapped two Germans and an Irishman near the
southeastern city of Zahedan in December 2003. The Europeans were
released after a month.
Three members of the Basij militia were killed in a November
6 ambush in Kerman Province, Reuters reported, citing the Iranian
Students News Agency (ISNA). They reportedly had just freed a
hostage, arrested seven of his kidnappers, and seized a ton of
narcotics. (Bill Samii)
IRAN STILL DESIGNATED BY RSF AS ‘ENEMY’ OF INTERNET.
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) announced on November 7 that Iran is
among what it describes as enemies of the Internet. RSF said Internet
filtering in Iran has increased over the last year, although
repression of bloggers appears to have decreased, and Iran now claims
to filter 10 million sites. Pornography, politics, and religion are
the traditional targets, and women’s rights is getting attention
lately, RSF claimed. A recent ban on broadband connections could
reflect a desire to prevent downloading of Western movies and music,
RSF speculated. (Bill Samii)
IRAN OFFERS ADVICE TO NEW UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. Inspectors from the
UN International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Iranian nuclear
facilities at Natanz and Isfahan on November 5, IRNA reported. On the
same day in Tehran, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Husseini
said the next secretary-general of the UN, South Korean Foreign
Minister Ban Ki-moon, should resolve the crisis over Iran’s
nuclear program, IRNA reported. Ban should head off some
countries’ interference in the process, Husseini added. Ban takes
office at the UN on January 1.
Russia and China are interfering by trying to remove
references to military action from the UN Security Council resolution
that is being discussed in New York, “The Washington Post” reported
on November 5. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom reportedly
back China and Russia. Patrick Clawson, deputy director for research
at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said elimination of
the military option greatly reduces the resolution’s credibility.
(Bill Samii)
IRANIANS REFLECT ON 1979-81 HOSTAGE CRISIS. The anniversary of the
November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by militants
and their holding of U.S. diplomats as hostages for 444 days was
commemorated in Iran over the weekend. Reflecting on the incident,
Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization Secretary-General
Mohammad Salamati said on November 5 that the action was appropriate
at the time because the revolution’s survival was at stake,
“Aftab” reported. Circumstances have changed, he continued, and in
the interest of regional stability and security, and in light of the
controversy over Iran’s nuclear program, now it is possible to
hold talks with the United States.
A former hostage taker, Massumeh Ebtekar, said her colleagues
thought the incident would end quickly because the revolutionary
government would oppose it, “Etemad” reported on November 4. Popular
support and the backing of revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini led to the incident’s duration.
Another student leader, Ibrahim Asgharzadeh, said current
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad preferred attacking the Soviet Embassy
at the time, “The New York Times” reported on November 5. Asgharzadeh
said he is willing to meet now with former President Jimmy Carter and
apologize for the hostage crisis if that would reduce Iran-U.S.
tensions. (Bill Samii)
TEHRAN CONSIDERS, AGAIN, DISCUSSING IRAQ WITH U.S. Iranian Foreign
Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Husseini said on November 5 that Iran
is willing to consider direct talks with the United States regarding
Iraqi affairs, “If we receive an official request,” state television
reported. Washington made this request in October 2005, and Tehran
agreed to hold such talks in March 2006. Tehran subsequently ruled
out taking part in such talks. (Bill Samii)
IRANIANS WELCOME HUSSEIN DEATH VERDICT. The death sentence announced
on November 5 for former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has been
welcomed in Iran. Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Husseini
described this as the minimum penalty, IRNA reported. Speaking at his
weekly press briefing, Husseini said the Iraqi dictator’s other
crimes, including the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, should not be forgotten.
Iranian state radio interviewed members of the public in
Tehran, and one woman said she felt “happiness” about the death
sentence. She added: “He should not be killed only once. They should
really torture him.” A man said, “I hope they will drag the leaders
of America and Britain to the same court.” A third man said, “The
interesting point is that he is being executed by the very people who
once supported him against the Iranian people.”
Families of Iranians killed in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War have
asked for representation at Hussein’s hanging, ISNA reported on
November 7. They said representatives of Iranian, Iraqi, Kurdish, and
Kuwaiti families should put the rope around the ex-president’s
neck together.
The Saddam Hussein case is affecting Iranians who want to
visit Shia holy sites in Iraq. Mohammad Ali Delaram, director-general
of Khuzestan Province’s Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization,
announced on November 7 that the border crossing with Iraq is open to
those who would like to see the holy sites there, Ahvaz television
reported. He said 114 people left the province that day to visit
Karbala.
The same day, Iranian Border Guards Commander Behnam
Shariati-Far announced that Iraq has closed the Mehran border
crossing for three days, Fars News Agency reported. He referred to a
state of alert in Iraq following the death sentence passed on former
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein the previous day. Shariati-Far said
the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization will be advised accordingly, and
he speculated that the border will reopen next week. (Bill Samii)
BELARUSIAN PRESIDENT MEETS IRANIAN OFFICIALS. Iranian Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei said in a November 6 meeting in Tehran with visiting
Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Iran is hostile
towards no one and is only looking after its own interests, Mehr News
Agency reported. Khamenei said “independent countries” have to have
more contact so they can withstand the plots of “the global
arrogance.” Some countries find it difficult to do this, he said,
because their governments lack popular support. Khamenei said Iran
and Belarus can expand relations in the trade sector. Lukashenka
called for stronger Minsk-Tehran times, and he concurred on the need
for strong relations between “independent states.”
Lukashenka also met with President Mahmud Ahmadinejad on
November 6. Ahmadinejad said, “We would like to see mutual
cooperation expand rapidly in different technological, scientific,
and economic fields,” IRNA reported. Lukashenka said Belarus is
interested in investing in Iran’s energy exploration sector, and
he invited Ahmadinejad to Belarus. Moscow’s Interfax news agency
quoted Lukashenka as saying, “We should exceed this target of $1
billion of our trade turnover.” Lukashenka acknowledged some
difficulties in banking and trade, although these were not specified,
and he voiced confidence that they will be resolved “within the next
few months.”
Lukashenka headed home on November 7, IRNA reported. RFE/RL
reported that the two sides signed eight agreements, some of which
involved the oil sector and the car and tractor industries. IRNA
described only a memorandum of understanding regarding expanded
bilateral cooperation. Lukashenka also visited the tomb of Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, father of the Islamic Revolution. (Bill Samii)
IRAN THREATENS NORWAY OVER MEETING WITH MUJAHEDIN KHALQ LEADER.
Members of the Norwegian legislature, the Storting, met on November 7
with the leader of an Iranian opposition group that the United
States, Canada, and the EU regard as a terrorist organization, dpa
reported. Mujahedin Khalq Organization leader Maryam Rajavi, the
self-styled president-elect of Iran, told the Norwegians that the
Iranian regime is a threat to “all humanity.”
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry reacted angrily to Iranian
Ambassador Abdul Reza Faraji-Rad’s threat on November 3 that a
meeting with Rajavi would hurt Oslo-Tehran relations, “Aftenposten”
reported on November 4. Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Raymond
Johansen described the ambassador’s action as “unacceptable.”
Johansen added: “The threat is that this meeting could be significant
for our relations. Our present relations with Iran are not warm and
friendly…. I cannot see that this has any significance at all.”
(Bill Samii)
FORMER IRANIAN OPPOSITIONISTS COMPLAIN OF CONDITIONS IN IRAQ. More
than 200 former members of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MEK) who
are living in an Iraqi facility guarded by the U.S. military say that
it has been more than three years since they claimed refugee status
with the United Nations, Radio Farda reported on November 8. The MEK,
which uses many cover names, is considered a terrorist organization
by the U.S., Canada, and the EU. These people want to live in
countries where they can be free and secure, Radio Farda reported,
but they are living in tents instead.
One of them, Dariush Afarinandeh, told Radio Farda by
telephone that 40 members of the group began a hunger strike on
November 7 to protest their uncertain status and living conditions.
He said neither the United States — which is protecting the group
from the Iraqi people and the Iranian regime — nor the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees has provided any answers regarding their
future. Afarinandeh told Radio Farda that he and his friends wish
they were at the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
because the Red Cross, human rights organizations, and the media go
there to interview the prisoners. “Here, unfortunately, no
international or human rights organization or the Red Cross has set
foot.” (Bill Samii)
ARGENTINA ISSUES INTERNATIONAL WARRANTS FOR HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI AND
OTHER OFFICIALS. A judge in Argentina has issued international arrest
warrants for an Iranian ex-president and eight other officials over a
deadly bombing more than a decade ago.
The attack, on a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in
1994, killed 85 people and injured hundreds more.
The arrest order came two weeks after Argentinian prosecutors
formally charged a number of former Iranian officials — including
ex-President Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani — for their alleged roles
in the bombing. ‘
Prosecutors say Hashemi-Rafsanjani and other senior officials
commissioned the attack. They say that while it was carried out by
the Lebanese Hizballah militia, the decision to target the Jewish
center came from the “highest authorities” within the Iranian
government.
Argentinian federal Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral issued the
arrest order for what he called “crimes against humanity” and asked
Interpol to capture the suspects.
“We activate the arrest warrant, on the one hand, with a
request to Interpol requesting the capture of certain people — and
with an international exhortation that would be transmitted by the
chancellory at the right time, soliciting that they proceed with the
detention,” Canicoba Corral said.
Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who served two presidential terms that
spanned much of the 1990s (1989-97), currently heads the Expediency
Council, an appointed body that among other things mediates between
parliament and the Guardians Council.
Judge Canicoba Corral has also requested the arrest of a
former minister of intelligence and security, Ali-Akbar
Fallahian-Khuzestani, and of foreign affairs, Ali-Akbar Velayati, as
well as onetime commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps
Mohsen Rezai and other ex-officials.
Tehran Shrugs Off Charges
Tehran has repeatedly denied any involvement the deadliest
terrorist attack ever on Argentinian soil.
On November 9, Iran’s charge d’affaires in Argentina,
Mohsen Baharvand, dismissed the investigation as politically
motivated.
“Because of the shortcomings of Argentina to find the real
perpetrators of this act and as a result of the seeds of
‘Iranophobia’ and ‘Islamophobia’ disseminated
throughout the world by the United States and Israel, again, this
[Argentinian] judicial system has accused Iran and Hizballah [of]
something which has been done 12 years ago,” Baharvand said.
Baharvand also said Iran will urge Interpol not to act on the
warrants.’
But observer Dr. Abdolkarim Lahidji, deputy head of the
Paris-based International Federation of Human Rights, said that
Interpol acts based on judicial orders and not political appeals.
“Interpol cannot go to Iran and arrest them,” Baharvand said.
“But if any of these officials whose names are on the arrest warrant
are seen in a country and the police in that country have a copy of
the arrest order, then they can be arrested — then it would be up to
that country to extradite the arrested person to Argentine for
questioning.”
Justice Served?
The arrest order might have largely symbolic significance for
the victims of the attack and their relatives, since it is highly
unlikely that Tehran would place those former officials at risk of
arrest.
Lahidji told RFE/RL that the arrest warrant suggests a body
of evidence implicating those former officials.
“If there were no such evidence, then an arrest order would
not have been issued,” Lahidji said. “Therefore [the arrest order]
demonstrates that, despite what Iranian officials have said, the
dossier is not empty.”
No one has been convicted in connection with the July 18,
1994, bombing, which reduced the seven-story Argentine-Israeli Mutual
Association (AMIA) to rubble.
Local Jewish groups and some officials have long accused Iran
and the Lebanese Hizballah of being behind the attack.
Officials Implicated
Iranian officials have been targeted by international
authorities before over alleged roles in attacks in Europe on
opposition members. In 1997, a German court issued a warrant for
former Intelligence and Security Minister Ali Fallahian in connection
with the 1992 murder of Iranian Kurdish opposition leaders at the
Mykonos restaurant in Berlin. The court said the so-called Mykonos
murders were carried out with the knowledge of Iran’s supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and former President
Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Fallahian is among those targeted in the
Argentinian warrants.
Lahidji noted that the warrants will limit travel options
open to Iranian officials.
“Since the issuing of the court order in the case known as
‘Mykonos,’ senior Iranian officials have not traveled to
European countries, and, as far as I can remember, Rafsanjani has had
several trips to Saudi Arabia and maybe to Syria,” Lahidji said. “So
merely the fact that the traveling [options] for the officials of a
country are limited is like sanctions — like the measures against
senior Iranian officials that could be put in place regarding
Iran’s nuclear case.”
In 2003, Iran’s former ambassador to Buenos Aires, Hadi
Suleimanpur, was jailed in London at Argentina’s request but
later freed for lack of evidence.
Alleged Motive
Prosecutors allege that Argentina’s decision not to
provide Iran with nuclear technology was the motive of the 1994
bombing.
Tehran has described the charges as a “Zionist plot” aimed at
diverting attention from crimes it says Israel has committed against
women and children in Palestine.
The attack on the Jewish community center in 1994 followed a
bombing two years prior that destroyed the Israeli Embassy in Buenos
Aires and killed 29 people. That case remains unsolved.
Argentina’s 300,000-strong Jewish community is South
America’s largest. (Golnaz Esfandiari)
IRANIANS TRAVEL TO BUDAPEST TO DISCUSS DRUG ABUSE. The head of
Iran’s Olympic weightlifting organization will travel to Budapest
in the coming days to meet with International Weightlifting
Federation President Tamas Ajan, IRNA reported on November 9. Nine
out of 11 Iranian athletes tested positive for using banned
substances prior to September’s World Weightlifting Championships
in the Dominican Republic. The athletes were banned from the meet,
Iran was fined $400,000, and Iran’s trainer, Bulgarian national
Georgi Ivanov, received a lifetime ban. Iran’s future in the
sport will be discussed in Budapest, as will payment of the fine.
(Bill Samii)
****************************************** ***************
Copyright (c) 2006. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NEW PIPELINE IN THE PIPELINE
By Christina Tashkevich
The Messenger, Georgia
Nov 13 2006
As part of the government’s plan to ensure the country’s energy
security, a USD 45 million rehabilitation of the North-South gas
pipeline is about to begin, announced Millennium Challenge Georgia
(MCG) on November 8.
“Preparatory works are over and the actual rehabilitation is about to
begin,” CEO of MCG Fund Lasha Shanidze told The Messenger. He said
the overall rehabilitation of the pipeline will be completed within
two years.
The project is part of MCG’s larger USD 49.5 million energy
infrastructure rehabilitation project. In 2005, the board of directors
of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) approved USD 295.3
million in its compact with Georgia. Other projects in Georgia include
road rehabilitation in Samtskhe-Javakheti, agribusiness development
and development of infrastructure in the provinces.
An Azeri company and two Georgian companies-Didgori and
GeoEngineering-have been selected to repair the pipeline. Shanidze
points out that this is a chance for Georgian companies to “show
their competencies” and gain experience in participating in such a
large-scale project.
The MCG says that the pipeline’s rehabilitation will reduce the amount
of losses through leakage, thus saving approximately USD 30 million
annually. It also will increase the reliability of energy supply,
reduce health hazards to the population from emissions and reduce
environmental hazards. The rehabilitation will also increase the
capacity of the pipeline.
Shanidze says in the beginning, those sections of the pipeline that
are the most hazardous and requiring urgent repair will be fixed.
Minister of Energy Nika Gilauri noted last week that conditions in the
energy sector have dramatically improved and that rehabilitation of
the North-South gas pipeline is an important step forward in Georgia’s
aspiration to achieve energy security.
MCC resident country director Colin Buckley praised Georgia’s
achievements in preparing for implementing MCC projects.
“Georgia has really done a remarkable job in getting the MCC
compact enforced to begin with, and this is the next step, which is
implementation. It’s to Georgia’s credit that things are advancing
on schedule and we look forward to having all of the five projects
under way relatively soon,” he said.
The North-South gas pipeline serves as the only gas supply route from
Russia to Armenia. The gas corridor reaches from the Georgian-Russian
border to the Georgian-Armenian and Georgian-Azeri borders with a
total length of 235 km.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

DUAL CITIZENSHIP: HOW MUCH IS IT COSTING CANADA?
By Bruce Cheadle
Hamilton Spectator, Canada
The Canadian Press
Nov 13 2006
Country looks good in retirement
For the record, Don DeVoretz doesn’t criticize immigrants who come
to Canada, stay long enough to become citizens, then leave to sow
greener pastures in the world’s economic hothouses.
“Nobody’s breaking any law here,” the economist and immigration
researcher said from Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, where
he’s co-director of Research for Immigration and Integration in the
Metropolis or RIIM.
“If we set up the policy to encourage people to come here, get
citizenship and leave without paying taxes, I would do it. You would.
It’s not evil.”
But DeVoretz does take issue with some of Canada’s current immigration
and citizenship policy.
In an increasingly mobile world, Canada’s generous social programs,
platinum passport and low threshold for naturalization make this
country an attractive way station.
Whether that is a good or bad thing for the country depends on who
you talk to.
Kenny Zhang, a senior research analyst at the Asia Pacific Foundation
of Canada, writes eloquently of the benefits naturalized Canadians
abroad bring to their adopted homeland.
The foundation has estimated there are 2.7 million Canadian citizens —
9 per cent of the total population at home — living outside Canada’s
borders.
That puts Canada ahead of the United States, China, India and Australia
for the proportion of nationals living abroad.
Zhang and his colleagues believe economic considerations are going
to keep increasing that number.
China and India are furiously recruiting their educated expatriates in
western countries as their economies modernize and grow exponentially.
Canadian nationals of Chinese and Indian descent help foster valuable
trade and cultural ties when they return to jobs in their mother
countries, Zhang argues.
But there’s a downside to the equation.
DeVoretz is working on a book that involved a series of interviews
with Canadian returnees to Hong Kong, where he estimates close to
250,000 Canadian nationals live and work.
The academic says there’s a uniform response in the interviews:
“They would like to come back (to Canada) in their retirement years.”
For a country that provides generous medicare benefits as well as
social security and old-age pensions, the cost of servicing these
retirees, “could be a very big issue,” says DeVoretz.
Lest it appear he’s picking on Hong Kong Canadians, DeVoretz makes the
point that policy-makers seldom talk about the estimated 1.2 million
Canadians — including power earners such as Wayne Gretzky and Celine
Dion — who live and work in the United States but are equally part
of the problem.
“There isn’t criticism aimed at that diaspora, but it is at the
foreign-born one. And that’s where the racism comes in, clearly.”
Canada’s relatively relaxed entry standards for business-class
migrants, generous family reunification policy and short, three-year
residency requirement for citizenship were all put in place to help
us compete for skilled immigrants with the attractive American market
in the 1990s, said DeVoretz.
Now that those migrants are flowing back out, Canada needs to address
some issues.
The range of options is staggering, from Israel and Switzerland’s
compulsory military service for citizens to the U.S. requirement
that worldwide income — after the first $100,000 — be subject to
American taxation.
Germany recently decided to revoke dual citizenship after age 18,
forcing adults to decide on their nationality. The Netherlands has
changed its citizenship policy three times in the last decade.
“Each country has addressed what it feels is the most vulnerable part
of its overseas diaspora,” said DeVoretz.
“I would like to have a Canada-first policy, like every other
country has.”
He proposes a couple of rather benign fixes.
First, make all citizens abroad file an income report annually in
Canada, “just so we know where you are.”
He’d also like to see evidence of political participation, through
Internet voting abroad or some other option.
Zhang, in a paper this year, noted countries such as Israel and
Armenia view their diasporas as “strategically vital political
assets.” Other countries, such as Mexico, India and the Philippines,
see the economic power of their diasporas reflected in remittances
sent home by expatriates working abroad.
Canada, up until this summer’s Lebanon evacuation, seems not to have
given its diaspora much thought.
Citizenship and Immigration Minister Monte Solberg now says his
department is reviewing dual citizenship.
“From my point of view, that’s the wrong medicine for the issue,”
Zhang said.
The majority of Canadians abroad probably hold only Canadian
citizenship, since neither China nor the U.S. formally recognizes
duals.
If the Canadian government has a problem with citizens living abroad
for the balance of their working lives and returning in retirement
for medical care and other services, the solution has little to do
with dual citizenship.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TALKING TURKEY: THE E.U. ASPIRANT NEEDS FREE-SPEECH LESSONS
Theodore Dalrymple
City Journal
Nov 13 2006
The Turkish government often seems determined to strike propaganda
coups against itself. It put 34-year-old author Elif Shafak on trial
recently for questioning Turkish national identity, and dropped the
charges only after predictably adverse publicity. But the charges
will be a warning to other Turkish writers not to go too far.
In her latest novel, The Bastard of Istanbul, which has already
sold 60,000 copies, Shafak tells the story of a Turkish and an
Armenian-American family. On no subject is the Turkish state more
sensitive than on the massacre of the Armenians in 1915. Was it just
one horrible massacre among others, or the twentieth century’s first
genocide? A lot turns on the question-or at least so both Armenians
and Turks believe.
Shafak specializes in inflaming the sore points of Turkish history.
She wants a Turkey less ethnically and culturally homogeneous than
that of the traditional Kemalist vision, and thus not only questions
the sanctity of Ataturk himself and the army that protects his legacy,
but expresses sympathy for Kurds and even Greeks.
One may doubt whether the realistic alternative to the Kemalist version
of Turkey is a multiculturalist paradise, where the Turk lies down with
the Greek, so to speak, rather than a Muslim theocracy. But Shafak
has every right to her views and should not have faced persecution
for them (apparently, she has received death threats, too).
That does not make her a heroine, however, all of whose views we must
accept. She subscribes, a recent admiring Le Monde article suggests,
to those hackneyed views of the 1960s that have brought much social
dislocation to the West, and would be more devastating still in
Turkey. She is a feminist who seems not only to deplore Turkish
machismo, no doubt understandably, but also to believe that men, beyond
insemination on demand, are redundant. In reaching this conclusion, she
reflects upon her own experience as an upper-middle-class intellectual
and assumes that it is exemplary for millions of compatriots.
Her father abandoned the family when she was an infant, leaving her
grandmother and her mother to raise her. Her mother, Westernized and
highly educated, became a diplomat. Shafak was born in Strasbourg and
lived successively in various capitals, including Madrid. According to
Le Monde, “she grew up in a universe in which women were independent
and educated, where the cultural heritage was passed from mother to
daughter, and marriage and motherhood were assaults on freedom.” Having
just given birth herself to a daughter, she said, “As for me, I will
always cultivate my independence, and my daughter will be raised
like that.”
It seems scarcely to cross her mind (at least as Le Monde presents
it) that this attitude is not necessarily a useful prescription for
all of Turkish society, or at least for that considerable part of it
that does not live in, and was not raised in, cosmopolitan diplomatic
circles. In short, Shafak seems a typical example of the intellectual
who uses personal history uncritically to draw conclusions about
society as a whole.
Dangerous as such intellectuals no doubt are, they should not have
to go to jail for their views. I disagree with what Shafak says,
but I defend (to the death it would perhaps be too much to claim)
her right to say it.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

November 13,2006
Itinerary of Benedict XVI’s trip to Turkey published
VATICAN CITY (Zenit.org) — The Vatican press office has published a general
outline of the itinerary and agenda for Benedict XVI’s upcoming apostolic
trip to Turkey.
Vatican Radio, directed by Jesuit Father Federico Lombardi, who also heads
the press office, completed details of the program for the Nov. 28-Dec. 1
trip.
The Pope will leave from Rome’s Fiumicino airport at 9 a.m. on Tuesday, Nov.
28. He will arrive at the Esenboga airport at Ankara, the Turkish capital,
at 1 p.m., local time.
The Holy Father will first visit the Mausoleum of Ataturk, “Father of the
Turks,” who proclaimed the Turkish republic in 1923.
Subsequently, the welcome ceremony will take place as well as a courtesy
visit to Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer.
The Pontiff will then meet with the deputy prime minister before meeting
with the president of religious affairs, Ali Bardokoglu, Grand Mufti and
highest Muslim authority, at his headquarters, and with the diplomatic corps
in the Apostolic Nunciature. The Holy Father will deliver addresses to each.
The following day, Benedict XVI will travel to Smyrna, the country’s
third-largest city, known as “The Pearl of the Aegean,” from where he will
go to Ephesus, the city where the Apostle Paul lived and was captive, and
where, according to tradition, the Blessed Virgin Mary and John the
Evangelist also lived.
In Ephesus, Benedict XVI will celebrate Mass at the Meryem Ana Evi (House of
Mary) Shrine and deliver a homily. It was in this city that a Council in the
year 431 proclaimed the Virgin Mary “Theotokos,” of Mother of God.
On that Wednesday afternoon, the Holy Father will fly from Smyrna to
Istanbul — formerly Constantinople — where he will visit and pray at the
Patriarchal Church of St. George and have a private meeting with Orthodox
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople. The Pope will greet
him at the patriarchate’s headquarters.
Divine Liturgy
On Thursday morning, Nov. 30, Benedict XVI will take part in the Divine
Liturgy in the Patriarchal Church of St. George in Istanbul. He will deliver
an address and sign a joint declaration.
The Pontiff will thus fulfill the original objective of his trip: to respond
to the invitation of Patriarch Bartholomew I to take part on the feast of
St. Andrew, patron of the patriarchate, observed on Nov. 30.
After the ceremony, the Holy Father will lunch with Bartholomew I in the
patriarchate. In the afternoon, he will visit the St. Sophia Museum.
Then Benedict XVI will go to the Armenian Apostolic cathedral, where he will
pray and meet and greet Patriarch Mesrob I.
That same afternoon, the Pope will meet with the Syro-Orthodox metropolitan
and the chief rabbi of Turkey.
Finally the Holy Father will meet and dine with the members of the country’s
Catholic bishops’ conference.
On Friday, Dec. 1, Benedict XVI will preside over the celebration of Mass in
Istanbul’s Cathedral of the Holy Ghost and deliver a homily.
It will be his last appointment, as he will then go to the city’s airport
and, after the farewell ceremony, depart at 1:15 p.m. for Rome’s Ciampino
airport.
Previous visits of Roman Pontiffs to Turkey took place in 1967 (Paul VI) and
1979 (John Paul II).
About 99% of Turkey’s 70 million inhabitants are Muslim, the majority Sunni.
Catholics represent 0.04% of the population.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress