Author: Emil Lazarian

Armenia’s latest military parade offered more than a display of hardware — it showcased India’s growing arrival as a serious defence exporter. During the Armenian Military Parade held on May 28, 2026, a wide range of Indian-origin systems rolled through the capital, underlining how New Delhi has emerged as one of Yerevan’s most important defence partners in a remarkably short span. 

The display was strategically significant for both countries. For Armenia, it signalled a rapid military modernisation drive amid tensions in the South Caucasus. For India, it was a public demonstration that its defence industry is beginning to compete in the global arms market. 

What Indian weapons did Armenia showcase? 

The parade featured a broad mix of Indian-made offensive and defensive systems: 

Akash Air Defence System: Developed by India’s DRDO and produced by Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL), the Akash system is a medium-range surface-to-air missile platform designed to intercept aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles. Its appearance in Armenia indicates Yerevan’s push to strengthen air defence capabilities after vulnerabilities exposed during recent regional conflicts. 

ATAGS 155mm Artillery Guns: The Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS), jointly developed by DRDO and Kalyani Group, is among India’s most ambitious indigenous artillery projects. The 155mm gun has a long firing range, automated systems, and high mobility — making it a modern replacement for legacy Soviet-era artillery. 

Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher: Pinaka is India’s indigenous answer to systems like Russia’s Grad and Smerch rocket launchers. Designed for saturation strikes over large areas, Pinaka gives armies the ability to hit enemy positions rapidly and at long distances. Its deployment abroad marks a major milestone for India’s rocket artillery exports. 

Swathi Weapon Locating Radar: This radar system detects and tracks incoming artillery shells, rockets, and mortars, helping armies identify enemy firing positions. For Armenia, such systems are crucial in mountainous conflict zones where artillery duels remain central to warfare. 

ALS-50 Loitering Munitions: Often described as “suicide drones”, loitering munitions hover over a battlefield before striking targets with precision. The inclusion of the ALS-50 reflects how India is increasingly entering the fast-growing global drone warfare market. 

Why is Armenia buying Indian weapons? 

Armenia’s shift toward Indian defence systems is driven by several strategic realities. For decades, Armenia relied heavily on Russian weapons. But the Ukraine war, sanctions, supply chain disruptions, and Moscow’s changing geopolitical priorities have weakened Russia’s ability to supply arms consistently. 

That forced Armenia to diversify suppliers. 

India emerged as an attractive alternative because it offers: 

• comparatively affordable systems 
• combat-tested equipment 
• fewer political conditions 
• faster delivery timelines 
• compatibility with Soviet-origin military structures 

Lessons from recent conflicts 

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict transformed military thinking in the region. Azerbaijan’s use of drones, precision artillery, and missile systems exposed major weaknesses in Armenia’s air defence and battlefield awareness. 

Indian systems such as Akash, Swathi radar, and loitering munitions directly address many of those gaps. 

Why this matters strategically for India 

India is becoming a defence exporter. For decades, India was among the world’s largest arms importers. Now, New Delhi is trying to transform itself into a defence manufacturing and export hub under the “Make in India” initiative. Armenia has become one of the clear examples of that strategy succeeding. 

Indian firms and state-backed defence companies are no longer just producing for domestic use — they are entering active geopolitical markets. 

Expanding influence in the South Caucasus 

The Armenia relationship gives India a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, a region historically influenced by Russia, Turkey, Iran, and Western powers. 

This matters because: 

• Turkey strongly backs Azerbaijan and maintains close defence ties with Pakistan 
• Azerbaijan has increasingly aligned with Islamabad on diplomatic and military issues 
• India sees Armenia as a potential balancing partner in the region 

Defence cooperation therefore carries geopolitical weight beyond simple arms sales. 

The Turkey-Pakistan factor 

One of the most important strategic dimensions behind India-Armenia defence ties is the emerging Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan alignment. 

Turkey supplied drones and military support to Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Pakistan openly backed Azerbaijan diplomatically and remains one of the few countries that does not recognise Armenia formally. 

India’s growing defence relationship with Armenia is therefore viewed by many analysts as part of a broader balancing strategy against hostile regional alignments involving Pakistan. If Indian systems perform effectively in operational environments, more countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe may begin considering Indian alternatives to Russian, Chinese, or Western weapons.

A 2,700-year-old irrigation system near Armavir in Armenia is giving researchers new insight into how ancient rulers turned dry land into fields, gardens, and vineyards. The study, led by Nazarij Buławka and published in “Antiquity,” shows how water management helped shape one of the region’s most important ancient cities.

An ancient city depended on water

Armavir sits on the edge of the Araks Valley. In ancient times, the site stretched for about 3.5 kilometers (2.17 miles). That made it one of the largest archaeological complexes in Armenia.

The city’s early growth was closely tied to the kingdom of Urartu. The powerful state ruled parts of the South Caucasus and eastern Anatolia from the ninth century B.C. to about 590 B.C.

During the reign of King Argishti I, the Araks Valley came under Urartian control. The king founded the fortress city of Argishtikhinili between two natural hills. Each hill held a citadel. One served political power. The other had religious importance.

Ancient inscriptions say five irrigation channels once carried water to the city and nearby farmland. They supplied fields, gardens, and vineyards. One inscription said the land had previously been unused. Researchers said that the detail suggests water shortages may have limited settlement before Urartian rule.

Satellite images reveal hidden canals

The new study set out to find traces of that ancient water network. Researchers used modern satellite images, Cold War-era spy satellite photos, and elevation data to study the land around Argishtikhinili.

The team used images from Landsat 5 and Sentinel-1. It also studied archival CORONA and GAMBIT satellite photographs from the 1960s and 1970s. These older images helped researchers see the landscape before modern farming and development changed many surface features.

Researchers also used digital elevation models to find small changes in the ground. These changes can reveal buried or eroded canals, levees, and abandoned river channels.

The team mapped the features using ArcGIS software. The goal was to separate modern irrigation works from older water-management systems.

More than 1,000 kilometers mapped

The results were large in scale. Researchers identified more than 1,019 kilometers (633.1 miles) of water-management features in the study area.

Modern canals make up about 429 kilometers (266.5 miles). Old mountain streams or former Araks River channels made up about 420 kilometers (260.9 miles). Researchers also found about 36 kilometers (22.3 miles) of deeply cut ancient channels.

Another 134.6 kilometers (83.6 miles) may represent ancient canals. Many of those possible canals sit near Argishtikhinili.

Researchers said the evidence points to a long, evolving irrigation system. Some parts may date to the Urartian period. Others may have been repaired, reused, or expanded in later centuries.

A system used for generations

The history of the irrigation system remains difficult to trace. It likely stayed in use until the fall of Urartu around 590 B.C. Irrigation appears to have returned during the Hellenistic period, when Armavir grew again.

Some canal sections may preserve earlier routes. Others may have been built later. Armavir remained important into the medieval period, which means the system may have changed many times.

That long history makes the network hard to date. Ancient canals may lie beneath later ones. Some modern canals may follow older paths. Farming has also damaged or hidden many surface traces.

Still, the study shows that irrigation was central to life in the Ararat Plain. Without engineered water channels, much of the land may not have supported large-scale farming.

Water helped build a city

Researchers said the canals helped make the area suitable for intensive agriculture. They may also help explain why Argishtikhinili became such an important Urartian center under Argishti I.

The study found that many levees run toward the northeast. Researchers said some may connect to dry stream beds or larger water systems. Others may have drawn water from branches of the Araks River.

Buławka and the research team said more fieldwork is needed. Future studies could help confirm which canals are Urartian and which belong to later periods. Researchers also need more data to link the water system with nearby settlements.

For now, the findings show how ancient engineering transformed the landscape. The irrigation system did more than move water. It helped build a city, support farming, and shape the history of Armenia’s Ararat Plain.

https://greekreporter.com/2026/05/28/irrigation-system-ancient-armenia-engineering/

Azerbaijan launched a military offensive on September 19, 2023; local Armenian authorities agreed to a ceasefire the following morning. By the end of September, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians, roughly 99 percent of the region’s population, had fled through the Lachin Corridor into Armenia. Shusha, the city overlooking the regional capital Stepanakert from the ridge above, had already fallen during the 44-day war in 2020, strengthening Azerbaijan’s hand before the 2023 offensive. Artsakh’s de facto president Samvel Shahramanyan issued a decree on September 28, 2023, ordering all state institutions dissolved by January 1, 2024. Azerbaijan administers the entire territory directly today.

The Conflict Emerged During The Soviet Collapse

During the Soviet period, Moscow organised Nagorno-Karabakh as the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, even though ethnic Armenians made up most of the local population. Political tensions intensified on February 20, 1988, when the regional Soviet voted 110 to 17 to request the transfer of the territory out of Azerbaijan and into Soviet Armenia. The vote triggered intercommunal violence across both republics, including the Sumgait pogrom of February 27 to March 1, 1988, in which dozens of ethnic Armenians were killed.

Violence escalated further after Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent states in late 1991. Armenian-backed forces gained control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts during the war that followed. Hundreds of thousands of people fled their homes during the fighting: roughly 724,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the seven adjacent districts, while several hundred thousand ethnic Armenians left Azerbaijani cities. Total deaths from the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994) are estimated at around 30,000 on both sides combined.

Russia brokered the ceasefire that ended the war. The Bishkek Protocol was signed by parliamentary representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh on May 5, 1994, and the ceasefire took effect on May 12, 1994. The agreement froze the front lines but did not resolve the region’s political status. Armenian-backed authorities continued governing the territory as the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, later also called the Republic of Artsakh, although no United Nations member state, including Armenia itself, formally recognised it as independent.

For more than two decades, negotiations produced little progress. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States, led most international mediation efforts, while periodic clashes continued along the line of contact, including the Four-Day War of April 2016.

The 2020 War Reshaped The Region

Large-scale fighting resumed on September 27, 2020. Azerbaijan launched a coordinated offensive that drew heavily on Bayraktar TB2 and Harop drones for surveillance and strikes, supported by artillery and armoured units. Turkey openly backed Azerbaijan; Russia maintained ties with both sides and chose not to invoke the Collective Security Treaty Organization commitments that Armenia argued should have applied.

The 44-day war significantly changed control of the region. Azerbaijani forces recaptured the seven surrounding districts (Agdam, Fuzuli, Jabrayil, Zangilan, Gubadli, Khojavend, and Kalbajar) and on November 8, 2020, took the city of Shusha (Shushi in Armenian) after a week of close-quarters fighting. The city overlooks Stepanakert from a clifftop ridge and was strategically decisive: its capture made the Armenian position in the regional capital untenable.

Russia brokered the trilateral ceasefire agreement, signed by Ilham Aliyev, Nikol Pashinyan, and Vladimir Putin on November 9, 2020, with the ceasefire taking effect at midnight Moscow time on November 10. Under the agreement, Armenia transferred additional territories to Azerbaijan; roughly 1,960 Russian peacekeepers deployed to the remaining Armenian-administered area and the Lachin Corridor; and the parties committed to a future transit route connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia. In all, the Armenian side lost roughly 75 percent of the territories in and around Nagorno-Karabakh that it had controlled before the war, including Shusha, Hadrut, and the seven surrounding districts.

The Lachin Corridor Crisis And The 2023 Offensive

Conditions inside Nagorno-Karabakh deteriorated sharply through 2022 and 2023. On December 12, 2022, Azerbaijani demonstrators (described by Armenia and several Western governments as state-backed) blockaded the Lachin Corridor, the only road link between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. On February 22, 2023, the International Court of Justice ordered Azerbaijan, by a vote of 13 to 2, to ensure unimpeded movement along the corridor. On April 23, 2023, Azerbaijan instead opened a permanent checkpoint on the route, which it framed as a customs and security measure but which Armenian officials and the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention argued was a continuation of the blockade.

Diplomatic efforts involving Russia, the European Union, and the United States did not produce a long-term settlement, and food, medicine, and fuel shortages worsened throughout 2023. On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijan launched what it called an “anti-terror operation” against Armenian armed formations remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani forces advanced rapidly through high ground and key road junctions; within about 24 hours, local Armenian authorities accepted a Russian-mediated ceasefire on September 20. Casualty figures reported by the two sides were 192 Azerbaijani military personnel killed and 511 wounded, against more than 200 Armenian killed and more than 400 wounded.

The offensive ended the separatist administration’s ability to govern the territory. A mass exodus through the Lachin Corridor began within days. The Berkadzor fuel depot explosion on September 25, 2023, killed at least 218 evacuees who had queued for fuel before the long drive to Armenia; another roughly 70 people died on the road during the exodus itself. By October 3, 2023, more than 100,617 ethnic Armenians had crossed into Armenia, roughly 99 percent of the pre-offensive population of Nagorno-Karabakh. On September 28, 2023, Artsakh president Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree formally dissolving all state institutions of the self-proclaimed republic by January 1, 2024.

Nagorno-Karabakh In 2026

Azerbaijan controls the entirety of Nagorno-Karabakh and administers the territory directly. Reconstruction has progressed across the seven surrounding districts and within Nagorno-Karabakh proper, with substantial public investment in roads, housing, an international airport at Fuzuli (opened October 2021), and the planned return of Azerbaijani families displaced in the 1990s. Russia confirmed in April 2024 that it was withdrawing the peacekeeping contingent deployed under the 2020 agreement; the withdrawal was completed in mid-2024, roughly a year and a half before the original five-year mandate would have ended in November 2025.

The status of negotiations between Yerevan and Baku has moved further than at any previous point. On March 13, 2025, the two foreign ministries jointly announced that they had finalised the text of an Agreement on Peace and the Establishment of Interstate Relations. On August 8, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev initialled the agreement at the White House under the mediation of US President Donald Trump, and the three leaders signed a separate Joint Declaration on Future Relations the same day. The agreement commits the two parties to establish diplomatic relations, delimit their shared border, and develop a transit corridor through southern Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave; the corridor has been branded the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), with the United States granted exclusive 99-year development rights.

The agreement has been initialled but not yet signed or ratified by either parliament. Azerbaijan has stated that it will not sign until Armenia removes from its constitution language that Baku interprets as a territorial claim; Armenia has begun preparing the constitutional amendments, with a national referendum likely required in 2027. Armenian parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 7, 2026, with constitutional changes and the peace process both shaped by the result. Many of the roughly 100,000 ethnic Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 remain in Armenia and have not returned.

Nagorno-Karabakh occupies a small section of the South Caucasus, but it has shaped the region’s politics for almost four decades. Soviet administrative borders, mountainous geography, ethnic demographics, and successive military realities all contributed to one of the longest-running territorial disputes to emerge from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether the August 2025 agreement ultimately ends that dispute or only the most recent phase of it depends largely on what happens in Armenian domestic politics and in the eventual ratification process.

Russia has sharply criticized Armenia for its closer ties with the European Union, arguing that Armenia is not maintaining a balanced relationship with Moscow and is working with countries that wish Russia harm. This criticism comes ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary vote on June 7, where the ruling Civil Contract party, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, is seeking a third term and has shown interest in strengthening ties with the West against various pro-Russian opposition groups. Recent polls suggest that Pashinyan’s party holds about 30% support.

Moscow’s discontent with Armenia’s warming relationship with the West was expressed by Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who emphasized that while Russia sees Armenia as a partner, it questions Armenia’s partnerships with the EU, especially given claims from Western nations about a “hybrid war” against Russia.

In response to these developments, Russia’s agricultural safety agency announced new temporary bans on Armenian produce, including tomatoes and strawberries, set to take effect on Saturday. Russia has warned Armenia that it may halt supplies of cheap oil, gas, and diamonds if Armenia continues pursuing EU membership. Armenia, with a population of around 3 million, depends heavily on Russian energy and military support.

With information from Reuters

By Eurasianet

By Hripsime Hovhannisyan 

(Eurasianet) — Armenia will hold parliamentary elections on June 7 under circumstances that may seem disadvantageous for the governing Civil Contract Party. Recent surveys indicate that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s public support has fallen to around 32 percent in vote intention among all respondents, rising to 38 percent among likely voters, a sharp decline from the support he enjoyed after the 2018 Velvet Revolution.

This erosion of trust was reflected, in part, in the March 2025 municipal elections in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city, where the Civil Contract party failed to secure a governing majority. 

Public dissatisfaction appears closely linked to several unresolved policy issues. The proposed peace agreement with Azerbaijan, brokered last August in Washington, remains deeply divisive, with the most recent polling showing public opinion almost evenly split, with 44 percent in support and 41 percent opposed. At the same time, Russia has intensified its efforts to shape Armenia’s political and information environment, employing methods similar to those observed earlier in Moldova and Georgia. 

Despite these pressures, Pashinyan continues, for now, to lead most pre-election projections. This creates a central paradox in the 2026 contest: an unpopular prime minister remains the frontrunner largely because the opposition appears even weaker and divided. 

Ultimately, the election will determine whether Armenia continues to distance itself from Moscow or moves back into Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Several factors explain the paradox of the upcoming elections, though none of them is decisive on its own. The first is the structure of Armenia’s electoral system, which strongly favors the largest political force in a fragmented field. Under the current election rules, a party can convert a relatively modest share of the vote into a dominant parliamentary position if its competitors remain divided.

With Civil Contract polling at around 32 percent in the most recent polls, most opposition parties remain clustered near the electoral threshold of 5 percent. Their support is dispersed across multiple platforms, limiting their ability to challenge the ruling party effectively. Even if several opposition groups were to reach 8-10 percent individually, they would still struggle, in aggregate terms, to surpass Civil Contract.

A second constraint on the opposition is reputational. Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, both former presidents who continue to dominate the main opposition networks, register consistently low levels of public trust. Both remain closely associated with the pre-2018 political order, and that legacy continues to shape voter perceptions. Survey data suggest that around 60 percent of Armenians distrust both the government and the opposition. Among those who express a preference, however, Pashinyan still outperforms his rivals by a wide margin. This reflects less a vote of confidence than a pragmatic calculation: many voters appear reluctant to return to figures they associate with the old system. 

Beyond the traditional opposition, Samvel Karapetyan was for a while widely seen as representing a potential wildcard. The Russian-Armenian billionaire and owner of Electric Networks of Armenia entered the political arena in mid-2025 after being detained on charges related to alleged attempts to destabilize the government. Karapetyan is not closely linked to the pre-2018 elite, and his profile differs in important ways from that of established opposition figures. But Pashinyan’s government appears to have successfully blunted his ability to influence the election’s outcome. 

Karapetyan was the force behind the formation in late 2025 of a pro-Russian opposition bloc called Strong Armenia. The bloc nominated him as its prime ministerial candidate in early 2026, but he was deemed ineligible due to the fact that the Armenian constitution prohibits dual citizens from running for a parliamentary seat. Karapetyan holds Russian and Cypriot citizenship in addition to having an Armenian passport. 

The Pashinyan-dominated parliament subsequently amended the electoral code in ways that have hampered Strong Armenia’s ability to campaign. And in late May, Armenia’s Investigative Committee announced an investigation into Narek Karapetyan, Samvel’s nephew and a leading Strong Armenia candidate, over allegations of concealing Russian citizenship, which is a disqualifying status under Armenian constitutional law.

According to an investigative report published May 19 by an exiled Russian media outlet, The Insider, Samvel Karapetyan has ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service, known as the FSB. The report also published evidence that the Kremlin is engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to influence the Armenian election’s outcome in ways that favor Russian interests.

Since April 2025, Kremlin-linked disinformation networks have increasingly targeted Armenia’s political space. Moscow has reportedly tasked Sergei Kiriyenko, who previously oversaw influence operations in Moldova and Georgia, with coordinating efforts in Armenia. The effectiveness of these initiatives, however, remains unclear.

The Moldovan experience suggests that even substantial Russian investments in information campaigns do not necessarily guarantee success when domestic institutions are resilient and Western partners are engaged. In December 2025, Armenia requested additional EU support in this area, and Brussels agreed to expand its anti-disinformation assistance. 

Beyond the information campaign, Russia retains significant economic leverage. It accounts for a large share of Armenia’s foreign trade and continues to supply natural gas at preferential rates. In reality, however, overt economic pressure can prove counterproductive by reinforcing Pashinyan’s narrative of the need for external diversification.

In the absence of a unified opposition or a broadly credible alternative, Pashinyan seems likely to retain power. As long as opposition forces remain fragmented, any runoff scenario would probably favor the incumbent over former presidents whose public support remains limited.

The deeper challenge, however, is one of legitimacy. Armenia may emerge from the election governed either by a prime minister with minimal popular backing or by opposition figures who also command little public trust. In either case, the next government is likely to face constraints in asserting a strong mandate.

This matters beyond Armenia itself. The country occupies a strategically sensitive position in the South Caucasus and has traditionally been a Russian foothold in the region. A Pashinyan victory would likely consolidate Armenia’s gradual integration with Western institutions, including closer ties with the EU and the United States, as well as continued engagement in the peace process with Azerbaijan. An opposition victory could, at least in the short term, redirect this trajectory.

Either outcome points to a period of governance marked by limited public confidence at a time when Armenia must make far-reaching strategic choices.

• Hripsime Hovhannisyan is a policy analyst specializing in South Caucasus affairs. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and has been actively conducting research on the region, with a focus on Armenia’s political landscape and regional dynamics.