Background
Armenia held its parliamentary elections on June 7. This time, the elections have grabbed global attention. The reasons behind this were the changing foreign policy direction, including a shift away from Russia, the normalisation of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, along with polarisation in Armenian society and domestic reforms led by the ruling Civil Contract Party, headed by PM Nikol Pashinyan.
In recent years, especially after Baku’s takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Armenia has distanced itself from Russia. Yerevan froze its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). At the same time, Armenia made concerted efforts to strengthen ties with the EU. On 26 March 2025, the Armenian parliament adopted the EU Integration Act, which officially endorsed Armenia’s EU accession. The bill calls on the Armenian government to begin the process of joining the EU, making the European integration of Armenia formally part of Armenian legislation.[1]
Post-Karabakh War, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan invested significant political capital in a negotiated peace agreement with Azerbaijan and a normalisation process with Turkey. In this regard, the outcome of these elections was expected to shape how the government in Yerevan would further navigate its relationships with Baku, Moscow, and Brussels.[2] The western narrative primarily labelled these elections as a deciding factor in determining Armenia’s foreign policy direction- whether towards Russia or the West.
Pashinyan, who has been in power since 2018, declared victory after exit polls showed his party securing more than 50% of the vote. Ruling party’s success came despite Pashinyan’s domestic support falling from 54% in 2021 to around 30% today, according to polls.[3] In the final result, the Civil Contract Party secured 49.8 per cent of the votes, while the pro-Russian Strong Armenia running on a pledge to maintain Armenia’s traditionally close ties to Russia secured 23.2 per cent. The pro-Russian Strong Armenia party has also called on Armenia’s election commission to annul the parliamentary election result due to “voting irregularities”. The opposition alliance’s Aram Vardevanyan stated that “the petition was submitted, alleging that the victory claimed by incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s governing Civil Contract party should not be allowed to stand, despite the huge margin”.[4]
Consequences of Pashinyan’s Re-election
The opposition parties expressed strong objections to the election results. Six opposition parties issued a joint statement rejecting the official results of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections. They argued that the voting was marred by systemic violations that undermined the integrity of the electoral process. The statement, signed by the Strong Armenia Alliance, Armenia Alliance, Prosperous Armenia Party, Bright Armenia Party, Armenian National Congress, and National Democratic Pole, asserts that “the official results do not reflect the true will of the Armenian people and cannot serve as the basis for forming a legitimate government that enjoys the confidence of the majority of citizens”. The opposition parties cited that the ruling regime has used widespread administrative resources, obstruction of opposition campaign headquarters, political persecution of opposition figures and activists, and abuse of state and pro-government media resources.[5]
These parties also warned that responsibility for any future escalation of the political situation in Armenia rests with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his government. As mentioned already, the Strong Armenia party appealed to the apex court to annul the election results or to call a second round of voting. They were arrested by the authorities. They also denounced the arrests of opposition politicians as an assault on democracy. Several other opposition parties followed suit, accusing the ruling party of forcing public-sector workers to vote for it and bribing other voters.[6]
This tug-of-war between the ruling and opposition parties in Armenia has further polarised public opinion in the country. They have been wanting Yerevan to reduce its dependence on Moscow, but at the same time, the bad memories of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the exodus of millions of Armenians from the region back to mainland Armenia will still haunt the people. There is a possibility of questioning the decision to normalise relations with Baku and Turkey.
Challenges Ahead
There are three primary challenges that Nikol Pashinyan faces right now. First, to control the opposition parties and their constant political accusations of elections being rigged. Secondly, to reduce economic dependence on Moscow. And thirdly, normalise relations with Baku by signing the peace treaty, which requires a constitutional amendment. The Civil Contract party lacks the two-thirds majority needed to initiate the constitutional referendum that would finalise the peace deal. This implies that Pashinyan has to cooperate with the pro-Russia politicians who are being arrested and vilified. In this scenario, there are uncertainties about the potential referendum on constitutional amendment.
While the inclination toward the west is evident, it would be wise if PM Pashinyan manage to balance the east and the west. He envisions Armenia acting as a regional economic hub once the Donald Trump-backed TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) corridor is built. This corridor will connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan’s exclave between Armenia and Turkey. Armenia is expected to benefit from transit through its territory. But its economy remains closely linked to Russia. Around 40 per cent of Armenian exports go to Russia, and it has benefited financially from Russian businesses and citizens relocating since Russia went to war against Ukraine. While diversification is possible through Western partners and regional states, it would take years for Armenia to stabilise economically after a decoupling with Russia.[7]
Navigating these challenges requires combative instincts and a farsighted, balanced geopolitical approach. On one hand, Nikol Pashinyan has to deal with growing opposition from the pro-Russian parties. At the same time, moving away from Russia economically may give a big jolt to the country’s economy. There is another risk that Europe’s leaders may question whether Nikol Pashinyan is a fully democratic leader if he continues to arrest and convict opposition leaders. For the time being, Europe’s main agenda in Armenia is to counter Russian influence. But in the long term, European states may adopt a cautious stance and become sceptical of Pashinyan’s respect for the rule of law, pluralism and civic freedoms. They might step up their support for Armenian civil society to ensure a guaranteed check on the drift towards one-man rule.[8]
Will Pashinyan be Able to Balance the Geopolitical Tightrope?
PM Nikol Pashinyan’s win in the parliamentary elections should not be interpreted as a mandate for breaking ties with Russia. It’s a lot tougher than it looks. Moscow still maintains a military base in Gyumri, and Yerevan still remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). At the last meeting of the EAEU Heads of State in Astana in May 2026, a joint statement by the EAEU leaders was adopted. The EAEU leaders demanded that Armenia hold a referendum on whether to join the EU or leave the EAEU as soon as possible. Moscow has already cleared its position when PM Pashniyan met Putin in April that Yerevan has to choose either the EU or the EAEU. This is the most difficult choice that Pashniyan has to make now. Considering the examples of other countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, which have applied for EU membership and are still waiting, Yerevan’s decision to join the EU may also take time or fail to bear fruit. In this situation, the right thing to do is to gradually diversify economic relations away from Russia, while keeping the EU aspiration on hold. EAEU benefits cannot be immediately substituted by European countries.
On hard security issues, Armenia might continue exploring partnerships with European countries. It may suspend its CSTO membership or may be expelled by the CSTO itself. Despite widespread narratives about the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus and elsewhere, Moscow retains significant leverage over Yerevan through trade, energy, military, intelligence, labour migration, and cultural connections. Pashinyan has not fully severed its ties with Moscow. Armenia’s dependence on Russia remains substantial and exceeds that of many other post-Soviet states. As a result, Pashinyan has never advocated severing ties with Moscow and is unlikely to do so.[9]
Implications for India
After PM Pashinyan won the elections, PM Modi also congratulated him. India and Armenia have a civilisational and historical relations dating back millennia. Due to the lack of a direct land route, the bilateral trade remained below potential. However, given the changing geopolitics of the South Caucasus, India has revised its policy toward the region in recent years. Mainly because of the Azerbaijan-Turkey and Pakistan nexus in the region, which has an indirect security concern for India. Armenia became the defence partner for New Delhi. According to expert estimates, both countries concluded contracts totalling US$1.5 billion, with the total volume of weapons purchases by Armenia from India reaching US$600 million by the start of the 2024-25 financial year.[10] Both countries have also been working toward diversifying the relations beyond the defence.
As it stands, the region’s geopolitics is changing rapidly; India should also revisit its policy toward the South Caucasus. New Delhi must consider the evolving dynamics of Armenia’s relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even Russia. India’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey are complex, while its relations with Russia are the most politically trusted. In this context, New Delhi must work towards diversifying its relations with Yerevan and should not keep them limited to just defence partnership.
Conclusion
Post-re-election of Nikol Pashinyan, the geopolitics in the South Caucasus is bound to change. There are a few things to observe. Yerevan’s aspirations for EU accession, managing ties with Russia and the EAEU, normalising relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and whether it will gain full support from the Armenian population. And lastly, if the USA and European countries continue to pursue their engagement with Armenia seriously for broader developmental goals rather than just to counter Russian influence. India should also closely monitor developments in the region and thus make its move carefully.
References
[1] Csongor Körömi, ‘Armenian parliament adopts law to launch EU membership process’, Politico, March 26, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-adopts-law-launch-european-union-accession-process/
[2] ‘Outcomes of the Armenian Parliamentary Elections, Implications for Armenia-EU Relations’, German Council on Foreign Relations, June 10, 2026 https://dgap.org/en/events/outcomes-armenian-parliamentary-elections
[3] Kathryn Armstrong and Rayhan Demytrie, ‘Armenia’s pro-West government wins election despite Russian pressure’, June 8, 2026. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgel990n51o
[4] ‘Pro-Russian opposition party calls for Armenian election result annulment’, Al Jazira, June 12, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/12/pro-russian-opposition-party-calls-for-armenian-election-result-annulment
[5] ‘Six Armenian Political Forces Reject Election Results, Say Official Data Does Not Reflect People’s Will’, Oragark News, June 14, 2026. st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;outline:none”>[6] Ibid.
[7] Matija Šerić, “Battle For Armenia: Yerevan Between Moscow And Washington – Analysis”, Eurasia Review, June 19, 2026. https://www.eurasiareview.com/19062026-battle-for-armenia-yerevan-between-moscow-and-washington-analysis/
[8] ‘Armenia’s westward turn overshadowed by personal rule, Civicus lens,’ June 18, 2026 https://lens.civicus.org/armenias-westward-turn-overshadowed-by-personal-rule/
[9] Sanshiro Hosaka, ‘Armenia After the Election: Diversification Without Decoupling from Russia’, International centre for Defence and Security, June 18, 2026. https://icds.ee/en/armenia-after-the-election-diversification-without-decoupling-from-russia/
[10] Nvard Chalikyan and Benyamin Poghosyan, “Geopolitical Aspects of the India-Armenia Partnership”, APRI Armenia, December 18, 2024. https://apri.institute/the-geopolitical-aspects-of-the-india-armenia-partnership/
(The paper does not necessarily represent the organisational stance… More >>