Author: Emil Lazarian

                                        Monday, 
Envoy Reiterates U.S. Stance On Karabakh
Armenia - Deputy Prime Minister Hambardzum Matevosian meets US Ambassador Lynne 
Tracy, 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unresolved after the 2020 
Armenian-Azerbaijani war, the U.S. ambassador to Armenia, Lynne Tracy, 
reportedly reiterated on Monday.
Tracy and Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Hambardzum Matevosian discussed the 
conflict, among other issues, at a meeting in Yerevan.
An Armenian government statement on the meeting said Matevosian praised the U.S. 
involvement in long-running international efforts to broker a Karabakh 
settlement.
“Ambassador Tracy concurred with the deputy prime minister: the issue of 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s status is not resolved and that process must be carried out 
under the aegis of the co-chairmanship of the OSCE Minsk Group,” added the 
statement.
Tracy already made such statements last year after U.S. President Joe Biden said 
Washington remains committed to facilitating a “comprehensive” 
Armenian-Azerbaijani peace deal together with Russia and France, the two other 
co-chairs of the Minsk Group.
“We do not see the status of Nagorno-Karabakh as having been resolved,” the 
envoy insisted on September 13 in remarks condemned by Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry echoed President Ilham Aliyev’s claims that 
Azerbaijan’s victory in the war put an end to the conflict.
Aliyev repeated those claims in early January. He also mocked the Minsk Group 
co-chairs and questioned the wisdom of their continued activities.
“They must not deal with the Karabakh conflict because that conflict has been 
resolved,” Aliyev told Azerbaijani television.
A senior Russian diplomat said a few days later that the U.S., Russian and 
French mediators should be able to resume their visits to Nagorno-Karabakh as 
part of their peace efforts. Armenian officials backed that statement.
The co-chairs had for decades travelled to Karabakh and met with its ethnic 
Armenian leadership during regular tours of the conflict zone. The visits 
practically stopped with the onset of the coronavirus pandemic and the 
subsequent outbreak of the Armenian-Azerbaijani war.
The mediators planned to resume their shuttle diplomacy after organizing talks 
between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers in New York in September. 
The trip has still not taken place, however.
Armenian Judge Faces Arrest After Freeing Oppositionist
        • Naira Bulghadarian
Armenia -- The main entrance to the National Security Service building in 
Yerevan.
Armenian law-enforcement authorities have moved to arrest a judge just days 
after he ordered the release of yet another jailed opposition figure.
A spokesman for Prosecutor-General Artur Davtian said on Monday that he has 
asked Armenia’s Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to allow the National Security 
Service (NSS) to indict and arrest Boris Bakhshiyan, who works at the court of 
first instead of Syunik province.
He refused to reveal the accusations which the NSS wants to bring against 
Bakhshiyan, citing the “secrecy” of the investigation and the need to show 
respect for the judge.
Aleksandr Azarian, the chairman of the Union of Judges of Armenia, expressed 
serious concern over the criminal proceedings, linking them to Bakhshiyan’s 
professional activities.
“We will closely monitor further developments and come up with an appropriate 
statement if necessary,” Azarian said in a statement.
Armenia -- Ashot Minasian.
As recently as on January 26, Bakhshiyan agreed to grant bail to Ashot Minasian, 
a prominent war veteran and opposition activist arrested on December 1.
Minasian and three other opposition figures were charged in November 2020 with 
plotting to kill Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and overthrow his government. 
The NSS claimed to have found large quantities of weapons and ammunition in a 
Syunik property belonging to Minasian.
Later in December 2021, the NSS dropped the coup charges strongly denied by all 
four men. But Minasian remained accused of illegal arms and was not set free 
until last week’s decision made by the Syunik judge.
Bakhshiyan also freed last fall two local government officials from Syunik 
affiliated with the main opposition Hayastan alliance. They were arrested last 
summer on separate charges rejected by them as politically motivated.
Erik Aleksanian, a trial attorney critical of the Armenian government, said 
Bakhshiyan is prosecuted because he freed the oppositionists. He claimed that 
the authorities want to punish him for those decisions and discourage other 
judges from thwarting politically motivated criminal cases.
Prosecutor-General Davtian’s spokesman, Gor Abrahamian, denied that. Speaking 
with RFE/RL’s Armenian Service, Abrahamian said that the move to arrest 
Bakhshiyan has nothing to with Minasian’s release and that it stems from “an 
incident that occurred much earlier.”
In recent months, Armenian opposition groups, lawyers and some judges have 
accused the authorities of seeking to increase government influence on Armenian 
courts under the guise of judicial reforms. The authorities deny this, insisting 
that the reforms are on increasing judicial independence in the country.
A controversial government bill enacted last year empowered the Armenian 
Ministry of Justice to demand disciplinary action against judges by the Supreme 
Judicial Council (SJC), a state body overseeing Armenian courts.
In a joint statement issued in early January, a dozen judges, among them 
Azarian, accused Justice Minister Karen Andreasian of abusing that authority to 
try to bully them and their colleagues known for their independence.
Minister Set To Become Armenia’s New President
        • Naira Nalbandian
Armenia - Economist and opposition politician Vahagn Khachatrian speaks at a 
seminar in Yerevan, April 30, 2013
High-Tech Industry Minister Vahagn Khachatrian on Monday effectively confirmed 
reports that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has offered him to become Armenia’s 
next president.
The largely ceremonial post became vacant after President Armen Sarkissian 
unexpectedly announced his resignation on January 22, citing a lack of 
constitutional powers. Sarkissian’s successor is to be elected for a seven-year 
term by the Armenian parliament controlled by Pashinian’s Civil Contract party.
Pashinian indicated on January 23 that he will replace Sarkissian by a figure 
loyal to him but did not name any candidates. Armenian media outlets reported 
over the weekend that the prime minister and his political team have decided to 
nominate Khachatrian.
Khachatrian did not deny the reports when he spoke with journalists. He said he 
meets the qualifications of the job spelled out by the Armenian constitution.
“In these circumstances I could presumably be on the list [of presidential 
candidates] given that I’m a member of the current government and the [ruling] 
political team,” he said.
Under the constitution, Sarkissian will be formally relieved of his duties 
unless he withdraws by Monday night his resignation letter submitted to the 
National Assembly. In that case, parliament speaker Alen Simonian will serve as 
interim president of the republic pending the election of a new head of state, 
which should happen by the beginning of March.
Khachatrian, 62, is an economist who had served as mayor of Yerevan from 
1992-1996 during former President Levon Ter-Petrosian’s rule. He was a staunch 
political ally of Ter-Petrosian until agreeing to join the government last 
August.
Ter-Petrosian has been highly critical of Pashinian since Armenia’s defeat in 
the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, branding the premier as a “nation-destroying 
scourge.” The ex-president has also slammed several members of his entourage who 
took up senior state positions over the past year.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2022 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
 

Tribune News Service of India
New Delhi, Jan. 30, 2022
Turkey is the new Dubai as far as influence operations against Kashmir
are concerned, concur security officials here who are now detecting
attempts to expand its ambit to cover the Indian mainland Muslims as
well as raise doubts about India’s foreign policy.
Two intelligence reports late last year had flagged the emergence of
Turkey as the hub of anti-India activities pushed by Pakistan’s ISI
after its earlier stomping grounds of the UAE and Saudi Arabia became
out of bounds as these countries intensified ties with Delhi to the
extent of storing their strategic reserves in India.
The expansion of Turkey’s foreign policy footprint tallies with
Ankara’s attempt to influence Muslims beyond the Arab heartland.
Despite a failed attempt to form a grouping with Pakistan and
Malaysia, ties with ISI turned warmer and have gone beyond Kashmir to
backing Islamist organisations in India.
The report to NSC Secretariat speaks of three-pronged efforts by the
Turkish government and related institutions — by media (employment to
Kashmiri journalists); educational institutes (well-paying
scholarships) and NGOs (influence Indian Muslims on foreign policy
inimical to Indian interests).
 

Asia Times
[If the buffer states between Berlin and Moscow disappear, the Germans
will quickly be between a rock and a hard place]
By Francesco Sisci
Many German gains at the end of the first Cold War could be lost. The
possibility of a second Cold War in Europe is no longer farfetched
and, to avoid it, Berlin should perhaps look it right in the eye and
think of China.
Germany was the country that gained the most since the end of the Cold
War 30 years ago. It regained the unity it lost in 1945, and it pushed
Russia back over a two “buffer-country” line, the greatest distance
from its unwieldy neighbor in its entire history.
The new buffer state lines were those of the former Soviet empire that
joined the European Union (EU) and NATO, and the fledgling states
emerging from the Soviet collapse such as Belarus and Ukraine.
Then, Germany saw a huge field of possibilities to expand its
increasingly precise and efficient manufacturing industry, while other
developed countries were chasing the new internet economy and exiting
manufacturing.
Eastern Europe, Russia and also China were all anxious to buy the
symbol products of new wealth: the BMWs, Mercedes and Porsches, all
far more glittering and tangible than the ethereal latest services
from the web – Google, Amazon and Facebook.
The rest of the EU was bound to Germany by the euro, by the
ever-closer relations of financial and productive subordination to
Germany’s virtuous debt to GDP ratio and by essential supply lines
stretching to Italy, Spain and France.
These European relationships were growing stronger and more solid than
those with America. The basis of American-European relations had been
defense against the Soviet threat, but with the collapse of the USSR
that existential threat was gone.
But the US-NATO defense alliance was abused, with high costs and low
performing deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, there was
the euro, separated from the dollar, and Washington’s increasing
distraction by Asia, which was not a challenge for Germany.
For Germany, the efficiency of its economy was the answer to any
theoretical political trial. For Germany, it was an ideal world – if
Russia had not begun to change it by narrowing the buffer lines.
Thinner buffers
Since 2008, Russia had eliminated or thinned the first line of buffer
countries. Listing the events in no particular order, Russia has split
and caged Georgia with a series of internal and external conflicts.
It has successfully supported the Assad regime in Syria, strengthening
itself in its port of Tarsus in the Mediterranean Sea. It aided the
Benghazi faction in Libya, it foiled a democratic election in Belarus
and virtually reannexed the republic. It detached Crimea from Ukraine
and annexed it.
Russia also tried to expand into Azerbaijan supporting Armenian
ambitions. It failed, but Armenia is now closer to Moscow. Moscow may
have inspired a coup in Kazakhstan, and in practice extended its power
throughout former Soviet Central Asia, thereby erasing any dreams of
an alternative gas supply to Russia.
There was a prospect of bringing Kazakh or Turkish gas to Europe and
Germany with a pipeline through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and
Turkey. Instead, Russia wanted and wants to channel all that gas only
through its pipelines to increase its political leverage with the EU
and indirectly with the US.
All this leaves Germany in a very different reality than 30 years ago.
Russia is now much closer to German borders. It can also be a good
thing because some of the countries returned under the strict
protection of Moscow were considered by some as bunglers and
scoundrels, and it was so much better to talk directly with the
Russians.
But the Russian extension to the west has also sent the second line of
buffer countries, those now in the EU and NATO, into turmoil and
dwindles prospects of negotiations on energy supplies. If the Russian
pipelines have no potential alternatives in Central Asian gas routed
through Turkey, then Berlin is under a Russian monopoly.
Germans can console themselves by thinking that the Russians need
German euros more than the Germans need Russian gas. But the reality
is that the Russians have proven that they are willing to suffer for a
political purpose, so they can take fewer euros. The Germans, on the
other hand, can hardly do without gas.
So, what can happen in the Ukraine crisis for Germany? The pro-Russian
coup in Kazakhstan may show that Moscow does not want a neutral
government in Kiev, nor a buffer state, but a satellite country.
For Berlin, the idea of admitting into NATO a fragile and decomposed
country, a “thief” of gas from the pipelines, like Ukraine is
certainly disturbing. But the de facto annexation of this immense land
and the anxiety and apprehension it spins throughout Europe, with
ramifications as far as Portugal, opens up possibly worse scenarios.
The ghost of a second Cold War in Europe, not only in Asia, is rising
again. Here, Germany will want to avoid being on the front line again,
at all costs, and must protect itself. Russia may want guarantees but
similarly so does the rest of Europe.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s move toward Ukraine, at the same
time as the coup in Kazakhstan, opens up new and existential scenarios
for Germany. The time when commercial economic integration could
replace geopolitics is over.
If Germany does not oppose Russia in Ukraine, it returns to the front
line and becomes a subject, not a leader, of the EU. The relationship
with the US, today dialectic, becomes hierarchical again because only
America can guarantee German security from the Russians or from
Polish, Romanian and Baltic anxiety.
Germany cannot get out of its geography, much less out of the EU and
NATO. It can try to play there, but Putin has changed his games.
Putin’s miscalculations
In other words, Putin may have miscalculated. By pushing too hard on
Ukraine, he found resistance and in the face of this resistance, he
did not immediately withdraw, but insisted, and so he is forcing
Germany into choices it did not want to make.
Berlin would have wanted to maintain a special axis with Moscow over
the other European countries, but this axis cannot exist in spite of
the European countries. If it has to be in spite of them, Germany may
be pushed to bend with the rest of Europe.
It is unthinkable and not practical that it would choose Moscow over
Europe, which it is an integral part of.
Therein lies the dilemma. Putin is in a corner and coming out of the
Ukraine game defeated could have heavy domestic consequences. Chaos in
Moscow would be a jinx for Berlin.
Germany may want an honorable compromise for Putin, but the Eastern
European countries may want to take this opportunity to push back the
Russians and step out of their shadow with more certainty, even at the
cost of possible instability in Moscow.
Moreover, beyond the intentions of others, Putin is hesitating by
keeping troops on the border without letting them withdraw or advance.
The more time that passes in this indecision, the weaker his hand
becomes, and the more complicated the game and German desires also
become.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz thus faces not a simple crisis in
Ukraine, but rather a complex redefinition of his country’s foreign
and economic policy after 30 years. And he has no time, because
Putin’s indecision does not help him.
That leaves the energy question. How does one survive or resist under
threat from Putin’s gas policies? Russian gas is indeed convenient,
but now thanks to new shale technologies, the world has perhaps more
oil and gas than mineral water.
Extractions have been reduced due to the economic crisis after Covid
and production has not restarted immediately. But the gas is there and
there’s a lot of it. The immediate problem is how to bring it to
Europe.
If liquified American gas comes in, regasification plants must be
equipped, but once that happens, Russian gas may become redundant.
Here the Russians have a window of only a few months to bargain with
the Germans and the Americans.
This, however, touches on webs of legitimate personal and business
interests that have been intertwined with Russian gas over the past
decades. These entanglements today may cloud the vision of many in
Europe and contribute to confusion, multiplying the risks of mistakes
and accidents in Ukraine and its surroundings.
Finally, how the Germans handle the Russians in Ukraine could become
the foreplay of a more sensitive terrain – how Berlin (and by
association the EU) will handle China. So far Germany has been very
good in keeping the two issues apart – a stern position on human
rights issues, and a very realistic approach to business.
Still, if things change with Russia, then they may change with China,
too. Priorities and goals are different between the two countries.
Still, if a new era of geopolitics is looming and realistic
geoeconomics is doomed, Germany may want to think hard about it.
This is very important for China, too. Perhaps Beijing should consider
what it should do to keep economic and political relations with
Germany and the EU on a fairly even keel when perhaps an even bigger
storm is coming.
 

                                        Tuesday, January 25, 2022
Corruption Survey Finds No Further Progress In Armenia
January 25, 2022
        • Nane Sahakian
Germany -- Microphone cables dangle over a logo of Transparency International 
(TI) during a press conference in Berlin, 23Sep2008
Armenia has practically not improved its position in an annual survey of 
corruption perceptions around the world conducted by Transparency International.
It ranks, together with Greece, Jordan and Namibia, 58th out of 180 countries 
and territories evaluated in the Berlin-based watchdog’s 2021 Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) presented on Tuesday.
Armenia and two other countries shared 60th place in the previous CPI released a 
year ago. Transparency International assigned the South Caucasus state a CPI 
“score” of 49 out of 100 at the time.
The watchdog kept the score, which is above the global average of 43, unchanged 
in the latest survey.
“Following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Armenia initially made both significant 
democratic improvements and positive strides against corruption, climbing 15 
points on the CPI over the last decade,” it said in a report. “But despite 
progress, in 2021 promised anti-corruption and judicial reforms stalled in the 
wake of the political and economic crisis triggered by the pandemic and renewed 
conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.”
“No progress was registered in 2021,” agreed Varuzhan Hoktanian, the programs 
director at Transparency International’s Armenian affiliate.
“I don’t yet see serious economic, political or social reforms,” he said. “That 
is why we have this situation.”
Armenia was 105th in the rankings three years ago. A Transparency International 
report released in January 2021 hailed “steady and positive improvements in 
anti-corruption” achieved there since the 2018 regime change.
Armenia - Varuzhan Hoktanian of the Armenian branch of Transparency 
International at a news conference in Yerevan, 15Mar2017.
Hoktanian suggested that the major change in corruption perceptions reflected 
post-revolution optimism that reigned in the country in 2018-2019.
“People expected things to get better,” Hoktanian told a news conference. “That 
is why the CPI went up. Now that period [of euphoria] is over, and both 
businesspeople and local and international experts are starting to perceive the 
situation with corruption through more concrete facts.”
“Secondly, you may recall that some serious steps were taken [by the 
authorities] in 2018 and 2019,” he said. “Whether that was good or bad is a 
different question.”
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has repeatedly claimed to have eliminated 
“systemic corruption” since coming to power in May 2018. Armenian 
law-enforcement authorities have launched dozens of high-profile corruption 
investigations during his rule. They have mostly targeted former top government 
officials and individuals linked to them.
The authorities set up last year a special law-enforcement agency tasked with 
investigating corruption cases. They are also forming new courts that will deal 
only with such cases.
Critics say that Pashinian uses corruption inquiries to crack down on his 
political opponents. They also claim that some members of his entourage are busy 
enriching themselves or their cronies.
Companies owned by or linked otherwise to at least three senior Armenian 
officials, including Pashinian’s deputy chief of staff, won dozens of government 
contracts in 2021, raising suspicions of a conflict of interest and even 
corruption. Pashinian insisted last month that they did not exploit their 
government connections to win tenders for road construction and procurements.
Armenian President Faces Fraud Probe After Resignation
January 25, 2022
        • Naira Nalbandian
Armenia - New Armenian President Armen Sarkissian arrives for his inauguration 
ceremony in Yerevan, 9 April 2018.
Two days after President Armen Sarkissian’s surprise resignation, Armenia’s main 
security agency was instructed to look into a media report alleging that he was 
not eligible to serve as head of state because of concealing a foreign 
citizenship.
Sarkissian, in office since 2018, announced his resignation in a written 
statement released late on Sunday. He attributed the move to the fact that the 
Armenian constitution gives the president of the republic mainly ceremonial 
powers.
Hetq.am, an independent investigative publication, claimed on Monday that 
Sarkissian stepped down because it emerged that he violated a constitutional 
provision stipulating that the president must have been a citizen of only 
Armenia for at least six years preceding their election by the parliament.
The publication said that an ongoing investigation conducted by it jointly with 
the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), an international 
watchdog, has revealed that Sarkissian was a citizen of the Caribbean island 
country of Saint Kitts and Nevis “not long before being elected president in 
March 2018.”
It said that in written comments to Hetq.am Sarkissian asserted that he had 
automatically gained that citizenship in return for investing in a local hotel a 
decade ago. He said he instructed his lawyers to hand back his passport to 
authorities in Saint Kitts and Nevis shortly before being appointed as Armenia’s 
ambassador to Britain in 2013.
According to the report, Sarkissian claimed to have discovered in 2017 that the 
lawyers failed to fulfill his wish. He said he then made sure he does not have 
that citizenship anymore.
Armenia - President Serzh Sarkisian (R) meets with Armenian Ambassador to 
Britain Armen Sarkissian in Yerevan, 19Jan2018.
Hetq.am noted that Sarkissian answered its questions during a visit to the 
United Arab Emirates which he wrapped up on January 18.
The presidential press office announced at the end of the trip that Sarkissian 
is going on a “short vacation” to undergo a “necessary medical examination.” He 
is believed to have flown to another foreign country without returning to 
Armenia.
The office did not comment on the report on Tuesday.
A spokesman for Armenian prosecutors told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service that they 
have told the National Security Service (NSS) to “verify” the information 
contained in the report. He said this will be done “within the framework” of a 
criminal case opened by prosecutors last May.
That inquiry was launched following renewed allegations that Sarkissian, who 
lived in the United Kingdom for nearly three decades before returning to Armenia 
in 2018, remained a British national after 2011. Law-enforcement authorities 
have still not released any details of the probe.
The 68-year-old president has insisted all along that he renounced his British 
citizenship in 2011.
Pashinian Again Accused Of Making Pro-Azeri Statements
January 25, 2022
        • Sargis Harutyunyan
Armenia - Tigran Abrahamian, a parliament deputy from the opposition Pativ Unem 
bloc, at a news conference, Yerevan, January 25, 2022.
Representatives of Armenia’s two leading opposition forces have accused Prime 
Minister Nikol Pashinian of again signaling his readiness to help Azerbaijan 
regain full control over Nagorno-Karabakh.
In a televised interview aired late on Monday, Pashinian was asked to comment on 
the possibility of Armenian recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity 
through a “peace treaty” sought by Baku.
He responded by claiming that Armenia already did so when it signed and ratified 
in 1992 a treaty on the creation of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS).
“Armenia and Azerbaijan de jure recognized in 1992 the inviolability of borders 
and [each other’s] territorial integrity within the bounds of borders existing 
in the CIS,” he said.
Pashinian also argued that territorial integrity of states has been one of the 
main elements of peace plans on Karabakh jointly drawn up by the U.S., Russian 
and French mediators.
Armenia - Gegham Manukian of the opposition Hayastan alliance speaks during a 
paliament session in Yerevan, October 27, 2021
Lawmakers representing the main opposition Hayastan alliance were quick to 
portray the remarks as further proof of Pashinian’s readiness to end Armenian 
control over Karabakh. One of them, Gegham Manukian, accused him of echoing 
“Azerbaijani arguments” in the conflict.
“According to him, Karabakh is Azerbaijan. Period,” another Hayastan deputy, 
Andranik Tevanian, wrote on Facebook.
Tigran Abrahamian of the Pativ Unem bloc, the other parliamentary opposition 
force, added his voice to these allegations on Tuesday.
“Nikol Pashinian is trying to substantiate Artsakh’s being Azerbaijani 
territory,” he told a news conference.
Abrahamian also argued that the so-called Madrid Principles of a Karabakh 
settlement, which were first put forward by the mediating powers in 2007, 
include not only territorial integrity but also people’s right to 
self-determination.
Armenia - Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian meets with Karabakh President Arayik 
Harutyuanian, Yerevan, January 24, 2022.
Various versions of that peace plan stipulated that Karabakh’s predominantly 
Armenian population would be able to determine the disputed territory’s 
internationally recognized status in a future referendum.
Pashinian has repeatedly criticized the proposed peace deal since Armenia’s 
defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. He claimed late last month that they 
envisaged the eventual restoration of Azerbaijani control over Karabakh. He also 
declared that “Artsakh (Karabakh) could not have ended up being completely 
Armenian.”
Those remarks were condemned by the Armenian opposition as well as Karabakh’s 
leadership. The latter openly accused Pashinian of making statements playing 
into Baku’s hands.
In a January 2021 article, Pashinian likewise said that the U.S., Russian and 
French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group sought a “surrender of lands” to 
Azerbaijan and offered the Armenian side nothing in return. The then Russian 
co-chair of the group, Igor Popov, bluntly denied the claim.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2022 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.