Daghestani man nicknamed ‘Donald Trump’ fined for anti-Armenian comments on T

OC Media
Mar 10 2026

A man from Daghestan posting under the handle ‘Donald Trump’ has been fined ₽10,000 ($125) for making comments on Telegram containing insults and calls for violence against Armenians.

Tofik Ismailov, 33, was fined by the Lenin District Court in Daghestan on 4 March.

Ismailov was found guilty of inciting hatred or enmity, as well as ‘humiliating the dignity of a person or group of persons on the basis of nationality’. These charges only apply if such actions were committed publicly, including online, but do not constitute a criminal offence.

According to the case materials, the administrative proceedings were initiated over comments the Telegram user left under the nickname ‘Donald Trump’. The authorities have concluded that the posts encouraged ‘actions involving violence, danger, and causing harm’ towards Armenians.

The comments were discovered as early as August 2025. The administrative case was opened on 24 February 2026 by the deputy prosecutor of the Lenin District of Makhachkala following the results of the investigation. In early March, the case materials were submitted to the court. They were initially returned to correct procedural deficiencies, after which, on 4 March, the case was resubmitted to court and considered for consideration.

According to the ruling, during the court session Ismailov did not deny that he had used the account under the name ‘Donald Trump’ nor that he had posted anti-Armenian comments. He admitted his guilt and confirmed that he personally published the posts.

When determining his punishment, the court took into account that Ismailov had admitted his guilt and had not previously been held administratively liable under the same article. These circumstances were considered mitigating. No aggravating circumstances were identified.

As a result, the court imposed the minimum fine provided by law — ₽10,000 ($125). Punishment for such a crime could range between a penalty of between ₽10,000 and ₽20,000 ($125-$250), 100 hours of community service, or 15 days of administrative detention.

The fine must be paid no later than 60 days from the date the decision comes into effect. If the fine is not paid, the offender may face additional liability for evading administrative punishment. This can include a double fine, administrative detention, or community service.

Toward Historic Peace In The South Caucasus Amid Instability In The Middle Eas

Eurasia Review
Mar 10 2026

By Fuad Abdullayev

Introduction

The global geopolitical architecture is undergoing a period of profound and consequential transformation. Within this, the Middle East has once again become the epicenter of global tension, where the escalating conflict between Iran on one side and the U.S. and Israel on the other has evolved into an open confrontation. The ramifications of this conflict are far from just local; its shockwaves extend far beyond the Persian Gulf, directly destabilizing neighboring macro-regions.

Paradoxically, however, against the backdrop of this external threat, the region is actually witnessing unprecedented steps being taken towards the establishment of durable peace and stability. At the heart of this is the transformation being observed in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, which shows that even under conditions of global uncertainty, countries can in challenging circumstances find ways to achieve pragmatic coexistence.

The Irreplaceability of Peace and the Middle Corridor

The escalation in the Middle East has served to highlight several important factors for the South Caucasus and its states:

  • First, the war on the region’s southern borders demonstrates that the security of regional states is closely interconnected. Under conditions of global uncertainty, any unresolved regional conflicts make countries extremely vulnerable to external geopolitical and economic challenges.
  • Second, the global logistics crisis created by the Iran-U.S. confrontation reinforced the importance of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor). Stretching from Central Asia through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus to Europe, this route has proven to be the safest and most reliable bridge between East and West.
  • Third, the crisis revealed the vital importance for states of having alternative access routes to world markets. Armenia has felt this particularly acutely. Facing the threat of a blocked or severely restricted southern transit vector (via Iran), Yerevan realized that lack of logistical alternatives is a direct threat to its national interests. Integration into international logistics projects through the territories of neighbors has become not just a matter of economic growth, but a fundamental security issue.

Threats to Armenia

The ongoing military clash between the U.S. and Israel on one side and Iran on the other hand does not only shift the balance of power at the macro level. It also has direct implications for the economic model which Armenia has been following. Recently, Armenia has been actively diversifying its economy and foreign trade by focusing more actively on engaging with Middle Eastern countries.

Within this process, Iran played a unique strategic role. Tehran acted not only as an indispensable trade and economic partner for Armenia but also as a key transit hub connecting the country with Persian Gulf ports, Arab markets, and India. Given Armenia’s closed borders with Türkiye and Azerbaijan, its southern border has historically served as a “lifeline”. Official Yerevan’s recent economic reorientation toward the Arab world, especially in light of the Armenian leadership’s desire to reduce traditional economic dependence on Russia, has made the country even more dependent on this transit direction.

Therefore, experts predict that if this conflict persists, it will have serious consequences for Yerevan in several critical areas: logistics, trade, and regional security. Specifically, the potential influx of refugees, the risk of spreading radical groups, and the general militarization of the region are cited as significant burdens on national security.

The Washington Agreements of August 8, 2025

The realization that the South Caucasus must cease to be a battlefield and should instead increase its participation in global trade networks, along with Azerbaijan’s determination in the pursuit of stability, led Baku and Yerevan to engage in a more pragmatic bilateral format. As a result of this diplomatic initiative, the parties met in Abu Dhabi on July 10, 2025, holding key consultations that laid the necessary groundwork for further progress in the peace process. Subsequently, on August 8, 2025, a draft peace treaty was initialed in Washington, and the agreements reached became a turning point. The initialing of the treaty in Washington signaled to the international community that the 30-year conflict was nearing a decisive resolution. This event enabled the process between the two countries to transition from political dialogue to tangible and concrete steps being taken in the direction of establishing resilient economic ties.

Gestures of Goodwill and Mutual Benefit

The uniqueness of the progress being observed at the current stage is that landmark positive changes began to occur even before the formal signing of the final peace treaty. Demonstrating its commitment to the spirit of the Washington agreements, Azerbaijan took several steps:

  1. Opening Transit Routes: Azerbaijan has authorized the transit of goods to Armenia through its territory. The importance of these transit opportunities for Armenia has increased even further since the eruption of the current crisis in Iran.
  2. Energy Supply: Baku began the direct supply of gasoline and diesel fuel to Armenia, which helped stabilize the neighboring country’s domestic energy market and uphold its competitiveness during a moment of crisis.
  3. Humanitarian Gesture: Azerbaijan performed a humanitarian gesture by releasing four individuals of Armenian descent who had been accused.

These actions demonstrate the clear dividends which are brought about by an environment of peace and emerging regional stability. Moreover, it sends an important signal going forward, as a finalized peace treaty would lead to even greater economic benefits for both countries. Azerbaijan will secure a reliable land connection with Nakhchivan (through TRIPP/the Zangezur Corridor) and consolidate its status as Eurasia’s main logistics hub. Armenia, in turn, will emerge from years of isolation, diversify its economy, gain access to new markets, and escape existential dependence.

Internal Challenges and the Constitutional Obstacle

Despite the clear successes and unprecedented economic advantages already generated by the peace process, the final signing of the treaty still continues to face serious domestic political and legal hurdles. Upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia will be decisive for the entire region. For the peace process to advance and conclude successfully, Armenian society must make a strategic choice: either support political forces favoring regional integration, economic development, and peace, or side with proponents of revanchism and continued confrontation. Choosing peace will guarantee the country’s ability to seize its historic chance for prosperity.

It should also be noted that the primary obstacle today, as repeatedly emphasized by participants in the negotiation process, remains Armenia’s legal framework. To establish a solid, unshakable peace, the Armenian Constitution and certain official documents (references to the Declaration of Independence, etc.) must be free of even indirect territorial claims against the neighboring state. The existence of such clauses creates a loophole for future conflicts. Synchronizing domestic legislation with international legal norms and peace treaty obligations is not merely a diplomatic formality, but a fundamental condition for the consolidation of mutual trust.

Hence, the South Caucasus stands on the threshold of a new era. While conflict rages in the Middle East, Baku and Yerevan have a historic opportunity to prove that political will, pragmatism, and a focus on building economic interdependence can overcome decades of hostility and serve as a global example for years to come. 

‘This is not peace, but defeatism’: a dissenting view on Armenia’s security s

JAM News
Mar 13 2026

  • Armine Martirosyan
  • Yerevan

The situation in the Middle East is extremely tense. Powers are trying to redraw borders, and the balance of power is shifting. Some Armenian experts say the region now follows the same logic that the South Caucasus experienced in 2020. In their view, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh that year created a new regional order. In this order, force dictates the rules rather than law. Since then, they argue, Yerevan has chosen a strategy of concessions.

CIS affairs expert Lilit Grigoryan says this approach amounts to “not peace, but defeatism”. Here is her view on what Armenia should do to ensure its security.


  • ‘Peace is strengthening’: outcomes of the third meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani experts
  • Pashinyan and Aliyev receive the Zayed Prize for Peace Efforts: why it matters
  • Opinion: ‘Armenia is returning to space it was pushed out of’

Iran between weakening and fragmentation

“What is happening in Iran is the result of processes that have unfolded over decades. The weakening of Iraq after the US invasion disrupted the regional balance of power. A redistribution of that balance became only a matter of time. Today the Middle East is undergoing a major reconfiguration, in which Israel pursues its own ambitions.

Two scenarios appear possible for Iran. The first is the gradual weakening of the regime while the country’s territorial integrity remains intact. Most European states support this scenario. The second is the fragmentation of Iran through support for separatist movements in certain regions. Israel is primarily interested in that option.

In any case, the regime will weaken. However, a prolonged conflict harms the countries of the Persian Gulf, which are already suffering significant losses. War drives oil prices up. Russia benefits from this situation. The United States has eased sanctions pressure in some areas and granted India a 30-day exemption from the ban on purchasing Russian oil. In addition, some weapons that had been intended for Ukraine are now being used against Iran. The conflict itself also shifts international attention away from the Ukrainian front, which again works in Moscow’s favour.”

South Caucasus without international law

“What is happening in the Middle East today already took place in the South Caucasus in 2020. At that time, with the consent of Russia, Turkey and Iran, a redistribution of power began. Russia and Azerbaijan changed the regional balance to Armenia’s detriment. This process created a new model — regionalism. In this model, major players, primarily Russia and Turkey, set the red lines, while smaller countries such as Armenia and Georgia accept the new realities. Azerbaijan became a co-author of this model.

Regionalism is essentially an anti-Western concept. Smaller states seek security through cooperation with regional heavyweights rather than through Western institutions. Armenia now acts within this logic. It declares friendly relations with everyone but relies primarily on regional powers. Discussions about Yerevan pursuing a Western course contradict the idea of regionalism. Armenia’s actual policies suggest something different.

However, this model contains a fundamental flaw. The new order rests on force rather than law. Previously, the issue of Artsakh was addressed within the OSCE Minsk Group, where the key principle was the non-use of force. Russia and Azerbaijan dismantled that structure with Armenia’s effective participation. The region now operates according to the principle of force. This means the costs of the new order will fall first and foremost on the weakest states — the smaller countries.”

Peace in exchange for concessions

“Military action against Armenia will resume the moment it stops making concessions. As long as it continues to concede, there will be no military escalation.

Ahead of the elections, the authorities will avoid any steps that could provoke escalation. Their key message is an economic breakthrough and lasting peace in the region for 99 years, according to TRIPP. It is a politically advantageous position: the authorities can accuse any opponent of potentially bringing the country to disaster and war.”

The “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) is a proposed transport corridor that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan.

Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to unblock the route with mediation from the US president. An American consortium would take part in managing the business operations linked to the project.

“But in a situation where the collective West no longer exists as a guarantor of international law, the greatest danger is the loss of a sense of reality — something the authorities are actively encouraging. Countries that can assess the situation soberly and recognise that the region is entering a period of military tension will emerge with the fewest losses.

When society sincerely believes that a single route — TRIPP, whose economic dividends remain uncertain — can solve everything, the most dangerous combination arises: loss of vigilance, lack of political will and absence of strategy.

The minimum Armenia can do under these conditions is pursue a policy of deterrence. But that requires political vision and determination.”

Deterrence strategy — the only way forward for Armenia

“A policy of deterrence is not the same as resilience. Resilience responds to blows after they occur. Active deterrence works preventively. A country identifies risks in advance and removes them before they grow. It seeks autonomy in all areas, not only in the military sphere.

Armenia has proclaimed ‘peace at any cost’. In reality, the country is moving not towards peace or stability but towards steady decline. The authorities have no plan B. Society is becoming divided and losing a clear understanding of what is happening. Under such conditions, the country risks finding itself unprepared for new challenges.

A policy of deterrence requires concrete steps. Armenia must secure supply chains. It must ensure food and energy security and manage water resources. Psychological preparation of society is also important. This is not about military mobilisation but about civic readiness. People should know what to do in a worst-case scenario. Regions should be able to provide themselves with food and fuel. They should maintain communication even without the internet and deliver basic medical assistance.

The military dimension also requires deep reform. Azerbaijani forces are consolidating their presence in occupied territories while Armenia remains passive. This passivity opens the way to creeping annexation. The logic is simple: if a country allows an adversary to entrench itself, the next step will be further advances. Limited tactical operations and targeted actions could prevent the opponent from feeling secure there and gradually push it back from the positions it has taken.”

Armenia plays by its opponent’s rules

“Armenia’s current policy accepts Azerbaijan’s appeasement programme. Baku openly calls it the peace of the victor: Azerbaijan sets the terms and Armenia agrees.

Inside the country and across the diaspora, many follow the same logic. First accept these conditions, rebuild strength and later address the accumulated problems. Today’s peace agenda operates within that framework.

Armenia’s fundamental problem lies elsewhere. For decades it has not monitored the strategies of its opponents, including Russia. It has not studied their tactics or drawn conclusions.

People now forget Russia’s role in the current situation with striking speed. That itself creates a security risk. A state that cannot identify hostile policies directed against it is destined to face the same scenario again — but in a worse form.

Meanwhile, the tactics of hostile countries are clear. They aim to prevent Armenia from accumulating strength, resources and capabilities so that it cannot, in their words, pursue revenge. One instrument is control over Armenia’s political field.

Aliyev’s rhetoric in Munich illustrates this approach. His references to Nuremberg and fascism were not accidental. Azerbaijan is building a narrative in which it presents itself as a fighter for justice while portraying Armenians as aggressors. Behind this stands a state-centred strategy with long-term planning and well-established mechanisms. Armenia does not counter this strategy — it adapts to it.”

Armenia should become a “poisonous flower”

“Armenia must openly defend its rights. This includes the issue of Artsakh, the deportation of the Armenian population and the demand for a just peace. Peace imposed by a victor never lasts. Either the winner continues the pressure, or the defeated side eventually pushes back. This is not stability. It is a postponed conflict.

For 30 years Azerbaijan built a strategy. Now, facing little resistance, it is moving to the next stage. Officials speak about ‘historical lands’ and the ‘restoration of Azerbaijani communities’ inside Armenia. As long as Yerevan believes concessions are a winning tactic, it keeps losing its already weakened strategic position. Armenian rhetoric increasingly repeats the narrative created in Baku, and changing that becomes harder each time.

Building a security policy on the assumption that ‘Azerbaijan also wants peace’ is extremely risky. Such an approach might have made sense in the early 1990s. At that time liberal democracy expanded and the collapse of the Soviet Union strengthened the discourse of human rights. Presenting that logic today as the only correct strategy is an anachronism and a gamble.

When a victor faces no real leverage from Armenia or outside actors, the absence of a plan B allows it to change the rules at any moment. Deterrence works in the opposite way. The adversary understands that any misstep will carry a high cost and that victory will not come easily. Being small does not mean being defenceless. A country can become a ‘poisonous flower’.”

TRIPP is not deterrence

“TRIPP is exactly what Azerbaijan sought — and obtained without firing a single shot. It is difficult to describe this as a deterrent. By the same logic, Armenia could ‘deter’ Baku by handing over all settlements where some Azerbaijanis once lived, abandoning the term ‘Artsakh’ and agreeing to any other concessions. The correct term here is not deterrence but defeatism.

The same logic appears in the case of Ukraine. If Kyiv agreed to territorial concessions and abandoned its course towards NATO, it could also ‘stop the war’. The question is at what price.”

How Russia controls Armenia’s political field

“Armenia is going through a deep crisis today, and it is not only about the current authorities. The emerging opposition does not resemble the old-style pro-Russian forces. Instead, Russian oligarchic structures have penetrated it. These actors offer no way out of the regionalism that threatens Armenia. Russia exercises almost total control over Armenia’s political field.

Moscow has no real problem with the current government. The real problem for Russia would be Armenian citizens who could create new parties, raise questions of justice and demand accountability — not only from Azerbaijan but also from Russia. Russian influence systematically closes that political space.

Russia has lost the Armenian people, but it has not lost the political field. Moscow now pursues three goals:

  • to close the issue of Artsakh
  • if possible, to attract Armenians from Artsakh to Russia — for this reason hostility toward them is artificially encouraged in Armenia
  • to shift responsibility for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh onto Pashinyan alone and attribute the redistribution of power in the region to other centres of influence.

At the same time, a more vulnerable Armenia could be brought back under control more easily if necessary. For now, Moscow does not need to do this. At present, Armenia — like Georgia and Azerbaijan — serves as a channel for bypassing Western sanctions.”

Why the West views Armenia through Baku’s lens

“The West is undergoing a deep transformation. This process will intensify over the next two to three years. Western decision-making centres do not act as a single bloc. Countries with organised lobbying networks promote their narratives more effectively.

Azerbaijan understood this long ago. It works successfully with Western experts against Armenia. A striking example illustrates this trend. A well-known Azerbaijani propagandist publicly claimed that Azerbaijan would help Armenia free itself from Russian influence. Armenia offers no comparable voices. Moreover, since 2023 some voices inside Armenia have begun repeating Azerbaijani messages.

As a result, Western perception forms in layers. First comes the Azerbaijani narrative. Then experts repeat and reinforce it. Finally, Western observers see a simplified Armenian political landscape. On one side stands a Russian oligarchic opposition. On the other stands the current government, despite its flaws. Western actors choose the latter as the lesser evil. They applied the same approach to Armenia’s previous authorities.”

Worst-case scenario for Armenia

“A multipolar world order is the worst scenario for Armenia. When major centres of power become equal in strength, they start competing for the periphery. Armenia lies exactly in that zone. The first step large powers may take is to divide smaller states among themselves. Multipolarity will not bring friendly or cooperative relations between centres of power. It will produce confrontation.

Under such conditions, regionalism becomes a trap rather than a solution. Armenia therefore needs to build a strong core inside the country. It should stop making constant concessions. It should accumulate strength and carry out reforms so that it can defend its rights in the future. Azerbaijan followed exactly this strategy for 30 years.”

https://jam-news.net/this-is-not-peace-but-defeatism-a-dissenting-view-on-armenias-security-strategy/

Haroutiun Galentz: The Form of Colour

Mar 13 2026

A new English-language monograph repositions the Armenian–Lebanese painter as a cosmopolitan modernist whose work demands to be read beyond national canons.

Haroutiun Galentz, “Portrait of Alikhanian” (1966), Janibekyan collection

Haroutiun Galentz: The Form of Colour (Skira, 2025) reassesses a major 20th-century modernist whose work has long resisted categorization. Edited by Vartan Karapetian and Marie Tomb, the first English-language monograph devoted to the artist brings together works from the Janibekyan Collection and the National Gallery of Armenia alongside holdings from museums and private collections across Europe, Asia, and North America. Through paintings, archival documents, correspondence, and memoirs, the book situates Galentz as a cosmopolitan modernist whose work demands to be read across borders rather than within national canons.

Haroutiun Galentz occupies a difficult place in 20th-century art history. A survivor of the Armenian Genocide, Galentz rebuilt his life and practice in Beirut, where he emerged as a key figure in the formation of modern painting during the interwar and immediate postwar years. Between 1920 and 1946, he was deeply embedded in the city’s artistic and intellectual circles, participating in a cultural milieu that was at once cosmopolitan and politically fragile. His contribution to the Lebanese Pavilion at the 1939 New York World’s Fair marks an early moment in the international visibility of Lebanese modernism — one that complicates later narratives that situate its emergence after the 1950s.

Galentz’s postwar relocation to the Soviet Union opened a second, no less complex, phase of his career. In this new ideological environment, his painting retained a luminous, introspective quality that sat uneasily within official aesthetic frameworks. His first solo exhibition in 1962 — welcomed by critics and writers such as Ilya Ehrenburg and Alexander Gitovich — took place just weeks before Nikita Khrushchev’s infamous denunciation of nonconformist art at the Manège. The proximity of these events is telling: Galentz’s work did not operate through overt dissent, but through ambiguity, interiority, and formal risk.

Across portraiture and landscape, Galentz’s practice registers a continuous negotiation between inherited traditions and lived circumstance. Early training in the Beaux-Arts system and sustained engagement with the French avant-gardes informed his approach to colour and composition. Rather than rejecting Socialist Realism outright, he absorbed and reconfigured it, gradually pushing toward increasingly abstract forms in his later years. What emerged was not a linear stylistic evolution, but a body of work shaped by displacement, adaptation, and a sustained commitment to painterly autonomy.

To order Haroutiun Galentz: The Form of Colour, visit bookshop.org.

The book is also available on skira-arte.com and artbook.com.

Iran war could impact Christian Armenia

Christian Post
Mar 10 2026

The war now unfolding around Iran will not only reshape the Middle East. It may also decide the fate of a small Christian nation sitting on one of the world’s most strategic crossroads.

Armenia, the world’s first Christian nation, sits at the intersection of energy routes, trade paths and great-power rivalry stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea. What happens inside Iran in the upcoming months could determine whether the South Caucasus becomes a connector between regions or a battleground for competing powers.

Iran occupies the southern hinge of this crowded neighborhood. It connects the energy-rich Gulf to the Black Sea and to Europe and borders a fragile arc of states whose futures remain contested. Armenia, a civilization that has preserved its faith for 17 centuries despite repeated invasions, is also a landlocked state still recovering from war and lies on one of the shortest north–south routes between these spaces.

The outcome of the current confrontation with Iran will help decide which of the three models prevails in this region. One model is a competitive corridor race dominated by larger powers. Another is a patchwork of quasi-sovereign spaces and frozen conflicts. A third is a rules-based network of lawful, state-controlled connectivity.

Three Irans and three south Caucasus futures

Three possible futures for Iran now dominate the strategic debate in light of recent United States and Israeli strikes and Iran’s missile and drone responses. Each scenario carries distinct consequences for the South Caucasus and for Armenia in particular.

The first possibility is fragmentation and weakened central authority. Commentators in Armenian and regional outlets warn that instability in Iran’s northwestern regions could generate new and unpredictable actors along Armenia’s southern border. They also warn that this instability could create significant refugee flows into the South Caucasus. For the region as a whole, this outcome would mean a looser and more volatile frontier where local militias, outside intelligence services, and rival capitals compete for leverage. For Armenia, it would mean heightened security risks in the Syunik region and new humanitarian pressures on a state with limited capacity to absorb such shocks.

A second scenario is a more centralized but security-dominated state in Tehran. Some research argues that sustained external pressure could push Iran further into isolation. Such pressure would deepen sanctions and reinforce hardline control over foreign and economic policy. Under that outcome, Iran would likely remain a significant regional actor but with fewer legal economic channels. This would increase the temptation to route trade, energy and influence through informal or gray networks. The South Caucasus would feel this through tighter sanctions enforcement, sharper scrutiny of north–south transit, and renewed pressure on states that depend on Iran for access.

Armenia is foremost among those states.

A third scenario is gradual political opening and economic reform. Initiatives such as the International North South Transport Corridor have long treated Iran as a potential pillar of a rules-based trade spine that connects the Indian Ocean to the Black Sea and to European markets. In that future, Iran would be more deeply tied into legal logistics, energy and financial networks. For the South Caucasus, that would mean more predictable transit regimes and a shift from corridor competition to corridor governance. For Armenia, it would create a more favorable environment in which to leverage its geography without constantly navigating around sanctions and great power red lines.

None of these outcomes is guaranteed. Each would redraw the strategic map in ways that policymakers in Washington, Brussels, Moscow, Ankara and regional capitals cannot afford to ignore.

Corridor politics and Syunik as a test case

Nowhere are these stakes clearer than in the struggle over corridor politics in the South Caucasus. Projects such as the International North South Transport Corridor and the proposed Persian Gulf to Black Sea route converge in and around Armenia’s Syunik province.

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the White House in August 2025, reflects a broader attempt to stabilize the region through lawful transit rather than coercion. It has already begun to redefine how outside powers think about transit, sovereignty and leverage in this narrow strip of land.

Many analyses stress that this territory is not only a local issue. It is a lever in broader contests over whether transit routes will respect existing borders or carve out new and extra-territorial spaces controlled by larger powers.

If Iran fragments or turns inward, there will be strong incentives for other regional actors to push alternative east–west routes that sideline both Iran and Armenia. That could mean renewed pressure for a corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan under weakened Armenian control. It could also mean infrastructure packages in which Armenia is treated as a transit space rather than as a fully sovereign state.

If, by contrast, Iran stabilizes and remains engaged in regional trade, Tehran is likely to continue opposing transportation schemes that bypass its territory altogether. It is also likely to support routes that preserve recognized borders and provide mutually beneficial access. In that context, Armenia can serve as a state-controlled and internationally recognized land bridge between the Gulf, the Black Sea and Eurasia.

The way outside powers choose to treat Armenia in these debates will send a signal about their broader approach to small states in contested regions. The key question is whether they will support regional integration that reinforces sovereignty or tolerate arrangements that hollow it out.

Refuge, humanitarian strain, and political risk

The humanitarian dimension of the Iran crisis will also shape the region’s future. Recent reporting has highlighted Armenia’s role as an evacuation and transit corridor during episodes of heightened tension around Iran, and a serious breakdown inside the country could send refugees northward. For a nation of fewer than three million people — still coping with the displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh — such an influx would place significant strain on public services and social cohesion.

In volatile regions, refugee flows rarely remain purely humanitarian; they quickly become strategic realities that neighboring powers attempt to exploit. If Western policymakers want a stable south Caucasus, they should begin preparing with Armenia now rather than scrambling in the middle of a crisis.

What policymakers should take from Armenia’s vantage point

Iran’s trajectory is not only a Middle East story. It is also a test of whether small states such as Armenia will be able to remain secure, connected and free to choose their own future within a stable international order.

For global readers and policymakers, Armenia’s experience offers three lessons for thinking about Iran’s future and about the wider region.

First, sovereignty and connectivity rise or fall together. Armenia’s position shows that when borders are pressured, and corridor arrangements are negotiated over the heads of small states, instability expands rather than contracts. Any strategy toward Iran that ignores how transit projects affect state control in the south Caucasus risks undermining the very order that it claims to defend.

Second, legal trade networks matter as much as military balances. In the best-case scenario for Iran, which would involve gradual opening and reform, initiatives such as the North-South Corridor and the Persian Gulf to Black Sea route offer a template for lawful connectivity. Such connectivity can reduce incentives for shadow networks and proxy confrontations. Keeping that option alive requires resisting shortcuts today that normalize extra-territorial corridors or overlook sanctions evasion tomorrow.

Third, humanitarian pressures are strategic issues. Refugee flows, evacuation routes and the absorption capacity of small frontline states should form part of policy planning. They should not be treated as complications that are addressed only after a crisis erupts. Armenia’s potential role as both a transit corridor and a temporary haven in future Iran crises should be resourced and governed accordingly.

The future of Iran will shape far more than the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. It will also determine whether countries like Armenia — small, democratic and historically Christian — can survive as sovereign states in a dangerous neighborhood.

If the region descends into fragmentation, corridor coercion and frozen conflicts, Armenia could once again find itself squeezed between larger powers. But if stability and lawful trade prevail, the south Caucasus could become a bridge connecting the Middle East, Europe and Asia. In that sense, Armenia’s fate is not just a regional issue. It is a test of whether the international order still protects small nations — or whether geography and power politics alone will decide their future.

Dr. Paul Murray is CEO of Save Armenia and a Christian leader engaged in global religious freedom and policy advocacy.

Trump says Iran war will be over ‘pretty quickly’

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

U.S. President Donald Trump has said that the war in Iran will “be over pretty quickly.” Addressing House Republicans attending a legislative retreat in Florida on Monday, Trump claimed that Iran would have attacked the U.S. “within a week” if the United States had not started the campaign.

“Within a week they were going to attack us 100%. They were ready. They had all these missiles far more than anyone thought, and they were going to attack us, but they were going to attack all of the Middle East and Israel. And if they had a nuclear weapon, they would have used it on Israel. And this was going to be a major attack. I know they had all of those missile sites and all those launchers that we got rid of, about 80% of them right now, by the way, got rid of most of the, you know, see, it’s died down to a trickle. They have very few launches left.”

Trump continued by saying the U.S. military had been “amazing”.

“And the missiles have been largely knocked out. the drones have been knocked down, and we’re hitting where they make the drones,” Trump said.

“We know them all, and we’re knocking the hell out of that. Now, where they manufacture the drones. A lot of work, a lot of brilliant work. But we’re going to have a much safer world as soon as it’s finished, and it’s going to be finished pretty quickly.”

Trump then told CBS News he thinks the war against Iran “is very complete” and that Washington was “very far ahead” ‌of his initial four to five week estimated time frame.

“I think the war is very complete, pretty much. They have no navy, no communications, they’ve got no Air Force,” Trump told CBS News.

When asked about ⁠the Strait of Hormuz, Trump said that ships are moving through now, but he is “thinking about taking it over.”

After Trump’s statement, Reuters reported that oil prices fell on Tuesday after hitting an over three-year high in ‌the prior session. Brent futures fell $4.17, or 4.2%, to $94.79 a barrel at 0345 GMT, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude was down $3.81, or 4%, to $90.96 a barrel. Both the contracts fell as much as 11% earlier before paring some losses.

The U.S. and Israel launched what they described as a pre-emptive strike against Iran on February 28, claiming that Tehran was developing a nuclear weapon and posing a threat—an allegation Iran has denied. In response, Iran launched counterattacks, firing missiles and drones at Israel, as well as at U.S. assets and other targets across the Middle East. 

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Armenian Prime Minister participates in second Nuclear Energy Summit

Politics14:00, 10 March 2026
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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is participating in the second Nuclear Energy Summit, which kicked off on Tuesday in Paris.

French President Emmanuel Macron and IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi welcomed Pashinyan and other world leaders attending the summit.

PM Pashinyan posted photos from the event on social media. 

After the summit, the Armenian Prime Minister is scheduled to travel to Strasbourg on Wednesday to address the European Parliament.

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Armenian government adopts policy to maintain nuclear energy as key energy sec

Nikol Pashinyan17:45, 10 March 2026
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Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan participated in the Second Nuclear Energy Summit in Paris. The high-ranking guests of the event were welcomed by French President Emmanuel Macron and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Rafael Grossi. The summit was also attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the Prime Ministers of Slovakia and Croatia, and heads of government and representatives of a number of other states.

The joint photo session of the summit participants was followed by the opening ceremony of the event.

The Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivered a speech. According to a press release issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, the PM’s speech reads as follows:

”Excellencies,

Ladies and gentlemen,

I extend my sincere gratitude to the President of France for convening and generously hosting this important event, as well as to the International Atomic Energy Agency for its close collaboration.

Following the first successful Summit in Brussels in 2024, we are confident that this second Summit in Paris will further foster cooperation among countries that have chosen to develop civil nuclear capacities and will promote real-world solutions for advancing the shared objectives of decarbonization and energy sovereignty.

These objectives, together with growing global energy demands, have prompted a renewed examination of the competitiveness of nuclear power, and many countries now recognize that nuclear energy – as a dispatchable, low‑carbon power source – can partner well with renewable energy sources rather than compete with them.Guided by this conviction, Armenia was among the first countries to fully support the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy by 2050 at COP28 , and we welcome the First Global Stocktake assessing progress toward the Paris Agreement goals. The Government of Armenia has also adopted a policy of maintaining nuclear energy as an essential factor of Armenia’s energy security and as a central component of its electricity mix.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Today, with the advancement of safety technologies, the life‑extension of the existing nuclear fleet provides a timely and cost-effective path to net zero. In this vein, Armenia, as many countries present here, has launched a program to extend the operational lifetime of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant (ANPP) until 2036. This extension will lay a solid foundation for the smooth and secure transition towards a new nuclear power unit.

To this end, our attention is centered on innovations in civil nuclear energy, particularly Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technologies, which offer promising prospects. Growing demand is encouraging leading companies to develop safer and more flexible solutions, with shorter construction timelines and scalable capacity that can better align with the needs of national electricity grids.

With these considerations, Armenia has made a decision to pursue Small Modular Reactor technology. Currently, we are carefully examining technologies and assessing proposals from international partners. The selection process is guided by the consideration of reliability, long-term sustainability, and our commitment to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.

Excellencies,

On the path towards nuclear energy by 2050, a skilled workforce will be the backbone of the nuclear sector, from design and construction to safe operation, maintenance, and eventual decommissioning. The implementation of training and education programs is essential to ensure the availability of the necessary workforce. In this regard, Armenia highly values international cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

Thanks to these efforts and the dedication of Armenian experts, I am pleased to note that throughout the operational history of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant no incidents related to nuclear or radiation safety have occurred.

To conclude, I would like to emphasize the importance of the safe management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, which is critically important for both current and future generations. Protection of human health and the environment should be our ultimate guiding principles.

We believe this Summit will foster the development of initiatives and partnerships among countries, international organizations, financial institutions and industry. I wish all participants productive and successful work.

Thank you”.

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Pashinyan, EBRD President discuss cooperation and reform programs

Armenia18:51, 10 March 2026
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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Odile Renaud-Basso, President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Prime Minister’s Office said.

The sides discussed bilateral cooperation and the progress of joint programs.

They emphasized the ongoing cooperation within the framework of the reforms implemented by the Government of Armenia, as well as the effective implementation of projects aimed at boosting the competitiveness of the private sector, developing small and medium-sized enterprises, and modernizing infrastructure.

Renaud-Basso reaffirmed the EBRD’s readiness to continue supporting the Armenian government in implementing planned programs and reforms in various sectors.

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Iran cannot participate in World Cup, minister says

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Iranian sports minister Ahmad Donyamali said that Iran cannot participate in the 2026 World Cup after co-host U.S. launched airstrikes alongside Israel, Reuters reported.

“Considering that this corrupt regime has assassinated our leader, under no circumstances can we participate in the World Cup,” the minister told state television, according to Reuters.

The 48-team World Cup will be held in the U.S., Mexico and Canada from June 11 to July 19.

“Our children are not safe and, fundamentally, such conditions for participation do not exist,” Donyamali said.

“Given the malicious actions they have carried out against Iran, they have forced two wars on us over eight or nine months and have killed and martyred thousands of our people. Therefore, we certainly cannot have such a presence.”

More than 1,300 Iranian civilians have ⁠been killed since the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes began on February 28, according to Iran’s U.N. ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani.

U.S. President Donald Trump earlier told FIFA representatives that Iran is welcome to play in the World Cup tournament in the United States, CBS News reported citing officials.

The Iran war came up in the conversation with the soccer association’s president, Gianni Infantino, and White House FIFA task force executive director Andrew Giuliani in the Oval Office on Tuesday evening, CBS News reported citing sources familiar with the conversation.

Infantino later posted on social media: “We all need an event like the FIFA World Cup to bring people together now more than ever.”

Donyamali’s comments were in response to Infantino’s post.

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