Author: Emil Lazarian

With Russia tied up in Ukraine, the West has stepped to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

On February 18, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev held talks at a meeting hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Both leaders took the opportunity to discuss a number of important issues: the draft peace treaty between the two states, the delimitation of inter-state borders, and the opening of transportation communications.

This, of course, was not the first time such a high-level meeting between the two leaders was mediated by a third party—what differed this time around however was who was meditating between the two.

For a long period of time, Russia was the principal mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, since 2021, this role has been contested by the European Union. Moreover, due to the war in Ukraine, the OSCE Minsk Group—which since the 1990s has held the mandate to assist in negotiating a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan but was widely regarded as a failure—has effectively ceased to function.

Russia has not been receptive to this change: it has repeatedly criticized the EU’s mediation efforts, accusing the West of attempting “to hijack Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks.” On February 17, the spokeswoman of the Russian foreign ministry, Maria Zakharova, expressed skepticism that U.S. mediation has “any added value.”

The change in meditator is important to consider, as Russia and the West have different motives to get involved in these peace talks—and these motives can shape negotiation outcomes in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. 

Russian Motives

As the traditional hegemonic power in the South Caucasus and arbiter in the decades-long Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, Russia is inclined to cling to preserving its regional dominance. At the moment, its primary mechanism for doing so is by trying to extend the presence of its peacekeeping contingent, deployed after the end of the Second Karabakh War in 2020. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, threatens its influence in the South Caucasus—the war is draining away Moscow’s military power and economic resources. Moscow worries that its declining influence will upset the region’s balance of power. The West, along with local middle-sized powers like Türkiye, have stepped into this breach and are seizing the opportunity to extend their influence in this strategically important region.  

The Kremlin realizes that, once the conflict’s two belligerents come to a basic agreement, Moscow’s involvement will become redundant. The Russian peacekeeping troops deployed in 2020 have a fixed term ending in 2025—though an extension is theoretically possible. Baku, however, has made it clear that it considers the presence of these peacekeepers on its internationally recognized territory to be a temporary affair, and will not endorse an extension beyond 2025.

In other words, if Armenia and Azerbaijan reach an agreement under Western auspices, Russia’s influence in the region would be significantly degraded. For that reason, Moscow seeks to preserve its influence in the following ways:

First, Moscow seeks a long-term military presence on the ground. For that, it requires the occasional flare-up of inter-ethnic tensions in order to justify maintaining Russian peacekeepers in the Karabakh region. 

Second, Moscow can further justify its presence by dividing Armenian political unity. It is conceivable, for example, that the Kremlin-orchestrated arrival of the Russian oligarch Ruben Vardanyan (who is of Armenia origin) is part of a scheme to only inflame tensions between local Armenians and Azerbaijan, but also to drive a wedge between Karabakh Armenians and the Western-leaning government in Yerevan. Vardanyan’s arrival caused a major standoff on the Lachin road between Azerbaijani government-backed activists and Karabakh Armenians—which only serves to further justify the presence of Russian peacekeepers.  

Third, Moscow’s plan for a peace treaty contains a provision postponing resolving the status of Karabakh. In the words of the Russian envoy to Yerevan, “the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is an issue that should be left to the next generation.” This ambiguity provides Moscow with additional leverage in future bargaining with Baku.

Western Mediation

Since 2021, there have been complementary efforts by the Biden administration in the United States and European Council president Charles Michel to play an increasingly active role in mediating between Baku and Yerevan.

Both the United States and the EU are interested in ending the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, as its unresolved status has been a major stumbling block in the South Caucasus’ emancipation from Russia’s imperial projections of power. If the conflict were to be partly or fully resolved, it would undermine Moscow by removing the underlying source of Russian leverage in the region. 

Additionally, the West is also pursuing its own interests by seeking to extend its influence in this traditionally Russia-linked sub-region. Due to geographic location and historic ties, Russia views this region as a key element of its strategy to avoid complete isolation. The West wants to reverse this by turning both Armenia and Azerbaijan away from Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Finally, both the United States and EU believe that the normalization of ties between Baku and Yerevan depends upon the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and emphasizing the rights and security of ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. Western mediators are concerned about the fate of this Armenian population once it is fully re-integrated into Azerbaijan proper. Therefore, since mid-2022, both Washington and Brussels have proposed direct talks between Baku and representatives of the Armenian community in Xankəndi—which local Armenians call by its Soviet name, Stepanakert—with the intention of establishing credible guarantees. Promisingly, at this year’s Munich Security Conference, Aliyev stated that “it was agreed with our international partners that there will be discussions on the rights and security of the Armenian minority in Karabakh.”

What’s Next?

Which peace treaty proposal will prevail hinges upon what is acceptable to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the capacity of the mediator in being able to support a peace deal. So far, the EU and the United States seem to be outcompeting Russia in this regard. Azerbaijan will definitely favor the West’s proposal, which calls upon both sides to respect each other’s territorial integrity, and rejects the Russian proposal that risks delaying the status issue. Armenia, on the other hand, prefers the Russian proposal, though the Pashinyan government is cognizant of the risks associated with tying its future security with Russia. Despite its bilateral security alliance with Russia and its membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the CSTO proved to be unreliable when Armenian troops clashed with the Azerbaijani military along the inter-state border—and the latter reportedly captured some strategic heights inside the Armenian territory—in September last year. This triggered the search for alternative security allies, and ultimately the establishment of a new two-year EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA). While the mission raised eyebrows in Russia and Azerbaijan, it could actually incentivize Yerevan to pursue a peace proposal offered by the West.  

The competing logics of third-party interests will interfere and might complicate the process of reaching a final agreement unless Russia is completely exhausted by its war efforts in Ukraine. Once Russia stops scheming against a peace treaty, the chances are that the sides will finally agree on a lasting peace.

Farid Guliyev, Ph.D., is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the Department of Political Science and Philosophy at Khazar University in Baku. The views expressed herein are solely the responsibility of the author.

“The preservation of Artsakh and the feeling of victory in the first Artsakh war gave us great strength and confidence, because we made this victory, which seemed impossible to many, possible. Thanks to the movement, we realized that we can prevent the disaster of losing our homeland through struggle.

The people of Artsakh continue to fight for the right to live a free, independent, dignified life, to avoid the threat of ethnic cleansing and deportation from the homeland hanging over our heads. In response, we received wars, loss of people’s life and difficult trials from neighboring Azerbaijan, which continue in the form of today’s blockade and the difficulties caused to us,” Ruben Vardanyan said in his message on the occasion of Artsakh Revival Day and the 35th anniversary of the Karabakh movement.

He noted that despite all the trials, the will to keep Artsakh Armenian remains unbreakable.

“All those who discuss and try to decide the fate of Artsakh without us do not understand that we took our fate into our own hands 35 years ago on this day. We paid a very high price for that decision.

Even if it takes another 35 years to reach our goal, it should not stop us, disappoint us, or take us away from our goal. We have enough will and persistence to achieve our goal and no one can take that away from us,” Ruben Vardanyan said.

After a devastating earthquake killed tens of thousands of people in Turkey, its border with Armenia was opened for the first time in three decades. 

On February 11 and 14, the Armenian-Turkish border opened to allow convoys of trucks carrying food, water, medicine, other humanitarian materials, and 27 rescue workers to make their way from Armenia to Adiyaman in southern Turkey. A few days later, those rescuers returned to Armenia via the same land border.

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These openings were the first in three decades and came amidst both ongoing negotiations to normalise Armenian-Turkish relations and a large-scale regional response to the February 6 earthquake that has so far killed 42,000 and left two million people in Turkey and Syria without homes. 

Turkey is a close ally of Azerbaijan, and Armenia’s borders with the two neighbouring countries have remained closed since the displacement and expulsion of 600,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories – internationally recognised as Azerbaijan – by ethnic Armenian forces during First Karabakh War of the 1990s.  

The implementation of the 2009 Zurich Protocols between Turkey and Armenia were meant to normalise relations, but their implementation was stalled due to Azerbaijan’s objections. Turkey maintained that the return of contested territories to Azerbaijan was a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations. 

Soviet-era rail routes that passed from Turkey through Armenia have ceased operation. New pipelines and railways connecting Baku to Turkey go out of their way to bypass Armenia by transiting Georgia instead. 

Another important sticking point in past talks between Turkey and Armenia has been Armenia’s efforts to promote international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Following the massacres of hundreds of thousands of the Ottoman Empire’s Armenians in the mid-1890s and 1909, the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) faction of the Young Turks ordered more massacres and the forced deportation Turkey’s Armenian population to the Syrian Desert in 1915. Over one million Armenians were killed in these massacres and death marches. The position of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that “it is factually problematic, morally unsound and legally unfounded to call this episode a ‘genocide’”. 

However, in 2020 during the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan retook much of the territory held by Armenian separatists and began the resettlement of displaced Azerbaijanis.  

In December 2021, Armenia and Turkey appointed special envoys to begin the normalisation process. They met in Moscow in January 2022 to begin talks. 

Turkey lifted its ban on direct cargo flights to Armenia on January 6. 

The Armenian and Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs met in Ankara on February 15. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, expressed gratitude for Armenia’s earthquake relief, and both officials announced the Armenian-Turkish border would open to third-country nationals and holders of diplomatic passports ahead of the 2023 tourist season. Both governments will also cooperate on the restoration of the historical Ani bridge over the Akhuryan River on the border of the two countries. 

“We must maintain this solidarity in the South Caucasus,” said Cavusoglu. “We highly appreciate Armenia’s humanitarian assistance, and I believe that it will also support the process of normalisation of relations between Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia.” 

His Armenian counterpart, Ararat Mirzoyan, was equally cordial. “I want to reaffirm the readiness and aspiration of Armenia to establish peace in the region and, in particular, to fully regulate relations with Turkey, to establish diplomatic relations, and to fully open the border between Armenia and Turkey,” he said. 

Armenia’s aid to Turkey has attracted international attention due to the historical and political context, but other regional actors have sent even larger rescue teams in shows of support for Ankara.  

To date, Azerbaijan has sent the most rescue personnel of any country. Baku sent 420 rescue workers to Turkey on February 6, the day of the earthquake, and another 227 on February 8. Azerbaijan has also sent a mobile field hospital, medical team, tents, bedding, and rescue dogs.  

Interestingly, Israel sent the second largest rescue cohort to Turkey – two teams totalling 450 aid workers and 60 tonnes of humanitarian materials.  

Israel is a close ally of Azerbaijan – an alliance that has provoked neighbouring Iran’s ire – and is an increasingly important actor in the South Caucasus. However, while Azerbaijan is close to Israel, Turkey and Israel have had significantly frostier relations. Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Eli Cohen met with Cavusoglu in Ankara on Tuesday to discuss earthquake aid and, together, announced the resumption of direct flights between Israel and Turkey. The first direct flight between the countries in 15 years departed the following day.  

Nevertheless, while both Armenia and Israel sent rescue teams to Turkey amid thawing relations, the two countries are increasingly at odds as Israel increases military aid to Azerbaijan and Armenia deepens ties with Iran.