April 3, 2026
On March 11, the military confrontation breaking out in the Middle East to the landscape, President of the European Council, Antonio Costa had visited Բաքու՝ what?heto attach With Aliyev։ As a result of negotiations fthe interlocutors reconfirm are committed to strengthening cooperation on a wide range of issues, from energy and communications to security and economic development.
According to the results of the meeting, Koshtan and Aliyev performed with a joint statement to the press, in which they emphasized the “strategic importance of the partnership between Azerbaijan and the EU” and expressed determination to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation. Baku and Brussels intend to build on the “positive dynamics observed during recent high-level meetings” by expanding cooperation in areas such as security, energy and transport.
of the document according to which the partnership contributes to “peace, stability, establishment of ties and sustainable development in the Black Sea region, South Caucasus and Central Asia”. The parties will continue negotiations on a new comprehensive agreement, which is designed to form a modern legal basis for cooperation and to replace the current partnership agreement that regulates relations between the countries.
The leaders of the Council of Europe and Azerbaijan discussed regional security and the development of the peace process between Baku and Yerevan, welcoming the agreement reached at the summit in Washington on August 8, 2025. «historical impulse» in the process of regulating relations. Costa reaffirmed that Brussels supports the ongoing bilateral dialogue aimed at achieving sustainable peace in the South Caucasus.
During the summary press conference, Aliyev noted the wide range of cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan, emphasizing that the alliance is the main economic partner of the Caspian country. almost 50 percent of the merchandise turnover of Azerbaijan in January fell to European Union countries, moreover, in the coming years, this indicator will increase due to the expansion of economic projects and mutual investments.
Energy remains the central element of bilateral partnership. Gas exports from the fields of the Western Caspian Sea to the European market continue to grow. In January, supplies via the Trans-Adriatic pipeline reached Germany and Austria. so Azerbaijan supplies gas to 16 countries, including 12 European countries. Azerbaijan last year exported about 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas, receiving an income of about 8.8 billion dollars, thein which about 13 billion cubic meters went to the European Union. These figures confirm Azerbaijan’s reputation as a reliable energy partner at a time when Europe continues to reduce its dependence on Russian energy resources. The country’s geographical location and infrastructure allow it to serve as an energy bridge between the Caspian region and European markets.
Costa supported Aliyev’s words, calling energy security “the cornerstone of our bilateral cooperation”. He reminded: In 2022, the European Union began to diversify energy sources, and Azerbaijan played a key role in this effort thanks to the Southern Gas Corridor.. Partnership is even more important became as Europe seeks to reduce dependence on Russian energy carriers.
In Baku, attention was repeatedly drawn to the need to increase European investments for the maintenance and expansion of the country’s energy capacities: Speaking At the annual advisory meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor initiative, Aliyev noted that the existing pipeline network is already operating at full capacity, stressing the need to expand transportation infrastructure and build new pipelines to deliver additional volumes of gas to European markets.
Investments in Azerbaijan’s energy sector have traditionally been a point of contention between Baku and European politicians: Aliyev at the Davos conference at the beginning of the year had criticized In his opinion, Europe’s financial support to Azerbaijan’s energy sector is insufficient. “Europe is not particularly interested in investing in fossil fuel or renewable energy extraction in Azerbaijan,” when long-term guarantees of demand and capital investment are needed to justify new extraction and infrastructure expansion projects.
In the coming years, Azerbaijan is going to increase its production capacity. Several new projects are expected to increase production, including additional development phases for large offshore fields such as «Shahdeniz», and: «A:Mrsheron» expansion of gas field production. According to Baku’s forecasts, these projects will allow to increase production by 10-15 billion cubic meters of gas per year, at the peak of production at the end of the decade.
In addition, Azerbaijan is expanding the renewable energy sector by cooperating with international partners. By the early 2030s, Govt provides generate six to eight gigawatts of renewable electricity through investments in wind, solar and hydropower projects. Some of this electricity could eventually be exported to Europe in projects such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable, which aims to transmit renewable energy from the South Caucasus to South-Eastern Europe.
US and Israeli aggression against Iran has led to increased tension in global energy markets. Liquefied natural gas supplies from Qatar collapsed after Iran retaliated. During his visit to Baku, Costa diplomatically noted that the ongoing military tensions in the Middle East and the cessation of oil and gas supplies through the Strait of Hormuz indicate the need for a reliable energy partnership, the clear prospects of which are not clearly visible.
In addition to energy, aspects have been important as well as cooperation in the fields of regional communication and transport: Europe Connecting Central Asia and China «Middle corridor» Azerbaijan’s role in development has strengthened its position as a transit link: The European Union reaffirms its commitment to support connectivity initiatives under the Global Gateway program, including the development of the railway project in Nakhijevan and new economic cooperation mechanisms designed to promote trade and investment.
Costa’s visit to Baku showed the general interest in deepening ties with the European Union, which persists in its confrontational anti-Russian course. For Azerbaijan, the expansion of projects for the export of energy carriers and the creation of transport corridors provides an opportunity to strengthen its position in the dialogue with the West, but the real dynamics of gas production far from a winning relationship։
Either way, Baku expects the European Union to take practical steps, especially in terms of investments, to modernize energy and transport links, and move from declarations to concrete actions.
Alexander Grigoriev
vpoanalytics.com
Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan
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Armenia: Defense Questions Legality Of Archbishop Bagrat Wiretapping
By PanARMENIAN
The defense of Archbishop Bagrat in the Sacred Struggle case has requested the court to clarify the legal basis on which wiretapping of the cleric and other individuals was conducted.
The motion was submitted by defense lawyer Hovhannes Khudoyan during a hearing at the Yerevan Court of General Jurisdiction, presided over by Judge Karen Farkhoyan, Pastinfo reports.
Khudoyan argued that if law enforcement authorities lacked legal grounds to initiate proceedings and carry out surveillance, then all subsequent actions would also be unlawful.
“We are raising a very simple question: was the initiation of the case lawful? It is unclear to me why the public prosecutor insists that evidence should first be examined and only afterward the issue of legal grounds addressed. Naturally, if the prosecution fails to present the relevant data to the court, then in the absence of such information, the entire trial becomes meaningless and no evidence can be properly examined.
The working time of the court, the prosecutor, and the defense, as well as the right to a trial within a reasonable time, directly depend on whether this case can proceed at all. And the position on that issue is clear — whether sufficient grounds existed or not. From a legal standpoint, the prosecution’s approach is unclear; from the perspective of political persecution, it is entirely understandable,” Khudoyan said.
Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan was detained overnight between June 25 and 26, 2025. Armenia’s Investigative Committee stated that participants and leaders of the Sacred Struggle movement had planned terrorist acts and actions aimed at seizing power. His detention has since been repeatedly extended.
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Yerevan named the conditions under which Armenia will withdraw from the CSTO a
The scenario in which Armenia withdraws from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is unlikely.
This was reported on Saturday, April 4 by the TASS news agency, referring to the statement of the Speaker of the National Assembly (Parliament) of Armenia Alain Simonyan.
He expressed his forecasts at a briefing, answering a question about the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow.
Simonyan admitted that Yerevan may decide to withdraw from the CSTO and the EAC if the Russian side raises gas prices for Armenia.
“I must say that if such a decision is made, Armenia will make its decision and finally withdraw from both the CSTO and the EAEU and other structures. But I don’t think it will come to that,” the politician said.
He commented on the talks about a possible increase in gas tariffs for Armenia and noted that such proposals have been repeatedly raised in the public field and have been discussed for many years.
The Speaker of the National Assembly of Armenia also commented on the meeting of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan with Russian President Vladimir Putin and called it a “very working and effective” conversation.
“I have said and I repeat: we have not done anything against Russia, we are not doing it and we are not going to do it. But at the same time, we have defended and will continue to defend the interests of Armenia,” the speaker said vaguely.
Earlier, EADaily reported that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s visit to Moscow was a fork in the road for Armenia’s political choice. Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that Yerevan’s drift towards the EU will lead to a break with Eurasian integration.
Read more: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/04/04/yerevan-named-the-conditions-under-which-armenia-will-withdraw-from-the-csto-and-the-eaeu
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The impossible is possible when everyone is one fist. regional meetings in a row
Meetings in the villages of Nor Kharberd, Arevabur, Noramarg and Ranchpar were really expected. Gagik Tsarukyan wrote about this.
“Warm reception, honest conversation and raising of real problems.
People talked about their daily difficulties, suggestions and expectations.
We listened to each other, discussed and tried to understand together what can be changed and how.
Such meetings are the most important for me. here I see the real picture, listen to people’s voices and try to offer practical solutions, not just words.
I am sure that there are no unsolvable problems if there is a will, the right approach and unity.
These days, I often hear the popular saying from our compatriots, with which I completely agree. the impossible becomes possible when everyone is united,” he wrote.
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The Artsakh page is not closed… Guys, I am with you and I believe that we will meet one day
April 4, 2026
The 3rd President of the Republic of Armenia, the President of the RPA, Serzh Sargsyan addressed the prisoners held illegally in Baku, including his comrades-in-arms, during the party’s congress.
“I want to appeal from this podium to our compatriots who have fought for the right of our people to live freely and safely, and who are still faithful to their principles and faith, who are in the prisons of Azerbaijan, my friends, guys, I am with you every day, no exaggeration, every hour, with my mind and heart, I believe that one day we will meet.
Your dignified attitude in those inhumane conditions is more eloquent and worthy of respect than the behavior of many in freedom,” President Sargsyan announced.
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Civil Contract convenes congress to confirm party list and Pashinyan’s nominat
Armenia’s ruling Civil Contract Party is expected to hold an extraordinary congress on Saturday.
Prime Minister and Civil Contract Chairman of the Board Nikol Pashinyan said on social media that the congress will vote on the party’s candidate list and pre-election program for the June 2026 parliamentary elections, as well as formally confirm him as the party’s nominee for prime minister.
Civil Contract Party members last week selected Pashinyan as the party’s candidate for prime minister in the upcoming election.
The extraordinary congress is scheduled for 2 p.m. local time at the Yerevan Sports and Concert Complex.
The Civil Contract list of candidates for parliament in the June 7 elections was determined through a closed vote and published online.
The party also released its election campaign program earlier on Friday.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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Pashinyan secures Civil Contract nomination for 2026 election
During its congress on Saturday, the Civil Contract Party unanimously confirmed its Chairman and Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan, as its candidate for Prime Minister in the upcoming June 7 elections.
The party also approved its electoral list.
Published by Armenpress, original at
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PROJECT SAVE Expands Photography Gallery with New Exhibit, Winslow Martin’s “M
Happy to coordinate interviews, images, or a preview visit ahead of the April 16 opening.
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Russian Deputy Prime Minister Warns Armenia’s EU Aspirations And Actions Agai
On April 2, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk warned that Armenia’s EU-oriented policies and actions against Russian businesses may force Moscow to reconsider economic ties, citing risks to investments, transit routes, and nuclear cooperation.
Overchuk stated in an interview with TASS that Armenia has approached a threshold at which Russia may be forced to revise its economic ties with the country. He noted that although Armenian officials consistently affirm their friendship with Russia and commitment to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) during bilateral and multilateral meetings, “comparing words with actions” suggests otherwise. According to him, Moscow maintains open and respectful dialogue, yet observes discrepancies between Yerevan’s statements and its policies.
Overchuk emphasized that despite assurances from Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, that Russian businesses face no risks in the country, developments indicate the opposite. He recalled that during discussions last summer, Pashinyan directly denied any threats to Russian investors, but subsequent actions have raised concerns. “We see that we are being told one thing, while in reality, something completely different is happening,” Overchuk stated, pointing to alleged violations of property rights involving a Russian businessman in the electricity sector and pressure on a Russian state-owned company to sell its railway concession.
He further underlined that Moscow is aware of both external and internal forces in Armenia seeking to reduce cooperation with Russia. Referring to Armenia’s adoption of a declarative law expressing its aspiration to join the European Union and efforts to align with EU standards, Overchuk argued that recent actions against Russian economic interests should be viewed within this broader political context.
Addressing regional infrastructure, Overchuk stated that the United States is interested in establishing a transport corridor through Armenia—referred to as the “Trump Route”—to facilitate the export of critical minerals from Central Asia and to strengthen oversight of Iran’s northern border. He added that various regional actors attach different strategic importance to the route, including Azerbaijan’s interest in reconnecting its territory and expanding access to Turkey.
Overchuk also drew attention to developments surrounding the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, stressing that Russia is closely monitoring decisions regarding its extension and Armenia’s broader nuclear energy policy. He remarked that explanations provided by Armenian authorities regarding dissatisfaction with an electricity company’s services remain an internal matter, yet emphasized that “property rights are primary” and that state seizures undermine investor confidence. According to him, such precedents increase perceived risks, reduce asset values, and encourage short-term profit strategies among investors.
Discussing regional transport cooperation, Overchuk stated that Armenia halted engagement with Russia on unblocking routes after previously agreeing in 2023 on principles such as sovereignty and reciprocity with Azerbaijan. He argued that this shift has exposed Armenia to “new, very serious threats” that did not previously exist. At the same time, he stressed that both Moscow and Yerevan share an interest in reopening transport links, particularly through the Meghri route, which could enhance connectivity with Iran, Turkey, and other EAEU markets.
Overchuk claimed that Armenia is being prepared for EU membership, which Russia considers a hostile bloc, warning that such a course would entail significant long-term consequences. He linked this trajectory to decisions regarding railway concessions and broader economic policy, asserting that these moves align with Yerevan’s declared rapprochement with the EU.
He also criticized plans for Western data center construction in Armenia, arguing that such projects generate minimal employment and complicate tax collection, while contributing to rising electricity prices that would affect both households and businesses.
Turning to the regional balance, Overchuk stated that the agreement on the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” has disrupted longstanding stability in the South Caucasus. He referenced the historical framework established after the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, noting that recent developments have altered established geopolitical dynamics. According to him, Russia’s participation in trilateral negotiations had previously ensured a balance of interests among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and other regional actors.
He noted that Armenia’s decision to proceed with the project without Russia, alongside Turkey’s ongoing railway construction toward Nakhichevan, has reduced clarity regarding the future of the Meghri section and increased pressure on Armenia. Overchuk described the exclusion of Russia from negotiations as “a big mistake.”
According to Overchuk, Armenia agreed to retain only 26% of transit revenues under the new route, effectively ceding 74%, which he characterized as a sovereign but potentially disadvantageous decision. He argued that continued participation in the trilateral framework could have ensured full ownership and near-completion of the project under more favorable terms.
He also questioned the long-term viability of the corridor, citing reliance on cargo transported across the Caspian Sea, which is shrinking due to climate change. This, he stated, introduces significant investment risks and may necessitate reliance on Russian rail infrastructure or costly dredging operations. “This is not fantasy,” Overchuk emphasized, referencing the rapid environmental decline of the Aral Sea as a precedent.
Additionally, Overchuk pointed out that Turkey is already constructing a direct railway connection to Azerbaijan, regardless of Armenia’s involvement, thereby limiting Yerevan’s ability to influence future cargo flows. He warned that if Russia’s economic interests in Armenia diminish, transit through Armenian territory may also decline, further restricting the country’s negotiating leverage.
Addressing nuclear energy cooperation, Overchuk stated that Russia’s state corporation Rosatom could extend the operation of Armenia’s nuclear power plant until 2036, provided certain conditions are met. However, he criticized Armenia’s preference for European contractors, arguing that they lack experience in seismically active regions and fail to coordinate adequately with the plant’s original designers. He stressed that Rosatom’s involvement must constitute at least 70% of the work to ensure safety guarantees.
Overchuk highlighted Russia’s global leadership in nuclear construction, noting its extensive portfolio of projects worldwide. He added that while Armenia has shown interest in small modular reactors, only Russian technology currently offers viable solutions, a fact well understood by Armenian specialists.
He further warned that discussions about limiting the presence of Russian companies in Armenia could prompt reciprocal considerations regarding Armenian businesses operating in Russia. Emphasizing that economic relations are a “two-way street,” he suggested that restrictions on one side would inevitably affect the other.
Overchuk also expressed skepticism about Armenia’s prospects in EU markets, particularly for agricultural and beverage exports, urging businesses to realistically assess these opportunities. He noted that expectations of replacing EAEU trade with EU trade may not align with actual European market access.
Finally, Overchuk stated that discussions about Armenia’s EU integration have already had tangible economic consequences. He noted that mutual trade between Russia and Armenia declined from $11.5 billion in 2024 to approximately $6.4 billion in 2025, attributing a $5.1 billion loss to uncertainty surrounding Yerevan’s geopolitical orientation. “How do you think Russian entrepreneurs will react,” he asked, “if Russian businesses are forced out of Armenia while Armenian companies continue operating in Russia?”
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Turkey and Armenia: When will the border crossings open?
When the Armenian prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, stepped out of a car and walked toward his host, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in June 2025, it was a truly historic moment. The two politicians shook hands, and turned to face the cameras together. It was the first time a representative of the Armenian government had visited Turkey, and he had been invited by the Turkish head of state.
Turkey and Armenia share a land border almost 330 kilometers long (200 miles), but the enmity between the two countries dates back over a century. Relations have always been overshadowed by the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, which Germany and many other Western countries officially recognized as genocide in 2016.
Ankara’s stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has further deepened the rift. Turkey sided with Armenia’s adversary Azerbaijan, and closed the Turkish-Armenian border in 1993.
Peace agreement opens up new prospects
However, since 2022 a cautious rapprochement has been underway. Armenia no longer insists that Ankara recognize the events of 1915 as a genocide.
Also last year, Armenia signed a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that finally put an end to decades of war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Since then, Turkish companies have dared to hope for the normalization of relations in the region, and the opening of the border with Armenia, which has been closed for more than thirty years.
There are two border crossings from Turkey to Armenia: Alican, in Igdir Province, and Akyaka, in Kars Province. Both have been closed since the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, but according to observers, they could be reopened within months.
Armenian media report that their government has already made the necessary preparations. On the Turkish side, work is still in progress, but is already at an advanced stage.
If the crossings were to open before Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June, it would be a big win for Prime Minister Pashinyan. For years now, he has pursued reconciliation with Turkey, and sought to bring Armenia closer to the West.
Alternative trade route through Georgia
Kaan Soyak, the head of the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council, says that, because of the sealed border, the two countries have had to conduct trade indirectly for years. He says that trade worth around 300–350 million US dollars (about 300 million euros) passes between them via Georgia. His statistics show that about 99% of this consists of goods transported from Turkey to Georgia, then on to Armenia.
According to Soyak, it’s predominantly clothing, chemical products, foodstuffs, and raw precious metals. He firmly believes that, with the border open, the volume of bilateral trade could quickly increase to one billion dollars. He also anticipates the swift construction of logistics corridors, including energy and telecommunications lines that will connect directly to the whole of the Caucasus.
But the Iran war has delayed the countdown. According to Soyak, the expansion of the war to affect the Gulf states, Iraq, and Lebanon, has raised fears of a fresh wave of migration. Consequently, progress on plans to open the land border between Armenia and Turkey has slowed.
Anatolia hopes to boost tourism
Turkey’s eastern provinces, including Kars, Igdir, Agri, Ardahan, and Van, are just a stone’s throw from the Armenian border. They’re also among the poorest regions of Anatolia. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, they occupy the lowest places in the city rankings with a GDP of just €3,250 to €4,350 per capita.
The people in this region therefore have high hopes for the movement of goods and people across the border – and for the arrival of visitors from Armenia and the Armenian diaspora worldwide. Many important historical and religious sites lie on the Turkish side of the border, so opening this up could provide many new opportunities for tourism.
Kadir Bozan, the head of the Kars Chamber of Commerce and Industry, also stresses the importance of the so-called Trump Corridor. The members of his organization see this route and its associated infrastructure as hugely significant.
Construction of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity was agreed last August as part of the peace plan between Armenia and Azerbaijan, brokered by US President Donald Trump. The plan envisages a 43-kilometer (26-mile) road and rail corridor through Armenia, connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan before continuing to Turkey.
Transport corridor between China and Europe
The corridor is intended to strengthen the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, and reduce transport times between China and Europe. Turkey sees it as an opportunity for it to become a key player in global trade. Last August, it started the construction of a 224-kilometer (139-mile) stretch of railway as part of the route, intended to carry millions of passengers and millions of tonnes of freight every year.
Bozan emphasizes that, for this reason, many in the region are hoping the Iran war will end soon, so the region can flourish as a center for business and tourism. Bozan points out that his city, Kars, already has a very good, popular train connection to Baku via Tbilisi.
People in the neighboring province of Ardahan, which shares two border crossings with Georgia, also have high hopes for the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. Ardahan is located just 20 kilometers (12 miles) from the Armenian border, and Cetin Demirci, the head of the Ardahan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, believes it will soon be the site of new production facilities, factories, industrial areas, and warehouses.
Demirci says his city has been shrinking for years, with many young people leaving. He believes opening the border here would create much-needed jobs, and revive the economy.
Kamil Arslan, the head of the Igdir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, is similarly optimistic about the future. “Trade knows no nationalism,” he says — people just want more than thirty years of enmity between Turkey and Armenia to end.
Arslan hopes he will soon see foodstuffs, construction materials, textiles, and services flowing across the border to Armenia. Especially Igdir’s famous, sweet apricots — just like in the old days.
This article has been translated from German.
https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-and-armenia-when-will-the-border-crossings-open/a-76648630
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