Author: Emil Karabekian

NUMBER OF SERVICEMEN AWARDED ORDERS, MEDALS AND RANKS ON OCCASION OF
ARMY DAY
YEREVAN, January 28 (Noyan Tapan). The Ardarutiun (Justice) bloc
considers that the PACE Resolution adopted lately on the basis of
David Atkinson’s report is very dangerous for Armenia. Ruzan
Khachatrian, Spokeswoman of the bloc, informed a Noyan Tapan
correspondent that the issue was discussed during the joint session of
the bloc and NA Ardarutiun faction held the same day. It was
established that though the high-ranking officials and political
statesmen continue insisting that the Resolution has no legal force
one shouldn’t underestimate the political importance of the Resolution
and its further influence on the legal settlement of Karabakh
problem. The members of the Ardarutiun faction agreed to the
estimation, according to which the adoption of the Resolution not
favorable for Armenians is the result of foreign and home policy
carried on by the Armenian authorities during the previous years. On
the eve of the NA spring session the bloc confirmed its intention to
continue boycotting the work of the parliament. At the same time its
was mentioned that the Ardarutiun faction will participate in the
discussion of issues of political importance. In particular, a
decision to participate in the discussion of the bill “On Return of
Deposits” submitted by the bloc and included into the NA agenda was
pronounced. According to Ruzan Khachatrian, the members of the bloc
condemned the conduct of Arshak Sadoyan, Chairman of the Union of
National Democrats. Touching upon the statements made by the latter
during the previous week, the participants of the session said that
according to the regulations of the Ardarutiun faction, each member of
the faction having a special opinion may express it but he has no
right to undertake activity or propaganda contradicting the decision
made by the faction, which is done by Sadoyan venturing insulting
statements. Sadoyan accused one of his colleagues in press saying
that the latter “sold himself” to the People’s Party of Armenia.
During the session of the bloc it was mentioned that one may speak so
only about his opponents and a question was raised if Arshak Sadoyan
perceives PPA as his opponent. Answering this Sadoyan declared that
his thought was represented out of any context in press and some mass
media (in particualr, the Aravot and Haykakan Zhamanak newspapers)
just spread a slander he never said. He assured that he didn’t want to
insult anybody or oppose the bloc and he treats the members of the
bloc with great respect. He said he regretted that everything was
interpreted this way. The Spokeswoman said that as according to the NA
regulations there are no mechanisms permitting to dismiss from a
faction Arshak Sadoyan may only himself pronounce a decision to leave
the faction. But the latter declared that he won’t leave the faction
and will continue working.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Agence France Presse
Jan 26 2005
Azerbaijan cheered by PACE resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh
AFP: 1/26/2005
BAKU, Jan 26 (AFP) – A strongly-worded resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh
from the Council of Europe will help lead to a settlement of the
decade-old dispute over the territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia,
Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev said Wednesday.
“This doesn`t mean that our territories will be freed immediately,
however it is an important political step towards their being freed,”
Aliyev said in televised remarks, referring to the resolution passed
Tuesday by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE).
In some of the strongest language it has used to describe the 1990s
Nagorno-Karabakh war, the assembly said the conflict led to
“large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas
which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing.”
An ethnic Armenian enclave that had a 25 percent Azeri population
before the conflict, Nagorno-Karabakh was the object of a war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan until 1994 when the active phase of the
conflict ended with Armenia in control of the territory inside
Azerbaijan`s borders.
It resulted in an uneasy truce with about a dozen soldiers along the
ceasefire line still killed each year by sniper fire and mines.
A 19-year-old Azeri soldier, Elhan Feizullayev, died along the
Azeri-Armenian ceasefire line Wednesday, Azerbaijan`s ANS television
reported.
“The resolution`s approval is a great victory for Azerbaijan. This
document has partially satisfied Azerbaijan`s interests… look at
Armenia`s reaction and you will see how it was defied,” Aliyev said.
In Yerevan, Armenia`s foreign ministry said the resolution was not
drafted objectively because of interference by the head of PACE`s
legislative committee, a citizen of Armenia`s other long-time
adversary, Turkey.
“Nevertheless we support the reaffirmation of a host of principles
which in particular affirm that independence and secession may only
be achieved through a lawful and peaceful process based on democratic
support by the inhabitants of that territory,” the foreign ministry
said its statement.
Azerbaijan`s foreign ministry hailed the PACE resolution.
“Azerbaijan has always considered the actions of Armenia to be a
typical example of ethnic cleansing… . Although the resolution does
not reflect this in a categorical way, it is still positive,” an
Azeri foreign ministry spokesman told AFP.
The PACE resolution urged the parties concerned to comply with UN
Security Council resolutions by refraining from any armed hostilities
and “by withdrawing military forces from any occupied territories”.
Azerbaijan`s foreign ministry said it viewed the passage of the PACE
non-binding resolution as a sign of the international community`s
keen interest in a resolution of the Karabakh conflict.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
January 26, 2005, Wednesday
ILHAM ALIYEV: WHETHER PEACEFUL OR MILITARY SETTLEMENT OF THE KARABAKH
CONFLICT IS TAKEN DEPENDS ON THE TALKS
“Azerbaijan would never reconcile itself to the loss of territories;
we’d reclaim them at any cost. Whether peaceful or military ways are
used, it depends on the talks, as well as other factors,” President
Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan stated at the media briefing for Russian
journalists in Baku last Saturday. According to the president, the
world community finally recognizes now that Armenia has occupied the
territories of Azerbaijan. “The fact of occupation has been
recognized, the UN and almost all the world has recognized the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. We think this problem should be
settled in compliance with international laws, rather than according
to someone’s fantasies, wishes or assumptions,” Aliyev said. (…)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Transitions Online, Czech Republic
Jan 7 2005
Analyst on Caucasus
The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit,
multinational organisation, with over 100 staff members on five
continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level
advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict is looking for one or
two analysts to be based in Baku and/or Yerevan.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of
political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk
of outbreak,
escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information
and assessments from the field, Crisis Group produces regular
analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at
key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes
CrisisWatch, a 12-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular
update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of
conflict or potential conflict around the world. Find out more at
The Caucasus Analyst(s) will be working under the supervision of the
Caucasus Project Director (located in Tbilisi) to research and
produce
reports on security, political, governance, human rights and social
issues related to Armenia/Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. The position will be based in Yerevan and/or Baku
Responsibilities will include:
– Conducting extensive field research and providing analysis on
prevailing security, social, legal, governance and political issues;
– Proposing policy initiatives for governmental, intergovernmental,
political, and nongovernmental stakeholders to address and resolve
sources of conflict;
– Preparing detailed reports and briefing papers setting out relevant
research findings and policy recommendations.
Candidate profile:
– Deep knowledge of the Caucasus region and extensive contacts in
Armenia/Azerbaijan with governmental and non governmental officials,
media, and academia;
– 5 years of professional experience in conflict analysis,
journalism, NGO, IGO, or government work related to Azerbaijan/Armenia;
– Excellent writing and analytical skills, good in summarizing fast
amounts of written material.
– Fluency in English, Russian and knowledge of local languages;
– Masters degree in international relations, human rights, political
science, sociology or similar.
Applications should be in English and include a CV, cover letter,
research proposal, writing sample and the contact details of at least
three referees. In the cover letter the candidate should briefly
describe how he/she meets the position qualifications. In the
research proposal he/she should propose ideas on themes that he/she
could write about in relation to Nagorno-Karabakh, and briefly
describe how he or she would research them (in no more than two
pages). The writing sample must be an unedited piece on current
developments in Armenia/ Azerbaijan.
Please send applications by email to [email protected] to
the attention of Johanna van der Hoeven. The closing date for
applications is 15 January 2005.

RIA Novosti, Armenia
Dec 28 2004
MOSCOW AND YEREVAN TO DISCUSS BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
MOSCOW/YEREVAN, December 28 (RIA Novosti) – On Tuesday the
Moscow-based President Hotel will host the sixth session of the
Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation between Russia
and Armenia.
The commission plans to consider a broad range of trade and economic
cooperation issues, including some energy, transportation, telecoms,
and humanitarian projects, the Russian Transportation Ministry told
RIA Novosti.
Russian Transportation Minister Igor Levitin is the Russian
co-chairman of the Commission; his Armenian peer is Armenian Defense
Minister and Secretary of the Presidential Security Council Serzh
Sarkisyan, who also heads the national delegation to the meeting.
Colonel Seiran Shakhsuvaryan, the press secretary of the Armenian
Defense Minister, said the meeting would discuss the implementation
of what had been agreed upon at the previous session on February 2003
and in the co-chairmen’s joint protocol of October 14, 2004.
A special protocol will be signed after the sixth meeting.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Freedom of Speech – in Any Language
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2004
By Jonathan Eric Lewis
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many have rightly
cited the Middle East’s democracy deficit as one of the prime reasons
that the region has produced so much terrorism and political violence.
In a November 2003 speech to the National Endowment for Democracy,
President George W. Bush argued that while we should not expect
democratizing societies in the Middle East to be identical to
post-industrial America, there are some common features to what he
termed “successful societies.” These include the limited power of the
state and its military, the impartial rule of law, a robust civil
society, property rights, religious freedom, and the rights of women.[1]
But if Washington is to be successful in fostering democratic change in
the Middle East and in promoting stability within states that have
ongoing ethnic conflicts, it must put linguistic freedom—the right to
freely speak and educate one’s children in one’s native language—on par
with other concepts such as women’s rights and religious freedom. The
lack of linguistic freedom in much of the Middle East is part and parcel
of the region’s general stagnation under archaic political systems.
Given the vast diversity of ethno-linguistic groups throughout North
Africa, Anatolia, the Levant and Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf, it
is striking that just three regional languages dominate the public
arena: Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. This is the legacy of
European-style nationalism in the Middle East: linguistic conformity has
been made a staple of national identity, as states still labor to
achieve a nineteenth-century European ideal of the nation-state.
There is nothing wrong with a state imposing a certain degree of
linguistic uniformity in order to achieve a measure of national
cohesiveness, such as the case in Israel where modern Hebrew acted as a
means of fostering a new, unifying national identity. However, when a
state’s policy shifts from using a language as a means of fostering
national unity to a deliberate policy of denying or eradicating the
cultural identity of minority groups, it bodes ill for tolerance in the
polity as a whole. Such has been the case with the Assyrians in Iraq,
the Kabyles in Algeria, and the Kurds in Turkey. A proper balance would
allow simultaneously for a unifying national language, such as Arabic or
Hebrew, together with a legally protected right for all minority groups
to speak their native languages at home and to print material in these
languages for personal use without fear of state repression.
The ideal of linguistic conformity, however, is pervasive throughout the
Middle East although actual policies have differed from state to state.
Baathist Iraq, perhaps the most totalitarian of all the Middle Eastern
regimes and certainly the most violent, had an extremely harsh language
policy that conformed to its fascistic interpretation of Arab
nationalism. Algeria’s Kabyles and Turkey’s Kurds have also been
subjected to state pressures, and have reacted by developing political
movements that have resisted official language policy. By contrast,
Israel, through its laissez-faire linguistic policies, has defused some
of the resentment of its large Arabic-speaking minority. By according
official standing to Arabic, it has bought the acquiescence of a large
Arabic-speaking Muslim minority that has yet to come to terms with the
legitimacy of Israel as a Jewish state.[2]
These four countries—Algeria, Iraq, Israel, and Turkey—provide different
models for the relationship between state power and linguistic freedom.
The Arabization policies of Iraq and Algeria ultimately foreshadowed
infernos of political violence. Turkey’s language policies led to
internal destabilization, particularly in the primarily ethnic Kurdish
southeast. The linguistic policies of Israel have contributed to a
relative degree of internal stability. What this variation shows is that
there is a high correlation between the suppression of languages, the
suppression of dissent, and political violence. As U.S. policymakers
raise the flag of women’s rights and religious freedom, they should
consider whether linguistic freedom, of the kind practiced in the United
States, isn’t just as suitable for promotion in the Middle East.
Iraq as Babel?
While significant attention has been devoted to guaranteeing religious
pluralism in post-Baathist Iraq, particularly for the minority
Christians and the majority Shi’ites, scarce attention has been devoted
to the need for linguistic pluralism.
Iraq, upon independence in 1933, was a linguistically pluralistic state
whose inhabitants spoke Iraqi Arabic (in several local dialects),
Armenian, Assyrian, Judeo-Arabic, Kurdish, and Turkmen. Over the
remaining century, and particularly under Baathist rule (1968 to 2003),
Iraq became an increasingly Arab state in which Arabic enjoyed a
privileged and dominant status. Under Saddam Hussein, ethno-linguistic
minority groups such as the Kurds, Assyrians and Turkmen experienced
extreme persecution and were severely restricted in their ability to
speak and educate their children in their own language.
In the new Iraq, first steps have been taken to restore linguistic
pluralism. Article 9 of the transitional Iraqi constitution, promulgated
in March 2004, defines both Arabic and Kurdish as the two official
languages of Iraq and also guarantees the “right of Iraqis to educate
their children in their mother tongue, such as Turcoman [i.e., Turkmen],
Syriac, or Armenian, in government educational institutions in
accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in
private educational institutions.”[3] The fact that this was agreed upon
by the Iraqi Governing Council should be seen as an underreported
victory of the Coalition Provisional Authority in its efforts to foster
a pluralistic polity, embracing not only Kurds but also Assyrians and
Turkmen.
Nevertheless, more needs to be done to guarantee the linguistic rights
of the Iraqi Shi’ite community. Najaf has long had a history of
linguistic pluralism with Shi’ites from Persia, Azerbaijan, Bukhara, and
Lebanon studying in the city’s madrasas (Islamic schools). Indeed, from
the mid-eighteenth-century to the most recent decades, the majority of
Najaf’s students were not Arabic-speakers at all. Historian Yitzhak
Nakash writes:
Iraqi Shi’is asserted that unlike intellectual activity at al-Azhar,
which was molded by the local culture and trends in modern Egypt,
activity at Najaf became less influenced by the city’s indigenous Arab
environment and instead was dominated by a Persian spirit. The strong
Persian presence in the madrasa distanced Najaf from Baghdad, thereby
hindering the potential social and intellectual exchange between Sunnis
and Shi’is in Iraq. Foreign linguistic elements penetrated into the
Arabic dialect of Najaf, and the method of study became patterned after
the Persian.[4]
Given that the Grand Ayatollah ‘Ali as-Sistani, the country’s pivotal
power-broker, speaks Arabic with a Persian accent, there is an obvious
need for guarantees of linguistic pluralism for the ethnically diverse
Shi’ites who will be returning to Najaf for scholarship. While
Washington should not actively take part in intra-Shi’ite theological
disputes, it should use its leverage in Iraq to guarantee that speakers
of Persian and Persian-influenced Arabic are not discriminated against
in the public administration of Iraq.
Nowhere in the Middle East does the United States have a greater
opportunity to foster linguistic pluralism than in Iraq. The provisional
constitution, while theoretically protecting the linguistic rights of
Armenians, Assyrians, and Turkmen, will be but a piece of paper unless
its provisions for linguistic freedom are vigorously enforced by the
Iraqi judiciary. Washington further has the obligation to make sure that
the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq do not abuse their newfound
freedoms to discriminate against non-Kurdish speakers, particularly
Assyrians, who fear that they will lose opportunities for bilingual
Arabic and Assyrian education. Given the strong correlation between the
persecution of ethno-linguistic minorities and state violence in Iraq,
policymakers should consider the status of linguistic pluralism as a
bellwether for Iraq’s success in nation-building.
Overly Arabized Algeria
Algeria, although a member of the Arab League, is linguistically
diverse. A majority of the country’s inhabitants speak Algerian-dialect
spoken Arabic. But Algeria’s heritage includes Berber, Roman, Jewish,
Moor, Arabic, Ottoman, and French influences.[5] Both Tamazigh (Berber)
and French are spoken by large numbers of Algerians as first languages.
In the name of national unity and the consolidation of identity, the
state has pursued a policy of Arabization against both languages, which
has had dire consequences for the political stability of the country.
The first target of Arabization was French. During the long period of
French colonial rule from 1830 to 1962, many Algerians, particularly
members of the educated and urban classes, used French as a primary
language. Such was the degree of French linguistic influence on Algerian
society and politics that Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, on
release from French prison, proclaimed his adherence to Arab nationalism
in French: “Nous sommes des Arabes!”(“We are Arabs!”).”[6] Ben Bella’s
use of French to proclaim his anti-imperialism and Arab-Islamic
nationalism was paradoxical, for it was he who, as president (1962-65),
initiated the policy of linguistic Arabization in the country’s primary
schools.
Arabization took a particular form. The leaders of independent Algeria
wished to link the country to the wider Arab world, which it regarded as
the cultural counter-weight to France. Hugh Roberts, vice-president of
the Society for Algerian Studies, has written:
The Arabisation policy was based on the premise that neither French nor
the colloquial Arabic and Berber spoken in Algeria could serve as the
language of education and administration. Its aim was accordingly to
make the modern literary Arabic, which had been developed as the lingua
franca of the Mashriq, the national language of Algeria.[7]
The promotion of this brand of Arabization gained momentum under
President Houari Boumedienne (1965-78), who declared a révolution
culturelle to accompany the country’s radical economic and foreign
policies. Boumedienne’s Arabization drive was intended to link Algeria
to revolutionary ideologies in the rest of the Arab world. But due to
the lack of native speakers of modern standard Arabic, Algeria imported
teachers from the Levant and Egypt, many of whom were sympathetic to
Islamism. Their teaching had an unintended consequence of strengthening
Islamism as an ideology in Algerian public life.
Also, because French remained the language of commerce, young educated
speakers of Arabic—the so-called Arabisants—did not command adequate
French for career advancement. These Arabisants gravitated to the study
Islamic law and literature at the university level, rather than the
francophone science and technology courses. This made them susceptible
to Islamist teaching.[8] The migration of lower class, rural Arabisants
into Algerian cities also played into the hands of Islamists. They would
become the shock troops of the Islamist insurgency of the 1990s.
Islamists still had to resort to French in order to recruit more
educated followers. One of the best-selling Islamist newspapers in newly
independent Algeria, Humanisme Musulman, was in French, not in
Arabic.[9] Likewise, La Cause, the diaspora newspaper of the Front
Islamique du Salut (FIS), an Islamist group, was published in French.
But the Arabic-French divide largely came to subsume the
Islamist-secular split, which itself resulted in part from forced
Arabization.
All of Algeria paid a price for Arabization, but it posed a direct
threat to the identity of the Kabyles. Numbering approximately 20
percent of Algeria’s population and a disproportionately large number of
its intellectual class, Kabyles are a non-Arab, nominally Muslim
community. Their ancestral homelands of Greater and Lesser Kabylia
border the Mediterranean Sea. Kabyles speak Tamazigh, an Afro-Asiatic
language linguistically unrelated to Arabic, and they trace their
descent to the pre-Islamic Berber community indigenous to North Africa.
Kabyles played a significant role in the Front de Libération Nationale
(FLN), the Algerian nationalist movement that fought for independence
from France, only to be politically sidelined by the Arab-Muslim
elements within the FLN once independence was achieved in 1962.
Governmental restrictions on Tamazigh-related activity began immediately
upon independence. They included the abolition of the chair of Berber
studies at Algiers University in 1962 and the criminalizing of the
possession of Tamazigh dictionaries. After the cancellation of a lecture
on Berber poetry by Kabyle activist Moulaoud Mammeri in the Kabyle city
of Tizi Ouzou in 1980, a series of riots and demonstrations were
sparked, often termed the Tizi Ouzou Spring, leaving several hundred
dead or wounded. More recently, Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika,
in a nation-wide television address, termed Tamazigh “a factory of
division in national unity.”[10]
The pressure has come not only from the state. Algerian Islamists have
likewise victimized the Kabyle community and are responsible for bomb
attacks against Kabyle music concerts and the kidnapping and eventual
murder of the famous Kabyle singer Matoub Lounes, who had told a Kabyle
newspaper that he was “neither Arab nor Muslim.”[11]
Linguistic freedom has been one of the linchpins of the Kabyle political
movement. The Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK, founded 2001)
is the most politically sophisticated of all the Kabyle ethno-linguistic
political movements. The MAK, partially led by Ferhat Mehenni, a Kabyle
singer-activist, advocates autonomy for Kabylia along the lines of that
enjoyed by the Catalonians, Flemish, Welsh, and Scottish peoples.[12]
The MAK boycotted the April 2004 Algerian presidential elections on the
grounds that Algiers has refused to recognize Tamazigh as an official
(rather than just a “national”) language.
Algeria’s Arabization policy has had repercussions for both Europe and
the United States. It has contributed to the growth of militant Islam
within the Algerian public sphere, fueling not only the Algerian civil
war but also the growth of a fundamentalist Arabisant Algerian diaspora
in both Europe and North America. More recently, continuing clashes
between the Kabyle minority and the country’s security forces have
clouded Algerian-U.S. cooperation in the ongoing war on terror, as
Washington is reluctant to work with security forces responsible for
suppression of a peaceful minority.
Unfortunately, President Bouteflika is using a restrictive linguistic
policy to forge a national consensus. He seeks to reconcile Arab
nationalists and Islamists by refusing to grant broad linguistic rights
to the increasingly restless Kabyle minority. Arabization has become one
more prop of an authoritarian regime that refuses to engage in
much-needed economic and political reforms. The very least the United
States can do, to begin to move Algeria in the direction of those
reforms, is to stand on the side of linguistic diversity and urge the
regime to abandon Arabization. Otherwise, the number of Arabisant
Islamists will continue to swell into the next decade, and so too will
the resentment of the Kabyles.
Talking Turkish
Although Turkey is one of the most Western, and certainly pro-American
countries, in the Middle East, Turkey’s language policy nevertheless
remains one of the harshest and most uncompromising. That policy has
become one of the prime impediments to Turkey’s possible accession to
the European Union (EU). A recent report from the European parliament
that argued against Turkey’s accession cited Ankara’s treatment of its
linguistic minorities among the reasons for denying Turkey’s entry.[13]
The policy in question is Ankara’s denial of linguistic freedom for its
Kurdish minority.
To understand Turkey’s harsh restrictions on speaking and publishing in
non-Turkish languages, it is necessary to recall the difficult
circumstances that faced the nascent Turkish republic at independence.
From the late Ottoman period onwards, the country’s elite sought
acceptance in Europe by embracing European-style notions of the nation.
By a process of Turkification, they also sought to prevent the emergence
of alternative national identities. They had learned, from long and
bitter experience, that national groups under Ottoman rule could appeal
to European powers to support separatist aspirations. By this process,
the empire had lost most of its Balkan possessions.
The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 ended the Turkish war of independence
against both European and Greek forces and gave birth to the secular
Turkish Republic. By its terms, Turkey had to recognize the rights of
non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians and Greeks to educate in their
own language. But these were small minorities whose national aspirations
were being realized outside of Turkey’s borders. The danger, in the
minds of the Turkish-speaking elite, lay in Anatolia, among Muslim
minority groups within the Turkish Republic. What was to keep them from
making separatist demands? Turkey therefore successfully excluded their
linguistic rights from the treaty.[14] Indeed, such disparate
ethno-linguistic groups as the Albanians, Abkhaz, Arabs, Bosnians,
Chechens, Circassians, Kurds, and Laz are not officially recognized by
the state and have instead been subsumed under a monolithic Turkish
identi ty.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s adamant secularism, or Kemalism, has likewise
determined Turkish linguistic policies. As a means of breaking with the
Islamic past, not only did Atatürk abolish the caliphate, but he also
rid Turkish of Arabic and Persian elements, and replaced its Arabic
script with a Latin one. This policy was deliberately intended to lessen
the strength of Islam, by making the great body of extant religious
literature inaccessible even to literate Turks. In 1932, the newly
formed Türk Dil Kurumu (TDK), an organization devoted to promoting the
Turkish language and protecting it from foreign influences, excised
thousands of Arabic and Persian words from the new, modern Turkish
lexicon.[15] The degree of success of this process is evident in both
the generally high literacy rate among Turks, and the inability of the
vast majority of Turks to read Ottoman-script Turkish documents. But e
ven this success has not prevented the reassertion of Islam in Turkish
politics.
The real cost of Turkification, however, has been paid by the state in
its relationship with its Kurdish citizenry. Steven Kinzer of The New
York Times, an observer of Turkish affairs, correctly assessed that “by
banning almost every kind of Kurdish organization, the government made
it impossible for moderate Kurdish leaders to emerge.”[16] One of the
most persistent demands of the mainstream Kurdish movement has been for
the freedom to use Kurdish in schools and the media, both of which have
been viewed with suspicion by Turkish authorities that rigorously adhere
to the indivisible and unitary character of the state. More recently,
the state has made some concessions, including the noteworthy granting
of permission by the Turkish authorities for Kurdish-language teaching
in private schools in Van, Batman, and Sanliurfa.[17] In June 2004,
Turkish state radio and television (TRT) began short broadcasts in two
Kurdish dialects, Zaza and Kurmanjy, as well as in Arabic, Bosnian, and
Circassian. There will likely be increasing demands for Kurdish language
classes in state-funded schools, and a growing demand by other
ethno-linguistic groups, such as the Circassians, for more linguistic
freedom than they have enjoyed to date.
Recent relaxations of government policy have been billed as concessions
to the EU. In particular, Ankara’s stringent policies on the public use
of Kurdish have been a constant source of friction with the EU, as well
as international human rights organizations. At the same time, there may
be a realization in the Turkish political elite that past policies have
been counter-productive. Those past policies were inspired by a
nineteenth-century European ideal of linguistic conformity—an ideal that
even Europe has abandoned as dangerous and divisive. The United States,
however, has taken a less adamant stance on linguistic freedom in
Turkey. This is one issue on which Washington might amplify the message
coming from Brussels: Turkey will be stronger if it allows a greater
measure of linguistic freedom. Far from prompting political separatism,
such liberalization will tend to neutralize it.
Israeli Diversity
Israel, in contrast to its Muslim neighbors, has a comparatively open
and tolerant linguistic policy, allowing for its Arab, Christian,
Circassian, and Druze minorities to speak their languages both in public
and private without state reprisals, and to educate their children in
their native languages. Indeed, the state-subsidized educational system
of the Arab sector teaches the majority of its curriculum in
Palestinian-dialect Arabic.
Israel has neither a constitutional provision nor a law that
specifically articulates the state’s language policy.[18] This affords
both central and local governmental authorities great flexibility in
shaping Israeli society’s use of various languages in private and public
life and allows for the state to reshape its policies in relation to
both the ongoing conflict with its adversaries and the emerging
challenges to Hebrew-language dominance.
In order to comprehend Israel’s relative degree of linguistic pluralism
within the context of the Middle East, one must take into account
several things: Israel’s history of Jewish immigration and the rebirth
of Hebrew as a vernacular language for the country’s Jewish citizens,
the granting to Arabic the status of an official language of the Jewish
state, Israel’s laissez-faire attitude toward the country’s Armenian and
Circassian minorities, and contemporary attempts to promote
bilingualism. Despite the rising numbers of Israel’s Arab citizens
involved in terrorist activities—still an extremely small number in
proportion to the numerical strength of the Arab sector—Israel’s policy
of linguistic tolerance has helped to stem the tide of radicalization of
its minority communities.
Hebrew, as the most widely spoken language and as the language of
government, has become to Israel what English is to the United States:
the language to be used by immigrants (whose native languages number in
the hundreds) so as to create a monolithic Israeli linguistic identity.
Given the importance of the rebirth of Hebrew as a vernacular for the
modern Zionist project, Hebrew has become the Israeli language, par
excellence. In the early years of the state, Hebrew primacy came at the
expense of the numerous languages spoken by Jewish immigrants,
particularly Yiddish, Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Persian, and Judeo-Berber,
vernacular languages that were both discouraged and marginalized in the
new Hebrew-speaking society. (Speech in other European languages spoken
by immigrants, such German and Polish, was also discouraged.)
But the State of Israel’s promotion of Hebrew as the dominant language
of its majority actually discriminated more against rival Judaic (and
European) languages than against languages spoken by the country’s
non-Jewish minorities. Certainly Israel’s Arab citizens are also
required to learn Hebrew in school. However, Arabic is an official
language of the Jewish state, a status it shares only with Hebrew. Not
only does Israel allow its Arabic-speaking citizens to maintain their
own linguistic identity, the government funds Arabic-language schools
for its Palestinian Arab citizenry. Likewise, signs in Israel are often
found in both Hebrew and Arabic, and there is no shortage of
Arabic-language newspapers and broadcasts.
Due to the growing demographic and numerical strength of Israel’s Arab
citizens, it is conceivable that Arabic will become an increasingly
influential language in the Jewish state. This partially explains the
attempts by some Israeli political activists to press for a greater
Hebrew-Arabic bilingualism among Jews, a move with significant political
implications. The Swiss government, for example, has given financial
support for an Arab-Jewish bilingual school in Jerusalem.[19] Haifa
mayor Yona Yahav recently argued that “one of the barriers that
exacerbates the Jewish-Arab conflict is the language barrier,” a clear
indication that he believes that an increased appreciation and
understanding of Arabic by all Haifa schoolchildren could help to lessen
the potential ethnic and political conflicts within the municipality.[20]
The effort to create a bilingual society in Israel will face many
obstacles, not least of which is the perception that Arabic is the
language of the enemy. There is also the fact that the million-plus
immigrants who arrived from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s have
differed from past Jewish immigrants. They have maintained their Russian
language, imparted it to the next generation, and supported cultural
activities in Russian. Over the past decade, Russian has emerged as a
second language of Israeli Jews, easily on par with Arabic in the media,
politics, and advertising.
In sum, Israel is more linguistically diverse than ever, and the absence
of linguistic legislation allows for a great deal of creativity and
flexibility. This laissez-faire attitude has served the state well,
compensating Arabic-speaking communities for other forms of perceived
social and political discrimination, and integrating large numbers of
Russian-speakers into society, even before they have mastered Hebrew.
Linguistic pluralism has been of crucial importance in strengthening
Israeli democracy, and in reinforcing a respect for political and
religious pluralism. It is no accident that the most vibrant democracy
in the Middle East is also the most tolerant of diversity in languages.
American Incentives
Whereas most people in the West take for granted the ability to speak or
publish newspapers in any language they wish, this very concept is still
viewed with suspicion, if not outright hostility, in much of the Middle
East. Here the idea of exclusive nationalism, with its pressures for
linguistic conformity, still holds rulers and intellectuals in its
thrall. The “new Arab media” actually reinforce this trend. The leading
journalists and thinkers who dominate the Arab media tend to ignore
issues dealing with minority rights, particularly of those who are not
Arabic-speakers. They thus contribute to marginalizing ethno-political
groups whose primary vernacular is a non-Arabic language, be it
Armenian, Assyrian, Bosnian, Chechen, Circassian, French, Kurdish,
Persian, or Tamazigh.
This is where the United States can and should play a role. Just as
Washington has an interest in a democratic Middle East, it also has an
interest in a Middle East that respects linguistic freedom. Its absence
is usually a sign of a dangerously dysfunctional political system. So it
was in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, where the oppression of Kurds and threats
to U.S. security went hand in hand. So it was in Algeria, where growing
Arabization led to civil war and the emergence of radicalized Islamist
cadres that have posed a clear danger to U.S. national interests. So it
was in Turkey, where a stringent policy against Kurdish contributed to
blocking Turkey’s path to the EU, a clear U.S. interest and one that
President Bush, despite opposition from French president Jacques Chirac,
rightly promoted at the June 2004 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
summit in Istanbul.
Washington can help to promote linguistic diversity if it raises the
issue to the same level as religious freedom and gender equality. It
should use its not-inconsiderable influence to assure that the new Iraq
protects linguistic freedom and pluralism. Indeed, it is unlikely that
Iraq will break with its sorry record of abusing minorities, or achieve
even a semblance of democracy, without guaranteeing such freedom.
Washington likewise should urge Algeria to stop placating Islamists at
the expense of Kabyles. The United States also should work with the
European Union to create still more incentives for Turkey to liberalize
its linguistic policies, especially vis-à-vis Kurdish. This can only
strengthen Turkish democracy, which is not only important for U.S.
strategic interests, but which also provides a working model for other
regional states, notably the fledgling Iraqi polity. As for governments
at odds with the United States, such as Iran and Syria, their policies
toward language freedom, particularly against their Kurdish citizens,
should be monitored and reported, just as the United States monitors
their involvement in terrorism.
It is in America’s long-term national interest for Washington to promote
linguistic freedom in a region stagnating under archaic economic and
political systems and generating totalitarian movements, religious and
secular, that are hostile to American national security. One way to do
that is to promote freedom of speech in its fullest sense. That means
not just the freedom to speak one’s mind. It means the freedom to speak
whatever language comes most readily to one’s lips.
Jonathan Eric Lewis is a New York-based political analyst and consultant
specializing in the history of Middle Eastern minority groups and their
political movements in the diaspora.
NOTES
[1] “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” remarks
at the National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, D.C., Nov. 6, 2003,
at
[2] I refer to Israel in its pre-1967 configuration.
[3] “The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period,” at
[4] Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1994), p. 257.
[5] Hugh Roberts, “Historical and Unhistorical Approaches to the Problem
of Identity in Algeria,” in Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria
1988-2002 (London:
Verso, 2003), p. 142.
[6] Ibid., p. 139.
[7] Ibid., pp. 12-3.
[8] Martin Stone, The Tragedy of Algeria (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1993), p. 52. See also James Coffman, “Does the Arabic Language
Encourage Radical Islam?” Middle East Quarterly, Dec. 1995, pp. 51-7, at
[9] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political
History (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 140-3.
[10] Le Matin (Algiers), Mar. 17, 2004.
[11] Stone, The Tragedy of Algeria, p. 213.
[12] Official website of the MAK, at
;page_centre=mak-pak-english.
[13] Reuters, Apr. 1, 2004.
[14] See “Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24,
1923,” at
[15] Martin Gani, “Euro-Turkish,” The World & I, Feb. 2004, pp. 170-7.
[16] Stephen Kinzer, Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds (New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), p. 114.
[17] Associated Press, Apr. 2, 2004.
[18] Bernard Spolsky, “Multilingualism in Israel,” Annual Review of
Applied Linguistics, vol. 17, 1996, at
[19] The Jewish Week (New York), Mar. 19, 2004.
[20] Jerusalem Post, Mar. 11, 2004.
This item is available on the Middle East Forum website, at
–Boundary_(ID_nBnCcmQ+LbP1dyRUmuOD9g)–
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

EXPERIMENTS ON DIABETICS CARRY ON
Endocrinologists are Unaware of New Medicines
Azg/arm
16 Dec 04
There are around 20-25 thousand diabetics in Armenia according to
different figures. After Armenia gained independence in 1991, the
state was providing exclusively animal insulin which is cheaper
compared to the human insulin. This year the state imported only human
insulin. Some of the specialists confessed that diverse complications
during the treatment where the result of the animal insulin. Others
became alarmed that the change from one type of insulin to the other
will have negative impact on the insulin-dependants. But the new
insulin went into hospitals without passing additional tests and put
the patients in the situation of a laboratory animal.
Today both the endocrinologists and insulin-dependants are facing a
new experiment. MP Napoleon Azizian declared at the parliament that a
suspicious insulin of Egyptian origin, which is registered only in
Palestine and Nigeria, has entered Armenia.
But the healthcare minister, Norair Davidian, said that the Egyptian
insulin has an international certificate and meets all the
characteristics of human insulin. According to Davidian, 60 percent of
the insulin is consumed in Egypt and around 250 million people in the
world use it.
Later on Napoleon Azizian informed Azg Daily that he failed to find
facts proving the healthcare minister and could not find nay
information that thedrug is registered. Azizian assures that he has
talked with a dozen of endocrinologists and “none of them has
information on the medicine”.
To all appearances, it is uncertain as to what effect will the new
insulin, which has never been used in Armenia before, have on the
diabetics.
We tried to find out how aware the Armenian endocrinologists are. We
will withhold their names as they requested. Here is what a renowned
specialist says: “I have never read about the Egyptian insulin
anywhere. Armenian insulin-dependants today use not only the insulin
registered in the republic but also drugs sent from abroad by their
relatives, but I have never come across that kind of insulin. No
medical directory mentions of such a drug. I participated in many
international congresses and conferences where the insulin providers
all over the world were exhibited, but never noticed anything with
that name”.
Another specialist thinks: “The fact that the drag was never
introduced speaks well for its quality. There is no indication to this
insulin even inthe Internet”.
Chief endocrinologist of Armenia, Ashot Mamikonian, tried to evade a
direct answer and said that the issue is within pharmacists’
jurisdiction.
We found out that our specialists had expressed their worries over
importing the unknown insulin but no one listened to them.
The new medicine is being put in use, as in the case of the human
insulin.
A tender is going to define the organization that will import the new
drug to Armenia.
Egyptian Vaksera Company is the supplier of the insulin. It is only
bottling the Polish insulin. By the way, Poland is not a recognized
insulin supplier too.
Perhaps the fact that Vaksera Company offers a double low price for
the insulin is the reason why the Armenian authorities went on risking
peoples’ health.
By Karine Danielian
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Armenian parliament tightens laws on smoking
.c The Associated Press
YEREVAN, Armenia (AP) – Armenia’s parliament voted to tighten
restrictions on smoking Friday, approving legislation that will hike
fines and outlaw lighting up in schools, on public transport and in
other public places.
The legislation passed by the National Assembly calls for fines of up
to 100,000 drams (US$200) for violators and also bans smoking by
teenagers under 16.
The legislation, which goes into effect in January, will also prohibit
smoking in cultural institutions and at sporting events.
Packs of cigarettes and other tobacco products that do not have
medical warnings about the dangers of smoking on them will be
destroyed.
The World Health Organization estimates that 63.7 percent of Armenian
men are smokers – the highest rate in Europe.
By comparison, an estimated 60 percent of men in neighboring Georgia
are smokers and 31.2 percent in Azerbaijan.
12/10/04 14:52 EST
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ITALIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER SAID EU MEMBERS WILL ABSTAIN AT UN GA VOTE
PanArmenian News
Nov 23 2004
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ “The EU member states will, to all probability,
abstain at the vote on the draft resolution on “the occupied
territories,” which is being discussed at the UN General Assembly
session today, stated Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Margarita
Boniver being currently in Armenia on a visit. It should be reminded
that the Azeri party initiated the discussion of the question of the
territories of the security belt around Nagorno Karabakh at the UN
GA. The control of those territories by the Armenian party is the
only actual guarantee of security of the Nagorno Karabakh Armenians
and prevention of resumption of hostilities.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

AGBU Press Office
55 East 59th Street
New York, NY 10022-1112
Phone 212.319.6383 x.118
Fax 212.319.6507
Email [email protected]
Website
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Tuesday, November 23, 2004
AGBU LENDS ITS SUPPORT TO KARABAKH NORTH-SOUTH HIGHWAY
New York, November 19, 2004 – AGBU President Berge Setrakian hosted
Nagorno Karabakh President Arkady Ghoukassian and his delegation at
a special luncheon on November 14, 2004, at Manhattan’s University
Club on the eve of Armenia Fund’s annual Thanksgiving telethon.
Special guests at the Sunday event included U.S. Congressman Frank
Pallone (D-NJ), Armenian Ambassador to the United Nations, Armen
Martirosyan, and Secretary of the Fifth Committee of the General
Assembly and the Committee for Programs and Coordination at the United
Nations, Movses Abelian.
Mr. Setrakian welcomed all those in attendance and encouraged their
active support in the fundraising campaign to expedite the completion
of the North-South highway.
President Ghoukassian, during his remarks, commended AGBU and its
leaders for their continuous support and dedication to Armenia in
general and to Karabakh in particular.
AGBU has supported Karabakh’s efforts to rebuild its economic,
educational and cultural infrastructure that most recently includes
the renovation and renaming of Alex Manoogian Street, the funding of
the Karabakh Chamber Orchestra, the building of a war veterans housing
complex and a public school-all in the capital of Stepanakert-and
the ambitious Karabakh Repopulation Project that seeks to rebuild
war-torn villages and provide livestock to local Karabakh families
in need. Earlier this year, AGBU opened an office in Stepanakert to
coordinate its activities and programs in Karabakh.
Founded in 1906, AGBU is the largest Armenian non-profit organization
with the mission to promote and preserve the Armenian heritage around
the world. For more information, please visit
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress