COUNT THE REASONS WHY WE’RE IN CRISIS WITH TURKEY
By Graham E. Fuller
Houston Chronicle, TX
utlook/5236035.html
Oct 23 2007
List of differences goes beyond Armenian genocide
Turkish-American relations are in crisis. But the U.S. House of
Representatives’ resolution declaring the World War I-era killings
of Armenians a genocide is only one cause – and that’s just a sideshow.
Turkish-American relations have been deteriorating for years, and the
root explanation is simple and harsh: Washington, D.C.’s policies are
broadly and fundamentally incompatible with Turkish foreign policy
interests in multiple arenas. No amount of diplomat-speak can conceal
or change that reality. Count the ways:
~U Kurds. U.S. policies toward Iraq over the past 16 years have been
a disaster for Turkey. Since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi
Kurds have gained ever-greater autonomy and are on the brink of de
facto independence. Such a Kurdish entity in Iraq stimulates Kurdish
separatism inside Turkey. Furthermore, Washington supports Kurdish
terrorists against Iran.
~U Terrorism: Turkey has fought domestic political violence and
terrorism for more than 30 years – Marxist, socialist, right-wing
nationalist, Kurdish, Islamist. U.S. policies in the Middle East
have greatly stimulated violence and radicalism across the region
and brought al-Qaida to Turkey’s doorstep.
~U Iran: Iran is Turkey’s most powerful neighbor and a vital source
of oil and gas – second only to Russia – in meeting Turkey’s energy
needs. Washington heavy-handedly pressures Turkey to end its extensive
and deepening relations with Iran in order to press a U.S.
sanctions regime there. Although there is little affection between
Turkey and Iran, there has been virtually no serious armed conflict
between the two nations for centuries. Ankara, the Turkish capital,
sees U.S. policies as radicalizing and isolating Tehran further,
which is undesirable for Turkey.
~U Syria: Ankara’s relations with Syria have done a 180-degree
turn in the past decade, and relations are flourishing. Syrians –
as well as many other Arabs – are impressed with Turkey’s ability to
simultaneously be a member of NATO, seek entry into the European Union,
say no to Washington on using Turkish soil to invade Iraq, restore
respect for its own Islamic heritage, develop new relations with the
Arab world and adopt a genuinely balanced position on the Palestinian
conflict. Ankara resists Washington’s pressures to marginalize and
stifle Damascus, the Syrian capital.
~U Armenia: Ankara and Yerevan, Armenia’s capital, are actually in
productive unofficial contact with one another, such as via so-called
"gray-market" trade and air links, and both would like to effect
a reconciliation. It is the Armenian diaspora, with its intense
nationalist rhetoric, that is one of the key factors in inflaming
the atmosphere against potential rapprochement.
~U Russia: There has been a revolution in Ankara’s relations
with Moscow after 500 years of hostility. Today, Moscow is the
second-largest importer of Turkish goods after Germany, and Turkey
has invested as much as $12 billion in Russia in the construction
field. Russia is Turkey’s primary source of energy, and Ankara
increasingly looks to Eurasia as a key part of its economic future.
Turkish generals, angry with Washington, even mutter about a Russian
strategic "alternative" if it is stiff-armed by the West. Although
there is some rivalry over the routing of Central Asian energy
pipelines to the West – whether via Russia or Iran and Turkey –
Ankara values its ties with Moscow and opposes U.S. efforts to bait
the Russian bear in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe on NATO expansion
and missile issues.
~U Palestine: Turks care a lot about Palestine – which they had
jurisdiction over in Ottoman times. They sympathize with Palestinian
suffering under 40 years of Israeli occupation. Ankara views Hamas
as a legitimate and important element on the Palestinian political
spectrum and seeks to mediate with it. Washington says no. Ankara has
good working ties with Israel but does not shrink from sharp public
criticism of what it perceives as Israeli excesses.
Overall, a "new Turkey" actively seeks good-neighbor relations with
all regional states and players. It seeks to be a major player and
mediator in the Middle East – to bring radicals into the mainstream
via patient diplomacy against what it perceives as Washington’s
complicating belligerence.
Turkey has deep interests in Central Asia. If the
Chinese-Russian-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization bids
to be the dominant geopolitical grouping in Eurasia, then Turkey,
like Afghanistan, Iran and India, would like an association with it.
Washington opposes that.
One may quarrel with the specifics of Turkish policies, but there is
broad belief across the Turkish political spectrum that these policies
serve the country’s core needs. While the U.S. State Department may
soothingly speak of "vital shared interests" in democracy, stability
and counterterrorism, all of that is mere motherhood and apple pie –
empty phrases – when compared with conflicting concrete policies in
so many key spheres. We had better get used to the fact that Turkey,
strengthened by its popular democracy, is going to pursue its own
national interests, regardless of Washington’s pressure. Few Turks
want it any other way.
Fuller is a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council
at the CIA. His latest book, "The New Turkish Republic," is forthcoming
in December. This article originally appeared in the Los Angeles Times.
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/o