Russia confirms 18,241 daily COVID-19 cases, lowest since October 31

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 14:10,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 26, ARMENPRESS. The number of confirmed COVID-19 infections in Russia over the past 24 hours has increased by 18,241, the lowest since October 31. The total number of infections has reached 3,756,931, TASS reports citing the anti-coronavirus crisis center.

According to the crisis center, daily values of new infections have not surpassed 22,000 for eight days. The relative growth amounts to 0.49%.

In all, currently 511,888 patients continue treatment in Russia.

New book examines the history of Armenians of Musa Dagh

Public Radio of Armenia
Jan 20 2021

– Public Radio of Armenia

Vahram Shemmassian, head of the Armenian Studies Program at California State University, Northridge, explores the history of Armenian resistance in the Musa Dagh region of the Ottoman Empire in his latest book, The California State University Northridge (CSUN) informs.

“The Armenians of Musa Dagh: From Obscurity to Genocide Resistance and Fame 1840-1915” is the second book by the Armenian scholar that chronicles the lives of the Armenian people living in the Ottoman Empire, as well as their resistance during the Armenian genocide. His first book in the series was “The Musa Dagh Armenians: A Socioeconomic and Cultural History, 1919-1939.

– Public Radio of Armenia

Shemmassian said he sees parallels between what happened 100 years ago to what is happening today in the region, with the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh sandwiched between the two states. 

“Turkey has been providing Azerbaijan with arms, and terrorists from Syria to help dispose of Armenians and, more specifically, to ethnically cleanse the country in order to obtain land,” he said. “The same resistance against tyranny and extermination that happened in the past is occurring again now, as an attempt to fully dispose of Armenian culture and the people apart of it.”

“The Armenians of Musa Dagh” is a comprehensive history of the people of Musa Dagh, who rose to prominence with their resistance to the genocide in 1915. Shemmassian presents a thorough analysis of the social, economic, religious, educational, and political history of the six villages that constituted Armenian Musa Dagh. He focuses on the important period of the mid-19th to the early 20th century, offering new insights into the people whose courage and persistence ultimately led to their successful self-defense.

The last (and longest) chapter of his book details the Armenian resistance to genocide, he said.

– Public Radio of Armenia

“We are all angry about what’s happening with Armenia and Azerbaijan, because they are finishing what Turkey started during World War I,” Shemmassian said. “Many war crimes were committed against Armenia last year, almost identical to the genocide that was happening a century ago. 

In addition to his work, Shemmassian pointed to “The Forty Days of Musa Dagh,” a novel by Franz Werfel that tells the struggles the Armenian community faced, as a work that can help people understand, on a more intimate level, what happened to the Armenian people during the genocide..

The publication of “The Armenians of Musa Dagh” comes on the heels of an anonymous $3 million gift to CSUN’s Armenian Studies Program, to support research and scholarships for students.

Shemmassian said he hopes his books provide a historical context for what is happening in Armenia today, as the past continues to influence Armenians.

“The final product, the publication of my books, is the most fulfilling feeling that one can have,” he said. “They are a legacy. At some point, we all die. I’m glad that I’m leaving something behind for future generations to read and learn.” 

Armenpress: Pashinyan offers parliamentary opposition to hold discussions on the terms of snap elections

Pashinyan offers parliamentary opposition to hold discussions on the terms of snap elections

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 19:18,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 20, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan offered the parliamentary opposition to hold discussions on the terms of snap elections, ARMENPRESS reports Pashinyan said during the parliament-Cabinet Q&A session.

‘’If you think we have exhausted ourselves, let’s go, hold parliamentary elections and see who has exhausted. Let’s sit down and together decide the terms so that you do not say later that the government decided the terms itself’’, Pashinyan said.

EBRD made record investments in Armenia in 2020

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 14:31,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 20, ARMENPRESS. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) responded to the Covid-19 pandemic in Armenia in 2020 with record investment of €167 million for projects in energy, banking and transport and through trade finance support, the EBRD Armenia Office told Armenpress. The Bank helped to address the immediate and longer-term needs of the country’s economy.

Dimitri Gvindadze, EBRD Head of the Yerevan Resident Office, said: “The EBRD team worked to help our clients deal with the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Our support included the provision of liquidity and trade finance. We invested in energy and transport infrastructure. Our support to the banking sector fostered companies’ access to finance. In 2021, supporting the recovery is our priority. We work closely with the European Union (EU) in Armenia and we thank our EU partners for this strategically important cooperation in the context of both public- and private-sector projects.”

The EBRD stepped up its investment to address immediate needs and to create the foundations for recovery, with a focus on building back better economies in the future. The Bank continued to concentrate its support on the private sector, which accounted for more than 90 per cent of total EBRD investment in Armenia in 2020.

In a pioneering project, the EBRD financed the first utility-scale 55 MW solar power plant in Armenia and in the Caucasus. The project will help boost Armenia’s supply of clean energy and reduce its reliance on imported fuels.

Keeping vital trade flows going, the EBRD supported a new record of close to €70 million in trade finance transactions in Armenia, involving eight local partner banks, under its Trade Facilitation Programme.

The EBRD further increased its support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with the provision of loans to commercial banks for on-lending to businesses. These loans included Women in Business credit lines.

In the infrastructure sector, the Bank funded the reconstruction and modernisation of the border-crossing point near the town of Meghri to meet modern safety and security requirements. The project received significant grant support from the European Union.

In addition, the EBRD supported Electric Networks of Armenia, which continues to modernise its electricity distribution network.

Advice and policy engagement

The Bank also provided business advice to local SMEs by implementing 80 advisory and consultancy projects (with the help of 70 local consultants), three international advisory activities and 10 market-development activities and training sessions.

The Business Support Office (BSO) launched an innovative initiative in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, providing free access to webinars for local firms on topics to help them deal with the crisis. Based on recommendations developed by the BSO, the National Assembly adopted a legislative package that improves the legal framework of leasing.

Plan to develop Karabakh transport infrastructure to be ready by March 1

TASS, Russia
Jan 11 2021
 
The document is to be approved by the parties at the highest level, according to the official statement published on the Kremlin website following the talks
MOSCOW, January 11. /TASS/. The trilateral working group on the Nagorno-Karabakh region will present a list and schedule of measures for the development of transport infrastructure on that territory by March 1. This is according to a statement published on the Kremlin website following the talks of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday.
By March 1, 2021, the working group will submit a list and schedule for the implementation of relevant measures for approval by the parties at the highest level, the statement says.
 
The measures involve the restoration and construction of new transport infrastructure facilities necessary for the organization, implementation and security of international transportation through the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia, according to the statement.
 
The working group is being created by three countries, its co-chairmen will be the deputy prime ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia.
 
The trilateral talks between the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia were held behind closed doors, with the exception of Putin’s statement at the start. The Russian leader noted that Russia values partner and good-neighborly relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia, thanking his colleagues for the positive assessment of Russia’s efforts as a mediator of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire. Putin stated that the agreements reached in November 2020 are implemented consistently, and that this creates the necessary preconditions for long-term and full-fledged Nagorno-Karabakh regulation on a just basis in the interest of both Azerbaijani and Armenian nations.
 

Armenian Ombudsman alarms on multiple unresolved issues at road sections controlled by Azerbaijan

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 13:00, 12 January, 2021

YEREVAN, JANUARY 12, ARMENPRESS. Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman) Arman Tatoyan alarms that several problems regarding roads that have come under Azerbaijani control remain unresolved.

“Different parts of the road are under Azerbaijani control and Azerbaijani flags and signs are installed there. Moreover, 21 kilometers of the 68 kilometer section of the Goris-Vorotan-Shurnukh-Kapan road is under Azerbaijani control. The Azerbaijani soldiers are installing the road signs with explicit provocation. In addition, as residents reported, [Azerbaijani soldiers] may appear on the road with weapons. They may stop on the road and conduct observations. These are roads which link our peaceful settlements with one another. This issue emerged because of using a mechanical approach in demarcation,” Tatoyan said at a news briefing.

He said that Armenian citizens are advised to travel via these roads quickly and without stops, otherwise the Azerbaijani side will consider it a provocation.

Tatoyan pointed out numerous problems that would arise in the event of hypothetical incidents which could happen on these parts of the road, for example traffic accidents.

“If, for example, a traffic accident were to happen between not only Armenian motorists but for example an Armenian motorist and an Azerbaijani motorist. What would happen if a car broke down in those parts of the road and the driver must stop and fix it? What would happen if traffic violations, crimes or other things were to happen in those parts? If we find this to be Azerbaijani territory, what does that mean? Does it mean that the Azeri investigative body must carry out investigative actions against an Armenian citizen? These issues aren’t regulated at all,” he said.

Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan

Ruling faction to nominate former military prosecutor for member of Supreme Judicial Council

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 12:48,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 13, ARMENPRESS. The ruling My Step faction of the Armenian Parliament will nominate the candidacy of former military prosecutor Gagik Jhangiryan for the member of the Supreme Judicial Council.

“I have agreed to be nominated by the ruling faction, but I am not holding a political position, I am not becoming a member of the political team. I am going to a professional work”, he told reporters.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

Armenian, Russian Prosecutor Generals discuss cooperation in extradition fields

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 13:07,

YEREVAN, JANUARY 13, ARMENPRESS. Prosecutor General of Armenia Artur Davtyan met with Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov during his working visit in Moscow, the Office of the Armenian Prosecutor General told Armenpress.

The officials praised the high level of the cooperation between their offices and expressed readiness to further deepen it in accordance with the strategic partnership and friendship spirit between Armenia and Russia.

They stated that the current legal-contractual base creates necessary conditions for the protection of rights of the Armenian and Russian citizens, raises the efficiency of the joint fight against international crime.

The Armenian and Russian Prosecutor Generals also discussed the partnership in the fields of extradition, as well as a wide range of issues of mutual interest.

The meeting also touched upon the activity of the representatives of the Russian prosecution in Artsakh during the Russian peacekeeping mission. Artur Davtyan said the Defense Army of Artsakh continues its functions on ensuring the security of Artsakh-Armenians, but added that the deployment of the Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh has greatly increased the security guarantees and created grounds for the strengthening of the stability in the Line of Contact.

Based on the results of talks the Prosecutor Generals of Armenia and Russia signed a 2021-2022 cooperation program.

Artur Davtyan has been awarded by Igor Krasnov with the Certificate of the Russian Prosecutor General for his major contributions to the strengthening of the rule of law and the international cooperation.

Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan

RFE/RL Armenian Report – 01/12/2021

                                        Tuesday, 
Armenian Opposition Unimpressed With Moscow Summit
        • Naira Nalbandian
        • Narine Ghalechian
RUSSIA -- Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev 
and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian attend a joint press conference 
following a trilateral meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, 
The two opposition parties represented in Armenia’s parliament claimed on 
Tuesday that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian failed to achieve anything during 
his talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev hosted by Russian President 
Vladimir Putin on Monday.
They singled out Pashinian’s failure to secure the release of Armenian soldiers 
and civilians held by Azerbaijan two months after a ceasefire deal brokered by 
Putin stopped the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Pashinian, Putin and Aliyev met in Moscow to discuss the deal’s implementation. 
In a joint statement issued after the meeting, they said their governments will 
set up a joint “working group” that will deal with practical modalities of 
restoring transport links between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The statement made no mention of the unconditional exchange of all prisoners 
also envisaged by the Russian-brokered deal. Pashinian confirmed that he and 
Aliyev did not reach any agreements on the issue.
“The enemy’s agenda is being fully realized while the Armenian side’s is not,” 
said Edmon Marukian, the leader of the opposition Bright Armenia Party (LHK). 
“Why? Because the symbol of our defeat [Pashinian] continues to hold talks.”
“Pashinian was taken to Moscow for doing only one thing: to sign up to the 
unblocking of transport routes and arteries vital for Azerbaijan,” agreed Naira 
Zohrabian of the Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK).
Both Marukian and Zohrabian stressed that in the run-up to the Moscow summit 
Pashinian said that the release of the Armenian prisoners of war is essential 
for opening the Armenian-Azerbaijani border for commercial traffic.
Armenia - Opposition leader Edmon Marukian speaks at a news conference, November 
19, 2020.
A senior member of the ruling My Step bloc, Ruben Rubinian, insisted that the 
joint statement issued by Aliyev, Putin and Pashinian is “beneficial for us” 
even though it makes no references to the POWs. He argued that the planned 
opening of the border will allow Armenia to have rail links with Iran and Russia.
“The Russian president backed in principle the Armenian side’s position [on the 
POWs,]” Rubinian told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service.
Pashinian thanked Putin for that support when they met separately in the Kremlin 
following Monday’s trilateral meeting. “This is the most sensitive and painful 
issue for us,” he said.
Putin stated, for his part, that the summit was “useful” despite Aliyev’s and 
Pashinian’s failure to agree on the release of the Armenian captives. “I hope 
that there will be an agreement on all problems, including the issues of 
humanitarian character,” he told the Armenian premier.
According to Yerevan-based human rights lawyers, more than 100 Armenian POWs and 
civilians remain in Azerbaijani captivity. They include 62 soldiers who were 
taken prisoner in early December when Azerbaijani forces seized the last two 
Armenian-controlled villages in Karabakh’s Hadrut district occupied by them 
during the six-week war.
In a letter to United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres publicized last 
week, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov branded those soldiers as 
“saboteurs” and indicated the Azerbaijani authorities’ intention to prosecute 
them on relevant charges.
The Armenian Foreign Ministry condemned Baku’s plans as a gross violation of 
international law and the Karabakh truce agreement. It accused the Azerbaijani 
side of “using Armenian prisoners of war as hostages to advance its political 
agenda.”
Wartime Security Chief Also Slams Pashinian
        • Robert Zargarian
Armenia - Mikael Hambardzumian, a senior official from the National Security 
Service, at a news conference in Yerevan, 27Nov2015.
A former official who ran Armenia’s National Security Service (NSS) during the 
recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh has hit out at Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, 
saying that he could have stopped hostilities three weeks before the ceasefire 
brokered by Russia on November 9.
Mikael Hambardzumian was appointed as acting head of the NSS on October 8 eleven 
days after Azerbaijan launched offensive military operations in and around 
Karabakh. Pashinian replaced him by another senior NSS officer, Armen Abazian, 
one month later.
In an interview with the Fifth Channel TV station aired late on Monday, 
Hambardzumian claimed that he himself decided to leave Armenia’s most powerful 
security service because of Pashinian’s handling of the war. He singled out the 
prime minister’s failure to accept a more favorable ceasefire agreement which 
was negotiated by Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 20.
In November 17 televised remarks, Putin said that the Armenian side would have 
suffered fewer territorial losses and, in particular, retained control of the 
strategic Karabakh town of Shushi (Shusha) had Pashinian agreed to that deal 
accepted by Azerbaijan. He said he was taken aback by Pashinian’s stance.
Pashinian explained afterwards that he rejected the proposed truce because it 
called for the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Shushi. He claimed that that 
too would have restored Azerbaijani control of the town overlooking the Karabakh 
capital Stepanakert.
“I was informed about [Putin’s] proposals not by the prime minister but by my 
colleagues,” said Hambardzumian. “I obviously wondered why we are not taking 
that step and what keeps us from doing that. After all, it was the only real 
opportunity to stop the war and suffer fewer human and territorial losses.”
According to Hambardzumian, during an October 19 meeting of Armenia’s Security 
Council the chief of the Armenian army’s General Staff, General Onik Gasparian, 
warned Pashinian that the Armenian side is heading for defeat and that the war 
must be stopped as soon as possible. He said then Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan 
echoed that warning.
“Nevertheless, such a decision was not made [by Pashinian] after that,” added 
the former NSS chief.
During the six-week war Azerbaijan recaptured four of the seven districts around 
Karabakh which had been occupied by Karabakh Armenian forces in the early 1990s. 
Baku agreed to stop its military operations on November 10 in return for an 
Armenian pledge to withdraw from the three other districts.
The Armenian opposition has blamed Pashinian for the defeat and demanded his 
resignation. Opposition leaders have portrayed Putin’s revelation as further 
proof of the prime minister’s mishandling of the war that killed at least 3,300 
Armenian soldiers.
Hambardzumian added his voice to the opposition demands shortly after his 
sacking. He was also among two dozen retired NSS officers who issued in December 
a joint statement calling for Pashinian’s resignation. The prime minister has 
repeatedly refused to quit.
Armenia Plans Limited COVID-19 Vaccination
Poland -- A paramedic is vaccinated with the Pfizer-BioNTech coronavirus disease 
(COVID-19) vaccine at a hospital in Warsaw, December 27, 2020.
The Armenian health authorities are planning to vaccinate only 10 percent of the 
country’s population against COVID-19, a senior government official said on 
Tuesday.
Gayane Sahakian, the deputy director of the National Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, also announced that Armenia will receive its first coronavirus 
vaccine doses before the second half of February.
“We are planning to acquire vaccines for 10 percent of the population to carry 
out at first vaccinations of only high risk groups,” Sahakian told a news 
conference.
“We are now holding negotiations on concrete time frames for their imports. We 
are confident that we will have the first imports by the end of January or the 
first half of February,” she said.
Sahakian said the talks center on possible supplies of the Russian vaccine 
Sputnik V or three other certified vaccines that have been developed by the 
Western pharmaceutical companies Pfizer, Moderna and AstraZeneca. It is still 
not clear which of them will be chosen by the Armenian government, added the 
official.
Sahakian announced in early December that the government has commissioned 
600,000 doses of coronavirus vaccines from COVAX Facility, a global partnership 
backed by the World Health Organization. She said Armenian medical and social 
workers, seniors and people suffering from chronic diseases will be the first to 
get vaccine shots free of charge.
Armenia -- Medics at the Surb Grigor Lusavorich Medical Center in Yerevan, 
Armenia's largest hospital treating COVID-19 patients, June 5, 2020.
The official did not clarify on Tuesday whether the government’s supply contract 
with COVAX, worth $6 million, remains in force. Nor did she say if the health 
authorities could vaccinate a larger proportion of the population later this 
year.
Armenia has been hit hard by the pandemic, with more than 162,000 coronavirus 
cases and at least 2,941 deaths caused by them reported by the authorities so 
far. The real number of cases is believed to be much higher.
The daily number of new infections has fallen significantly since the beginning 
of November. The Armenian Ministry of Health reported on Tuesday morning that 
355 more people have tested positive for COVID-19 in the past 24 hours, sharply 
down from more than 2,000 cases a day routinely recorded in late October and 
early November.
Sahakian acknowledged that the country’s coronavirus numbers will likely rise 
again after the New Year’s and Christmas holidays and the reopening of schools. 
But she did not predict a serious resurgence of cases.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2021 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.
 

Confidence and Catastrophe: Armenia and the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War

War on the Rocks
Jan 11 2021
CONFIDENCE AND CATASTROPHE: ARMENIA AND THE SECOND NAGORNO-KARABAKH WAR
MICHAEL A. REYNOLDS
JANUARY 11, 2021
COMMENTARY
“In war,” Carl von Clausewitz cautioned, “the result is never final.” On Nov. 9, 2020, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan learned this lesson the hard way when he signed a ceasefire that put an end to a 44-day war with Azerbaijan over the territory of Mountainous Karabakh and seven adjoining provinces. It was a crushing defeat that erased Armenia’s victory in the First Karabakh War, a six-year armed conflict that had concluded just over a quarter century ago.
 
This second conflict came as no surprise. With peace talks stalled, Azerbaijan had, for over a decade, been threatening war and ostentatiously arming for one. Nor was the war’s outcome any surprise. The bigger and better equipped Azerbaijani army, backed by Turkey, overwhelmed the smaller and obsolescent Armenian force. What is a surprise is the way Armenia’s leadership for over two decades remained stubbornly blind to the likelihood of such a debacle ― and even contributed to it by alienating allies and needlessly provoking enemies. One might have expected that as a tiny, isolated, and resource-poor country with a tragic history stamped by violence, Armenia would have taken a more realist approach to diplomacy, displaying hardheaded pragmatism, cunning, and shrewd cynicism. Yet to the contrary, Armenian statecraft has revealed itself as a mix of delusional self-confidence and naïve sentimentality.
 
A Tragic History
 
The Republic of Armenia is a small country, roughly 11,500 square miles and just barely bigger than Massachusetts. Yet, every day in Armenia reminds you that Armenians not long ago inhabited a far wider geography. The restaurant advertising “Adana-style” cuisine, recalling a city by the Mediterranean; the “Kilikya”(Cilicia) beer, named after a region in southwestern Turkey; the mosaic on the street in Gyumri that depicts the city of Kars, 80 miles away, across a closed border; the news item about the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople, located in Turkey’s capital; the television documentary about the Armenian Cathedral of the Holy Cross on an island in Lake Van; and, of course, Mt. Ararat, the national symbol of Armenia. Standing at an elevation of nearly 17,000 feet, the volcano literally looms over Armenia in a way that photos do not capture. Once you see Ararat in person, you immediately understand why Armenians adopted it as their national symbol and reproduce its image everywhere. Yet, Ararat too, lies outside the borders.
 
As these daily reminders suggest, Armenians have inhabited lands outside the republic for centuries, particularly the highlands stretching from the Caucasus to Anatolia. Their distinct language, unique alphabet, and separate Christian church set them apart from their neighbors. For much of their history, they maintained a precarious existence on the periphery of far larger and more powerful entities such as the Roman, Byzantine, Parthian, Ottoman, Safavid, and Russian empires.
 
That existence came to a ghastly end in World War I. An emerging world order that acknowledged nations and the nation-state, not imperial dynasties, as its natural and most legitimate units transformed the Armenians of Anatolia into potential sovereigns of that land, and thereby set them up as competitors with their Turkish and Kurdish neighbors. In 1915, to ensure that the Armenians could never follow the example blazed by the Balkan peoples and create an Armenian nation-state in Anatolia, the government of the Ottoman empire put an effective end to the Armenian existence in Anatolia, killing off as many as a million through deportations and massacre.
 
That horrific experience, memorialized by Armenians as Medz Yeghem, the “Great Catastrophe,” and described commonly as a genocide, was followed by what appeared to be redemption. In May of 1918, with the Russian Empire in ruins and a tottering Ottoman Empire amenable to buffer states in the Caucasus, the Armenians managed to establish a sovereign Armenia centered on the old Khanate of Yerevan. The surrender of the Ottoman Empire that autumn and the victorious Entente powers’ plans to partition it fired Armenian imaginations. Armenian diplomats set off to the Paris Peace Conference to lobby, in the words of Armenia’s first prime minister, Hovhannes Kajaznuni, for “a great Armenia from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, from the mountains of Karabagh to the Arabian Desert.” The allied powers were sympathetic, and in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres they endorsed a vast Armenia that reached from the Caucasus through eastern Anatolia to the Black Sea.
 
With a population of a little more than a million, however, the existing Armenia could barely hold on to its territory in the Caucasus. How it could absorb and defend nearly 10 times more territory was not at all clear. Moreover, news of the Treaty of Sevres and the prospect of Armenian rule filled the Muslims of those lands with fear. Turks, Kurds, and others rallied behind Mustafa Kemal to resist the treaty and the partition of Anatolia. Kemal, in turn, partnered with Vladimir Lenin, trading Turkish influence in the Caucasus, particularly in Azerbaijan, to Soviet Russia in exchange for guns and gold. As Kemal’s troops squeezed the Armenian Republic from the west the Red Army rolled over Armenia from the east, the formerly buoyant Armenians surrendered to the Soviet Union in December 1920.
 
The Treaty of Sevres was dead. Armenia’s diplomats had chased a phantom, one that required them to fight an unwinnable two-front war against the Turks and the Bolsheviks. They lost everything as a result. No one put this point more bluntly than Kajaznuni, who in 1923 penned a powerful denunciation of the grandiose delusions of his political party, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which had dominated the politics of the first Armenian Republic. “We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds,” Kajaznuni angrily lamented. Paris, London, and Washington were generous with Anatolian territory, but their priorities were not Yerevan’s. “We had implanted our own desires into the minds of others; We had lost our sense of reality and were carried away with our dreams.” So self-deceived were Armenia’s leaders that they had remained cavalier even as the Turkish army was massing just across the border. “We were not afraid of war because we thought we would win,” Kajaznuni reminded his audience.
 
Armenia’s Second Chance
 
Armenia regained its independence some 71 years later when the Soviet Union fell apart. The Soviet collapse coincided with the outbreak of a war for the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. Soviet authorities had initially assigned the territory to Azerbaijan as a nominally autonomous region. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the ethnic Armenians of Karabakh moved to have the territory reassigned to Soviet Armenia. The conflict grew violent and evolved into a war. Backed by the Republic of Armenia, the Armenian Karabakhis eventually prevailed. The ceasefire of 1994 marked their triumph.
 
The Armenian victory was enormous. Karabakhis had consolidated control not only over Karabakh but also over seven adjoining Azerbaijani provinces, or 13.6 percent of Azerbaijan’s total territory. The psychological dimension of the conquest was no less consequential. Armenians draw little distinction between Azerbaijani Turks and Anatolian Turks. Many accordingly saw the victory over Azerbaijan as a redeeming win at the end of a century marked by calamities. Once at an academic conference of Turks and Armenians that I attended in 2005, a non-academic observer from the Republic of Armenia who was bemused at the proceedings stood up and exclaimed, “We Eastern Armenians are so different from you Western Armenians! You always see yourselves as victims! But we know ourselves as conquerors!”
 
Yet, no matter how great Armenia’s victory in 1994 was, it could not be decisive. They had won the battle for Karabakh, but they lacked the means to compel Azerbaijan, a country nearly three times larger in territory and population, to concede all that they wanted. Moreover, their victory violated the principle of territorial integrity, a pillar of the international order. Azerbaijan thus had four U.N. Security Council resolutions calling for the unconditional withdrawal of occupying Armenian forces from the seven Azerbaijani provinces. Absent Azerbaijan’s consent, Armenia could never legitimize its gains in the international arena. This led to a bizarre predicament whereby Yerevan declined to recognize the Republic of Artsakh as a state, even as it supported Artsakh in all imaginable ways and called on others to recognize Artsakh’s sovereignty. A conclusive solution to the Karabakh conflict would require the Armenians to agree to some form of compromise. Ultimately, they proved unwilling to do that.
 
To facilitate a negotiated solution to the war, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe created the so-called “Minsk Group” co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States to host peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the victor in possession of both Karabakh and seven surrounding provinces, Armenia had tremendous leverage, and in the Minsk Group it had a relatively favorable environment. Armenia’s strategy was simple: As a recent report from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe put it, “maintain the status quo while stalling until the international community and Azerbaijan recognized Nagornyy [sic] Karabakh’s independence.”
 
Time, however, was one factor not in Armenia’s favor. As a small landlocked country largely bereft of natural resources and with outlets only through Georgia and Iran, Armenia’s prospects for economic growth were limited. Further crippling Armenia’s economy has been its dependency on Russia for security, a reliance dictated by Yerevan’s uncompromising stance on Karabakh. Yerevan is a formal treaty ally with Moscow, hosts Russian military bases, and has Russian troops guarding its borders with Turkey and Iran. That security dependence, however, has carried with it a parallel energy and economic dependence that has constrained Armenia’s development. An anemic economy has caused as much as one-third of Armenia’s population to leave the country in search of employment abroad, further undermining the country’s long-term prospects.
 
By comparison, Azerbaijan’s future prospects were bright. Just months after signing the 1994 ceasefire, Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev inked the so-called “Contract of the Century” to develop Azerbaijan’s Caspian oil fields with a consortium of international oil companies. In the 1990s, Baku hoped the attraction of its energy riches would prompt the West to pressure Armenia to compromise. After those hopes fell through at negotiations in Key West in 2001 and in Rambouillet in 2006, Baku turned to the military option. Its oil and gas exports enabled it to boost its military spending 10-fold between 2006 and 2016. Whereas Armenia’s commitments to Russia bound it to purchase virtually all its arms from Russia, Azerbaijan had the freedom and means to acquire advanced and innovative weapons systems from Israel and Turkey, among others, as well as from Russia.
 
Baku never sought to camouflage its intention to rearm and retake Karabakh by force if negotiations failed. To the contrary, Baku publicized its buildup with words and images. In the parade celebrating the centennial of Azerbaijan’s armed forces in 2018, the Azerbaijanis showcased their new weaponry, including Israeli drones and Russian thermobaric rocket launchers. Nor did Haydar’s son and heir, Ilham Aliyev, leave any question for parade watchers as to why Azerbaijan was acquiring so many weapons. “We want the conflict to be resolved peacefully,” he announced, but “[i]nternational law is not working.” With the arsenal on parade, Aliyev would show “to the people of Azerbaijan, to the enemy and to the whole world” that Azerbaijan’s army is “ready to restore Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity at any moment.”
 
Baku’s warnings were not limited to rhetoric. In April 2016, the Azerbaijani armed forces initiated a four-day skirmish. Aliyev took the opportunity during the fighting to air his frustrations. Armenia, he growled, “want[s] to turn this into a never-ending process. They want negotiations to last for another 20 years.” The combat was intense, and deaths were well over a hundred on each side. The Azerbaijani army managed to seize a small amount of territory, some two to three square miles.
 
Some in Armenia saw the clash as a wake-up call. In May 2016, Samvel Babayan, the former commander of the Karabakh army, implored his listeners to understand that Armenia simply could not compete with Azerbaijan in either financial or human resources. Boasts that in the event of war Armenian soldiers would be “drinking tea in Baku” were idle. More likely, Babayan predicted to his compatriots, the Azerbaijanis would be drinking tea in Yerevan. Another warning came from the journalist Tatul Hokabyan, who said the 2016 skirmish should be “a cold shower for Armenian hot heads.” But others dismissed such criticisms, and only three years later did the Armenian government undertake a half-hearted effort to review combat performance.
 
In fact, Armenia’s self-confidence was hypertrophying into a pride that echoed the hubris of 1920. Yerevan and Stepanakert (Karabakh’s capital) began openly to advance maximal claims. The seizure of the Azerbaijani provinces outside Karabakh proper had been incidental to the struggle for Karabakh. Kelbajar and Lachin, which ensured connection to Armenian proper, were considered strategically vital, the lands between Karabakh and Iran as valuable, and those between Karabakh and Azerbaijan as dispensable. Stepanakert initially made no definite claims to the lands outside Karabakh. Not unlike Israel that used the Sinai as a bargaining chip with Egypt in 1979, the Armenians initially intended to trade land for peace.
 
In 2006, however, the Republic of Artsakh formally assumed jurisdiction over all seven adjacent regions. Thereafter, the government began settling Armenians in and around Karabakh, with the goal of consolidating their gains by creating “facts on the ground.” In 2018 the Armenian air force flew the Armenian professional poker player and playboy Dan Bilzerian on a helicopter to Karabakh as part of a planned major investment project. The consensus regarding the adjacent occupied regions changed radically, and the notion of ceding land for peace went from axiomatic to unthinkable.
 
Feeding Armenian overconfidence was a disbelief in Azerbaijanis’ attachment and commitment to Karabakh. Armenia owed its battlefield success in the first war to greater national cohesion and higher motivation. Asserting sovereignty over Armenian-inhabited lands resonated with a communal memory centered on the loss of such lands. Azerbaijan lacked a comparable sense of mission and urgency to galvanize them ― they were fighting to preserve a status-quo they had taken for granted. Azerbaijani nationalism was still in formation as the Soviet Union broke apart, and internal political divisions and infighting sapped the Azerbaijanis’ war effort.
 
Armenia, pointing to such things as the semi-nomadic past of many Azerbaijanis and their historically lower rates of literacy, was already inclined to see Azerbaijani nationalism as thin and artificial. As a result, it tended to dismiss the Republic of Azerbaijan as a khanate run by the Aliyev clan, not a nation-state. Some in Armenia assured themselves that Azerbaijan’s inability to effectively mobilize its people and resources reflected an underlying indifference to Karabakh as well as a collective incapacity.
 
Since 1994, however, the Azerbaijani government has pursued a steady campaign to build a sense of national identity among its citizens. The loss of Karabakh and the need to avenge that loss have been focal points of this nation-building project. The very presence inside Azerbaijan of between 600,000 and 800,000 people displaced by the conflict, or nearly one out every 10 Azerbaijanis, reminded Azerbaijanis daily of their loss. Official channels such as schools, popular culture, and music further drove the message home. In time, the need to reclaim Karabakh became one matter on which all Azerbaijanis could passionately agree.
 
Disaffecting the Patron
 
In the spring of 2018, Nikol Pashinyan, a journalist-cum-politician, tapped into widespread discontent in Armenian society to lead a series of popular protests that spurred the collapse of the governing coalition and led to his election as prime minister. Pashinyan dubbed the tumult and his rise to power as Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution,” recalling the so-called “color revolutions” and their promises of more open politics at home and a more pro-Western approach abroad.
 
The desire to extricate Armenia from the political and economic ruts into which it had fallen was the proper instinct, but given the country’s limited resources, military and economic dependence on Russia, and the clearly growing threat that a better-armed and increasingly frustrated Azerbaijan posed, the achievement of that goal demanded political acumen and sagacity, qualities that Pashinyan lacks. Although Pashinyan outwardly reaffirmed Armenia’s pro-Russian orientation, and the Kremlin responded in kind, by the end of the year Moscow had become alarmed about trends in Pashinyan’s Armenia. The repeated arrests of former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, whom Putin described as “a true friend of Russia,” irritated the Kremlin. More substantive moves, including the curtailment of intelligence ties with Russia and Pashinyan’s replacement of pro-Russian personnel with thinly experienced loyalists, only upset Moscow further.
 
Meanwhile, anti-Russian rhetoric was percolating in Armenian circles. Karabakhi leaders grew dismissive, telling their Russian contacts, “We don’t need [you] Russians at all, we can walk to Baku without you.” When the Second Karabakh War erupted, prominent Russians gleefully repaid the contempt, branding Pashinyan a “pro-American marionette” and predicting Armenia would pay a steep price for Pashinyan’s alienation of Moscow. Given Pashinyan’s inconsistency and confusion on foreign policy matters, it is possible that he was not actually pursuing a policy to delink Armenia from Russia for the sake of the West. But his carelessness certainly gave Moscow that impression, which was just as damaging.
 
While antagonizing Russia, Pashinyan and his Cabinet indulged in maximalist claims. In March 2019, his defense minister, David Tonoyan, famously announced that Armenia’s policy was no longer “land for peace” but “war for new territories.” If Azerbaijan dared to initiate another war, Armenia would take more Azerbaijani territory. Parliamentarians warned Azerbaijanis that if there were to be another war, “We will go all the way to Baku!”
 
Pashinyan doubled down on maximalism when on a visit to Stepanakert in August 2019 he asserted, “Artsakh is Armenia, and that is it!” A desire to outflank political rivals inside Armenia and Karabakh may have motivated Pashinyan’s call for unification, but it was an incendiary declaration. It amounted to an unequivocal rejection of Azerbaijan’s position and thus the very idea of negotiations.
 
Pashinyan threw logic and prudence aside entirely а year later in a speech he delivered on the centennial of Sevres, declaring that the treaty is a “historical fact” and “remains so to this day.” The head of the Armenian government was reviving the claim to eastern Turkey but disregarding the fact that Turkey famously nurtures a national paranoia on the theme of Sevres and is 25 times larger than Armenia. As Gerard Libaridyan, a foreign policy adviser to Armenia’s first president, put it, Pashinyan’s address amounted to “at minimum, a declaration of diplomatic war” against Turkey. In addition, as Libaridyan noted, Pashinyan had recast the Karabakh question from one of self-determination into one of Armenian expansionism, another colossal error.
 
Confronting the Consequences
 
The defeat in Karabakh has stunned Armenia. The expectations invested in Armenian arms, the goodwill of the democratic West, and the guardianship of Russia have been shattered. Alas, the opposition to Pashinyan has focused its ire not on the brazen diplomatic and strategic recklessness that led Armenia to a calamitous and inevitable defeat but on the decision to surrender. The candidate behind whom Pashinyan’s opponents have rallied, Vazgen Manukyan, persists in propagating fantasies. While addressing a rally in Yerevan on Dec. 5, Manukyan prophesized, “A large force will gather against Turkey, the world will not forgive Turkey for her insolence. If an alliance against Turkey is formed, we will be in it.” Turkey may have enemies, but symbolic resolutions passed in the French National Assembly favoring the recognition of the Artsakh Republic and cooperation with the United Arab Emirates will neither constitute an alliance nor reverse Armenia’s battlefield losses.
 
Nov. 9, 2020, has become one more bitter date for Armenians who know many. The political scientist Arman Grigoryan warns that unless Armenians take this moment of defeat to soberly reassess their strengths and weaknesses, it will not be the last. Nonetheless, the proponents of the “Armenian Cause” ― the conviction that the restoration of Armenian sovereignty over the entire territory of historic Armenia is both just and feasible ― continue to dominate the public debate. And, as Grigoryan writes, they “have created an image of reality, which reflects not reality, but rather their desires and prejudices.” The description could have been Kajaznuni’s. That states seek to maximize their power in the interest of self-preservation is a central tenet of the theory of realism. Armenia’s example perhaps suggests that historical trauma coupled with limited experience of sovereignty can lead states voluntarily to pursue self-destructive policies.
 
The future of Armenia, like that of any other country, lies also in the hands of its neighbors. Azerbaijan’s armed forces have won for Baku more options in foreign policy than it has ever had. It no longer exists in Russia’s shadow. Turkish assistance in training and arming the Azerbaijani army were critical to Azerbaijan’s victory, but, paradoxically, Azerbaijan, having accomplished most of its objectives in Karabakh, no longer needs Turkey as much as it did.
 
How Baku will seek to use its new independence remains to be seen. Aliyev’s continued descriptions of Yerevan, Zengezur, and Goyce (Sevan) as “our historical lands” will generate only loathing in Armenia and instability beyond. More promising is Aliyev’s recognition of the possibilities of peace, cooperation, and development in the future. Like the First Karabakh War, the second has ended with a ceasefire, not a peace treaty, and a rudimentary ceasefire at that. Clausewitz’s admonition that in war “the result is never final” is every bit as relevant to Azerbaijan in 2020 as it was to Armenia in 1994.
 
 

Michael A. Reynolds is the director of Princeton University’s program in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies; associate professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton; and senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is the author of Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918.