Newsweek, NY
Aug 29 2004
An Empire Of Stories
Turkey’s tortured history inspires two fine novels
By Malcolm Jones
Newsweek Sept. 6 issue – Turkey is a novelist’s dream, or perhaps a
land dreamed by a novelist. A border country between Europe and the
Middle East, it has for centuries been so many things to so many
people – Christians, Muslims, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds and, of course,
Turks – that it has become a place where fantasies and realities
collide like tectonic plates. Everybody has a story, and, as two new
novels set in Turkey demonstrate in their radically varying tales,
every story is startlingly unique.
In “Birds Without Wings,” Louis de Bernieres tackles a piece of
Turkish history with the same vigor that he used to sketch World War
II Greece in “Corelli’s Mandolin.” But this is a darker book, with
nothing like its predecessor’s central love affair to soften its
tragedy. Near the novel’s beginning, de Bernieres introduces
Philothei, his fictional village’s most beautiful woman, about whom
one character says she “reminded you of death,” because to look upon
her was to know that “everything decays away and is lost.” Like
Eskibahce, the village she inhabits, Philothei is notable for nothing
but her beauty; both are doomed. By the end of “Birds Without Wings,”
Eskibahce has been decimated by World War I and its aftermath. What
had been a patchwork paradise of ethnicities – Greeks, Turks and
Armenians – is gone, sacrificed for modern Turkey, forged by the
ruthless, charismatic Kemal Ataturk out of the ashes of the Ottoman
Empire. The Greeks have been exiled, the Armenians slaughtered. Those
who remain are too impoverished and war-weary to know what hit them.
De Bernieres takes his cues from Tolstoy – his characters’ stories are
always played out against the scrim of history. The Turkish novelist
Orhan Pamuk is more a Kafka man. “Snow” takes place in the 1990s in
the far-eastern Turkish village of Kars. And while the story, packed
with nationalists, socialists and militant Islamists, has a
superficial currency, its reality is dreamlike. Snow falls for most
of the novel, isolating the town, where a poet, called Ka, has come
to investigate a series of suicides by teenage Muslim girls who
refuse the secular government’s order to remove their headscarves.
Artistically blocked for years, Ka, a Westernized sophisticate,
suddenly begins to write poetry again. He falls in love so deeply
that he begins to betray everything – even his own scruples – to preserve
his happiness. Because he believes in nothing beyond his own desire,
he is marked for tragedy.
De Bernieres is so inventive – celebratory but never sentimental – that
he is the more beguiling of the two novelists. But Pamuk is the more
profound. At the end of “Snow,” a young man says to the narrator,
“I’d like to tell your readers not to believe anything you say about
me, anything you say about any of us. No one could understand us from
so far away.” By refusing to condescend to his characters – by just
showing them, not explaining them – Pamuk endows even the most
reprehensible figures with dignity. Like de Bernieres, Pamuk never
generalizes. In their indelible novels, every tragedy wears a
different face.
Author: Dabaghian Diana
BAKU: Azerbaijani-German relations in good progress
Azer Tag, Azerbaijan State Info Agency
Aug 28 2004
AZERBAIJANI-GERMAN RELATIONS IN GOOD PROGRESS
[August 28, 2004, 18:01:45]
As reports from press service President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, in connection with official visit President Ilham Aliyev
to Germany a Germany’s department of press were spread an official
report on August 25.
According to the report Germany and Azerbaijan have intend for still
more developing mutual economics relations. About that were declare
the Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and President Ilham Aliyev
in Berlin on August 26.
After the conversation with President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev
the Federal Chancellor Mr. Schroeder has made a statement for
representatives of mass media. ` Relations between Azerbaijan and
Germany are at a fine high level.’ The reforms wich are carried out
in Azerbaijan to set going surprising economic achievments.
The Federal Chancellor has noted that President Ilham Aliyev is very
much interested in creation in Azerbaijan of a lawful state, makes
huge efforts for this purpose and has achieved successes. Therefore,
I regard him with the deep respect.
He made the point that activity of the German companies in Azerbaijan
will be extend.
President Ilham Aliyev frankly noted that activity of the Cerman
companies in Azerbaijan are wishfull. The Federal Chancellor had
announce that in the coming autumn or in the beginning of the next
year both countries to carry out in Berlin a conference with
participation of representatives of the German economy in connection
with investments in Azerbaijan. In the conference will discuss real
opportunities of expanding economic relations with Azerbaijan.
With the attention of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and
Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder was sighned the
agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and the contract
between State Concern `AZAL’ of Azerbaijan Republic and the company
`Airbus’ of the Federative Republic of Germany on purchasing four
airbuses. In accordance with the contract in sum 169 euro will be
realized purchase a three aircraft A-319, as well as one corporative
jet A-319.
The Federal Chancellor emphasized that the contract on the purchase
of four airbuses are indication of Azerbaijan’s integration into
Europe. At the same time, the question is realization of the EU New
Neighborhood Policy.
CONFLICT WITH ARMENIA SHOULD BE SETTLED BY PEACE WAY
Then, concerning of conflict over Nagorny Karabakh Mr. Schroeder were
convinced that Germany has recognized and will recognize territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan. Gerhard Schroeder and Ilham Aliyev has noted
that the Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh conflict should be
settled only by peace way. The Federal Chancellor underscore a point
Germany’s contribution and efforts within the framework of activity
of the OSCE Minsk Group.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Olympics: Ibrahim strikes Greco gold
BBC Sport, UK
Aug 26 2004
Ibrahim strikes Greco gold
Latest wrestling results
Karam Ibrahim won Egypt’s first Olympic gold medal since 1948 when he
thrashed Georgian Ramaz Nozadze to take gold in the Greco-Roman
wrestling 96kg class.
The powerful 24-year-old secured the title after only three minutes,
22 seconds of the bout, winning 12-1.
Ibrahim’s winning margin equalled the scoreline in the semi-final in
which he beat Mehmet Ozal of Turkey.
Ozal held on to beat Iranian Masoud Hashemzadeh in a close contest
for the bronze medal.
South Korea’s Jung Ji-hyun won gold in the 60kg category with a 3-0
overtime victory over Cuban Roberto Monzon Gonzalez.
Jung took an early 2-0 lead which he held for most of the bout but
was unable to get the third point required for a win in the mandatory
six minutes.
Jung (red) won the 60kg class
He finally registered the decisive point after toppling Monzon from a
clinch position early in extra-time.
Bulgarian Armen Nazarian beat Russian Alexey Shevtsov 4-3 to win the
bronze.
Nazarian, who won gold in Atlanta in 1996 as an Armenian before
winning another gold in Sydney for Bulgaria, overturned a 2-0 deficit
against Shevtsov.
Shevtsov had earlier lost 6-3 to Monzon Gonzalez in one semi-final,
while Jung progressed to the gold medal bout with a 3-1 win over
Nazarian.
In the 74kg division, Alexandr Dokturishivili of Uzbekistan took the
gold medal, beating Finland’s Marko Yli-Hannuksela 3-1 on points.
Russia’s Varteres Samourgachev beat Switzerland’s Reto Bucher to take
the bronze medal, winning by great superiority.
Warwick mayor of Armenian origin sent letter to House Chair Hastert
ArmenPress
Aug 24 2004
WARWICK MAYOR OF ARMENIAN ORIGIN SENT A LETTER TO US CHAIRMAN OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WARWICK, AUGUST 24, ARMENPRESS: Scot Avetissian, the mayor of
second biggest city of Rhode Island, Warwick, sent a letter to the
third high rank official in the country, chairman of House of
Representatives Dennis Hastertin calling him to reconsider his
disposition to Resolution 193 and the bill proposed by Adam Sheef.
In May, 2000, Legal Committee of the House of Representatives
unanimously adopted Resolution 193 which says that US will remember
all previous crimes against humanity, including Armenian Genocide.
However, House of Representatives headed by Dennis Hastertin plans to
exclude the issue from its full session.
“Didn’t you talk about proposing the resolution on Armenian
genocide to the House of Representatives still in 2000,” Avetisian’s
letter says. “Next year the 90th anniversary of Armenian Genocide is
celebrated and it would be to the point to make a gesture to a nation
whose biggest hope, according to Ronald Reigan, “is the recognition
of the massacre of one and half million Armenians.”
In terms of Sheef’s bill, Scot Avetissian writes, “It is important
that US Congress openly states that Turkish government will not have
any US support in its lobbying efforts against resolution on
genocide.”
It is true that the House of Representatives adopted Sheef’s
resolution in its full session last month, however, Hastertin and
some republican congressmen publicly have opposed it later. Why does
Hastertin oppose Sheef’s resolution. American people do not pay taxes
for Turkish lobby, don’t they? – American Commission on Armenian
Cause poses the question and waits for the reply of the letter.
Information on Russian-Armenian relations
Putinru.com, Russia
Aug 20 2004
INFORMATION ON RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN RELATIONS
Armenia is Russia’s strategic ally in the Southern Caucasus and an
important partner within the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO).
The development of military cooperation began on August 21, 1992, in
Moscow when the presidents of Russia and Armenia signed a treaty on
the legal status of Russia’s Armed Forces in Armenia. On March 16,
1995, the two countries’ presidents signed a treaty on a Russian
military base in Armenia for a term of 25 years with an automatic
extension if both sides agree.
There are 2,500 Russian military personnel in Armenia. The Armenia
group of Russia’s Federal Border Service is also deployed in Armenia.
In keeping with a 1972 agreement, the group guards the republic’s
borders with Turkey and Iran.
The Declaration on Allied Interaction was signed in September 2000.
The Agreement on Questions of Joint Planning of Using Troops in the
Interests of Ensuring Joint Security came into effect in January
2002.
On November 11, 2003, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and
Armenian Defense Minster Serzh Sarkisyan signed a plan for military
cooperation in 2004 and two protocols concerning the location and the
allotment of land for the 102nd Russian military base.
In keeping with the new accords, the Russian installations at Guimri
will be combined into a single military complex. The numerical
strength of the Russian base’s personnel is about 3,000. It is
Russia’s largest military installation in the Caucasus.
Russia played the determining role in ceasing the armed conflict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh in 1994, and
continues to provide assistance in settling the conflict.
Russia is, as before, Armenia’s leading economic partner. According
to Russia’s Statistics Committee, in 2003 the goods turnover between
the two countries increased by 34.5% to reach $203.3 million. Exports
grew by 33.5% to reach $126.2 million, and imports grew by 36.2%
($77.1 million).
Russian exports grew largely because Russia supplied nuclear fuel and
equipment to Armenia for its nuclear power plant, energy carriers,
and rough diamonds. The export of Russian tobacco and chocolate
products dramatically increased. Russia also imported a larger amount
of aluminum, alcohol, and fruit and vegetable produce from Armenia.
Russia, which invested about $180 million in Armenia, is its largest
investor. The Russian investors accounted for 40% of all investments
made in Armenia in 2003.
According to Armenia’s National Statistics Service, Armenia invested
$91.83 million in Russia in 2003, $68.42 million of which were direct
investments in the real sector of the economy.
Russian investments increase by 92.2% compared to 2002, with direct
investments increasing by 9.73 times.
Russia invested in over 400 enterprises registered in Armenia.
Russia is Armenia’s largest creditor. The republic’s debt to Russia
amounts to about $100 million.
The debt emerged mainly because of the Russian deliveries of nuclear
fuel to the Armenian nuclear power plant. Armenia owes over $10
million to Itera for Russian gas.
In March 1999 on the 10th anniversary of a destructive earthquake in
Spitak, Russia signed an agreement with Armenia on providing
humanitarian aid to Armenia and in keeping with the agreement, part
of Armenia’s debt to Russia was written off.
In November 2002, the sides signed an agreement on settling Armenia’s
$93.7 million debt that transferred five Armenian industrial plants
(the Razdan thermal power plant, the Mars factory, the scientific
research institute of automatic control systems, the scientific
research institute of mathematical machines, and the scientific
research institute of materials technology) to Russia.
The fuel and energy sector remains the most promising sphere of
Russian-Armenian cooperation. The Armenian nuclear power plant, which
produces about 40% of all electricity in the republic, is the major
cooperation project in this sector.
Electronics, instrument-making, transportation, engineering, iron and
steel, and chemical production, as well as industrial cooperation and
financial and credit relations are potential areas of future
Russian-Armenian cooperation.
Fifty of Russia’s 89 regions maintain trade relations with Armenia.
About 2 million Armenians live in Russia, Armenian newspapers are
published in Russia, and there are Armenian schools in Russia. The
Union of Armenians of Russia was set up in 2000.
The Russian-Armenian University that has about 1,200 students
enrolled and six departments, is a positive example of cooperation in
the sphere of education. Eleven branches of Russian state and
non-state higher educational establishments operate in Armenia.
The Program of Cooperation in the Cultural Sphere for 2003-2005 was
signed.
Days of Armenia’s Culture were held in Russia in November 2001, and
Days of Russia’s Culture were held in Armenia in April 2004.
In June 2004, the National Television and Radio Broadcasting
Committee of Armenia gave Kultoura (Culture) All-Russian state
television channel a broadcast frequency in the republic.
Work to prepare a number of agreements in the fields of production
cooperation, tourism, encouragement and protection of investments,
and other areas is under way.
AAA: Activists Assured of Cont’d Support by Sens. Voinovich & DeWine
Armenian Assembly of America
122 C Street, NW, Suite 350
Washington, DC 20001
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:
PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
August 20, 2004
CONTACT: David Zenian
E-mail: [email protected]
ASSEMBLY ACTIVISTS ASSURED OF CONTINUED SUPPORT BY SENATORS VOINOVICH AND
DeWINE
Washington, D.C. – Senator George V. Voinovich (R-OH), reiterating his
support of issues of concern to the Armenian-American community, will
co-sponsor a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide, his key field
office staffer told a group of Armenian Assembly activists during a meeting
in Cleveland Friday.
“We were very encouraged by the positive news that came out of our very
successful meeting with Michael Kobylka of Voinovich’s staff in Cleveland.
We appreciate his understanding and support of our core issues that impact
the Armenian-American community and Armenians in general,” Assembly
Grassroots Director Nancy Yerian Hiteshue said after the meeting which was
also attended by Cleveland state chair Anita Kazarian and activists Hovig
Tumasyan, Dick Arslanian and Zahn Askaryan.
Also on Friday, the Armenian Assembly group visited the Cleveland district
office of Senator Mike DeWine (R-OH) to discuss issues of concern to the
Armenian-American community including military aid parity between Armenia
and Azerbaijan in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Foreign Operations bill and
legislation granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to Armenia.
Sen. Voinovich, who is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
has supported restrictions on U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan until it lifts
its illegal blockades against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, by voting in
1999 to retain Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.
As a member of the Appropriations Committee, Sen. DeWine has supported
congressional efforts to reaffirm the Armenian Genocide and has also
repeatedly pressed for increased levels of U.S. assistance to Armenia and
Nagorno Karabakh. He has also favored restrictions on U.S. assistance to
Azerbaijan by casting one of the decisive votes in 1999 to retain Section
907 of the Freedom Support Act.
“August being the month when both the Senate and House are in recess and
legislators are back in their home states, it is a great opportunity to
involve our members and activists in the political process in support of
Armenian issues and express their concerns to the elected officials who
represent them in Washington,” she said.
The Armenian Assembly of America is the largest Washington-based nationwide
organization promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian
issues. It is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt membership organization.
NR#2004-076
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
First Web Programming Competition in September in Armenia
FIRST WEB PROGRAMMING COMPETITION TO BE HELD IN SEPTEMBER IN ARMENIA
YEREVAN, August 20 (Noyan Tapan). From September 13 the first web
programming competition will start in Armenia. 17-30-year-old
specialists mastering Windows or Linux operation systems and Java/JSP
or PHP programming languages may participate in the competition. The
competition is organized by the Union of Information Technologies’
Enterprises, the “Incubator of Enterprises” fund and “Lycos Armenia”
company. Bids for participation in the competition will be received
till September 9 through Internet, by address. Arman
Valesian, the Executive Director of the Union of Information
Technologies’ Enterprises, reported at the August 20 press conference
that the goal of the competition is to reveal high-quality young
specialists of the web programming sphere. According to him, besides
the organizers, some companies of the sphere, Unicomp, Migma, CIT and
others will also hand prizes to the best participants of the
competition. It was mentioned that the winners of the competition will
receive computer accessories, monetary prizes, as well as proposals of
job. Hovhannes Avoyan, the Chairman of UITE, the Director of the
“Lycos Armenia” company, expressed a hope that like the first
Pan-Armenian programming competition held in late June this
competition also will pass successfully. To recap, more than 400
programmers from Armenia and Syria participated in the Pan-Armenian
competition. The best 10-15 participants of the competition have
already received invitations of job from different organizations of
the sphere.
Baku needs help from Moscow
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 20, 2004, Friday
BAKU NEEDS HELP FROM MOSCOW
SOURCE: Vremya Novostei, August 18, 2004, p. 5
by Shakhin Abbasov
VISIT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF AZERBAIJAN TO MOSCOW CENTERED AROUND
RUSSIA’S PARTICIPATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT
Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Eldar Mamedjarov came to Moscow with a
three-day official visit, yesterday. This is Mamedjarov’s first visit
to Russia in the capacity of the foreign minister. The visitor and
his Russian opposite number Sergei Lavrov will discuss the war on
terrorism and problems of the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
Mamedjarov said before leaving for Moscow that “the central issue on
the agenda concerns Russia’s role as a mediator and chairman of the
OSCE Minsk Group in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”
“This is a matter of importance for us,” Mamedjarov said.
The talks in Moscow are taking place against the background of active
Russian-Azerbaijan contacts. Five prominent Russian politicians
visited Baku in the last three months – ex-premiers Yevgeny Primakov,
Sergei Stepashin, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, CIS Executive Secretary
Vladimir Rushailo, and Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov.
Some discords have been already settled. The accord signed in 2002
divided the Caspian Sea into national sectors of Russia, Azerbaijan,
and Kazakhstan. Azerbaijan joined construction of a railroad from
Russia to Iran and to the Persian Gulf via Azerbaijan.
In 2002, Azerbaijan made an important step in Moscow’s direction when
it leased Russia the Gabala radar installation. Azerbaijani parties
of the opposition and organizations of environmentalists still
maintain that the radar is harmful to the population of nearby areas.
The day before yesterday, PR Department of the Russian Space Force
found itself compelled to announce that the effect the radar has on
the population and environment does not exceed the established norms.
In fact, demands to sanitary norms in the USSR were stiffer than
anywhere else in the world. In any case, the final conclusion will be
drawn by specialists.
Political scientist Rasim Musarbekov maintains that “the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is like a time bomb” that jeopardizes
the otherwise good relations between Baku and Moscow. Mamedjarov’s
visit to Moscow is taking place against the background of
deterioration of the situation in Georgia. In Azerbaijan itself, not
one public statement of President Ilham Aliyev in the last twelve
years failed to boil down to the threats to resume hostilities and to
criticism of the OSCE Minsk Group. When a military exercise was run
in Nagorno-Karabakh in early August (participation of the Armenian
army in it was not even denied), Mamedjarov even went so far as to
question expediency of continuation of negotiations within the
framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Some specialists do not rule out the possibility that official Baku
may take radical steps to restore territorial integrity of the
country, simultaneously with analogous actions on the part of Tbilisi
against runaway autonomies. “Mamedjarov on his visit to Moscow will
try to gauge the readiness of the Kremlin to put Yerevan under
pressure so as to make it more docile in the talks,” Musarbekov
explained. The United States is another key member of the OSCE Minsk
Group, but the forthcoming presidential election in this country have
persuaded the US Administration not to grate the powerful Armenian
diaspora without a compelling reason.
On August 20, President of Russia Vladimir Putin is scheduled to meet
with his Armenian counterpart Robert Kocharjan in Sochi. It is clear
that the course and the tone of conversation will take into account
the outcome of Lavrov’s negotiations with Mamedjarov that will have
ended by then.
Unless Baku secured Moscow support, Azerbaijan may begin buying arms.
Sources in the Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan say that Baku is
already negotiating the matter with Pakistan and Ukraine. “These arms
deals will radically change the military parity between Azerbaijan
and Armenia,” Musarbekov said.
August in Russia: a midsummer night’s dream of politics
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
August 18, 2004, Wednesday
August in Russia: a midsummer night’s dream of politics
WPS Observer
It’s mid-August: the height of the holiday season. Everyone’s on
vacation! The press is providing vivid coverage of Boris Yeltsin’s
trip to Norway for some fishing – at the invitation of King Harald V.
The last time Yeltsin visited the land of the fjords was in 1996,
notes the Novye Izvestia newspaper; that was an official visit during
which Yeltsin faced many unpleasant questions about the fate of
Alexander Nikitin, a Russian member of Norway’s Bellona
environmentalist organization. Moreover, at the time the Kremlin was
concerned about NATO exercises taking place in Norway close to
Russia’s border.
Times have changed. Yeltsin will fish for salmon on a Norwegian
Island, sail along the coast on a 19th century schooner called the
Paulina, and picnic among the fjords, with shrimp and white wine –
entirely carefree.
Norwegian papers are saying that retirement has been good for
Yeltsin: in contrast to past occasions, “he looks good, speaks
rationally, and not only gets his facts straight, but even corrects
others.” To everyone’s surprise, Yeltsin has proved to be remarkably
well-informed. “When Yeltsin was shown a document stating that the
first official border between Norway and Russia was established in
1826, he protested loudly: No, no! The first border agreement was
reached back in 1348!” It’s hard to believe this is the same
historical figure who at one time said the legendary “Chechen
snipers” numbered only 38.
Actually, Yeltsin isn’t forgetting about business affairs during his
vacation. According to Novye Izvestia , Yeltsin is making this family
visit to Norway in order to lobby for the interests of Aeroflot and
his own son-in-law, Aeroflot chief Valery Okulov: the main aim is “to
help his son-in-law sign an agreement for Norwegian salmon to be
shipped to Japan by Aeroflot via the Erland Airport.” Thus, it’s a
traditional attempt to combine business with pleasure.
President Vladimir Putin is taking a break as well: “at least until
the end of this week – or until early September, according to some
reports,” says Nezavisimaya Gazeta .
Putin has headed in the opposite direction from Yeltsin: to his
Bocharov Ruchei residence in Sochi. All the same, he also intends to
combine relaxation with work, and has already found time to discuss
Chechnya’s upcoming presidential election with Central Electoral
Commission Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov. And the Kommersant
newspaper reports that Veshnyakov wore a white suit, in keeping with
the summer season, but Putin wore “business gray” despite the 30
degrees Celsius heat. (Ever since Putin’s historic meeting with
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who took the liberty of turning up at the
Kremlin without a tie, the press has carefully monitored the clothing
details of everyone who meets with Putin.)
But the meeting with Veshnyakov was only the start of an extensive
work schedule. As Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports, Putin’s schedule for
this week includes meetings with President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine
and President Robert Kocharian of Armenia. At the end of August,
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder may visit Bocharov Ruchei; and
rumor has it that French President Jacques Chirac might come along.
In short, the summer season of politics is at its peak.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s politicians and political analysts have been
looking at the results of the first hundred days of Putin’s second
term and weighing up the head of state’s political prospects.
Some very diverse opinions have been expressed: as the Vremya
Novostei newspaper reports, after 90 minutes of debate at a special
forum the analysts taking part still didn’t manage to reach
consensus.
Vyacheslav Nikonov, director of the Politics Foundation, declared
optimistically during the discussion that he considers the balance of
the first hundred days to be positive. In his view, the authorities
are being “bold and active” in carrying out the reforms which will
“make Russia more comparable with the rest of the world.” Nikonov
even quoted Mikhail Khodorkovsky, although he added that in his view,
“Putin is more liberal than 90% of the citizenry, not just 70%.”
Nikonov then proceeded to employ a metaphor: “In recent years our
Russian plug has never quite managed to fit into Europe’s
power-points, but these days we are making good progress on
redesigning the plug.”
Mikhail Deliagin, director of the Globalization Institute, disagreed
with Nikonov: “Europe’s power-points are different, and American
power-points are different, and normal people don’t keep changing
their plugs – they just buy an adapter.” Deliagin also resorted to
metaphors, comparing the state administration reforms to an axe:
“Ever since the axe-blow fell in March, the government has remained
in a state of paralysis.”
Boris Makarenko, first deputy director of the Political Techniques
Center, was even harsher in his criticism: “Putin’s system of
governance is turning itself into a closed model, and a closed model
soon becomes stupid.”
Vremya Novostei observes that the only issue on which the analysts
were unanimous was the YUKOS affair. Even Vyacheslav Nikonov admitted
that “the drawn-out conflict over YUKOS is fraught with negative
consequences.”
Then again, as the Izvestia newspaper notes, this forum of political
analysts at the Media Center didn’t seem too concerned about Putin’s
first hundred days as such. The analysts were more interested in what
the political landscape will look like by the time of the next
parliamentary and presidential elections. Everyone agreed, with
concern, that at present the political stage in Russia remains
closed, and instead of dialogue between the authorities and the
citizenry there is only “propaganda through one gateway”: thus, the
preconditions for the emergence of any significant “successor” to
Putin simply don’t exist.
But Vremya Novostei points out that the analysts are all sure Putin’s
political career will not end in 2008.
Mikhail Deliagin was the most skeptical on this point: “No, a person
doesn’t make such titanic efforts just in order to vacate the chair
afterwards.” In Deliagin’s view, “even if we aren’t facing an
eternity of Putin, we certainly aren’t facing only four more years.”
Deliagin was contradicted by Vyacheslav Nikonov, who pointed out that
former heads of state in Europe often go on to hold other important
posts; so after Putin steps down as president, he might become prime
minister, for example.
But Boris Makarenko disagreed with Nikonov, saying that there cannot
be two centers of political power in Russia – a president and a prime
minister. So in 2008, we should expect to see a re-run of Operation
Sucessor.
The discussion was rounded off by Gleb Pavlovsky, who said that once
Putin is no longer president, he will still remain the leader of the
nation, “and the new head of state will have to measure up to Putin.”
Pavlovsky explained his views in more detail in a lengthy interview
with Nezavisimaya Gazeta .
In Pavlovsky’s view, Putin’s main problem at present is his lack of
real support among the political class. “What do we have now? We have
President Putin, and then we have a vast rabble – in the bureaucracy,
the media, and business – who claim to act in Putin’s name, but lack
any mandate from the people and pursue their own entirely mercenary
goals.”
Corruption in Russia, according to Pavlovsky, has progressed to a
qualitatively different level: now it is “no longer a phenomenon, but
a class.” Ties of corruption permeate the state bureaucracy from top
to bottom: “This is a huge stratum, involving millions of people. Our
political future will be determined by the extent to which our
society and political forces succeed in resisting this.”
So far, as the YUKOS affair has shown, the corrupt are skillfully
making money “by taking advantage of inside information obtained via
their positions in state service, in an entirely criminal manner.” Of
course, says Pavlovsky, “they are scoundrels. But Putin can’t
separate the state from the scoundrels all on his own.” When a
political community “is passive and also corrupt, a leader is forced
to wait.”
Pavlovsky believes that in the YUKOS affair, Putin has run up against
“a weakness in non-party leadership”; rather than “a coalition of
interests, there has been an explosion of incoherent emotions which
provide no political support and need not be taken into account.”
At present, says Pavlovsky, “we can discern the start of a battle
with those who seek to convert their personal loyalty to Putin into
capital.” However, according to Pavlovsky, “this will not be a battle
of the liberals versus the security and law enforcement people
(siloviki). Why should they fight each other? While the siloviki are
sending people to jail, the liberals can play with on the stock
market with frozen shares.” And that’s basically what is now
happening to YUKOS.
Meanwhile, rather than developing productive political ideas, the
political class is offering Putin “a mixture of insults and
nonsensical hints about Putin’s alleged intention to bring back
totalitarianism.”
Pavlovsky categorically denies any such accusations against the head
of state: “If he did want to do that, I assure you that given the
present state of our society, he wouldn’t encounter any strong
objections.”
Pavlovsky points out that Putin has seen two convincing examples of
“the inferiority of totalitarian systems” – the Soviet Union and East
Germany. So Putin is well aware that while the mobs are “breaking
into offices and pissing on secret files,” the masters of those
offices are doing deals and redistributing portfolios.
According to Pavlovsky, the problem with the Russian citizenry today
is that it displays “a paralysis of will, along with the wish to
retain the role of onlookers in politics.”
Among those adopting this dangerous stance is the Kremlin’s party
itself, United Russia: “it is still a self-contained, politically
helpless organization without any political personnel reserves.”
And there is no source of new political personnel: “What does a young
man find if he joins United Russia in the hope of pursuing a regular
career in state service? A sign saying ‘Closed’ – with everyone off
claiming pieces of property. So he’ll turn away and go into business.
So later on, the state will be forced to approach the private sector
for new personnel again. And the private sector will supply them –
along with lobbyists” – that is, with the prospect of further
corruption.
In Pavlovsky’s view, the political vacuum between the president and
the citizenry has been created by “pseudo-parties that collapsed
after failing to find any support in society.” These days, the
leaders of those parties “are visiting America, all expenses paid,
and denouncing ‘Putin’s authoritarianism’ there – even though they
themselves have no authority and no ideas.”
Meanwhile, an August poll by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM)
indicates that by no means all the political parties are viewed as
having “no authority and no ideas.” According to the Novye Izvestia
newspaper, one “predictable sensation” has been the opinion of
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) voters of the LDPR
faction’s performance in the Duma in its first session since the
elections: 22% of respondents who voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s
party say that the faction’s performance has fully met their
expectations, and a further 15% say the faction is doing even better
than they had expected. Novye Izvestia notes: “So it turns out that
Vladimir Zhirinovsky has been well rewarded for withstanding a
barrage of stones and old shoes during a demonstration on Teatralnaya
Square.”
Left-wing voters are watching the activities of their Duma members
most closely of all: 60% of respondents who voted for the Communist
Party (CPRF) and 56% of those who voted for Motherland (Rodina) say
they keep track of what the corresponding Duma factions are doing.
But these voters are also the most disappointed: 24% and 22% say the
CPRF and Motherland factions are not performing well enough in
parliament.
And 57% of respondents who voted for United Russia last December now
say they have no interest at all in what the United Russia faction is
doing.
“Many of them aren’t even aware that such a party exists,” says
Andrei Piontkovsky, head of the Strategic Studies Center. “After all,
at the Duma elections these people just voted for the Vladimir Putin
brand-name.” In Piontkovsky’s view, those who voted for the left-wing
parties are being unfair in their assessments now: “the CPRF and
Motherland have actually done even more for their voters than they
might have.” But their electorate, made up of “the socially
discontented layers of the population,” values results: these voters
believe that the CPRF and Motherland have been unsuccessful in
defending their interests.
The Vedomosti newspaper quotes Alexander Prokhanov, chief editor of
the leftist-patriotic Zavtra newspaper: “Information about what the
CPRF faction is doing in the Duma simply isn’t reaching the people.”
And this also explains why United Russia’s performance is rated
fairly high (16% approval): “Pro-government propaganda depicts United
Russia member Andrei Isayev, chairman of the Duma’s labor and social
policy committee, as standing up for the people’s rights.” In
Prokhanov’s view, “the people see that the very last of what they
have is being taken away from them, and they don’t know who’s taking
it away. But they do see Isayev standing up for them.”
Vedomosti points out that many analysts predicted a substantial drop
in support for United Russia, since it has been responsible for
getting the unpopular reforms through parliament. To all appearances,
however, this hasn’t happened: United Russia voters still have a
neutral or positive attitude to the party.
Dmitri Oreshkin, head of the Mercator Analytical Group, says this is
because most of those who consciously voted for United Russia are
people who have “adjusted to life,” so they aren’t very interested in
social benefits: “They expected the party to support the president’s
policies, and that’s what it has been doing.”
What’s more, United Russia continues to strengthen its leadership
positions. In early August, five United Russia members, joined by
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, submitted a bill amending the constitutional
law on the federal government. If this amendment passes, will
overturn the existing ban on senior state officials, including
ministers, holding leadership posts in public organizations or
political parties.
As Kommersant-Vlast magazine observes, United Russia’s handlers in
the Kremlin “have evidently decided it’s time to follow the example
of the Soviet Constitution, which used to uphold the ‘guiding and
directing role’ of one particular party.”
Then again, says Kommersant-Vlast , the proposed amendment would not
oblige all Cabinet ministers to join United Russia en masse – and
anyway, state officials have always been responsive to the tasks and
objectives of each successive Kremlin-backed party.
However, according to Kommersant-Vlast , there is no doubt that the
opportunities offered by this change in legislation will be taken up:
the government’s most important decisions will be “sanctified” by the
will of the party, and United Russia will indeed come to resemble the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Kommersant-Vlast draws attention to a theory popular among
many political scientists, on the subject of what Vladimir Putin
might do after his second term expires: “After the 2008 election,
Putin could become the leader of United Russia and the government it
will form – thus in effect becoming the head of state, while the new
president will be a decorative figure who is 100% personally loyal to
Putin.”
All the same, says Kommersant-Vlast , United Russia might be doing
itself a disservice by taking full responsibility for everything that
happens in Russia.
Of course, if oil prices keep on rising, and the modest sums of money
now being offered to the people as compensation for social benefits
are increased, a party-based government will not face any threats.
But if the economic situation deteriorates, says Kommersant-Vlast ,
the Kremlin may require a “scapegoat” – and United Russia would be
perfectly suited to that role.
If that happens, then in December 2007 voters might turn away from
the self-discredited United Russia and vote for another party: one
for which the efforts of state-controlled television channels would
create an image as the defender of the rights of the common people.
In the opinion of Kommersant-Vlast , exactly who ends up replacing
United Russia isn’t all that important: it could be a party led by
Dmitri Rogozin or Gennadi Zyuganov or Gennadi Semigin, or some
newly-formed organization. What’s important is that the Kremlin’s new
party “would not be tainted by complicity in passing unpopular
reforms, so it could not only replace United Russia as the nation’s
leading party, but also become a reliable support base for Putin’s
successor in the election of 2008.”
Needless to say, as Kommersant-Vlast points out, the Kremlin would
have to “exercise a certain amount of skill in policial tactics” when
replacing one party with another right before an election. But this
task is well within the capabilities of the Kremlin team led by
Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the presidential administration,
“who has long since gained a reputation as a master of
behind-the-scenes political maneuvering.”
More opinion poll results indicate that some political moves of this
nature may indeed be required.
In a poll done by the National Public Opinion Research Center
(VTsIOM), reported in Vremya Novostei , only half of respondents said
the hopes they had held of Putin’s presidency have been fulfilled to
some extent. Thirteen percent said they never had any particular
hopes. And 28% said their hopes for some improvements in the
situation have been disappointed.
Vremya Novostei reports that respondents in the higher income
brackets were most inclined to give the president’s performance a
positive evaluation: 68% of them were optimistic. In the medium
income brackets, 57% of respondents expressed approval. Among the
poorest respondents, the figure was down to 40%.
These contradictory evaluations indicate, says Vremya Novostei , that
there is still no consensus in our society about Putin’s policy
course: some people see the president as a pro-West liberal reformer,
while others see him as a “strong hand” fortifying the hierarchy of
governance. One thing is clear, says Vremya Novostei : “As he
implements such radical reforms as monetizing benefits, Vladimir
Putin is unlikely to be able to maintain the balance between the
interests of various societal groups while also retaining a high
approval rating across all layers of the electorate.”
Eloquent evidence of this can be seen in the recent fall of Putin’s
approval rating: according to VTsIOM, it’s down to 59%, while the FOM
puts it at 48%.
Irina Yasina, program director at the Open Russia Foundation, says in
the Moskovskie Novosti weekly: “What is currently happening to the
social benefits system is the result of the state’s greed, laziness,
and disrespect for all of us.”
Yasina emphasizes that the whole country, “even the illiterate,” is
aware that oil prices are currently very high. The regime has
received a “windfall,” and everyone knows that. “People might not be
very clear about the exact size of the windfall, but they do
understand that enormous revenues are involved.” What’s more, thanks
to the efforts of state-controlled television channels, everyone also
knows about the Central Bank’s growing gold and currency reserves.
“And all of a sudden – there’s this penny-pinching. Begrudging a few
hundred rubles to cover the cost of medications for invalids and war
veterans, whose homes are cluttered with bottles and jars of pills.”
Yasina says that in a country with practically no health insurance
system, “some other field for stinginess should have been chosen.”
Moreover, says Yasina, the authorities are showing “total disrespect
for their own citizens” – not considering it necessary to explain
their actions or the consequences of those actions. Then again,
Yasina believes that “we fully deserve such disrespect”: a society
that prefers not to get involved with the government’s actions
eventually receives whatever the authorities consider convenient for
themselves.
In the Vedomosti newspaper, leading television journalist Olga
Romanova says: “The people aren’t being told anything. Either this is
a preventive measure, or there’s nothing to say and no one to say
it.”
The impression, says Romanova, is that “over there in the Kremlin,
the Cabinet, and Bocharov Ruchei there is also dead silence – not a
sound. Politicians and ministers have stopped communicating – not
only with the people, but even among themselves.”
Is this only because it’s the summer vacation season? But Romanova
says it’s possible that this “midsummer night’s dream of politics”
may not end with the coming of autumn: “Actually, everyone benefits
from the absence of both domestic politics and foreign affairs. No
news – no disturbances. No objectives – no need to achieve them. No
government – no criticism.”
Only Gleb Pavlovsky is having premonitions of trouble: “We keep
assuming that a calm sea means it’s impossible there will ever be a
strong wind. Our political system has now become accustomed to a calm
sea. In this situation, only one prediction can be made: some day,
the calm will be replaced by a storm.”
Then again – who knows? As Pavlovsky says, only one thing in Russia
is predictable: Russia’s unpredictability.
Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin
Assaulted taxi driver in coma found with money in his pockets
MONTREAL
Assaulted taxi driver in coma found with money in his pockets
Police search for four suspects. After dropping off customer in St. Laurent,
three men hit cabbie’s head and face
MIKE KING, DANIELLE ADAMS contributed to this report
The Gazette
August 18, 2004
Police are still searching for four suspects wanted in connection with
the severe beating of a taxi driver in north-end Montreal Monday
evening.
Garo Tachijian, a veteran of more than 20 years with the Champlain cab
company, remains in a coma as a result of his head injuries.
But according to Montreal police Constable Miguel Alston, Tachijian’s life
isn’t in danger and his condition is considered stable.
Money was still in Tachijian’s pockets when he was found at the back of an
isolated building on Place Henri Bourassa in Cartierville, so police are
treating the incident as an armed assault rather than armed robbery.
Alston said the motive for the vicious attack remains unknown.
A nephew who answered the phone at the family residence refused to comment.
A young woman age 16 to 18 years old whom Tachijian picked up as a fare is
one of the suspects.
She had him take her to the Cartierville address, possibly from somewhere
around St. Laurent, and apparently asked him to get her purse from his trunk
once they arrived.
Investigators say it was then that three men in their early 20s jumped
Tachijian and began hitting him on the head and in the face with a blunt
object.
All four are said to have fled the scene in a Chrysler van.
“These things happen often,” said Antonio Perez, a fellow Champlain taxi
driver who has driven a cab in Montreal for 24 years. Perez said he has
heard of many cabbies who have been robbed and assaulted over the years.
A few years ago, Perez recalled, one of his fares jabbed a revolver into his
ribs and demanded whatever cash the cabbie could hand over.
“I was very afraid. I thought right away that I would die. I thought of my
children,” he said.
The robber just grabbed the money and Perez’s car keys, and took off.
It was only when Perez got to a phone to call police that he realized he was
bleeding. The barrel of the gun had been shoved into his ribs so hard that
it broke the skin.
Perez said, however, that he feels lucky having had only one such incident
in 24 years.
Richard Leblanc of the city’s taxi bureau said there have been 16 armed
robberies of taxi drivers so far this year.
He noted that is down from the corresponding period the past two years – 22
in the first six months of 2003 and 21 during the first half of 2002.
Comparatively, the number of armed robberies of Montreal depanneurs the
first six months of the past three years were 327, 350 and 262 respectively.
Leblanc reminded taxi drivers that they can refuse fares if they feel
threatened or are asked to take someone to an isolated area like an
industrial park late at night – when most assaults occur.
He said cabbies should trust their instincts and act accordingly.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress