Author: Dabaghian Diana

“Russia’s Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia Becomes a Slide”
PINR
29 November 2004
Over the past two months, Moscow’s geostrategy has suffered serious
setbacks in Ukraine and Abkhazia, a mini-state on the Black Sea that
broke away from Georgia in 1993 and has since been dependent for its
existence on Russian support.
The guiding aim of President Vladimir Putin’s geostrategy is to restore
Moscow’s influence over its periphery, which it lost after the fall
of the Soviet Union. The Putin regime envisions a trade and security
alliance that would incorporate some of the republics of the former
Soviet Union in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, in which
Russia would be the dominant power. Moscow pursues its goal by trying
to promote and cultivate friendly governments in the target states.
Wherever Moscow attempts to reassert its influence, it meets with
opposition from the Euro-American alliance, which has the strategic
aim of incorporating Russia’s periphery — especially in Eastern Europe
and the Caucasus — into the Western system of market democracies. If
Ukraine tilted westward, it would be a candidate for admission to
the European Union and N.A.T.O. If Abkhazia were to be reabsorbed
into Georgia, Moscow would lose one of its important footholds in
the Transcaucasus to a pro-Western state.
The Putin regime has responded to its persistent structural conflict
with the West by taking a proactive approach toward the political
systems of its target states and dependencies. In Ukraine and Abkhazia,
Moscow has most notably attempted to influence the outcomes of
presidential elections overtly through Putin’s endorsements of favored
candidates and by sending in political operatives to strategize and
support those candidates.
In both cases, Moscow’s tactics have backfired; it has not been able
to overcome internal divisions within the target states and it has
awakened resistance in electorates to outside influence, resulting in
disputed elections that have brought endemic conflicts to a head and,
in Abkhazia’s case, institutional failure. Through overplaying its
hand, Moscow now finds itself threatened with a permanent loss of
influence in Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus. The situation in
Abkhazia is particularly revealing, because that small country with
a quarter-million people shows in microcosm how even a society that
is radically dependent on Moscow and is pro-Russian will resist its
protector when it feels that it is subject to undue pressure.
Abkhazia’s Disputed Election
Until its first contested presidential election on October 3, 2004,
Abkhazia was ruled by strong man Vladislav Ardzinba who had followed
an unwavering pro-Moscow line. Unrecognized by any state, including
Russia, Ardzinba’s regime was subject to an economic blockade by
Georgia and was only able to survive through the presence of Russian
“peacekeepers” who kept the Georgian military at bay.
During Ardzinba’s tenure, Abkhazia’s economy collapsed, leaving half
the country’s working-age population unemployed. Criminal activity
became rampant and corruption and cronyism were rife within the state
bureaucracies. Nonetheless, when it came time to replace the aging
Ardzinba, Moscow hit upon a plan of contested elections, which it
calculated would result in the victory of its favorite, Raul Khajimba,
an ex-K.G.B. agent and the incumbent prime minister, and would have the
added benefit of conferring a modicum of legitimacy on the mini-state,
which would strengthen its position in any future deal with Georgia
or pave the way to some regularized and permanent form of separation.
>>From all appearances, the Abkhazian elections seemed to be a win-win
situation for Moscow. All five candidates were pledged to maintain
Abkhazia’s special relation with Russia. Indeed, they could not do
otherwise: the civil war of 1992-1993 had resulted in the ethnic
cleansing of the Georgian half of the country’s population, leaving
its ethnic Abkhaz, Armenian and Russian components completely dependent
on Moscow for protection against an irredentist Georgia, which gained
enhanced Western backing after the 2003-2004 Rose Revolution.
Despite the fact that Russian interests were not likely to be impaired
whomever won the presidential election, Putin made it clear that
he endorsed Khajimba by meeting with him and no other candidate,
and posing with him for a photograph that became an icon of the
campaign. Moscow also dispatched operatives to plan and support
Khajimba’s campaign.
To the surprise of Moscow and political analysts, Putin’s efforts
to manipulate the election had the opposite of their intended
effect. Opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, running on a platform
of continued ties with Russia and promises of an anti-crime and
anti-corruption administration, won slightly more than 50 percent of
the vote (44,002) to Khajimba’s 30,815 votes, with the other candidates
splitting the rest.
Analysts attributed Bagapsh’s unexpected showing to widespread public
resentment against Abkhazia’s corrupt political system and Moscow’s
efforts to perpetuate it. The slogan “We Can Decide Ourselves”
appeared on the streets, signaling popular defiance of Moscow.
Although Abkhazia’s Central Electoral Commission certified Bagapsh’s
victory, the election was clouded by charges of irregularities and an
unconstitutional revote in the Gali district, to which Bagapsh and
Khajimba agreed. When the Central Electoral Commission met to reach
its decision on October 6 and 11, supporters of Bagapsh occupied the
building where it was deliberating, setting a precedent of direct
action that would be repeated over the coming weeks by both sides,
finally eventuating in institutional failure and political paralysis.
Institutional Failure
Despite having agreed to the revote in Gali, Khajimba did not accept
the Commission’s verdict and sued to have the vote overturned by the
country’s Supreme Court. On October 28, after having heard testimony
that Bagapsh supporters had threatened commissioners during their
deliberations, the Court declared the Commission’s decision to be
valid. Upon learning of the Court’s verdict, Khajimba’s supporters
seized the court building and held the judges hostage until they
reversed their decision and replaced it with a ruling ordering
the Central Electoral Commission to set up a revote. On October 29,
incumbent President Ardzinba issued a decree requiring new elections,
setting the stage for a downward spiral to institutional failure.
In quick succession, Bagapsh’s forces took over the state television
and Khajimba’s sealed off parliament, in which Bagapsh supporters
have a majority, to prevent it from declaring Ardzinba’s decree
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission refused
to meet to plan new elections and Ardzinba replaced Khajimba as prime
minister with former Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations operative
Nodar Khashba, a Moscow loyalist.
With different institutions under the control of opposing factions,
Abkhazia’s political system became paralyzed as neither candidate
proved willing to compromise, despite repeated negotiations. Bagapsh
insisted that he would be inaugurated on December 6, whereas Khajimba
demanded a revote.
The stand off spiraled out of control on November 12 when, during
a large rally of Bagapsh supporters, a group of them seized control
of the government complex in Abkhazia’s capital Sukhumi, including
the president’s office, supposedly to allow Bagapsh to set up his
new administration. In the commotion, 78 year old Tamara Sharkyl — a
linguist, human-rights advocate and respected Abkhaz nationalist — was
killed by a ricocheting bullet fired by Ardzinba’s presidential guard.
At the urging of Bagapsh, his supporters left the government complex,
but remained outside it, preventing official business from being
conducted there. Since then, the tensions have deepened. After Bagapsh
supporters brought two presidential guards to the prosecutor’s office
in connection with Sharkyl’s death, security forces loyal to Ardzinba
launched a commando raid on the office and freed them, setting
off a chain of events leading to a “declaration of disobedience”
by 2000 police officers who vowed to refuse to follow orders from
the government.
Throughout the deepening tensions, Moscow supported Ardzinba, Khashba
and Khajimba, refusing to concede anything to Bagapsh. On November 12,
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko
placed Moscow’s support behind the Ardzinba regime and threatened
Russian intervention: “If the situation continues to follow the illegal
track, the Russian side will have to protect its interests. In Abkhazia
one and all should know that all responsibility for the likely effects
will be placed on Bagapsh and his followers.”
Not only did Moscow’s hard line fail to break the resolve of the
Bagapsh faction; it also provoked a strong response from Tbilisi,
which regards Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Despite the failure of
its assertive posture, Moscow has continued to try to exert pressure,
redeploying some of its peacekeepers from Abkhazia’s Georgian border
toward Sukhumi and temporarily closing crossings along Abkhazia’s
border, threatening to impede Abkhazia’s citrus harvest from going
to market.
With Moscow taking one side in the election dispute and Abkhazian
state institutions divided and deadlocked, a last attempt at
conflict resolution was undertaken by the Council of Elders, an
extra-constitutional public body of clan and local leaders. When the
Council met in Sukhumi on November 20, its proceedings were disrupted
by an invasion of 100 old people bussed in by the Bagapsh camp. The
meeting was quickly called off after a decision was made to reconvene
the Council with new membership.
On November 23, the Council met again and declared that Bagapsh
should assume the presidency and that he and Khajimba should form
a team. Earlier, Bagapsh had offered Khajimba the posts of prime
minister or vice president, which the latter had refused, calling
instead either for a revote or for both candidates to drop out in
favor of a new election with new candidates, one of whom presumably
would be Moscow’s current protégé Khashba. Khajimba responded to
the Elder’s decision by appearing to back down for the first time,
saying that he would consult with his supporters before reaching a
decision. Meanwhile, Khashba threatened to resign as prime minister if
the supporters of both candidates did not vacate the public property
that they had seized and disband their militia, and Ardzinba announced
that he would not vacate the presidency on December 6.
In response to Ardzinba’s announcement, parliament passed a resolution
on November 26 declaring Bagapsh’s victory to be valid and demanding
that the State Guard Service “provide for the inauguration of the
president elect” on December 6. Khajimba labeled the resolution
“absurd” and Ardzinba’s office announced that the incumbent
president had not instructed state agencies to obey the parliamentary
instructions. Deputies in the Parliament who are opposed to Bagapsh
reported that 200 of his supporters had invaded the chamber, demanding
that their candidate’s victory be recognized.
Moscow Hardens its Line and Georgia Senses an Opportunity
With Moscow’s strategy in a state of collapse, Abkhazia appears to
be headed for yet another confrontation on December 6, when Bagapsh
has vowed to be inaugurated as president and Ardzinba has pledged
to remain in power. In order to head off a Bagapsh takeover, Moscow,
speaking through anonymous government sources and Alexander Tkachov,
governor of Krasnodar territory, which borders Abkhazia, ratcheted
up its hard-line rhetoric, threatening — if Bagapsh assumed the
presidency — to cut off pensions to Russian citizens in Abkhazia
and to close the country’s border with Russia, blocking the citrus
exports and tourist trade that are Abkhazia’s major sources of income.
In a sharp break from his previous pro-Russian position, Bagapsh
responded that if Moscow followed through on its threats, Tbilisi
would have an opportunity to restore its control over Abkhazia,
an opinion echoed by Alexander Shakov, an analyst at the Russian
Institute of Strategic Research.
Thus far, Moscow’s position has been eased by the reluctance of the
United Nations, which monitors the cease-fire between Georgia and
Abkhazia, and the United States to intervene in the conflict. Tbilisi,
however, has sensed an advantage and has stated that the “people’s
will” should prevail in Abkhazia, a shift from its standard line
that nothing that transpires in the breakaway republic’s political
system is legitimate or worthy of comment. Georgian Minister for
Conflict Resolution and Prevention Georgy Khaindrava offered Sukhumi
“the widest authority ever known in international practice.”
Tbilisi believes that time is on its side. In a news conference
on November 24 celebrating the anniversary of the Rose Revolution,
Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili noted that Georgia’s budget
in 2005 will be triple its current figure, that much of the increased
spending will go to beef up the military and that N.A.T.O. and the
E.U. are considering Georgia as a candidate for membership. With
reference to Abkhazia, Saakashvili said that “it is the main goal and
task of my life, my personal life,” adding that Tbilisi is getting
ready to reassert sovereignty over the breakaway region and that
“we need patience,” but not “excessive pacifism.”
Conclusion: The Pitfalls of Neo-Imperialism
It is reasonable to conclude that Moscow has acted to the detriment
of its interests in Abkhazia. The cause of the mini-state’s
institutional failure and political implosion resides less in the
internal divisions of its society than in Moscow’s “neo-imperialist”
policies. Like their neo-conservative counterparts in Washington, the
Russian neo-imperialists are long on vision and short on a realistic
appraisal of actual conditions. Just as the neo-conservatives believed
that U.S. forces would be welcomed in Iraq, Moscow hard liners
were confident that their favored candidate would win in Abkhazia’s
contested election, simply by dint of Putin’s endorsement, government
control of the local media, the Abkhazian population’s pro-Russian
attitudes and its dependency on Moscow, and Moscow’s campaign
support. They did not reckon with the large number of people in the
mini-state who were disaffected by a decade of economic depression,
rampant crime and corrupt rule, and were willing to back a member of
the established political class who promised to bring reform while
maintaining good relations with Moscow.
When the election did not yield Moscow’s desired result, Putin could
have accepted defeat and turned it into an opportunity by playing the
role of honest broker and arranging the kind of deal that the Council
of Elders proposed and Bagapsh offered, allowing Bagapsh to assume the
presidency and giving the prime minister’s post to Khajimba. Instead,
Moscow refused to recognize its mistake and has continued to back
the losing side, now to the point of threatening the population with
severely punitive economic sanctions and possible military coercion.
Moscow has stood by and watched Abkhaz political society split apart,
counting on the resulting stress to bring its adversaries and the
general population around to heed its dictates. Abkhazia’s plunge
into direct action and political gang rule, verging on civil warfare,
cancels any possibility of a legitimized pro-Moscow regime there. If
Moscow succeeds in installing a president to its liking in Sukhumi,
his regime will be perceived as an imposed domination both inside and
outside Abkhazia. If Bagapsh assumes the presidency, Moscow will either
institute punitive measures, driving Sukhumi to bargain with Tbilisi,
or it will have to mend fences with its former opponent. The latter
option is the only one that is consistent with Russian interests,
but it is not clear that Putin will take it.
Moscow has managed to cause a shift in attitudes that was unthinkable
before the October 3 election. Bagapsh, who consistently asserted that
Abkhazia had to be pro-Russian, because if it was not, it would be
“swallowed” by Georgia, is now saying that Moscow is forcing Abkhazia
into Tbilisi’s arms. Tbilisi is now signaling that it will be generous
to a “popular” government in Sukhumi. It is a difficult feat to bring
Georgians and Abkhazians together after a bloody civil war and ethnic
cleansing, but it seems possible that Moscow is doing just that.
The Euro-American alliance stands to gain the most from Moscow’s
mismanagement of Abkhazia, just as it does in Ukraine. What appeared
immediately after the October 3 election to be a minor slippage in
Russia’s foothold in Abkhazia has now become a slide that will be
difficult to arrest.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report
may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed
to [email protected].
–Boundary_(ID_I0gAUsMHnziW7BRrd+oGAQ)–

Southland Celebrates Thanksgiving
KABC, CA
Nov 26 2004
LOS ANGELES – It’s Thanksgiving, and groups around the Southland are
making sure that the less fortunate have some holiday cheer.
In Long Beach, the “Long Beach 5K/10K Turkey Trot & Chicken Chucking
Championship is holding a walk to benefit the nonprofit Community
Action Team, followed by participants hurling rubber chickens to
raise money for local food bank charities.
Pasadena’s Union Station Foundation is holding its annual
Thanksgiving Dinner-in-the-Park, billed as the “biggest potluck in
the nation.” Volunteers are expected to serve more than 5,000 meals
to the poor, homeless and elderly.
The Los Angeles Police Department, West Valley Pals and Woodland
Hills Optimist Club are hosting a free Thanksgiving dinner at the
Guadalupe Community Center.
In Valley Village, more than 500 men, women and children will enjoy a
traditional turkey dinner with all the trimmings. Needy residents of
the East Valley will receive vouchers provided by Temple Beth Hillel
and distributed by numerous outreach organizations, including Jewish
War Veterans, the East Valley Multi-Purpose Center, Loaves and Fishes
and The Salvation Army, among others.
In Hollywood, Food on Foot will feed and distribute backpacks to the
homeless and poor. For every two 64-pound bags of trash collected from
the streets of Hollywood, Food on Foot will reward individuals with a
$5 food gift certificate from a fast-food restaurant or grocery store.
In Orange County, the 27th annual Dana Point Turkey Trot will feature
5K, 10K and children’s races; the Orange County Rescue Mission will
serve Thanksgiving dinner in Santa Ana; and Rep. Loretta Sanchez,
D-Garden Grove, Hon. Bishop Jaime Soto and others will join in serving
Thanksgiving dinner to the needy during the 19th annual Casa Garcia
Thanksgiving dinner that owner Frank Garcia serves in the parking
lot of his eatery in Anaheim.
And in Glendale, Armenia Fund Inc. is holding its annual Thanksgiving
telethon, “Make It Happen,” to raise funds to complete the remaining
56 miles of the North-South “Backbone” Highway in Karabakh, Armenia.
Proceeds will also benefit continued assistance in the areas of
health care, education and infrastructure development in the Republic
of Armenia. The 12-hour event will be televised live from Glendale
throughout the United States, South America, the Middle East, Canada
and Armenia.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

WORLD VISION RENOVATES FOUR HEALTH POSTS IN LORI PROVINCE
ArmenPress
Nov 25 2004
YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 25, ARMENPRESS: On Wednesday, November 24, World
Vision Armenia celebrated the opening of the renovated health posts
in four rural communities in Lori Marz. The ceremony took place at
12:00 PM at the health post in Norashen village and was followed by
a visit to Sarchapet, Artsni and Saratovka communities where World
Vision and Support to Communities (STC) has completed the renovation
of the local health posts.
Renovation of the health posts was done in the framework of the Support
to Mobile Medical Teams program, a five year project funded by US
Agency for International Development and World Vision and targeting
57 rural communities in Gegharkunik, Lori Tavush and Syunik marzes.
The program aims to provide medical services to the population
of remote communities (serving 32,000 people), increase access of
vulnerable children and their families to a healthy and balanced diet,
conduct health education and promotion among population, establish
revolving drug funds, conduct primary health care trainings and work
closely with policlinics, hospitals and health posts to increase
levels of care. World Vision Armenia works closely with its local
partners including STC and the Scientific Association of Medical
Students of Armenia.
Since May 2004 over 12,600 people in 25 villages of Lori and
Gegharkunik regions have benefited from this program. Four Mobile
Medical Teams regularly visited remote communities, providing qualified
health care services to the residents.
As a part of the program activities focused on strengthening
community-based health structures in villages, World Vision Armenia
together with STC started the renovation of the health posts in 11
villages of Gegharkunik and 5 villages of Lori from which renovation
of four Lori health posts has been completed.
Next year the program will start to deliver primary health care to
vulnerable children and families in Syunik and Tavush regions.
“By the end of the program, villages will have benefited from
five years of MMT visits, and will also have primary health care
structures and community knowledge strengthened in a sustainable
manner.” says Julian Srodecki, WV Armenia Operations Director.

ARMENIAN FM FLIES TO BURKINA FASO FOR FRANCOPHONE SUMMIT
ArmenPress
Nov 24 2004
YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 24, ARMENPRESS: Armenian foreign affairs minister
Vartan Oskanian has left today for Ouagadou, the capital city of
Burkina Faso that will host November 26-27 the 2004 Francophone summit.
The official theme of the 10th Francophone Summit is, “La Francophonie,
espace solidaire pour un developpement durable.
The ministry said the summit is expected to grant Armenia the status of
observer in the 51-nation Francophone world. Armenia is already member
of several Francophone-affiliated organizations-the International Union
of French-Speaking Capital Cities and the International Assembly of
French-Speaking Parliament Members.
The Armenian ministry said the observer status and later the status
of a full member will allow Armenia to enter into direct contacts and
establish cooperation with tens of African countries, constituting
the bulk of the organization.
The 10-th Francophone summit will be attended by some heads of states,
particularly, France’s Jacques Chirac and Lebanon’s president. Also
Georgia, Austria, Hungary and Croatia are seeking the observer status
with Armenia, Georgia will be represented by its foreign minister
Salome Surabichvili.
The leaders of member countries are expected to review the results
of the 4-year plan adopted at the 2002 summit, and tackle the
full-10 year plan they expect to adopt at the 2006 summit. They will
consider priorities for legal action and co-operation within the bloc,
following through on a decision at the 9th summit to penalize, even
expel, dictators and corrupt leaders in la Francophonie. The move
into politics marks a departure: past summits focused on cultural
and economic issues, and avoided potentially explosive issues and
criticism of corrupt regimes.

Russia’s Gazprom set to take part in Armenia-Iran gas pipeline construction
Iravunk, Yerevan
23 Nov 04
ArmRosgazprom, a Russian-Armenian joint venture where Russia’s Gazprom
holds 45 per cent of shares, is going to participate in a tender
to construct the Armenian sector of a pipeline that will deliver
natural gas from Iran, the company’s director-general has told Iravunk
newspaper. Karen Karapetyan also denied reports that the pipeline would
be used to export Iranian gas to European markets. The following is an
excerpt from K. Sarkisyan’s report by Armenian newspaper Iravunk on 23
November headlined “Gazprom is going to take part in the Iran-Armenia
gas pipeline construction”; subheadings have been inserted editorially:
It is clear that society cannot but be interested in the activity
of Armenia’s only gas supplier AyRusgasard ArmRosgazprom taking into
account the significance of the sphere. Moreover, the company is also
operating in a number of important spheres such as power export and
heating projects. Two months ago ArmRosgazprom Director-General Karen
Karapetyan was appointed a member of the Razdan Power Plant RPP board
of directors from Russia’s Gazprom.
Karen Karapetyan In connection with my appointment as a member of
the board of directors I can say that the Razdan power plant is the
property of the Russian Federation and this country’s government
decided to appoint me as a representative of Gazprom.
No significant changes have been made to the Razdan power plant
management. Simply a new team has been formed which will carry
out management.
Passage omitted: on relations between Gazprom and Russia’s power grid
monopoly Unified Energy System
Gazprom set to take part in Armenia-Iran gas pipeline construction
Correspondent The principle “gas for electricity” is the basis of the
Iran-Armenia gas pipeline project . Given this, can power be exported
outside this project?
Karapetyan It is known that high-voltage power lines are being
constructed between Iran and Armenia. It will give an opportunity to
export more power than that supplied in exchange for the received gas.
Correspondent Will AyRusgasard take part in the construction of the
Armenian sector of the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline?
Karapetyan It is known that the right to construct the Armenian sector
was given to the Iranian party. The latter will soon announce a tender
where we shall also take part.
Correspondent Is Gazprom going to take part in the construction of
the second part of the gas pipeline’s Armenian sector?
Karapetyan Yes, it is. We are waiting for a working delegation to
visit Armenia. After talks with Armenia, a visit by a representative
delegation is expected.
Gas export to Europe impracticable
Correspondent There are rumours that the gas pipeline will go to
Europe. Is it real?
Karapetyan The capacity of the gas pipeline is not of a transit one. A
gas pipeline with the diameter of 700 mm will be constructed, which
will satisfy Armenia’s demand. If we construct a pipeline of bigger
diameter, we shall need bigger investment.
It is also clear that bigger diameter would be profitable for us if
there was demand in third countries’ markets. But today there is no
free space on those markets. The construction of a transit pipeline
demands three times more investment. Moreover, the construction of
a transit pipeline is fraught with numerous problems, and if we do
not resolve them we can hardly find an investor.
Correspondent According to some sources, the Iranian party is
nevertheless aspiring to reach the European gas market. Will they
settle the problems mentioned by you?
Karapetyan There was not such agreement. In 1995-96 when this project
was being prepared, they were speaking about a 700-mm diameter
pipeline. As for reaching the European market, Iran may settle this
problem by means of the existing gas pipelines, let us say those
which pass via Turkey.
Correspondent Exporting Iranian gas via other gas pipelines seems
not to be real as they do not reach Europe. Given this, it is logical
that Iranian gas export projects via Armenia are nevertheless on the
agenda. Will these projects come true in future?
Karapetyan No, not in the near future. First, it should be taken into
account that in case of transit, the Georgian gas pipelines should
be also used, which requires major investment as well. Time for this
topic may come in future.
Nairit’s debt
Correspondent Rumours are being recently circulated that to cover
Armenia’s major chemical plant Nairit’s 8m-dollar debt to AyRusgasard
Nairit’s shares of the same value will be given to the company. Is
this true?
Karapetyan There are no plans in this regard yet. Nairit indeed owes
us 8m dollars, and we are trying to find common ground with this
company’s management.
Passage omitted: Karapetyan on gas supply forecasts; gas supply safety

ARMENIAN PRESIDENT, ITALIAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS COOPERATION
Arminfo
23 Nov 04
Yerevan, 23 November: Armenian President Robert Kocharyan today
received Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Margherita Boniver and the
delegation accompanying her in the visit.
The Armenian president expressed satisfaction with the current level
of Armenian-Italian relations, the presidential press service has
told Arminfo news agency.
The sides discussed a wide range of issues pertaining to bilateral
and international ties, including cooperation of the countries in
international organizations.
The source reports that the sides exchanged views on reforms under
way in the UN bodies, particularly on the expansion of the UN Security
Council.
In turn, Margherita Boniver noted Italy’s interest in the South
Caucasus countries. The Italian deputy minister considered as important
Kocharyan’s upcoming official visit to Italy in January 2005. She said
that this visit would boost cooperation between the two countries. At
the meeting, the sides also discussed the current situation in the
resolution of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict.

Belmont Citizen-Herald, MA
Nov 18 2004
Banquet, concert to benefit Armenian music students
The first annual banquet of the Hovanness Badalian Music Fund will be
held on Saturday, Dec. 4, at the Hellenic Cultural Center in
Watertown.

H. E. Arman Kirakossian, Armenia’s ambassador to the U.S., will
be in attendance and composer Konstantin Petrosian of Providence,
R.I. will be the master of ceremonies. Among the highlights of the
evening: the first U.S. appearance of folk singer Artur Anushavanian;
soprano Nune Karapetian performing with pianist Nune Hakopian; and
recognition of Boston’s own Arev Armenian Folk Ensemble with an
Appreciation Award.

The goal of the fund is to provide merit-based scholarships to
children enrolled in Armenian music education programs worldwide. The
fund will also provide assistance to individuals and organizations
that create material and training programs for children.

The fund is named in honor of Hovanness Badalian, who played a
significant role in educating Armenian children and young adults.
Through his songs he spread the spirit of the Armenian culture around
the world. Upon his passing in 2001 composer Vardan Ajemian said, “We
lost a great artist. He was the father of Armenian folk songs. We
lost a very honest man.”

Armenia celebrated Badalian’s 80th birthday last month at the
National Opera in Yerevan with the participation of prominent artists
including his daughter, opera singer Nuneh Badalian.

For information and to make a contribution to the fund call
617-331-0426, or write to HBMF, P.O. Box 733, Watertown, MA 02471.

Mediamax news agency, Yerevan, in Russian
18 Nov 04
Armenian, German presidents discuss Karabakh settlement
Yerevan, 18 November: Armenian President Robert Kocharyan discussed
the settlement of the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict with German
President Horst Koehler in Berlin today.
Robert Kocharyan also discussed the Karabakh problem with German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder during their meeting on Wednesday 17
November, a special correspondent of Mediamax reports from Berlin.
Robert Kocharyan and Horst Koehler today examined prospects for
expanding relations between Armenia and the European Union (EU) in
the context of the EU’s New Neighbourhood Policy.
During the meeting with Gerhard Schroeder, Robert Kocharyan presented
Armenia’s position on the beginning of the negotiations on Turkey’s
accession to the EU, the special correspondent of Mediamax reports.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE
Ref: PR/04/11/014
Assembly of Armenians of Europe
Contact: Armine Grigoryan
Rue de Trèves 10, 1050, Brussels
Tel : +32 2 647 08 01
Fax : +32 2 647 02 00
Turkish denialism of Armenians in the capital of Europe
“Mothers, Goddesses and Sultans”- but not Armenians
17/11/2004, Brussels – The Palace of Fine Arts of Brussels (Belgium)
hosts the exhibition on Turkey `Mothers, Goddesses and Sultans’ which
will last from October 06 2004 to January 16 2005. The exhibition
accounts pieces from the collection of the Topkapi Palace (Turkey),
Louvre, Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna, the museums of Berlin and
the most important museums in Turkey. This exhibition is organized
with the mutual agreement of the prime ministers of Belgium and Turkey
in order to introduce the Belgian and European society with the
cultural values and the history of Turkey and intends to emphasize the
European vocation of Turkey.
The leaflet on the exhibition distributed to the visitors at the
entrance of the Palace of Fine Arts says `We encounter the peoples,
who have left their traces in Anatolia in the course of 9000
years. The journey takes us through such renowned cultures as the
Hitties, Greek and Roman antiquity, Byzantium and the Ottomans’. From
the first sight one may find the absence of the Armenians and Armenian
culture in Anatolia very strange, since for centuries the Eastern
Anatolia was the cradle of Armenians and it is also called the
Armenian Plateau[i]. Even during the Ottoman Empire Armenians
represented a sizeable and dynamic part of the ottoman population,
particularly in Istanbul and other urban centre, and their omission in
this exhibition is quite deliberate on the part of the Turkish
organizers. But the most interesting piece of the exhibition is the
map of the Ottoman Empire from 1299 to 1923, without any mention of
the Armenians or Armenian Republic (the first Armenian Republic, 1918
– 1920) and Greece (independence of Greece recognized by the Ottoman
Empire in 1832). No expert or historian would dare to make a single
map to represent such a complex region over for such a long period of
time (1299 – 1923), since the movement of borders has been radical
over the period considered, and at times extremely rapid.
The Ottomans fought against the neighboring Byzantine State, crossed
into Rumelia and then captured Constantinople in 1453 during the reign
of Sultan Mehmed II (1451-1481)[ii], putting an end to the Byzantine
Empire. The Ottomans fought with the Serbs, Bulgarians, Hungarians,
Venetians, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Britain, the Vatican, Spain
and also France and Russia. During the reign of Sultan Selim I
(1512-1520), Egypt was conquered and the “Caliphate” passed from the
Abbasids to the Ottoman dynasty. During the reign of Suleyman the
Magnificent (1520-1566) the borders of the Empire extended from the
Crimea in the North to Yemen and Sudan in the South, and from Iran and
the Caspian Sea in the East to Vienna in the Northwest and Spain in
the Southwest[iii].
However, the Ottoman Empire lost its economic and military superiority
vis-a-vis Europe, which had developed rapidly with the Renaissance and
the geographical discoveries starting with the sixteenth century and
failed to adapt to the new developments. Thus, the balance of power
shifted in favor of the European States starting in the same century.
The nationalist movements that started in the nineteenth century and
the rebellions of the Balkan nations organized and supported by the
European States and Russia, brought about the emergence of independent
states within the Ottoman territories in the Balkans.
The Russian field marshal M.I. Kutuzov’s victorious campaign of
1811-12 forced the Turks to cede Bessarabia to Russia by the Treaty of
Bucharest (May 28, 1812).
Agha Mohammad Khan (Iran, reigned 1779-97), had reasserted Iranian
sovereignty over the former Iranian territories in Georgia and the
Caucasus. Fath ‘Ali (Iran, reigned 1797-1834). attempted to maintain
Iran’s sovereignty over its new territories, but he was disastrously
defeated by Russia in two wars (1804-13, 1826-28) and thus lost
Georgia, Armenia.
Subsequent wars of Russia with Turkey were fought to gain influence in
the Ottoman Balkans, win control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus
straits, and expand into the Caucasus. The Greeks’ struggle for
independence sparked the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29, in which
Russian forces advanced into Bulgaria, the Caucasus, and northeastern
Anatolia itself before the Turks sued for peace. The resulting Treaty
of Edirne (Sept. 14, 1829) gave Russia most of the eastern shore of
the Black Sea, and Turkey recognized Russian sovereignty over Georgia
and parts of present-day Armenia. Furthermore, in the Balkans, the
Ottomans acknowledged Greece as an autonomous but tributary state,
granting autonomy to Serbia, and recognized the autonomy of the
Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia under Russian
tutelage. In 1832, the Turkish Sultan finally recognized the Greek
Independence and Prince Otto had accepted the crown
In 1918 the Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan declared
their independence from Russia which lasted until 1920. From 1920 to
1923 the three countries of South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia) were merged into Transcaucasian Federated Republic. The first
independent Republic of Armenia was also recognized by the Ottoman
Empire.
The above-mentioned historical facts prove the presence of the
Armenians in the region which should not be ignored. It is very
strange to see the name of `Azerbaijan’ on the map, while the names of
Armenia and Greece are absent. As reported by Radio Free Europe, the
Azerbaijani Defense Ministry spokesman called for Azerbaijan’s (the
closest ally of the Republic of Turkey) takeover of the entire
territory of Armenia and removal of the entire Armenian population
from the Caucasus. He went so far as to say, and we quote, `Within the
next 25 years there will exist no state of Armenia in the South
Caucasus’. This inevitably reminds of the intentions of the
perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide. In this context the negationism
of the Armenians is not a simple mistake or lack of professionalism by
the organizers of the exhibition, but has its roots go back into the
beginning of the 20th century – the Armenian Genocide committed by the
Ottoman Empire in 1915. The Armenian Genocide is still denied by the
Republic of Turkey, which also imposes a blockade on the Republic of
Armenia for more than 10 years. Therefore, the radical exclusion of
Armenians from ottoman history is consistent with the genocide carried
out in 1915-1916 and it has been the practice in Turkey since the
establishment of the republic in 1923.
The negationism and the denial of the Armenian Genocide are also
reflected in the premeditated annihilation of Armenian cultural
heritage in the territory of the actual Republic of
Turkey. Sourb. Arakelots[iv] (of the Holy Apostles) Church of Kars
turned into a mosque in 1998. The church of Tekor[v] which was erected
in the 5th c. and was standing until 1956 served as a target during
the artillery trainings of the Turkish army. The monastery of
St. Karapet[vi] was plundered and partly devastated in 1915. During
the artillery trainings of the Turkish troops in the 1960s the
monument turned into a heap of stones which were later used for the
foundation of a village in the same place; the carvings of the
Akhatamar Church (Lake Van, Eastern Turkey) is nowadays used for
shooting practice for the visitors, etc. So, after some decades there
will not be any evidence or trace of the Armenians in the region.
The Assembly of Armenians of Europe considers such negationist and
revisionist attitude of the Republic of Turkey, aspiring to the EU
full membership unacceptable. We believe that such behaviour
destabilizes the whole region of South Caucasus and impedes the
normalization of Armeno-Turkish relations. Moreover, the extension of
this denialist approach to an exhibition carried out in Belgium, in
partnership with Belgian institutions, is a worrying sign at a moment
when Turkey is pressing to join the European community of values. The
Assembly of Armenians of Europe is sure that this is an attempt of the
Turkish authorities to force their own denialist approach on an
unsuspecting European public.
_____
[i] Mustafa Ibn-Abdullah (1609-57), the first and foremost Turkish
goegrapher. In his most important oeuvre `Miror of the World’ (Jehan
Numa) he writes about Armenia (folio 121a) – `Armenia consists of 2
parts, Maior and Minor=85.’
[ii]
[iii] < 0index.html>
sh/sultans/10index.html
[iv] < ots_Galery.htm>
rakelots/Arakelots_Galery.htm
[v] < ry.htm>
or_Galery.htm
[vi] < t_Galery.htm>
arapet/Karapet_Galery.htm

A1 Plus | 16:35:16 | 16-11-2004 | Social |
STUDENTS FIGHTING AGAINST CORRUPTION
During September-October of 2004 ARF `Nikol Aghbalyan’ Student Union
held a survey on `Corruption in Institutes of Higher Education of
Armenia’ among the 1100 students of 11 state institutes of higher
education of Armenia.
‘The aim of the survey was to find out what students thought about
corruption in their colleges, which reasons of college corruption they
stress, which of the phases in education process they consider more
corrupted, which of structures they underline for fighting against
college corruption and what their personal willingness is to struggle
against the fallacious phenomenon’, Karen Antashyan, member of `Nikol
Aghbalyan’ Student Union said.
Under the survey, 47% of the persons surveyed are pessimistic and think
corruption has always been in colleges and will be.
Students cited low wages of lecturers, draft evasion by students and
patronage of IHE leadership as the reasons for college corruption.
43% of the surveyed students expressed willingness to partake in any
initiative for fighting with corruption, 25% finds actions must be taken
against college corruption but excluded own participation in the
process, and 32% thinks all the initiatives for that purpose will fail.
Only in Armenian State Institute of Physical Training 5 lecturers have
been dismissed for corruption. No lecturer has been discharged from
other colleges – maybe there is no corruption there?
Members of ARF `Nikol Aghbalyan’ Student Union think the rest of youth
unions will join them and will fight more actively against corruption.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress