Armenia Guarantees Safety For All Turkish Football Fans

ARMENIA GUARANTEES SAFETY FOR ALL TURKISH FOOTBALL FANS

ARMENPRESS
Aug 22, 2008

YEREVAN, AUGUST 22, ARMENPRESS: In a today’s story, titled ‘Armenia
does not demand visas for game," the Turkish daily Hurriyet quotes
president of the Turkish Football Federation M. Ozgener as saying
that he received the first official letter from Armenia.

According to the Turkish daily, Ruben Hayrapetian, president of the
Armenian Football Federation, sent a letter to his Turkish counterpart
on August 21 saying that the September 6 qualifier between Turkey
and Armenia in Yerevan for the 2010 World Cup will proceed ‘in the
atmosphere of football celebration.’ The Turkish newspaper says that
Ruben Hayrapetian gave assurances that the Armenian authorities will
have done everything to ensure the highest possible safety for Turkish
fans who will arrive in Armenia to watch the game. He said also that on
September 6 there will be only ‘football passions.’ Ruben Hayrapetian
wrote ,"This game has stirred up big interest also outside Turkey and
Armenia. Understandingly, there are political elements in the created
condition, but the Armenian Football Federation is interested only
in the sporting outcome of the game."

He said the best possible conditions are in place at Yerevan Hrazdan
stadium and Turkish fans will be able to travel to Armenia without
visas after the government of Armenia made a special decision to that
end .

He said also the safety of all Turkish fans in Armenia will be
guaranteed. "We hope that Turkish and Armenian football players will
show a game that will be a football celebration," he said.

Turkish National Security Council Meets Over Strategic Issues

TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS OVER STRATEGIC ISSUES

Arab Monitor
Aug 21 2008
Italy

Istanbul, 21 August – The Turkish National Security Council (MGK)
met today at the headquarters of the Turkish Staff Officers’ school
in Istanbul for a thorough discussion about the repercussions of
the NATO-Russian crisis over Georgia on the balance of power in the
Caucasus region and its consequences for Turkey’s national security
interests. Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to brief
the MGC on his visits to Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and foreign
minister Ali Babacan will report about the NATO emergency meeting
that took place in Brussels two days ago.

Prime minister Erdogan is expected to report about the outcome of
his efforts to draw the Russian, the Georgian and the Azerbaijan
governments into a joint Caucus stability pact. The stakes for Turkey
are high, as Ankara, as a NATO member, intends to maintain support
for the territorial integrity of Georgia, without however ruling out
the possibility of a secession of South Ossetia and Abhkazia. Given
the strategic importance of energy policy for Turkey, Ankara has no
intention to harm its relations with Russia.

Another issue of prime importance for the MGK meeting will be the
relationship with Armenia: following the crisis in Georgia, Turkey
intensified ongoing talks between Turkish and Armenian officials aimed
at improving bilateral relations and healing historic rifts. Regarding
the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations, one of the decisions
to be taken in today’s MGK meeting will be the eventual visit of
President Abdullah Gul to Erevan in occasion of the Turkish-Armenian
football match on 6 September.

Last but certainly not least, the issue of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk
will be on the MGK’s agenda today: Turkey has been pressing the United
States to prevent the Kurdish militia Peshmerga and the Iraqi Kurdish
regional government from taking over Kirkuk through a combination
of Kurdish militias’ actions on the ground and a staged referendum,
backed by the Kurdish Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. On this issue,
the United States have failed to meet Turkey’s expectations and have
not been capable of imposing a Provincial Electoral Law on the Iraqi
government, that would have kept the Kurdish Peshmerga militia out
of Kirkuk and granted constitutional rights to the Sunni Arab and
the Turkmen communities of the area, as requested by Turkey.

TIME: The Five Faces Of Barack Obama

THE FIVE FACES OF BARACK OBAMA
By David Von Drehle

TIME
Aug 21 2008

If Barack Obama had not chosen a life in politics, he might have
made a fine psychotherapist. He is a master at taking what you’ve
told him and feeding it right back. What I hear you saying is …

Open his book The Audacity of Hope to almost any page and listen. On
immigration, for example, Obama first mirrors "the faces of this
new America" he has met in the ethnic stew pot of Chicago: "in the
Indian markets along Devon Avenue, in the sparkling new mosque in the
southwestern suburbs, in an Armenian wedding and a Filipino ball." Then
he pivots to give voice to the "anxieties" of "many blacks" and "as
many whites about the wave of illegal immigration," adding: "Not all of
these fears are irrational." He admits that he knows the "frustration"
of needing an interpreter to speak to one’s auto mechanic and in the
next breath cherishes the innocent dreams of an immigrant child.

In other words, he hears America singing — and griping, fretting,
seething, conniving, hoping, despairing. He can deliver a pitch-perfect
expression of the racial anger of many American blacks — as he did
in his much discussed speech on race relations earlier this year —
and, just as smoothly, unpack the racial irritations gnawing at many
whites. To what extent does he share any of those emotions? The doctor
never exactly says.

Consciously or unconsciously, Obama has been honing this technique
for years. During his time at Harvard Law School in the 1980s,
the student body was deeply divided. In one heated debate, Obama so
adroitly summarized the various positions without tipping his own
hand that by the end of the meeting, as Professor Charles Ogletree
told one newspaper, "everyone was nodding, Oh, he agrees with me."

He has been called a window into the American psyche. Or you might
say he’s a mirror — what you see depends on who you are and where
you stand. Obama puts it this way: "I serve as a blank screen on
which people of vastly different political stripes project their
own views." But those metaphors all suggest that he is some sort of
passive instrument, when in fact his elusive quality is an active
part of his personality. It’s how you square the fact that Obama once
wrote the most intimate memoir ever published by a future nominee
yet still manages to avoid definition. At his core, this is a deeply
reserved and emotionally reticent man. Consider this anecdote from
Dreams from My Father: as a young man in New York City, he lived next
door to an elderly recluse "who seemed to share my disposition." When
he happened to meet his neighbor returning from the store, Obama
would offer to carry the old man’s groceries. Together, the two of
them would slowly climb the stairs, never speaking, and at the top,
the man would nod silently "before shuffling inside and closing the
latch … I thought him a kindred spirit," Obama concludes.

Both his rhetorical style and his ingrained disposition tend to obscure
rather than reveal. This is how Obama remains enigmatic no matter
how much we see of him. As the campaign enters its last chapter, it
may not be enough for him to say, as he often does, "This election is
not about me … this campaign is about you." Supporters and opponents
alike want a clearer picture of Obama, and they are selecting elements
of his words, policies, public record and biography to shape their
clashing interpretations. Those pieces of Obama are also open to
interpretation, because so few of them are stamped from any familiar
presidential mold: the polygamous father, the globe-traveling single
mother, the web of roots spreading from Kansas to Kenya, friends
and relatives from African slums to Washington and Wall Street, and
intellectual influences ranging from Alexander Hamilton to Malcolm
X. Four of the faces of Obama pose various threats to his hopes for
victory. The fifth is the one his campaign intends to drive home,
from the convention in Denver right to Election Day.

1. The Black Man Henry Louis Gates Jr. once wrote an essay on the life
of writer Anatole Broyard, the light-complexioned son of two black
parents who lived his life passing as a white man. "He wanted to be a
writer," Gates explained, but "he did not want to be a Negro writer. It
is a crass disjunction, but it is not his crassness or his disjunction
… We give lip service to the idea of the writer who happens to be
black, but had anyone, in the postwar era, ever seen such a thing?"

Obama tells a parallel story in his memoir, the journey of a man
raised by his Caucasian mother and grandparents who seeks his identity
as an African American. Along the path, he was drawn to a number of
older black men who argued that America’s racial divide is absolute
and unbridgeable. Obama recalls a visit as a teenager to the home
of a black man his white grandfather considered a friend. To his
surprise, the man explained that it was hopeless to think any white
man could truly befriend someone black. "He can’t know me," the man
said of Obama’s grandfather. No matter how close they might seem,
"I still have to watch myself."

That is resolutely not the message communicated in Obama’s campaign,
however. "I reject a politics that is based solely on racial identity,
gender identity, sexual orientation or victimhood generally," he has
declared. He enjoys nearly unanimous support from African Americans in
polls; nevertheless, just as Broyard sought to avoid being labeled
a "Negro writer," Obama resists efforts to define him as a "black
candidate." And for some of the same reasons too. As soon as the
race label is added, some of the audience tunes out, others are
turned off and still others leap to conclusions about who you are
and how you think. Obama has written that race was his "obsession"
growing up but that he long ago left that burden behind. Now he lays
claim to the whole spectrum: "the son of a black man from Kenya and
a white woman from Kansas" with "brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews,
uncles and cousins, of every race and every hue, scattered across
three continents."

The question, to borrow from Gates, is whether enough people in
2008 are ready to imagine such a thing. There’s an interesting
scene in Dreams in which Obama meets for the first time another of
those influential elders — the Rev. Jeremiah Wright. Earlier this
year, Wright’s comments about race led Obama to repudiate his former
pastor. In an uncanny way, this conversation from more than 20 years
ago goes directly to the heart of Obama’s current dilemma. The
eminent sociologist William Julius Wilson had published a book
arguing that the role of race in shaping society was giving way to
class. But for Wright, the concept of a postracial politics simply
didn’t compute. "These miseducated brothers," the pastor fumed to
the young Obama, "like that sociologist at the University of Chicago,
talking about ‘the declining significance of race.’ Now, what country
is he living in?"

If identity politics might gain some black votes for Obama, it can
also cost him votes elsewhere. So how many Americans will agree with
Wright that race is still front and center? The number is notoriously
slippery, because voters don’t always tell pollsters the truth. At
the Weekly Standard, a magazine with a neocon tilt, writer Stanley
Kurtz rejects Obama’s postracial message because he suspects it
isn’t sincere. Probing the coverage of Obama’s career as an Illinois
legislator in the black-oriented newspaper the Chicago Defender,
Kurtz concluded, "The politician chronicled here is profoundly
race-conscious." Though Kurtz’s message is aimed primarily at whites,
it’s not so different from one angrily whispered by Jesse Jackson. "I
want to cut his nuts off," Jackson fumed — because he believes that
Obama’s race ought to determine which issues the candidate raises
and how he discusses them. Either way, whether an opponent claims
that Obama remains race-conscious or a supporter says he ought to be,
both are rejecting the foundation of his campaign.

Figures like Jackson and Wright have invested a lifetime in the
politics of black identity. Obama’s success, whether it culminates in
the White House or not, signals the passing of their era. So it is no
wonder that younger voters have been key to his candidacy. Having grown
up in the era of Oprah Winfrey, Denzel Washington, Tiger Woods and,
yes, Henry Louis Gates Jr., they are better able to credit Obama’s
thesis that "there’s not a black America and white America and Latino
America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America."

2. The Healer Dreams from My Father is the story of a quest — not
for honor or fortune but for meaning. The book presents a wounded
young man who has never felt entirely at home — not among whites
or among blacks, neither in slums nor in student unions — and is
haunted by "the constant, crippling fear that I didn’t belong." He
wants to know how to feel rooted and purposeful. At the end of his
odyssey, he decides to take a leap of faith. For the young Obama,
"faith in other people" becomes his home.

This is what he preaches: the seemingly unlimited power of people
who are willing to trust, cooperate and compromise. Bringing people
together for action, what he calls "organizing," holds "the promise of
redemption." And without exactly saying it, Obama offers himself as the
embodiment of his own message, the one-man rainbow coalition. You don’t
believe white and black can peacefully, productively coexist? Think
the gulf between Chicago’s South Side and the Harvard Law Review
can never be bridged? Do you fear that the Muslim masses of Africa
and Asia are incompatible with the modernity of the West or that
cosmopolitan America and Christian America will never see eye to
eye? Just look at me! It’s not unusual to meet Obama supporters who
say the simple fact of electing him would move mountains, changing
the way the world looks at America, turning the page on the nation’s
racial history and so on. He is the change they seek.

The message doesn’t work for everyone: so far, Obama’s numbers in the
national polls average below 50%. But his enormous and enthusiastic
audiences are evidence that many people are intrigued, if not
deeply moved. "Yes, we can!" turns out to be a powerful trademark
at a time when 3 out of 4 Americans believe the country is on the
wrong track. Many Democrats placed their political bets on anger
in recent years: anger at the war, anger over the disputed election
in 2000, anger at Bush Administration policies. Obama doubled down
on optimism, beginning with his careermaking speech at the 2004
Democratic Convention: "Hope in the face of difficulty, hope in the
face of uncertainty, the audacity of hope. In the end, that is God’s
greatest gift to us, the bedrock of this nation, a belief in things
not seen, a belief that there are better days ahead."

If you click deeply enough into Obama’s website, you can find position
papers covering enough issues to fill Congressional Quarterly. He has
a specific strategy to refocus the military on Afghanistan. He backs
a single-payer health-care system. But it wasn’t some 10-point plan
that turned Obama into a politician who fills arenas while others
speak in school cafeterias. He knows that detailed policies tend to
drive people apart rather than bring them together. People arrived
to hear him out of fervor or mere curiosity, and they stayed for
the sense of possibility. They heard rhetoric like this, from his
speech claiming victory after his epic nomination battle: "If we are
willing to work for it and fight for it and believe in it, then I am
absolutely certain that generations from now, we will be able to look
back and tell our children that this was the moment when we began
to provide care for the sick and good jobs to the jobless; this was
the moment when the rise of the oceans began to slow and our planet
began to heal; this was the moment when we ended a war and secured
our nation and restored our image as the last, best hope on Earth."

That’s a pretty quick step from an election to nirvana, and Obama’s
opponents would like to turn such oratory against him. No one does it
more effectively than radio host Rush Limbaugh, with his judo-master
sense for his foes’ vulnerabilities. Limbaugh rarely refers to Obama
by his name. Instead, he drops his baritone half an octave and calls
him "the messiah."

3. The Novice Obama’s critics tend to paint him two ways — related
portraits but subtly different. The first is a picture of an empty
suit, a man who reads pretty speeches full of gossamer rhetoric. "Just
words," as Senator Hillary Clinton put it.

And it’s true that Obama doesn’t have a thick record of businesses
he has built or governments he has run. For one thing, he has moved
around too much. The restlessness in his résumé is striking:
two years at Occidental College, two years at Columbia University,
a year in business, three years as a community organizer and then
law school. Obama’s four two-year terms in the Illinois state senate
are his version of permanence, but in two of those terms, he was busy
running for higher office.

Voters accustomed to evaluating governors and generals may have a hard
time deciding what value to place on a stint of "organizing." But
it was surely real work. Reading Obama’s account of his efforts to
organize the residents in a single Chicago neighborhood, with weeks
of toil going into staging a single meeting, is like watching a man
dig the Panama Canal with a Swiss Army knife.

As for his conventional training, friends of Obama’s like to point
out that 12 years as a lawmaker is more experience than Abraham
Lincoln, the original beanpole from Illinois, had in 1860. They
note that the issues Obama is most drawn to — health-care reform,
juvenile justice, poverty — aren’t the easiest. They tell the story
of his artful arm-twisting and cajolery in the Illinois senate on
behalf of bills to reform campaign-finance laws and require police to
videotape interrogations. Obama worked his colleagues one by one, on
the floor, on the basketball court, at the poker table, and managed
to pass some difficult legislation. "He’s unique in his ability to
deal with extremely complex issues, to reach across the aisle and to
deal with diverse people" one Republican colleague, McCain supporter
Kirk Dillard, told the Wall Street Journal.

That wasn’t enough to impress Clinton in the primaries. She enjoyed
noting that Obama was chairman of a Senate subcommittee yet had never
convened a substantive hearing. John McCain’s campaign will not be
any more dazzled. In a sense, the question of Obama’s preparation
hinges on data that are still being gathered, because his greatest
accomplishment is this unfolding campaign. For a man given to Zen-like
circularities — "We are the change we seek" — the best proof that
he can unite people to solve problems might be his ability to unite
them to win an election.

4. The Radical Others believe Obama is like the clever wooden offering
of the Greeks to Trojans: something that appears to be a gift on the
outside but is cunningly dangerous within. They find in his background
and in what he leaves unsaid telltale signs of a radical. Obama has
worked on education issues in Chicago with William Ayers and has
visited the home of Ayers and his wife Bernadette Dohrn. Both were
leaders of the violent, leftist Weather Underground. But the indictment
of Obama framed by his opponents starts years earlier in Hawaii,
with the black man who told Obama that a true friendship with his
white grandfather wasn’t possible. The man’s name was Frank Marshall
Davis, and in the 1930s, ’40s and early ’50s he was a well-known poet,
journalist and civil rights and labor activist. Like his friend Paul
Robeson and others, Davis perceived the Soviet Union as a "staunch
foe of racism" (as he later put it in his memoirs), and at one point
he joined the Communist Party. "I worked with all kinds of groups,"
Davis explained. "My sole criterion was this: Are you with me in my
determination to wipe out white supremacy?"

The conservative group Accuracy in Media (AIM) is eager to paint the
radical picture. In press releases and website articles, AIM calls
Davis "Obama’s Communist Mentor," although by the time they met, Davis
had been out of politics for decades, and "mentor" may exaggerate his
role in the young man’s life. Still, it’s clear that Obama did seek
advice from the old man and that what he got was undiluted. "You’re
not going to college to get educated. You’re going there to get
trained," Davis once warned Obama. "They’ll train you so good, you’ll
start believing what they tell you about equal opportunity and the
American way and all that s___." Did the future candidate take this
to heart? Not according to him. "It made me smile," Obama recalls,
"thinking back on Frank and his old Black Power dashiki self. In
some ways he was as incurable as my mother, as certain in his faith,
living in the same ’60s time warp."

Obama’s memoir displays more familiarity with the ideas of the far left
than most American politicians would advertise. His interest in African
independence movements led him to the seminal work of Frantz Fanon, a
Marxist sociologist, and he speaks in passing of attending "socialist
conferences" at the Cooper Union in New York City. But as Obama told
TIME, this was in the Reagan years, and he was also reading works
by conservative giants like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. He
browsed among the ideologues but never bought in, he said. "I was
always suspicious of dogma and the excesses of the left and the right."

Not all Obama critics see red, of course. Some merely believe he is
more liberal than he claims to be. They cite a National Journal study,
which Obama disputes, that rated him the most liberal member of the
U.S. Senate, and they aren’t dissuaded by the candidate’s recent
positions in favor of gun owners and an electronic-surveillance bill
loathed by civil libertarians.

There is another Trojan-horse interpretation just below the radar. It
is the idea that a man named Barack Hussein Obama might be hiding a
Muslim identity. Obama has tackled this dozens of times. His Kenyan
grandfather was indeed a Muslim; his father espoused no faith;
Obama attended a Muslim school in Indonesia for a time as a boy
because that’s where he lived — Indonesia is a Muslim country. He
believed in no religion until he moved to Chicago as a grown man and
was baptized Christian by Wright. As campaign spokesman Robert Gibbs
puts it, "His Christian pastor and this Muslim thing — how can he
have problems with both at the same time? Pick one."

But that’s the problem with having five faces. There’s more than one to
choose from. The "secret Muslim" rumors about Obama may be scurrilous,
but they survived the sudden fame of Obama’s card-carrying Christian
pastor. A recent poll found that 12% of Americans believe them.

5. The Future

Back up a few paragraphs and look again at something Obama wrote in
his memoir. It’s that passing reference to his mother living in a
"’60s time warp." No presidential nominee since John F. Kennedy has so
lightly dismissed those turbulent years. What could the Summer of Love
have meant to a 6-year-old in Hawaii, or Woodstock to an 8-year-old in
Indonesia? The Pill, Vietnam, race riots, prayer in school and campus
unrest — forces like these and the culture clashes they unleashed
have dominated American politics for more than 40 years. But Obama
approaches these forces historically, anthropologically — and in
his characteristic doctor-with-a-notepad style. In The Audacity of
Hope, he writes about the culture wars in the same faraway tone he
might use for the Peloponnesian Wars. ("By the time the ’60s rolled
around, many mainstream Protestant and Catholic leaders had concluded,"
etc.) These fights belong to that peculiar category of the past known
as stuff your parents cared about.

"I think that the ideological battles of the ’60s have continued to
shape our politics for too long," Obama told TIME. "The average baby
boomer, I think, has long gotten past some of these abstract arguments
about Are you left? Are you right? Are you Big Government? Small
government? You know, people are very practical. What they are
interested in is, Can you deliver schools that work?"

This aspect of Obama — the promise to "break out of some of those
old arguments" — speaks powerfully to many younger Americans, who
have turned out in record numbers to vote and canvass for him. Obama
is the first national politician to reflect their widespread feeling
that time is marching forward but politics is not, that the baby
boomers in the interest groups and the media are indeed trapped in a
time warp, replaying their stalemated arguments year after year. The
theme recurs in conversations with Obama supporters: He just feels
like something new.

Obama on the stump is constantly underlining this idea. As he
told a recent town-hall meeting in a New Mexico high school gym,
"We can’t keep doing the things we’ve been doing and expect
a different result." It’s a message his campaign organization
has taken to heart. Obama’s is the first truly wired campaign,
seamlessly integrating the networking power of technology with the
flesh-and-blood passion of a social movement. His people get the fact
that the Internet is more than television with a keyboard attached. It
is the greatest tool ever invented for connecting people to others who
share their interests. For decades, the Democratic Party has relied
on outside allies to deliver its votes — unions, black churches,
single-interest liberal groups. With some 2 million volunteers and
contributors in his online database, Obama is perhaps a bigger force
now than any of these. McCain may perceive Obama’s enormous celebrity
as a weakness — workhorse vs. show horse — but celebrity has its
benefits. Obama will accept the nomination in front of a crowd of
76,000 in Denver’s professional-football stadium, and the price of
a free ticket is to register as a campaign volunteer.

Each of the first four Obama faces presents risks for his campaign,
but the fifth prospect offers a way around many of them. If he can get
through a general-election campaign without enlisting in the culture
wars, he gains credibility as something new. That in turn might keep
him from becoming mired in the trap of identity politics. Branding
himself as the face of the future can neutralize the issue of
inexperience. And if he can build his own political network strong
enough to win a national election, he will lend credibility to his
almost mystical belief in the power of organizing.

Obama’s banners tout CHANGE WE CAN BELIEVE IN, and this slogan cuts to
the heart of the task before him. The key word isn’t change, despite
what legions of commentators have been saying all year. The key is
believe. With gas prices up and home prices down; with Washington
impotent to tackle issues like health care, energy and Social Security;
with politics mired in a fifty-fifty standoff between two unpopular
parties — plenty of Americans are ready to try a new cure. But will
they come to believe that this new doctor, this charismatic mystery,
this puzzle, is the one they can trust to prescribe it?

–Boundary_(ID_9qIlYXx21gj8mUI+btvdJQ)–

UNHCR And Armenian Government Population Movement To Be Prepared For

UNHCR AND ARMENIAN GOVERNMENT POPULATION MOVEMENT TO BE PREPARED FOR EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

ARMENPRESS
Aug 20, 2008

YEREVAN, AUGUST 20, ARMENPRESS: The Georgian-Russian war prompted a
big flow of population movement from Georgia to Armenia. After the
end of active military actions, specialists of the Armenian Migration
Agency of the Territorial Ministry and UNHCR Armenia Agency visited
three crossing points on the Armenian-Georgian border to study the
situation on the ground.

According to UNHCR Armenia Agency, some 11,000 people crossed into
Armenia through Bagratashen border check point on August 8-18. For
comparison, three days before the standoff, on August 5-7 only 400
foreigners crossed into Armenia through Bagratashen.

Part of foreigners who fled to Armenia used it as a transit country to
fly home. The majority of foreigners were ethnic Armenians, citizens
of Georgia-women and children who sought safe refuge in Armenia at
their relatives and friends.

There were also ethnic Georgians and ethnic Ossetians, as well as
Russian citizens of Armenian origin, fleeing Georgia, and also foreign
diplomats, members of their families and personnel of international
organizations in Georgia.

The UNHCR Armenia Agency has set up a task force with other UN agencies
in Armenia to examine the movement of population together with Armenian
government to be prepared for emergency situations.

Construction Of Underground Parking Facilities To Be Launched In Yer

CONSTRUCTION OF UNDERGROUND PARKING FACILITIES TO BE LAUNCHED IN YEREVAN IN SEPTEMBER

ARKA
Aug 19, 2008

YEREVAN, August 19. /ARKA/. The construction of the first underground
car parking areas in Yerevan is to be launched in September, Yerevan
Nakhagits Institute Director Gurgen Musheghyan said at a press
conference on Tuesday.

The parking areas will be built in the centre of the city.

The city authorities are planning to build underground parking places
for 10,000 cars.

Musheghyan said that the underground parking facilities will relieve
streets from cars.

The municipality decided to build parking places under Republic Square,
Myasnikyan Square and other sites.

Later, such facilities will be constructed even under some yards.

Plea Deal Reached For Ohio Man Arrested Outside Obama Event

PLEA DEAL REACHED FOR OHIO MAN ARRESTED OUTSIDE OBAMA EVENT

WTTE
Aug 19 2008
OH

DES MOINES, Iowa (AP) — Prosecutors have reached a plea agreement with
an Ohio man who was accused of carrying an unlawful knife outside an
Iowa hotel where presidential candidate Barack Obama and his family
stayed during a campaign visit in July 2007.

Armenian native Davit Zakaryan is expected to plead guilty to a simple
misdemeanor charge of interference with official acts.

Prosecutors this month dismissed the knife charge as part of a
plea deal. Wapello County attorney Allen Cook says that under the
agreement, Zakaryan will get a 30-day suspended sentence and pay a
minimum fine. He will not have to serve any time in jail unless he
violates terms set by the court.

Zakaryan was living in Cincinnati but selling campaign memorabilia
in Iowa.

ANKARA: Turkey’s ‘Caucasus Alliance’ Proposal: How Likely Is Its Suc

TURKEY’S ‘CAUCASUS ALLIANCE’ PROPOSAL: HOW LIKELY IS ITS SUCCESS? (1)
By Guner Ozkan

Today’s Zaman
Aug 19 2008
Turkey

Amid desperate EU attempts and increasingly tough words from the US
to Moscow for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of Russian
forces in the war between Russia and Georgia, Turkey has suggested
the establishment of the "Caucasus Alliance."

Turkey is surely acting in good faith, as it has, with some
reservations, good economic, political and social relationships with
both Moscow and Tbilisi; it seeks a durable peace on its doorstep. So
what does the Turkish proposal include? How likely is its success in
a region as complex as the Caucasus, and why?

Goals and means of the ‘alliance’

Though still in the process of creation, after prompt visits to Moscow
and Tbilisi Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan outlined the
purpose and content of the Caucasus Alliance. Its main objective is
to establish permanent peace and security in the region by bringing
all regional states together in a joint formation. To this end,
it envisages a structure in which regional states are expected
once again to reassure each other of respect of state sovereignty,
restraint from the use and threat of force, the inviolability of
state borders and non-harmful economic and energy security in their
common space of the Caucasus. Principles such as state sovereignty,
inviolability of borders and so on in the formation will take their
main references from the charter of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), of which Russia, Turkey and all other
Caucasian states are members.

Erdogan is seeing that the establishment of lasting peace and security
is the principal aim here, and he believes that this goal can be
achieved through the increase of economic cooperation among regional
states. In order to better present this idea, he gave the examples
of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) and
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) projects as economic ventures contributing
significantly to regional peace and security. He pointed out the
necessity to develop more such projects and to expand them in such
a way that would connect all peoples in the Caucasus.

Russia and Georgia appear to have accepted the new formation in
principle, and the foreign ministries of the three states are going to
work on the details, as Turkey gets ready to offer the plan first to
Azerbaijan and Armenia and then to the EU for their participation. The
Turkish side is particularly hopeful that the Caucasus Alliance in
the offing will resolve the other most important regional security
issue, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Baku and Yerevan, once
and for all.

Interdependence as security solution

In fact, the proposal Turkey is now presenting is a method that
has been discussed in international relations security studies for
years, mainly between liberal and realist security thinkers. Turkey’s
suggestion of an "alliance" for the Caucasus takes its logical base
from liberal views on security solutions that have developed primarily
as responses to those of the state-centric realist perspectives in
interstate relations.

Of others, neo-liberal institutionalists principally suggest that there
are various diverse and important actors in domestic and international
levels, which function outside the strict control of governments.

Intergovernmental organizations as well as private ones, with their
diverse agendas, can and do influence governments’ decisions, pushing
them to cooperate among themselves further and thereby allowing states
to get over a number of inter and intrastate disputes. Basically, the
liberal school suggests that the presence of complex interdependence
among societies and states allows multiple channels to open
between those actors in their trans-governmental and transnational
relations. This "complex web of linkages" between formal and informal
actors deals with a myriad of issues in which the military security
and/or survival of the state prioritized by the realists is not
supposed to take top priority. Rather, it is assumed that if or when
states manage to construct a complex interdependence among themselves,
such as improved trade relations and joint economic projects in a
particular region, the risk of the use of military force will be,
to a large extent, avoided.

Realist perspectives on security, on the other hand, do not share
much of those liberal views on security. For them, though complex
interdependence is a source of cooperation and an important method
for problem solving, or at least decreasing the tension among states,
the same sources are the scarce commodities for which individuals
and states often strive for control, paving the way for inter and
intrastate military conflicts. Indeed, realists argue that states
always seek to maximize their power in line with their national
interests in economic, military and security issues and minimize the
risks in the same matters. Realists see that complex interdependence
can only work so long as all parties are satisfied, and yet this is
often impossible to succeed in and hard to sustain. So interdependence
resembles no more than a fierce competition for power and domination
over scarce resources. As continuous rivalry over scarce resources
is a never-ending phenomenon, conflict cannot always be avoided. In
this never-ending state of rivalry, intergovernmental organizations,
for the realists, are no more than instruments in the hands of states
to promote their national/security interests.

*Assistant Professor Guner Ozkan is a Caucasus expert at the
Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO-USAK)
and a lecturer at Mugla University.

Madrid: Georgian leader’s "worst’ decision" was to use force

ABC Newspaper , Spain
Aug 13 2008

Georgian leader’s "worst’ decision" was to use force

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made one of his worst decisions
when he chose to use force to solve a problem his country has had
since 1991. He did not take into account the likelihood that Russia
would behave in the worst way – as it did – and respond with such a
level of violence that a nation as small as Georgia had no chance of
resisting. After observing for decades how Russia dealt with the
problem of Chechnya, it was not reasonable to hope that the Kremlin
would behave with any moderation regarding a region like South
Ossetia, whose inhabitants it claimed to be defending. Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin with his own style of a forceful Russian military
response, did not have a moment’s doubt when he ordered the Army to
respond as forcefully as possible, with no concern for possible
civilian victims.

After a precarious ceasefire, the world is now rediscovering a
territory that is small in area but huge in complexity and full of
political and military land mines. Russia is trying to maintain its
monopoly on the transit of hydrocarbon fuels that come from the
Caspian Sea and Central Asia, crossing Georgia -because the alternate
route through Armenia is closed by Turkey – and it does not want its
southern border with the Muslim Middle East to be controlled by hands
it considers unstable. Kremlin leaders are especially alarmed over the
possibility that Georgia -and even worse, Ukraine – might enter the
Atlantic Alliance. After this short and intense war, it is hard to
determine whether the Alliance will try to speed up any ties with
Georgia, because the predictable Russian reaction could not worsen the
already-delicate NATO-Russian relations or, fearing that the situation
will be aggravated, they will decide to place Georgia’s NATO
aspirations on hold for a time. The Russian offensive, which President
Medvedev announced had ended yesterday, has given the West an idea of
Russia’s military capacity and its determination to use it when it
sees its interests threatened.

Russia’s petroleum wealth has revitalized the country’s economy, and
the long era of "Putinism" has restored classic imperial images, for
which NATO should prepare for a period of serious instability with its
principal neighbour: giving in to Russia’s demands could undermine our
credibility, but resisting what Russia is doing has a price that we
will have to be ready to pay.

Most of the consequences of this crisis will fall on the Atlantic
Alliance and the European Union because the UN has again gotten mired
down in its own contradictions. The origin of the Security Council’s
right of veto lie in the victory in World War II, and it is useless to
negotiate condemnations or demands when the country at whom they are
directed has this right. Nor has the UN done anything to defend
International law in the case of independence for Serbian Kosovo
region, the first effects of which we are seeing in the case of South
Ossetia. The UN would not be able to deny the Ossetians what it has
conceded to the Kosovar Albanians, and it is quite probable that fear
that this tendency would spread was one of the reasons Saakashvili
made such an erroneous decision. Maybe it is now impossible for
Georgia to regain sovereignty over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as the
president had promised the most nationalist faction of his
followers. Russia has destroyed the military capability of his
country, not to mention the immediate costs. Recent plans to for new
gas pipelines across Georgia have gone up in smoke.

[translated from Spanish]

Fighting one’s way out of Commonwealth

WPS Agency, Russia
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 15, 2008 Friday

FIGHTING ONE’S WAY OUT OF COMMONWEALTH
Foreign peacekeepers might appear in Georgian conflict areas

by Aleksei Malashenko

WHAT CONSEQUENCES FOR SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLICS MAY STEM FROM THE
EVENTS IN SOUTH OSSETIA?; The latest developments in South Ossetia
prove peacekeeping efforts fragile.

First, this is a precedent that allows for outright hostilities after
years of negotiations and peacekeeping efforts. What it means for
Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and even the Trans-Dniester region is
clear: war remains an acceptable (but not necessarily effective) means
of reintegration for the states split by separatist tendencies. The
South Ossetian precedent exposed fragile nature of the talks that
exist parallel to war preparations.

Second, this latest war on the post-Soviet territory spells an end of
the Commonwealth. Relations between Russia and Georgia bear an
increasingly stronger resemblance to the Azerbaijani-Armenian
relations. Yes, Russia will be feared. In the meantime, it is this (or
analogous) fear that compels former Soviet republics to keep their
distance from Russia and seek powerful allies in the international
community.

Third, the Georgian-Russian war became a strike at President Dmitry
Medvedev who had to go public with quite serious decisions in the
premier’s absence. Medvedev deserves credit for doing so without
unnecessary hysterics. It was clear that he was disturbed and upset
indeed.

The German foreign minister admitted insecurity in the matter of who
the guilty party was. Information from Tskhinvali makes it plain that
it was the Georgians who shed the first blood and that the Georgian
troops were not always an example of humanity. What happened in South
Ossetia is a humanitarian catastrophe.

The enemies will meet for negotiations again one day. Arranging the
talks will be a chore, but they are the only option.

And since they are patently unable to settle the conflict all by
themselves, the involved parties may even find it necessary to invite
some respected and independent intermediaries or even peacekeepers.

Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 12, 2008, p. 3

Europe’s energy source lies in the shadow of Russia’s anger

guardian.co.uk, UK

Behind the tanks in Ossetia are key oil and gas pipelines, writes Alex
Brett Alex Brett
The Observer, Sunday August 17 2008

When Russian tanks poured into South Ossetia, it was the clearest
turning point in Russia’s relations with the West since the fall of
the Berlin Wall: Russia not only managed to destabilise a pro-Western
regime but, crucially, demonstrated to its neighbours how defenceless
they are against incursions by its armed forces.

For years, the US and the EU have been looking for ways of
circumventing Russia for energy, especially in the light of the
controversial cuts in supply it made to Ukraine, Belarus and the Czech
Republic. The opening of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) from
Azerbaijan to Turkey should successfully enable the flow of 16 billion
cubic metres (bcm) of gas into Europe without Moscow’s interference.
However, with Georgia being the only viable country for the pipeline
to go through – as Azerbaijan is technically at war with Armenia – the
current crisis showed energy majors operating in the Caucasus how
tenuous their grip on resources could become should the Kremlin
intervene in the affairs of its neighbours again. The SCP was closed
for a time during the latest violence.

This is of particular concern to BP, which owns 25.5 per cent of the
SCP, and is already in dispute with Moscow over the status of
subsidiary TNK-BP.

Nick Day, chief executive of risk consultancy Diligence, says Russia
had been using its energy supply as a tool of its foreign policy and
that ‘the greatest threat to Western companies in the region is
renationalisation in former Soviet countries, which has already been
taking place in Russia. As a result of this conflict, countries
neighbouring Russia may offer oil and gas contracts to Moscow as an
olive branch.’

While a spokesman for the EU commission says the situation in Georgia
meant that the EU ‘had no time to waste’ in dealing with energy
security, the instability of the region covering the SCP threatens to
scupper Europe’s policy of diversifying its energy supply, giving
Russia a much stronger hand. This is chiefly due to the undesirable
nature, as Europe sees it, of the most viable alternatives – Iran,
whose nuclear programme is a bone of contention, and Iraq, whose
current instability is cause for great concern.

Europe has to look at the viability of projects already on the table
for its long-term energy supply. The Nabucco project takes gas from
the Shah Deniz gas fields in Azerbaijan, starting from Turkey and
ranging into the heart of Europe, with the potential for inputs from
Iran and Iraq. By contrast, the South Stream project starts directly
from Russia, taking Gazprom gas through new EU member states Romania
and Bulgaria and provides ease of access to greater resources. Nabucco
aims to provide 10bcm of gas from 2013 rising to 31bcm in 2021,
whereas the South Stream aims to supply 30bcm on completion, forecast
to be in 2013.

However, the Georgian conflict has caused great damage to the
viability of Nabucco. As Charles Ebinger, director of the Energy
Security Initiative at the Brookings Institution, points out, ‘the
South Stream project has been strengthened by the current situation
and Nabucco may fall by the wayside’. To that extent; ‘Russia has the
whip hand over Europe in terms of energy policy’. Ebinger reflects the
thoughts of most experts. Valery Nesterov, energy analyst at Troika
Dialog, says: ‘the resource base for the South Stream is stronger than
that of Nabucco. The South Stream has a head start; Nabucco has been
dealt another blow.’ Nesterov argues that any plans to supply the
Nabucco pipeline from Turkmenistan are not viable as the Turkmens are
already supplying around 90bcm of energy to Iran, Russia and China.

The geographic positioning of Turkey and Russia as the only suppliers
direct to the continent mean the EU’s bargaining position looks
weak. Furthermore, Turkish-Russian co-operation is proceeding at a
gallop. This was confirmed by Ankara’s silence on Georgia and comments
from the Turkish energy ministry suggesting they would ‘increase
supplies from Russia and Iran’ in the event of a shortfall from the
SCP. Nesterov says ‘deeper co-operation between Russia and Turkey is
likely. It is to both countries’ advantage.’

So the South Stream, in terms of viability, can provide guaranteed
energy to Europe over the longer term, while Nabucco is beset by
unresolved problems. When the only alternatives are gas from Iran and
the Persian Gulf, energy from Russia seems to reconcile Europe’s
regional strategic interests with security of supply at a smaller
diplomatic cost. But it is only the lesser of two evils.