CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE EU’S ROLE
Reuters Alert, UK
May 24 2006
Source: Crisis Group
Georgia, Abkhazia, S. Ossetia
Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006: To guarantee its own security,
the EU must become more engaged in resolving the conflicts in the
South Caucasus lest they ignite into full-fledged wars in Europe’s
neighbourhood.
Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role,* the latest
report from the International Crisis Group, examines the EU’s efforts
to address tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
and points out how the EU can do more.
“Greater engagement is a challenge Brussels has only just begun
to address”, says Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group’s Caucasus Project
Director. “There have been a few promising steps, but there is a long
way to go”.
Thus far, others have taken the lead in promoting conflict settlement
in the region, but over a decade of negotiations led by the UN in
Abkhazia, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, have not produced
comprehensive peace agreements. With its reputation as an “honest
broker”, access to a range of soft and hard power tools, and the lure
of greater integration into Europe, the EU has a greater role to play,
and offers added value to compliment the UN and the OSCE.
To avoid instability on its borders, the EU seeks a ring of
well-governed countries around it. It is further interested in the
South Caucasus to ensure access to Caspian oil and gas, develop
transport and communication corridors between Europe and Asia, and
contain such threats as smuggling, trafficking and environmental
degradation.
As the EU is unlikely to offer membership to Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan any time soon, it must identify innovative means to
impose conditionality on its aid and exercise influence. European
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans are being finalised. These offer
a chance for the EU to enhance its role especially if the peaceful
resolution of the conflicts are defined as commitments.
The new EU Special Representative should observe ongoing negotiations
for the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. The
Commission has allocated significant funding to rehabilitation in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It should assess how it can start doing
more in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
“The EU is trying to define its role in a new neighbourhood which is
neither at war nor at peace”, says Nicholas Whyte, Director of Crisis
Group’s Europe Program. “If the EU fails to implement its strategic
vision for a secure neighbourhood, its credibility in the region, and
generally vis-a-vis Russia and the U.S., will suffer. More troublingly,
if the South Caucasus conflicts continue to deteriorate, the EU may
find itself unprepared for responding to wars among its neighbours”.
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Kimberly
Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601 To contact Crisis Group media
please click here *Read the full Crisis Group report on our website:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Instability in the South Caucasus is a threat to European Union (EU)
security. Geographic proximity, energy resources, pipelines and the
challenges of international crime and trafficking make stability in
the region a clear EU interest. Yet, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts have the potential to ignite
into full-fledged wars in Europe’s neighbourhood. To guarantee its own
security, the EU should become more engaged in efforts to resolve the
three disputes. It can do so by strengthening the conflict resolution
dimension of the instruments it applies. As the EU is unlikely to offer
membership to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan even in the medium term,
it must identify innovative means to impose conditionality on its aid
and demonstrate influence. This is a challenge that Brussels has only
begun to address.
Since 2003 the EU has become more of a security actor in the South
Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. It has appointed a Special
Representative for the South Caucasus, launched a European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission, and employed the Commission’s Rapid
Reaction Mechanism to support post “Rose Revolution” democratisation
processes. It has included Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and started Action Plan
negotiations due to end mid-2006. The Commission has allocated some
~@32 million for economic development confidence building programs in
Georgia, and it has cooperated closely with the UN and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
Nevertheless, the EU can do more to help resolve conflict in the
region, in particular through the Action Plans currently being
negotiated with each country. For the EU, these are a chance to
enhance and reposition itself in the South Caucasus if they can be
tied to conflict resolution and include specific democratisation,
governance and human rights benchmarks. For the region they may be
an opportunity to map out the reform process concretely. But there
is a long way to go. The EU’s relations are not strong with either
Azerbaijan or, to a lesser extent, Armenia. It does not participate
directly in negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. In and around Nagorno-Karabakh, it has done little for
conflict resolution. It has rarely raised the South Caucasus conflicts
in its high-level discussions with partners and has employed few
sanctions or incentives to advance peace.
To become more effective, the EU must increase its political
visibility. Compared with Russia, the U.S., the UN and the OSCE,
its financial and political engagement in the region has been minimal.
However, as it gives more aid through new and old instruments, its
ability to provide incentives and apply conditionality should grow.
Compared with other actors, the EU can offer added value, with its
image as an “honest broker” free from traditional US/Russia rivalries;
access to a range of soft and hard-power tools; and the lure of
greater integration into Europe.
The arrival of a new Special Representative (EUSR) is an opportune
moment for the EU to strengthen its political presence. The EUSR should
try to become an observer in the three conflict negotiation forums. In
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where the Commission has already allocated
significant funding, efficient and well-targeted assistance can give
weight and credibility to the EU’s diplomatic and political efforts.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, rather then wait for an agreement on the
principles of resolution mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group, the EU
should begin contingency planning to assist peace implementation now.
Sending military and civilian assessment missions to the region could
give new impetus to a negotiation process which seems to be dangerously
running out of steam. Whether or not a peace agreement is eventually
signed, the EU should be prepared to implement confidence building
programs or – in a worst case – to consider a range of options in
case of an outbreak of fighting. Otherwise, having remained out
of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied districts for over a
decade, either war or peace will find it struggling to catch up in
its own neighbourhood.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the European Union and its Member States:
To increase the EU’s visibility and effectiveness as a political actor
1. Open fully-staffed European Commission Delegations in Baku and
Yerevan.
2. Strengthen the EUSR’s regional presence by at a minimum appointing
a EUSR political analyst in each of the three South Caucasus capitals.
3. Start a public awareness campaign in the region about the EU, its
values, institutions, programs and conflict resolution capabilities.
To take full advantage of the negotiating process for European
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans
4. Define the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
as an Action Plan priority for Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the Plan
aimed specifically at ensuring that:
(a) Azerbaijan and Armenia should commit to resolving the conflict
through peaceful negotiations without delay, defining the principles of
an agreement as renunciation of the use of force to settle disputes;
incremental withdrawal of occupied districts; return of displaced
persons; opening of transport and trade routes; and determination of
the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a referendum;
(b) Armenia should pledge to encourage the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh
authorities to agree to a peace settlement according to the principles
defined above; and
(c) both states should commit to foster reconciliation, confidence
building and mutual understanding through governmental and
non-governmental channels.
5. Action Plan elements should include clear benchmarking to measure
progress in the development of genuine democracy, good governance,
respect for human rights, the rule of law and free and fair elections;
and the establishment of a comprehensive monitoring mechanism, whose
reports are made public.
6. Increase public ownership and awareness by engaging civil society in
Action Plan preparation and monitoring (particularly in Azerbaijan),
organising conferences, seminars, and media events, and strengthening
the involvement of parliaments and local authorities.
7. Coordinate with other bilateral and multilateral players to ensure
consistency between the Action Plans and the commitments made to the
Council of Europe (CoE), the OSCE, NATO and the UN.
To increase the impact of crisis management and conflict prevention
actions
8. Strengthen the capacity of Commission staff in the region to carry
out post-conflict rehabilitation by offering training in security
sector reform, mediation and reconciliation, confidence building,
and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR).
9. Develop more initiatives focused on confidence building across
ceasefire lines and the soft side of conflict-resolution, such as
working with civil society, media, women, youth and former combatants,
and apply community participation to project planning, implementation,
monitoring and follow-up.
10. Increase engagement with non-recognized entities (Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh) and promote democratisation,
civil society development and the rule of law, not as recognition of
status but as a means to break their isolation, build confidence and
avoid exclusion from broad EU integration processes.
11. Promote European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
funding opportunities, especially in Azerbaijan, and develop an
interim mechanism to distribute funds to local civil society groups,
possibly through a member state embassy or the Europa House, before
an EU delegation opens in Baku.
12. Support new regional programs in particular for students, teachers,
professors and other professional groups including police, judges,
lawyers and journalists.
To prepare for an eventual Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement and
encourage the parties to compromise
13. Seek agreement for the EUSR to participate in the OSCE Minsk
Group as an observer.
14. In the case of the Commission, carry out a needs assessment study
of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent occupied territories (including
places where IDPs have settled) even before a framework agreement
on the principles of a settlement is agreed between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
15. In the case of the Council, request the Secretariat to develop
ESDP options in support of peace implementation, send assessment
missions in close cooperation with the OSCE and begin contingency
planning so as to prepare for:
(a) deployment of peacekeepers around Nagorno-Karabakh; and
(b) deployment of a civilian crisis management advisory team to
engage in DDR, security sector reform, mediation, political affairs,
human rights and media issues in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
To support the peaceful resolution of the Georgian-South Ossetian
and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts
16. Expand the Commission’s role in addressing the Georgian-South
Ossetian conflict and finance another tranche of aid to support
projects identified in the OSCE needs assessment.
17. Once Georgia passes the appropriate law and designates a budget
line for its implementation, make funding available to its new property
commission and property restitution fund.
18. Agree a Joint Action to provide financial support for the Joint
Control Commission (JCC) mechanism in April 2006.
19. Request the JCC and the parties to the Geneva process to invite
the EUSR to observe their meetings and activities.
20. Raise the Georgian-South Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazia conflicts
at EU-Russia summits and other high-level dialogue forums.
21. Continue the border management assistance mission and facilitate
communication and cooperation between Georgian and Russian border
guards.
22. Agree a Joint Action to support a Georgian-South Ossetian Special
Coordination Centre and joint policing.
Tbilisi/Brussels, 20 March 2006
Full report at amp;rss=1