Author: Boris Nahapetian

UNITED ARMENIAN FUND
1101 N. Pacific Avenue # 301
Glendale, CA 91202
Tel: 818.241.8900
Fax: 818.241.6900
For Immediate Release
6 December 2004
UAF’s 131st Airlift Delivers $2.7 Million of Aid to Armenia
Glendale, CA – The United Armenian Fund’s 131st airlift arrived
in Yerevan on December 6, delivering $2.7 million of humanitarian
assistance.
The UAF itself collected $2 million of medicines and medical supplies
for this flight, most of which were donated by the Catholic Medical
Mission Board ($996,000); AmeriCares ($737,000); MAP International
($167,000); and Health Partners ($55,000).
Other organizations which contributed goods for this airlift were: Dr.
Stephen Kashian of Illinois ($104,000); Dr. Haroutune Mekhjian of New
Jersey ($94,000); Kardinal-Fings Gymnasium ($71,000); Nork Marash
Medical Center ($57,000); Focus Armenia/Dr. Mary Alani ($54,000);
Armenian Eyecare Project ($37,000); Armenian Missionary Association
of America ($36,000); Michael Ohanian of Massachusetts ($36,000);
and the Armenian General Benevolent Union ($36,000).
Also contributing to this airlift were: Anoush Najarian of
Massachusetts ($22,000); Bedford/St. Martins ($21,000); Armenian
Relief Society ($19,000); Verein Armenienhilfe Direkt of Switzerland
($14,000); Howard Karagheusian Commemorative Corp. ($13,000); Harut
Chantikian of New Jersey ($12,000); and the Armenian Engineers &
Scientists of America ($10,000).
Since its inception in 1989, the UAF has sent $395 million of
humanitarian assistance to Armenia on board 131 airlifts and 1,136
sea containers.
The UAF is the collective effort of the Armenian Assembly of America,
the Armenian General Benevolent Union, the Armenian Missionary
Association of America, the Armenian Relief Society, the Diocese of
the Armenian Church of America, the Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic
Church of America and the Lincy Foundation.
For more information, contact the UAF office at 1101 North Pacific
Avenue, Suite 301, Glendale, CA 91202 or call (818) 241-8900.
###
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TURKISH SPECULATIONS OVER ARMENIAN GENOCIDE CARRY ON
Will EU Press on Turkey to Open the Border-Gate?
Azg/arm
16 Nov 04
Discussions over Armenian-Turkish relations gathered new momentum
recently. Armenia’s pushy policy in achieving international
acknowledgement of Armenian Genocide and footless conclusions about
removing the issue from Armeniaâ=80=99s foreign agenda where in the
center of discussions.
Turkish Haber Analiz and Aksham online editions were actively involved
in the debates. While Haber Analiz was publishing opinions of
employees of Ankara Eurasian Military Research Center, Aksham
mentioned names of Armenian Diaspora representatives in order to
confirm Center’s opinions.
In response to Turkish press, Azg Daily voiced an opinion that Turkey
wants to disorient the world community in the face of EU accession
talks as well as signaling to Armenia to reconsider its Turkish
policy.
Though the press office of Foreign Ministry of Armenia officially
stated that “there is no change in Armenia’s foreign policy as regards
Genocide acknowledgement” and Turkish Foreign Ministry’s indirect
confirmation of the fact, Turkish press still continues its
speculations. Even more, Reuter’sinterview with Kars mayor Naif
Alibeyoghlu held in support of border-gate opening became a reason for
speculations.
On November 11 Gyunduz Aktan, ex-ambassador and member of
Armenian-Turkish Reconciliation Commission spoke out of Reuter’s
interview from the pages of Radical. According to Milliet’s November
11 issue, Reuter considered Kars mayor “purposeful man” and noted
about his dream of quitting the blockade set up 11 years ago as well
as about 50 thousand signatures collected in support of this purpose.
According to Radical, Alibeyoghlu underscored the importance of
Armenian-Turkish border opening for region’s peace and prosperity, and
Reuter added that Ankara does not share Kars mayor’s optimism. Aktan
who heads the Eurasian Military Research Center told Radical that the
problem is not merely the border-gate opening but “Armenia’s demand of
Armenian genocide recognition”.
Armenia never made such demand to Turkey but instead continuously
displays readiness to improve Armenian-Turkish relations without any
precondition and even emphasized that Genocide acknowledgement is not
obligatory. As Armenia’s readiness has to be known to Aktan, then his
concern is to make Armenia give up Genocide recognition claims in
exchange for open border.
This means that Turkey’s political circles consider EU’s pressures to
be real if not in the sphere of improvement of relations with Armenia
then in the sphere of border opening. In search of ways to ease the
pressure, Turkey resorts to means of confusing the world community,
meanwhile misleading the Turkish society.
By Hakob Chakrian
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

NEW STIPEND ESTABLISHED FOR STUDENTS
ArmenPress
Nov 11 2004
YEREVAN, NOVEMBER 11, ARMENPRESS: The All-Armenian Youth Foundation
announced today about establishment of 25,000 drams ($50) stipend
for 130 students of state-run universities, excelling in their study.
Some 675 students have applied for the stipend, established together
with the Russian-Armenian Business Cooperation Association. Third year
students are eligible. The official presentation of the new stipend,
named Gitelik (Knowledge) will take place on November 17.

State comes 1st, mosque 2nd in Turkey’s system
By Colin McMahon and Catherine Collins Chicago Tribune
Chicago Tribune
Sun Oct 24, 9:40 AM ET
Like the modern office building where he works, Mehmet Bekaroglu is without
flourish. His dress is Western conservative, his manner approachable, his
message conciliatory.
Islam is a peaceful religion, Bekaroglu says. And it is his job to see that it
stays that way in Turkey.
“We are like a strainer for tea,” said Bekaroglu, a senior official at Turkey’s
sprawling Religious Affairs Directorate, known as Diyanet. “We strain the
information so that when it reaches the people, it is the best possible
interpretation based on the Koran. . . . Our mission is to get people to live
in peace and harmony.”
“Peace” is invoked like a commandment at Diyanet, which supervises Turkey’s
70,000 mosques and other state religious properties. Officials prepare the
sermons for Friday prayers in pursuit of unity and understanding. Every mufti
and imam who helps Turks interpret Islam is on the Diyanet payroll.
The Diyanet system is less a separation of mosque and state than a subjugation
of mosque by state. And the goal is not to fuel Islam among Turkey’s 70 million
people. The goal is to temper it.
The outcome of this uniquely Turkish approach has implications far beyond the
borders of the geopolitically strategic nation.
No matter how Turks try to avoid the tag, many Westerners like to present
Turkey as a model of pluralism and prosperity for the Muslim world. It has
opened up politically and economically. It has expanded ties to the West. Yet
despite a constitution that dictates its secular nature, Turkey maintains a
strong Muslim identity.
This mix lends Istanbul its charm and energy. Turkey’s largest and greatest
city, though not its capital, Istanbul is a rush of narrow lanes fit for carts
and wide boulevards choked with cars; of wood-frame homes that have stood for
centuries and modern towers that mock Turkey’s deadly earthquakes; of ancient
brick and tempered steel.
Now as the European Union (news – web sites) considers whether and how to
invite Turkey in, many see a tremendous chance to exploit Turkey beyond its
cliched status as a bridge between East and West and turn it into an example
for new alliances between mostly Christian and mostly Muslim societies.
A European embrace of the nation that succeeded the Ottoman Empire, the most
powerful and longest-reigning Islamic empire the world has known, would grant
great credibility to Turkey’s approach. And it would repudiate Muslims who
argue that the West is fundamentally opposed to Islam and that Turkey has
betrayed its Islamic identity in a futile pursuit of Western riches and
respect.
If the November 2003 bombings of Jewish and British targets in Istanbul, and
about a dozen smaller bombings since, were intended to knock Turkey off its
path toward the European Union, they have so far failed. Instead the attacks
confirmed for many Turks in the military and some in civilian life that tight
control of religion is a matter of national security.
In shaping how Muslims worship, and how they don’t, the Turkish state reaches
into several critical areas of public life. It manipulates the education system
to dissuade the pious from attending religious schools and prohibit them from
expressing their piety in public schools. It imposes the first and the final
say over what is preached at mosques and who does the preaching. And it
intervenes in the political system should a religious party or leader be deemed
a threat to Turkey’s secular nature.
At the center of this system of control is Diyanet, a 75,000-member
Sunni-dominated bureaucracy surpassed in size and budget only by the education
system and the armed forces.
Most Diyanet officials are not practicing clerics but bureaucrats. They dress
in the jackets and ties that many pious Muslims shun. They rise through the
ranks by cultivating contacts and passing exams. They proudly display photos of
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey and the national icon, but
also the man whose wariness of Islam led to the creation of Diyanet.
The Diyanet headquarters of glass and steel gleams off a new highway on the
edge of Ankara, the former backwater that Ataturk remade into a capital city as
he turned the Turkish state away from Istanbul, away from its mosques of tile
and stone, away from its history as the seat of the Islamic caliphate.
Though 280 miles southeast of Istanbul, Ankara feels more Western than
Istanbul. The new section, with its universities, apartment buildings, hotels,
theaters and embassies, now dwarfs ancient Ankara. And though urban growth has
squeezed its parks and strangled its wide boulevards, parts of Ankara still
have the feel of the European model used to build the city in the 20th Century.
At the same time, Ankara is clearly the seat of state power. The military
establishment is here, as are the courts and parliament. Ataturk rests here, in
a mausoleum built in 1953 that stands as an impressive monument not only to him
but also to modern Turkish architecture. And it is from here that Diyanet runs
the state enterprise that is Islam.
“At Diyanet, we are not working to make people more religious,” said Ali
Bardakoglu, a theologian and academic who heads Diyanet. “It is not our project
to convert [people] to Islam. . . . Religious services are to promote peace,
not conflict.”
The army likes it this way. So do many secular Turks who point to Iran and
Saudi Arabia as justification in silencing even a whisper of Islamic
fundamentalism. They say Turkey’s secular creed has afforded the country
political, economic and religious pluralism unmatched in the Muslim world.
But restrictions that some Turks find undemocratic, such as barring head
scarves in government offices and university classrooms, are at the heart of
efforts to protect Turkey’s secular system. Devout Turks, whose numbers are
growing, chafe under Diyanet control. All they ask, they say, is the kind of
freedom of worship enshrined in the U.S. Bill of Rights and available to their
Muslim brethren in the United States.
Bardakoglu acknowledges the criticism. But he says it is too soon to talk of
abolishing Diyanet.
“Turkey has paved a common way for modern, social and political life together
with individual religiosity,” the Diyanet leader said. “We should prevent
religion from being used for political purposes. We should pave the way for
individual religiosity instead.”
Diyanet: Then and now
The Diyanet system has its roots in Ottoman history. Turks point out that a
split in duties between state and mosque began to take shape in the early
1800s, a century before Ataturk made his mark as a young military officer.
But the theocratic trappings of the Ottoman Empire are undeniable. Though often
not especially devout, Ottoman sultans were also the Islamic caliphs, empowered
not merely with political and military might but also with spiritual authority.
Islam was synonymous with Ottoman and with Turkish governance into World War I,
even as the Young Turks were wresting power from the sultan in the empire’s
dying years.
It took Ataturk to formally sever Islam’s political role soon after proclaiming
the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Ataturk abolished the Islamic caliphate,
depriving Muslims across the world of a figure many viewed as “God’s shadow on
Earth.” He secularized the educational system and closed the religious
colleges. And in the 1924 constitution that codified his secular revolution,
Ataturk established Diyanet.
As a full-service employer, Diyanet pays not only salaries but also housing and
other benefits for its imams and muftis. Those who live on mosque property
don’t pay rent. They get health coverage and pensions, just as other civil
servants. The state pays for all of it.
Along with this, Diyanet lays down standards for its clerics. Anything that
hints at religious extremism violates those standards.
“Unfortunately, we do not have religious freedom in this country. The
government interferes in so many ways with our freedom to worship as we like,”
said Imam Abdullah Sezer of Fatih Mosque, in one of the most conservative
neighborhoods of Istanbul. “In a secular state, which is what Turkey is
supposed to be, that is not right. We want the same religious freedoms they
have in the United States.”
Turkey’s most conservative Muslims, an estimated 5 percent of the population,
want to turn Turkey into an Islamic republic. Larger minorities support a legal
system based on their version of Shariah, a code of conduct inspired by various
sources including the Koran, the sayings and conduct of the Prophet Muhammad
and rulings by Islamic scholars. On the issue of women’s rights, the Diyanet
line is far more liberal than what many imams would prefer to preach.
Letting such views have a full hearing, backed by the authority of clerics,
would foster discord and fuel radicalism, Diyanet supporters say.
Kemal Dervis, a parliamentarian and former vice president of the World Bank
(news – web sites), acknowledged the contradiction of having a secular state
run a religion. But he said Diyanet remained necessary as a regulator,
especially when conservative forces from other countries spend money in Turkey
to spread their views.
“It is a little like the state should not intervene in the banking system, but
it has to regulate it,” Dervis said.
A message of peace, down to the letter
Diyanet’s extensive reach can be seen in its elaborate process to shape and
deliver Friday sermons to mosques across the country.
A lower commission at Diyanet does much of the early work on draft sermons
submitted by imams or theologians across the country. Then the higher
commission, made up of 16 clerics, theologians or academics plus a former army
general, all appointed to 7-year terms, meets weekly to work the sermons over.
By the time the sermons are posted on the Internet and read at Friday prayers,
they conform to the commission’s view of Islam–and thus to the religious
interpretation of Diyanet and the Turkish state.
Topics are selected up to a year in advance, with themes such as “Love of
Mothers” and “How to Educate Our Children” and “Laziness.” The sermons are
shaped, edited, inspected and approved a few months in advance. Sometimes,
though, a sermon is written and delivered immediately to respond to events.
That was the case in April, when Jewish leaders expressed concern to the
government about the Turkish release of the Mel Gibson movie “The Passion of
the Christ.” An age limit of 16 was applied to the film, and a sermon titled
“Christ in the Koran” was whipped up.
Jesus Christ, worshipers were told, was a servant of God but not the Son of
God. And he was put on Earth not to redeem men but “to remind them of the rules
of the Torah.”
Mehmet Bekaroglu, who as chairman of the religious services department oversees
the sermon commissions, said state officials outside Diyanet do not dictate the
sermons, though they sometimes inquire about a certain topic.
Bekaroglu’s career helps show how similar Diyanet is to other civil services
and government bureaucracies.
Born in 1954, Bekaroglu started studying the Koran not in elementary school but
at home with his parents. He went to a religious high school, then joined
Diyanet and worked as an imam outside Istanbul. He attended the Institute of
High Islam, scored well on tests and became a mufti.
By the mid-1980s, Bekaroglu was looking to move into management. He took
another exam and became a deputy inspector. Then, quickly, he scored well on
the next test and was promoted to inspector, one of 56 that Diyanet employs in
districts across Turkey.
The inspectorate system is a key aspect of Diyanet. Each department within the
bureaucracy is inspected every two years to ensure that its personnel are
complying with Turkish law and with Diyanet’s vision of Islam. Mosques are
inspected every three years.
Inspectors and their deputies field individual complaints as well. When imams
do push the limits, Ankara takes note. And if the local or regional muftis fail
to deal with the issue, Ankara will dispatch an inspector to restore order.
“Inspectors look to see if the system is breaking down,” said Bekaroglu, who
became chief inspector in 2002 and served about a year before moving up to his
current post. “The goal is to enforce peace, to get people to live in harmony.”
Flare-ups are rare, officials said, not surprising given that an imam’s whole
livelihood, not merely his post, depends on Diyanet.
“As long as the sermon doesn’t provoke terrorism or promote violence, there are
no serious punishments,” said Mufti Mustafa Cagrici of Istanbul. “If there are
complaints, we will issue a warning. There could even be a disciplinary action.
He could be suspended for a time.”
A case earlier this year in the eastern village of Kotanduzu, in one of
Turkey’s most conservative regions, showed how Diyanet polices its clerics.
Villagers complained that the local imam was haranguing them as being
un-Islamic. Women who wore head scarves and long skirts were told to switch to
the black chador, a head-to-toe garment. Men were taken to task for playing
cards.
Regional Diyanet officials stepped in, removed the imam from his post and began
an investigation. They blamed his behavior on health problems but made it clear
that he would not be back on the job unless the cure involved a change of
heart.
Turkish Islam is considered more pluralistic and more tolerant than most forms
of Arab Islam, having been influenced by shamanism in Central Asia; by Sufism,
an Islamic mysticism that emphasizes self-awareness and intimate and personal
religious experiences; by the Alevi Muslim minority, which has a more liberal
interpretation of Islam and makes up a fifth to a quarter of Turkey’s
population, and by non-Muslim minorities.
“Diversity in religion and political culture created a milieu where various
religious groups lived in peace and practiced their faith,” said Nilufer Narli,
a professor at Kadir Has University, tracing Turkey’s openness to the West and
to pluralism back to Ottoman times. “Respecting the other’s faith and his or
her human dignity and freedom were the virtues shared by all the religious
groups.”
Non-Muslim minorities, mostly Jews, and Greek and Armenian Christians, have
faced discrimination and even persecution, both under the modern republic and
during the Ottoman Empire. But today, they say they are better off in many ways
than Muslim Turks because the state interferes far less in the religious lives
of non-Muslims than in the lives of pious Muslims.
“The state has become so suspicious of all pious people,” said Hrant Dink, an
ethnic Armenian and a Christian by birth who edits the Armenian newspaper Agos.
“[Islam] here is oppressed by secularism.”
Education for all–who play by the rules
On a summer morning in a courtyard outside Istanbul University, young devout
women gathered to pay a personal price for the state policy of religious
control.
The women knew that their wearing of head scarves was barred from public
universities. Yet they showed up anyway to take the annual entrance exam,
joining thousands of male and female students who had gathered before dawn.
A university proctor emerged to address the students.
“Boys to the left,” the proctor commanded. “Girls to the right.”
Immediately, dozens of young women stepped aside to remove head scarves and
floor-length coats. One ducked behind a building, then returned with tears of
shame streaming down her face.
She handed a scarf to another woman and ascended the stairs, eyes down before
the male proctor. “I feel sorry for these girls,” he said.
Watching her sister go, Saziye Kirbas said: “I don’t know if God will forgive
this sin of uncovering her head, but she needs to go to school, and this is the
only way to do it.”
Though surveys show that most of the country opposes the head scarf ban, many
Turks have decided that it is better to go along.
“I never got an education, and today I am completely dependent on my husband,”
said Havva Altuntas, who brought her daughter, also covered, to the university
exam. “I don’t want my daughter to be dependent on any man. . . . Covered,
uncovered, what does it matter? Only an education matters.”
But no matter how much an education matters, some Turks want the right to put
faith first.
Covered head to heel in cloth and coat on the day of her high school
graduation, Tugba Unlu ignored the hot summer sun as she spun out a sermon
about Islam and democracy.
“They want us to give up our head scarves,” Unlu said, clutching a certificate
of academic achievement and a copy of the Koran the school had awarded her.
“But instead of compromising our religious beliefs we would rather compromise
our education.”
Unlu had been honored as a top student at her religious school in Sincan, an
Ankara township of nearly 300,000 people. For all her talk of becoming a
doctor, she knew this day might end up the highlight of her academic career.
“I don’t understand why they are trying to change us,” Unlu said. “Maybe they
think the devout among us pose a threat of Islamic terrorism and that we want
to change the democratic system. This is proof there is not democracy, there is
no equality in this country.”
Head scarves are the most visible and potent symbol of the conflict between the
devout and the state. But they are not the only way the state uses the
education system to control Islam. To get into the overcrowded university
system, graduates of religious schools must score better on their entrance
exams than students from public schools.
The state asserts that because religious schools are better academically,
public school applicants must be given a leg up. Parents who send their
children to religious schools, many because they see those schools as more
disciplined and morally upright, assert that the policy is pure discrimination.
“Everyone should be able to live the life he wants,” said Ismail Dogan, a
retired textile worker in Kayseri, a conservative city of about 500,000. “They
should respect the devout, and the devout should respect them. We are not
against the secularists. But we also want them to respect us.”
Dogan’s older sons and his daughter all graduated from religious high schools
and went on to private universities that required great financial sacrifice, he
said. But the youngest son will go to a public high school in hopes of a better
shot at a public university. It wasn’t fair, Dogan said, but for now it is the
Turkish system.
“We don’t want to cause problems in the country. We don’t want to go to the
protests,” Dogan said. “It is better to keep quiet, not to cause divisions.”
Politic in public, at home with Islam
For Turks who fear any hint of Allah in politics, the controversy last month
over a proposal to criminalize adultery affirmed their searing distrust of
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development
Party, known by its Turkish acronym, AKP or AK Party.
Suggested as part of a sweeping revision of Turkey’s penal code, the measure to
restore potential prison sentences for adulterers had the strong support of AK
Party’s conservative base. But it angered liberals and women’s groups. It
alarmed European Union officials, already concerned about Turkey’s limits on
religious freedom.
And it provided AK Party critics with fresh ammunition: Never mind that AKP had
won praise for its 22 months of governance, opponents said, Erdogan was finally
revealing his “secret agenda.”
AK Party eventually dropped the adultery provision and pushed through the rest
of the legal package. To Erdogan’s supporters, the decision provided evidence
of how far he had come as a politician.
“AK Party is not an Islamic party, it’s a center-right party,” said Celal
Hasnalcaci, a factory owner in Kayseri, which proved to be an AKP stronghold in
the party’s stunning victory in national elections in November 2002. “The
people of the party may be Islamic, but the party is not. The vote for AK Party
was a vote against the old order.”
Though Kayseri may have voted against the old political order, its people
revere the old ways. As they have done for centuries in this city, which dates
to the 4th millennium BC, residents make room in their homes for workshops
where they make carpets coveted around the world. Families are close, and the
mosque is a center of many people’s lives.
Hasnalcaci belongs to an Islamic chamber of commerce known as MUSIAD, which AKP
opponents portray as a kind of Muslim cabal funding an Islamic revolution.
MUSIAD members reject that characterization and say they merely want what
capitalists the world over want: lower taxes, private ownership rather than
state control and transparency in the government bidding process. AK Party,
they say, is the most capable of breaking the cycle of corruption that has long
been a part of the Turkish government’s relationship with big business.
Looking out over the floor of his factory, located in a Kayseri industrial park
in a valley beneath the extinct Mt. Erciyes volcano, Hasnalcaci watched a few
dozen men and women, some in head scarves and some not, assemble his Keep Out
brand of clothing.
Keep Out jeans fit tight and ride low. The sleeveless shirts ride high. It’s
all designed for the bare-midriff look that competes with pious dress on the
vibrant Istiklal Avenue in central Istanbul.
If a fundamentalist regime came to power in Turkey, Hasnalcaci might not lose
his factory, but he would certainly have to redesign Keep Out’s casual line.
And an adult daughter of his who goes uncovered would have to change her ways
too.
“Yes, yes, the hidden agenda,” Hasnalcaci said, a bit exasperated by the whole
question of Turkey’s turning fundamentalist. “Well, it’s not possible.”
Power upfront and behind the scenes
With his party dominating parliament by a two-thirds majority, his approval
ratings high and his international image glossy, Erdogan is the most powerful
person in Turkish politics. But there are limits to Erdogan’s power, some
dictated by the rule of law and some by Turkey’s own complex rules of the game.
In Turkey the government and the state are not always synonymous. The state
bureaucracy can prove hard to control for even the most adept party in power.
And Turkey’s so-called deep state, made up of ruling elites from the military,
judicial branch, business and media, has long wielded tremendous power behind
the scenes.
The deep state’s various players are seen as unofficial protectors of Turkey’s
secular system. The army, meanwhile, is empowered by the constitution to be its
official protector.
Erdogan knows firsthand the dangers of being holier than they allow, having
spent four months in prison in 1999 for reciting a poem that included such
lines as, “The mosques are our barracks.”
Erdogan now leavens his piety with heaps of practicality. “In the office I’m a
democrat,” says the politician who once pursued a professional soccer career.
“At home I’m a Muslim.”
Many Turks fear this commitment to individual liberty is all talk. Some women
in particular fear that Turkey, even if it does not become Islamic by law, will
become so conservatively religious that space will shrink for liberal women to
work where they want, see whom they care to and dress as they wish.
“Trying to do my job has never been so difficult,” said theater director Almula
Merter, who has battled censors to put on various productions, including most
recently “The Vagina Monologues” and a play about incest called “Taboo.” Merter
has lived in Istanbul and New York City for the past 10 years, and she has seen
Turkey move backward on liberal values and women’s rights in that time.
“I sometimes wonder: Am I doing the wrong thing by staying here and
performing?” Merter said.
Notwithstanding its history of coups–three military overthrows, plus the
orchestrated fall of Welfare’s coalition government–the army has kept to the
sidelines. Even when Erdogan pushed for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict
that drew Turkey back from the hard line many generals supported, the military
went along.
Today, the military remains Turkey’s most respected institution. But that
public trust would be severely jeopardized were the army to override democracy
again, analysts say.
“Any Turkish army reaction that is not formulated correctly is seen as a
reaction against Islam,” said Umit Ozdag of the Center for Eurasian Strategic
Studies, an Ankara think tank with good sources among the army’s senior
officers. “An army move on AKP strengthens AKP.”
An army move on AKP would also almost certainly doom Turkey’s hopes of joining
the European Union. But then, so would a sharp swing toward conservatism by the
party’s devout leaders.
In December, the EU is to decide whether to begin negotiations that would lead
to Turkey’s membership. Should the vote go Turkey’s way, the invitation would
signal a profound break from the suspicion and hostility that have marked the
Christian West’s attitude toward the Turkish people for nearly a millennium.
A no vote, however, no matter what the justification, would fuel resentment.
“If Turkey and Europe do not become full partners, that creates more fertile
ground for extremism,” said political analyst and commentator Cengiz Candar.
“Turkey is bigger than Turkey now.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

FrontPage Magazine
Oct 20 2004
Islamism’s Inspiration
By FrontPage Magazine
FrontPageMagazine.com | October 20, 2004
(In our October 11th issue, we carried a piece by Robert Spencer,
Terror’s Islamic Roots, which criticized Mustafa Akyol’s October 8th
piece Still Standing For Islam – And Against Terrorism. The battle of
the minds continues. Below is Akyol’s response, followed by another
counter from Spencer – The Editors).
*
Terror’s Roots Not in Islam By Mustafa Akyol
After my article on Frontpage, titled Still Standing For Islam – And
Against Terrorism, Robert Spencer, the editor of the Jihad Watch
website posted a rebuttal. He argued that Islam is indeed the
legitimate source of terrorists such as al-Qaeda, and my arguments
can’t persuade those militants to stop their violence.
I wonder how the arguments of Mr. Spencer can help the same cause,
but that is trivial for now. Let me explain what I really say and
what I really want to do.
In a nutshell, what I am trying to do is to show that the current
terrorism under the name of Islam is not legitimate from an Islamic
point of view. By doing so, I want to refute two diametrically
opposing camps: Islamist terrorists and some of the harsh critics of
Islam. Interestingly, both camps agree that Islam is a cult of
violence, whereas for me, and for hundreds of millions of Muslims
around the globe, Islam is a path to God. We just wish to cleanse
that path from the distortions of the politically oriented radicals
and intolerant bigots.
When I say terrorism (or authoritarianism) is not legitimate from an
Islamic point of view, I mean the Islamic ideal that I believe in,
and which is based on the Koran, besides everything else. Of course,
there are Muslims who think that evils such as attacks against
American or Israeli civilians, kidnappings, bombings, repressive
regimes or anti-Semitism are legitimate. They are obviously out
there, as we all know. I am trying to de-legitimize their doctrine. I
am not trying to ‘cover up’ militant Islamists, as I have been
accused of doing on Jihad Watch.
Mr. Spencer also quoted the “Muslim Q&A” website, which promotes
compulsion in religion. Well, I am horrified by such views, which I
believe to be totally contradictory to the spirit of the Koran and I
am ready to stand against them.
Yet Mr. Spencer insists that such efforts won’t persuade the
militants to have a farewell to arms or the fanatics to accept
freedom of worship. He is right. I don’t expect al-Qaeda militants to
weep and repent when they read what I, or what many other moderate
Muslims – most of them much more qualified then myself – write. But
we can, Lord willing, persuade the Muslim masses that are confused
about what to believe; confused whether al-Qaeda and its ilk are
brave heroes of Islam or a bunch of bigoted zealots.
Moreover, while we moderates can’t probably convert militants into
peaceniks, it is very probable that portraying Islam as a cult of
violence will help converting non-violent Muslims into militants. The
majority of the world’s Muslims, who believe that their religion
demands peace, will be horrified to see what they will perceive as
anti-Islamic propaganda and will be prone anti-Western sentiments.
Please let’s be careful about this.
Mr. Spencer also criticizes me for defining an Islamic case of just
war. He writes,
Likewise, Akyol’s contention that “the war verses describe only an
abnormal state of affairs – in which the Muslim community faced an
enemy that sought its annihilation – and verses that promote peace
and tolerance describe the Islamic ideal” will do nothing to pacify
radical Muslims, since they have argued again and again that today
the Muslim community faces an enemy that seeks its annihilation.
Well, defining a concept of just war cannot prevent fanatics to
distort the current reality and raise a false justification. When the
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, for example, the justification was
that they undertook military intervention in response to an official
request for help by the Afghanistan government, and also fulfilling
treaty obligations under the terms of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship
Treaty. On paper, that could sound legitimate. In reality, it was an
obvious distortion of facts. The problem was not the theory on paper,
rather the Orwellian method of misinterpreting real events.
What al-Qaeda and its ilk do is to distort both the Islamic doctrine
of war (on paper), and the current events. In a forthcoming article
of mine, I explain why it is a big distortion to present the U.S. as
the enemy of Islam while it saved Muslims from slaughter or
starvation in many recent conflicts, such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia
and Afghanistan (during the Soviet Invasion.)
In other words, it is not my fault if militants distort the doctrine
of just war, but I am determined to stand against that, too.
Mr. Spencer also questions my opposition to the doctrine of
abrogation (naskh), which holds that some Koranic verses are
abrogated by the later ones. He says that doctrine is rooted in the
Koran. That is a common view, but I and other critics of abrogation
don’t think so. As also explained in the article that I linked to in
my recent Frontpage piece, that abrogation in question should be
better understood as the abrogation of previous revelations by the
Koran.
Mr. Spencer also criticized me for quoting hadiths and sira, while I
“rejected” them at the same time. But I did not say I reject these
secondary sources of Islam; I said I “question” them. This means I
believe that we can refer to these sources to learn about the works
of Prophet Muhammad, but since they are very late collections, they
might well include untrue stories and we can be critical and
selective on them. And this is not a completely unorthodox view. As
I pointed out in my recent Frontpage article, even the very
conservative Al-Azhar is reconsidering to purify the sources of
hadith from `the strange, the false and from forgery.’
Mr. Spencer also argued that I “dismissed the Armenian genocide… in
order to avoid ten years in prison as mandated by law in [my] native
Turkey.” I don’t know how Mr. Spencer can figure out my motives. In
fact, I don’t care about any penal law while building my arguments.
If I had believed that the tragedy in 1915 was “Armenian Genocide”, I
would have said that. (Well, some people say that in Turkey, such as
my university professor Halil Berktay, and they are obviously not in
jail.) Mr. Spencer even used the horrific term “Holocaust denial” to
describe my position on the Armenian issue. I am confident that in
this “Holocaust denial,” my references are not notorious pro-Nazis
like Ernst Zündel or Arthur Butz, but esteemed historians such
Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes.
However, despite all these, I should say that I appreciate Mr.
Spencer’s commentary on my writing. He has pointed out some points
that I should have stressed more or clarified. Thus, I believe that
all these rebuttals and counter-rebuttals I have with Mr. Spencer
(and Mr. Bostom) and all the comments about me at Frontpage and Jihad
Watch stirs a “creative tension”, which is indeed fruitful, as long
as it does not turn into to a blind exchange of accusations and
counter-accusations.
I believe that Mr. Spencer’s Jihad Watch will never decline to such a
one-sided, bigoted point of view. After all, if you watch something,
you have to look through a fair lens in order to see it right.
As far as it goes that way, I am glad to be “watched” – since my
“jihad” (struggle) is focused on saving Islam from militancy and
bigotry.
Mustafa Akyol is a political scientist, columnist and writer from
Turkey. He is also a director at the Intercultural Dialogue Platform,
based in Istanbul. He can be reached at [email protected]
*
The Islamic Foundations of Terror By Robert Spencer
Mustafa Akyol, in his fourth essay and latest reply to me, says that
I `argued that Islam is indeed the legitimate source of terrorists
such as al-Qaeda, and [his] arguments can’t persuade those militants
to stop their violence.’ Akyol adds: `I wonder how the arguments of
Mr. Spencer can help the same cause, but that is trivial for now.’
Actually, it is not trivial at all. It is the core of Akyol’s
objections to my arguments, and central to our differing
perspectives. Akyol says: `In a nutshell, what I am trying to do is
to show that the current terrorism under the name of Islam is not
legitimate from an Islamic point of view.’ I applaud any such efforts
whenever they are genuine and effective; my objections to Mr. Akyol
have nothing to do with the fact that he is trying to delegitimize
the radicals. But for such attempts, whether by Mr. Akyol or anyone
else, to be worthwhile, they have actually to refute the arguments
from the Qur’an and Islamic tradition used by Islamic radicals. If
they don’t do this, then they don’t show that terrorism is
illegitimate from an Islamic perspective, and fail at Mr. Akyol’s
stated purpose.
How, then, can my arguments help Akyol’s cause? By compelling him to
make them stronger. If I can see holes in them from the standpoint of
Islamic theology and tradition, Islamic radicals can see them too,
and many more. If Islamic moderates wish to succeed, they simply must
not leave these holes open.
Akyol adds: `I want to refute two diametrically opposing camps:
Islamist terrorists and some of the harsh critics of Islam.
Interestingly, both camps agree that Islam is a cult of violence,
whereas for me, and for hundreds of millions of Muslims around the
globe, Islam is a path to God. We just wish to cleanse that path from
the distortions of the politically oriented radicals and intolerant
bigots.’ And later in his piece he says, `The majority of the world’s
Muslims, who believe that their religion demands peace, will be
horrified to see what they will perceive as anti-Islamic propaganda
and will be prone [to] anti-Western sentiments. Please let’s be
careful about this.’
So evidently Western non-Muslims must not point out the elements of
Islam that give rise to violence, lest non-committed Muslims will
perceive us as anti-Muslim and become violent themselves. This is, of
course, self-contradictory (for if they are against the violence in
Islam, they should not oppose someone who opposes it with them) and
palpably absurd (for if they are really non-violent, how can nothing
more than a perceived insult make them violent?).
Akyol acknowledges that his efforts `won’t persuade the militants to
have a farewell to arms or the fanatics to accept freedom of
worship,’ but he says he is going after the silent majority of
Muslims who are confused. Once again, I applaud his efforts – but he
surely knows that Osama and other radicals use carefully constructed
arguments from the Qur’an and Islamic tradition to buttress their
views. The `Muslim masses’ can read those as well as I can; if
Akyol’s counter-arguments can be easily refuted by the radicals, how
will they convince the masses?
Later, Akyol notes that I criticized him for quoting hadiths and sira
right after rejecting them. He says: `I did not say I reject these
secondary sources of Islam; I said I `question’ them. This means I
believe that we can refer to these sources to learn about the works
of Prophet Muhammad, but since they are very late collections, they
might well include untrue stories and we can be critical and
selective on them. And this is not a completely unorthodox view. As
I pointed out in my recent Frontpage article, even the very
conservative Al-Azhar is reconsidering to purify the sources of
hadith from `the strange, the false and from forgery.”
That’s fine, but what Al-Azhar is doing is nothing new. The sifting
of true ahadith from false ones has gone on ever since there have
been ahadith. There are many ahadith among the Sahih Sittah, the
collections generally accepted as most reliable by Muslims, that
contain exhortations to jihad warfare against Jews, Christians, and
others. Does Mr. Akyol think that these are all weak ahadith? If so,
how will he convince Muslims to reject material from the revered
collections of Bukhari, Muslim, and other respected sources? This is
not a rhetorical question; I hope he has an answer, and am looking
forward to seeing it.
As for the Armenian genocide, I believe that Bernard Lewis was justly
prosecuted in France for his denial (although I abhor such speech
laws), and I do not think he is an unimpeachable source, given his
marked and uncritical affection for Ataturkism. I refer objective
readers to The History of the Armenian Genocide by Vahakn N. Dadrian.

In sum, I appreciate Mr. Akyol’s efforts to oppose radical Muslims.
But if he really hopes to delegitimize violence in Islam, he has to
construct an Islamic argument strong enough to refute radicals –
something he says he has no hope of doing. If he cannot do this, how
can he expect Muslim moderates to follow him? I devoutly hope for
fundamental and global reform in Islam, but it can only come from a
definitive repudiation of everything Islamic that gives rise to
terrorism. Mr. Akyol is not there yet; I do hope he arrives someday.
Robert Spencer is the director of Jihad Watch and the author of
Onward Muslim Soldiers: How Jihad Still Threatens America and the
West (Regnery Publishing), and Islam Unveiled: Disturbing Questions
About the World’s Fastest Growing Faith (Encounter Books).
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Armenian Tourism Development Agency /ATDA/
Tel.: (+3741) 54 23 03/6
Fax: (+3741) 54 47 92
Email: [email protected]
<; ATDA/Armenia to participate in JATA World Tourism Congress and Travel Fair 2004 15 September, 2004 -- The Armenian Tourism Development Agency (ATDA) will be representing Armenia and the Armenian tourism industry at the JATA (Japan Association of Travel Agents) World Tourism Congress and Travel Fair 2004 in Tokyo from 23- 26 September, 2004. Armenia participates in this prestigious event for the first time and is also represented by Saberatours-Sevan, Tufenkian Hospitality and Armen Tour. ATDA, working actively with many Armenian tour operators, agencies, and other tourism representatives, has developed a winning program and marketing strategy designed to further Armenia's reputation as a "four season destination" for world travelers and tourism professionals. JATA World Tourism Congress and Travel Fair 2004 in Tokyo is another opportunity to enlarge our target tourism population, specifically in the Asian market. With over 700 booths, the annual JATA World Travel Fair is Asia's largest travel trade and consumer travel exhibition. It provides a unique opportunity for exhibitors to reach the three key targets for travel promotion - travel trade, media, and consumers -together at one show. Each year this show attracts over 100,000 visitors, including 30,000 travel trade and media representatives. JATA WTF with its comprehensive congress program, presentations and supporting events represents the entire product spectrum of the tourist industry. This event is a meeting ground for the development of new ideas, global approaches and targeted marketing for local, regional and international niche markets and their providers. Armenia's representation at such events is integral to securing maximal benefits and growth for its burgeoning tourist trade and all its related industry interests and economic ventures. The JATA WTF < air.itb-berlin.de/en/Ausstellerhallen/Gelandeplan/index.html>
exhibition hall is organized for optimum exposure and is grouped
according to geographic destination. For those who may be in Japan
during this event, the ATDA/Armenia exhibit will be at #A-31 , making
it easy to find and accessible to all.
For further information about JATA World Tourism Congress and Travel
Fair 2004 or other industry exhibitions and events, please visit us
at 3 Nalbandian Street in Yerevan, or call us at 54-23-03 / 06. We
are more than happy to provide information on this and other Armenian
Tourism matters.
Armenian Tourism Development Agency Address: 3 Nalbandyan Street
Yerevan 375010, Armenia Tel: (3741) 542303, 542306 Fax: (3741)
544792 E-mail: [email protected] URL:
<; From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Verheugen Meet Religious Representatives Of Minorities In Istanbul
Anadolu agency, Turkey
Sept 9 2004
ISTANBUL – Guenter Verheugen, the European Union (EU) Commissioner
for enlargement, met on Thursday religious representatives of the
minorities in Istanbul.
Before the meeting held at the Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate,
Verheugen visited the patriarchate and the Hagia Georgi Church.
Patriarchate First Secretary Filadepfias, Chief Rabbi of Jews in
Turkey Ishak Haleva , Vatican’s representative in Turkey George
Marovich , Latin Catholic community’s representative Louis Pelatre,
Syriac Catholic community’s representative Yusuf Sag, and Armenian
Orthodox community’s representative Kirkor Damatyan joined the meeting.
Early in the morning, Verheugen met representatives of employers and
workers in Istanbul.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE
Aug. 19, 2004
Teri Bond Michael, [email protected]
(310) 206-3235
Sasha Stone, [email protected]
(310) 206-5490
$1.1 Million Gift to UCLA Establishes Rouben Mamoulian Endowed Chair in
Directing for Film and Theater
UCLA Film and Television Archive screens Mamoulian’s ‘Love Me Tonight’
during Festival of Preservation Aug. 21
The estate of Azadia Mamoulian, widow of film and theater legend Rouben
Mamoulian, has donated $1.1 million to the UCLA School of Theater, Film
and Television to establish an endowed chair in theatrical and motion
picture directing, announced Robert Rosen, dean of the school.
Mamoulian’s musical masterpiece, “Love Me Tonight” (1932), was recently
restored by the UCLA Film and Television Archive and will screen at the
James Bridges Theater, at 7:30 p.m., Saturday, Aug. 21, as part of their
12th Festival of Preservation. For information, call (310) 206-FILM or
visit .
“To have an artist of the distinction of Rouben Mamoulian associated
with the chair is a great honor for us,” Rosen said. “It is particularly
appropriate since Mamoulian moved easily between stage and screen, just
as our students are encouraged to do during their time on campus.”
The Mamoulian Chair enables the school to invite film and theater
artists of great distinction to teach at UCLA and enhance the
curriculum. During the most recent academic year, the chair funded the
residencies of veteran award-winning directors Robert Butler, Barry
Primus and Joe Sargent in the Department of Film, Television and Digital
Media. The residency of distinguished musical theater director Jeremy
Mann also was funded and resulted in a sold-out Ray Bolger Musical
Theater production of “Into the Woods.”
Mamoulian’s films are known for their sex and seduction, wit, lyricism,
and highly inventive filmmaking techniques. “Love Me Tonight” is an
enchanting tale of an amorous tailor (Maurice Chevalier) who woos a
lovelorn princess (Jeanette MacDonald). The film was a landmark
collaboration between Mamoulian and composers Richard Rodgers and Lorenz
Hart. They produced a technique that was revolutionary at the time
wherein the story, action and dialogue were seamlessly integrated with
irresistible songs. The Packard Humanities Institute funded the
restoration of the print.
In addition to “Love Me Tonight,” the UCLA Film and Television Archive
has restored such Mamoulian classics as “Applause” (1929), “City
Streets” (1931), “The Song of Songs” (1933), “Becky Sharp” (1935), “The
Gay Desperado” (1936), “High, Wide and Handsome” (1937) and “The Mark of
Zorro” (1940).
Additional films directed by Mamoulian include “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde”
(1932), “Queen Christina” (1934), “We Live Again” (1934), “Golden Boy”
(1939), “Blood and Sand” (1941), “Rings on Her Fingers (1942), “Summer
Holiday” (1948) and “Silk Stockings” (1957).
Born and raised in Russia, Mamoulian studies law at the University of
Moscow and pursued his love of theater by taking acting courses in the
evening. He began his directing career on stage in London and New York
and received critical acclaim for his 1926 Broadway non-musical
production of “Porgy,” featuring an all-black cast. That hit led
Paramount studios to sign Mamoulian to direct the drama “Applause”
(1929).
Throughout his moviemaking career, Mamoulian returned frequently to the
stage, overseeing productions of the Gershwin opera version of “Porgy
and Bess” in 1935 and “Carousel” in 1945. He won much praise as the
original director of “Oklahoma” in 1943. In later years, he turned to
writing. He died in 1987 at the age of 90.
The Mamoulian Chair is part of UCLA’s Ensuring Academic Excellence
initiative, a five-year effort aimed at generating $250 million in
private commitments specifically for the recruitment and retention of
the very best faculty and graduate students. The initiative was launched
in June 2004. Its goals include $100 million to fund 100 new endowed
chairs for faculty across campus, increasing the number to 331. In
addition, campus officials plan to increase support for an estimated
3,500 graduate students per year by raising $100 million to fund
fellowships and scholarships in the UCLA College and $50 million for
fellowships and scholarships in UCLA’s 11 professional schools.
About the UCLA School of Theater, Film and Television
The UCLA School of Theater, Film and Television offers its students a
unique blend of scholarship and practical training, bringing together
the highest levels of professionalism with the social mission of a
public university. Its landmark integration of theater, film, television
and digital media and its outstanding faculty and facilities nurture
creative innovation, personal vision and social responsibility.
Comprehensive undergraduate and graduate programs are offered in acting,
animation, critical studies, design, digital arts, directing, production
and writing. The recipients of Oscars, Emmys, Tonys and other
prestigious awards, alumni include such notable artists as Allison
Anders, Carol Burnett, Charles Burnett, Nancy Cartwright, Francis Ford
Coppola, Susan Egan, David Koepp, Frank Marshall, Greg Nava, Alexander
Payne, John Rando, Tim Robbins, Eric Roth, John Rubinstein, Pietro
Scalia, Paul Schrader, Tom Schumacher, Tom Shadyac, Brad Silberling,
Penelope Spheeris, Gore Verbinski and many more.
About the UCLA Film and Television Archive
The UCLA Film and Television Archive is internationally renowned for its
pioneering efforts to preserve and showcase not only classic films and
television, but also contemporary, innovative moving image media. The
archive also is a unique resource for media study, with one of the
largest collections of media materials in the United States – second
only to the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. – and the largest of
any university in the world. Its vaults hold more than 220,000 motion
picture and television titles and 27 million feet of newsreel footage.
The combined collections represent an all-encompassing documentation of
the 20th century.
-UCLA-
SS379
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Interfax
Aug 12 2004
Mining industry output down 4.7% in Armenia in H1
Yerevan. (Interfax) – Armenian mining enterprises produced product
worth 62.14 billion dram ($120 million) in the first half of 2004,
4.7% less year-on-year, the country’s Trade and Economic Development
Ministry told Interfax.
This drop was attributable to the aluminum foil plant Armenal, a
major sector producer, being idle since the start of the year.
Mining enterprises sold 60.586 billion dram worth of product in the
reporting period, 62% more year-on-year and reflecting high world
metal prices. Armenian product exports increased 50.7% to 47.455
billion dram. The sector employs 7,737 workers.

Messenger.ge, Georgia
July 29 2004
Tbilsresi maintenance missing ingredient
By M. Alkhazashvili
To maintain both a stable economy and state, Georgia strives to
overcome its energy problems. To do so, it is essential to have the
important energy producing system Tbilsresi working properly.
During the 1970’s and 80’s Tbilsresi, located in Gardabani in Eastern
Georgia, produced half of the Georgian energy system’s output, and in
autumn and winter 70-75 percent of the country’s entire energy
system. Unfortunately, the 1990’s saw the dramatic decline of the
station, as poor maintenance and over use led to serious damage
It took more than a decade to build Tbilsresi, which was begun in the
early 1960’s and completed in 1972. In 1990, the output of Tbilsresi
station was 1,100 megawatts, and this was increased that year by the
construction of a new unit, number 9, with an output of 300
megawatts. In 1994, unit number 10 was begun, adding a further 400
megawatts.
But due to the lack of repairs on the infrastructure, between 1994-96
units numbers 5, 6 and 7 stopped functioning. Then in 2002, units 1
and 2 were stopped and it was decided to build new ones in their
place, but a lack of finances meant this was never carried out.
Although number 3, 4 and 8 still work and can produce energy, the
lack of repairs on these units means they are now urgently in need of
rehabilitation.
The more recently built units 9 and 10, which were purchased by the
American AES company and now belong to the Russian RAO UES, have a
mixed record of performance. Unit 10 has not worked since 2001, while
unit 9 has suffered numerous break downs and is currently being
overhauled by RAO UES.
During past year, the limited production of Tbilsresi as led Georgia
to satisfy its requirements through the import of Russian
electricity, although this was hampered last winter by the frequent
break-down of the Kavkasioni 5,000 kilowatt high voltage transmission
line, again because of lack of maintenance.
Although the Georgian State Electrosystem (GSE) halted Russian
imports on June 15th owing to their high cost, it looks like Georgia
will again have to rely on imported energy from Russia. Considering
Russia is also the country’s sole supplier of gas, the new government
has eagerly pushed for energy projects with Iran, Azerbaijan and
Armenia. More importantly, it gives the country ample cause to
rehabilitate its internal electric infrastructure.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress