BAKU: Russian Defense Ministry Not Confirming Information About Deli

RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY NOT CONFIRMING INFORMATION ABOUT DELIVERY OF ARMS TO ARMENIA

Today.Az
s/50070.html
Jan 13 2009
Azerbaijan

Russian Defense Ministry has refuted announcements of Azerbaijani mass
medias that earlier spokesman for Russian Defense Ministry Alexander
Petrunin in his interview to Azerbaijani ANS TV channel confirmed the
fact of the free delivery of Russian military hardware in the amount
of $800,000,000 to Armenia.

An official of the group for interaction with mass media of the
department of press service and information of the Defense Ministry
of Russia, who did not call his name, said while speaking of the
Noviy Region correspondent that Alexander Petrunin did not confirm
any data to Azerbaijani mass medias.

Notably, earlier Azerbaijani version was also refuted by spokesman
for Armenian Defense Ministry Seyran Shahsuvaryan.
From: Baghdasarian

http://www.today.az/news/politic

ANKARA: Apologizing To Armenians Under Prosecution

APOLOGIZING TO ARMENIANS UNDER PROSECUTION

BIA
Jan 12 2009
Turkey

Following the filing of six complaints against the campaign
apologising for the "Great Catastrophe" of 1915, the Ankara Chief
Public Prosecutor’s Office has started an investigation against the
signatories, for violating Article 301.

Six people, Hasan Huseyin Satır, Sabahat Ozgur, Mehmet İnal Kolburan,
Huseyin Erdggan, Serdar Orhaner and KurÅ~_at Karacabey, have filed
a complaint against the organisors and signatories of the Internet
signature campaign to apologise to their "Armenian brothers and
sisters" for the events of 1915.

"Great Catastrophe" of 1915

The campaign can be found at www.ozurdiliyoruz, and a brief text is
presented in Turkish and other languages. The English text reads:

"My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the
denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were
subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share,
I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and
sisters. I apologize to them."

The six people filed complaints claiming that this campaign denigrated
the Turkish nation because it accused the nation of committing a
genocide. This means that the prosecution will investigate under the
controversial Article 301.

At the time of writing, the campaign has been signed by over 27,000
people.

Previous complaint Last month judge Hakkı Yalcınkaya of the Å~^iÅ~_li
2nd Penal Court had also filed a complaint against the campaign,
demanding its trial under Article 301 and the closure of the website.

Yalcınkaya is known for his intimate relationship with nationalist
lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz, himself a suspect in the Ergenekon
trial. Yalcınkaya, too, has been investigated by the Ministry of
Justice for asking Kerincsiz on the phone if there was "anything he
could do".

Yalcınkaya was involved in the court case against the Armenian
newspaper Agos’ licence holder Serkis Seropyan and editor Aris
Nalcı when they stood accused of influencing the judiciary. He
acquitted them.

In a previous case, he was part of the group of judges who sentenced
former Agos editor Arat Dink and Seropyan under Article 301 with a
suspended sentence.

–Boundary_(ID_HlE1rLSzXKc4qXnSpWeUyg)- –
From: Baghdasarian

The Good Sailor Policy

THE GOOD SAILOR POLICY
by Khatchik DerGhougassian

Harvard International Review
icle&id=1817
Jan 9 2009
MA

The Return of the US Fourth Fleet and the South American Reaction

Khatchik DerGhougassian is a Professor of International Relations at
the Universidad de San Andrés in Argentina, a Visiting Professor at
the American University of Armenia (Yerevan, Republic of Armenia),
and an advisor at the Ministry of Defense of Argentina. He holds an MA
degree in International Relations from FLACSO/Argentina and did his
PhD studies at the University of Miami in International Studies. His
research projects have included arms transfer, gun control policies,
terrorism, organized crime and international conflict.

Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, along with Cuba’s Castra and Bolivia’s Evo
Morales, denounced the "imperialist" and "interventionist" character
of the re-deployment. Photo courtesy ¡Que comunismo!/flickr.comAfter
58 years of absence, the US Fourth Fleet went back to business on
July 1, 2008 in the southern West Hemisphere. If the event had
occurred in 1990s, the Argentine government would probably have
welcomed the initiative and even anticipated further enhancing the
"special relationship" that the Carlos S. Menem administration had
with the United States. But times have changed. Since the so-called
"left turn" in Latin America after the 2001-2003 social and economic
crises and the subsequent political turmoil in Argentina, Venezuela,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and other countries, almost every US move in the
region has been received with skepticism, concern, and criticism. Such
has been the case with the return of the US Fourth Fleet.

The decision of re-deployment was made public on April 24, and although
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead made an announcement
assuring Latin America that the move does not imply new military
assets in the region, the leaders of South American countries were
not convinced, with the exception of Colombia. Cuba’s Fidel Castro,
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, and Bolivia’s Evo Morales denounced the
"imperialist" and "interventionist" character of the re-deployment,
whereas Brazil’s Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, declared that his
country would not allow the fleet to operate in Brazilian waters
without authorization. Jobim’s Argentine colleague, Nilda Garré–whom
Admiral James Stavridis, the head of the Southern Command (SouthCom),
visited on May 7 during his South American tour to personally explain
Washington’s decision–was also not convinced. Brazil and Argentina
did not take any immediate steps against the US decision, but the
issue of the Fourth Fleet is on their defense and foreign policy
agendas and is being widely discussed and debated in both official
and unofficial circles. In the South American press, an uncritical
perspective towards the US military move is rare.

Same Concern, Different Reactions On July 1, 2008, the day of the
Fourth Fleet’s arrival, the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
and Paraguay–the four founding members of the Southern Common Market
(Mercado Común del Sur -MERCOSUR)–as well as Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Chile, met for a summit in the city of San Miguel de Tucumán
in Argentina. Although the two main issues on the agenda were the
world food crisis and the European immigration policy, Venezuela’s
Chávez referred to the re-deployment of the Fourth Fleet and proposed
that his colleagues ask Washington for an official explanation of the
move. Brazil and Argentina were the first countries to take action. The
Brazilian Senate debated the issue while Lula rushed his Foreign and
Defense Ministers, Celso Amorin and Nelson Jobim, to Washington to
meet separately with their American counterparts. At the same time,
Argentina’s Crisitina Fernández de Kirchner demanded explanations
from the US Undersecretary of State for Hemispheric Affairs, Thomas
Shannon, during his visit to the country on July 10. Even Chile,
which has signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States,
raised the issue at a bilateral meeting.

None of the explanations that the representatives of the Pentagon, the
State Department, or the commanding officers of SouthCom and the Fourth
Fleet have provided officially have satisfied South Americans. Yet,
neither Brazil nor Argentina went beyond an official demand for
explanation. Moreover, during his visit to Argentina in the second
week of September, Brazil’s newly appointed Minister of Strategic
Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, denied any relation between the
re-deployment of the Fourth Fleet and his country’s ambitious decision
to raise the defense budget from 1.5 to 2.7 percent of the GDP. "We
do not work based on enemies or threats; only on capacities we need,"
he said. During the VIII Conference of the Defense Ministers of the
Americas with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Banff, Canada,
Nilda Garré maintained that bilateral cooperation between Argentina
and the United States would continue despite her concern about the
reactivation of the Fourth Fleet, which she described as "a military
move for which we do not see any convincing explanation."

Argentina and Brazil’s rather prudent reaction can be explained
first by a realist approach to the issue; historical experience has
shown that confrontation with the United States never has a positive
outcome. Second, there is at least one country in South America,
Colombia, that is aligned with the United States, and Brazil, the
leading country in the process of the regional integration, does
not want to alienate any member of the Union of the South American
Nations (UNASUR). Third, there is a widespread conviction in Brazil and
Argentina that the defense and exercise of sovereignty are basically
a function of strengthening national and regional institutions to face
any direct or indirect attempt of foreign intervention in the region.

Venezuela, however, did not hesitate to go further and raise the
stakes with the United States. Barely a month after the Fourth Fleet
became operative in the waters of the South Atlantic, President Chavez
seized on the opportunity of renewed Russian-American tension in the
aftermath of the Georgia crisis and announced that Venezuela and Russia
would hold joint naval exercises in the Caribbean. On September 8,
Moscow confirmed the visit of the nuclear warship Piotr Veliki. Later
that same week, Chávez expelled the US Ambassador in Caracas as
a gesture of solidarity with Bolivia’s Evo Morales’ decision to
expel the US Ambassador in La Paz. At the heart of Venezuela’s and
Bolivia’s hawkish position lies not only an ideological factor but
also the conviction that the United States is indeed intervening
in their internal affairs. Moreover, both Chávez and Morales have
experienced direct hostility from Washington: in April 2002, the former
US Undersecretary of State Otto Reich rushed to legitimize the failed
military coup against Chávez; in Bolivia the US Ambassador publicly
repudiated Evo Morales while he was still a leader of the coca-growing
peasants and a candidate for the presidential elections. Both leaders
came into power with an agenda of radical reforms violently opposed by
entrenched minority sectors, which after historically holding power are
now facing threats and have been displaced and marginalized. Chávez
and Morales have accused Washington of maintaining ties with the
opposition, providing its leaders with financial aid, and even arming
them. Hence, an emerging Russia is seen as a potential ally to balance
the US hegemonic drive in the region.

Unconvincing Explanations As soon as news of the redeployment of the
Fourth Fleet was made public, the leading figures of the US SouthCom
started an active public campaign to explain the reasons behind the
decision. Through meetings with South American leaders and several
press conferences, the following arguments were crystallized as
the official US rationale: (a) the redeployment of the Fourth Fleet
has to do with operational reasons, and is not directed against the
sovereignty of any Latin American nation; (b) there is no hostile
intention toward any country, including Venezuela; (c) the decision
has no relation to the discovery of large offshore oil reserves
in Brazilian waters; (d) more broadly, it does not aim at future
appropriation or threatening of South America’s abundant natural
resources, including oil, natural gas, water, and agricultural land;
(e) its mission is to fight drug trafficking and terrorism; (f) this
mission also includes providing humanitarian assistance in times of
natural disasters or epidemics.

Most of these strategic arguments have already been formulated in
several US military documents that are public, particularly in the
October 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century and Admiral
James Stavridis’ U.S. Southern Command 2008 Statement. The first
document, for instance, concludes that the US sea strategy "focuses on
opportunities -not threats; on optimism -not fear; and on confidence
-not doubt." More precisely, Stavridis’ address before the 110th
Congress mentions poverty and inequality, drugs, violence and crime,
and terrorism as some of the "challenges" that the US SouthCom faces.

Reasons for Concern in the South Yet, none of these arguments seem
to convince South Americans. For Argentina, involving the military in
humanitarian assistance could raise the issue of confusing the roles of
the military and the civilians. After the bloody dictatorship of the
military government in 1976-1983, the return of the democracy brought
about a strict separation of internal and external security, as well
as civil and military roles. Argentine law forbids any military
interference in internal affairs, and Argentines are therefore
suspicious of any move that could weaken civilian rule.

More broadly, South Americans do not accept "challenges" such as
drug trafficking, violent crime, and even terrorism as issues that
reserve any role for the military. This does not necessarily mean
that some countries have not militarized these issues. Colombia
is engaged in the US "war on drugs;" Bolivia’s military annually
receives US$30 million dollars in US assistance to fight the same
war in Bolivia; violent crime in Rio de Janeiro has led to increasing
public support for the use of the military against organized gangs;
and even Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution ideal has a strong military
component. Generally, however, while countries south of the Panama
Canal look for an authentic means of regional integration, Central
America and the Caribbean are becoming further integrated in the North
American process. Whereas in Central America and Mexico militaries are
increasing their involvement in fighting the so-called "new threats,"
South American countries are moving toward a regional and global
strategic repositioning that reserves a more traditional role for
the military.

There are two basic reasons why Central American nations and Mexico
are inclined to give a greater role to their military in dealing with
the "new threats."

The first reason is related to the greater integration of these
countries within the North American process, which has decreased their
autonomy in executing their defense and security agendas. Despite
the participation of several Central American nations in the 2003
US-led intervention in Iraq, Washington does not plan to include any
Latin American military in its global projections. In other words,
no Latin American country is foreseen as a partner in a NATO-style
alliance. During the Cold War, especially in the 1980s, Central
American militaries were useful in fighting leftist insurgencies
or regimes. The process of pacification in the early 1990s left
these militaries with no specific mission. Unwilling to include
them in its post-Cold War strategic designs, Washington pushed for
yet another domestic function for these militaries through their
involvement in the so-called "new threats." For Washington, such a
role would decrease the risks of arms proliferation in its "backyard"
(i.e. Noriega). For the Central American militaries, the redefinition
of their role by Washington has perhaps become essential to their
institutional survival.

The second reason is the historically unprecedented level of crime
and delinquency in Central America and the impotency of the internal
security agencies to deal with the problem. The military is seen as
the only efficient way to fight crime, gang violence and organized
crime, despite the high risk such a move involves. In Mexico, for
example, it is clearly the cartelization of drug trafficking and
the high levels of violence that have increased the militarization
of internal security, a move that Washington hailed within the logic
of the "war against drugs."

For South America, by contrast, autonomy from the United States has
become a virtue, particularly since the failure of the southern
hemisphere’s ill-fated attempts at integration in the 1990s. The
consistent exception is Colombia, which has sought cozier relations
with the United States. In general, though, South Americans are all
too suspicious of Washington’s rhetoric about the "war on terror"
and "preemption," perhaps due to tragic memories of Cold War US
interventions that were based on similar national security doctrines.

This strategic repositioning of South America, in turn, is closely
related to the renewed importance of natural resources in the global
economy. Oil in Venezuela and Brazil, natural gas in Bolivia, copper
in Chile, the world’s largest water resources, cultivable land areas,
and the rich resources of the Amazon are gaining new importance in the
global free market system. With the price of the oil barrel hitting
historic records, water reserves becoming a strategic asset, and in a
world facing food crises, South American nations see an opportunity to
escape cycles of sudden growth and brutal collapse. It is, therefore,
hard for them not to suspect an interest in natural resources behind
the redeployment of the Fourth Fleet, notwithstanding the verbal
assurance they receive from the United States. This is not to say, as
some suggest, that the United States would appropriate these natural
resources through military force; but any power projection could be a
prelude of a direct or indirect interference in South American economic
policies. After having paid their entire debt to the International
Monetary Fund, and amidst strong rejection of advice from international
financial institutions, South American nations have recovered a level
of sovereignty that includes the protection and management of their
resource-rich lands–without any foreign interference.

The Ghosts of the Cold War With the exception of Colombia and perhaps
Peru, the broad concern that all South American nations share about
the redeployment of the US Fourth Fleet has to do with two factors:
(1) the failure of the early 1990s attempt to institutionalize a
hemispheric defense and security regime, and, (2) the apparently
enduring phenomenon of the "left turn" and its social, economic,
and political expressions. Neither of these two factors should be
understood in absolute terms. Quite the opposite, they are both so
diverse and complex that the possibility of reversals in the future
cannot be ignored. In other words, US hegemonic push in the Western
Hemisphere has not come to an end, and the electoral comeback of
rightist forces is not impossible. But, both the 1990s failure to
institutionalize a hemispheric defense and security regime and the
"left turn" in South America are tangible proof that the post-Cold
War order has created serious limitations in terms of expectations.

Nevertheless, the disenchantment of the 1990s has brought back some
of the Cold War ghosts, and especially the suspicion of renewed US
involvement in South American internal affairs and a widespread
hostility to American imperialism. The recent US-Russian tension
has sparked fears of a "new" Cold War in the Western Hemisphere, as
Venezuela seems to consider the emerging Russia as a counter-balancing
factor to the perceived US power play to the South. Regardless of
the real intentions of Russia, Caracas has opened the possibility
for Russian battleships to navigate where the US Fourth Fleet now
is present.

Conclusion: The Rationale of a Regional "Shield" In all, even if the
US Fourth Fleet’s novel mission of "humanitarian assistance" during
natural disasters is a serious initiative aimed at reassuring South
Americans of the United States’ good intentions, it still is a move
within Washington’s logic of a global power projection. This global
projection of power has already defined and confirmed a policy of
primacy in the world, the aim of which is to prevent the emergence of
any regional power. In Latin America, however, the United States has
historically looked for a hegemonic presence, and the long series of
direct intervention and support for military takeovers is still more
relevant to Latin Americans than any explanation the US SouthCom can
put forth.

Chávez and Morales perceive US hegemony as a threat. Venezuela’s
leader, therefore, sees in the emergence of Russia the opportunity
to forge an anti-US military alliance as a guarantee for Venezuela’s
national security. At the same time however, Chávez did not hide
his interest to start a dialogue with the Obama administration.

Despite their concerns regarding the redeployment of the US
Fourth Fleet, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and other South American
countries do not wish to risk the regionalization of another global
tension. Since the return of democracy in the 1980s, formerly rival,
if not enemy, South American countries have defined their relations
as a "security community," and are eager to secure the region as a
"zone of peace." This "zone of peace" however is sometimes shaken
by the internal crisis of a country, which can have a "spill-over"
effect on the rest. The most recent examples are the Colombia-Ecuador
tensions in March that followed the assassination of the FARC guerrilla
leader by Colombia on Ecuadorian territory, and the separatist threat
in Bolivia that in September escalated to deadly clashes between
the government and the opposition. In both cases, South American
countries showed a clear political will to deal with the challenges
and avoid any extra-regional interference. Any revival of the Cold
War, in its classical or "new" forms of power projection, can simply
become a potential invitation for intervention by the US Fourth Fleet,
which few desire.

This has not been the panorama that Brazil, the emerging power in
the region, had in mind when the Lula government decided to launch
a historically unprecedented and ambitious plan to reorganize its
defense sector, which foresees a drastic increase of the defense
budget from 1.5 percent to 2.7 percent of the GDP and includes the
construction of a nuclear submarine. The plan is conceived as a
common regional "shield" of defense, as well as a broad development
project, as Minister Mangabeira Unger characterizes it. Indeed, Brazil
simultaneously proposed the creation of the South American Defense
Council (CSD), which was approved at a meeting of the UNASUR countries
in Santiago, Chile in September 2008. If it overcomes tremendous
political and technical obstacles, the CSD could strengthen the idea
of a regional "shield."

Concerning the re-deployment of the Fourth Fleet, the rationale
of the regional "shield" does not specifically aim at countering
the US move. It aims at strengthening South America’s defense and
security to prevent foreign interference targeting the region. With
the prospect of a global financial collapse and the advent of a
deeply turbulent context in world politics, protectionist policies
are gaining importance. Overall, therefore, the redeployment of the
US Fourth Fleet has strengthened the protectionist instinct in South
America, as no country is willing to give any credibility to alleged
good intentions in a move that is by essence a power projection.

Khatchik DerGhougassian is a Professor of International Relations at
the Universidad de San Andrés in Argentina, a Visiting Professor at
the American University of Armenia (Yerevan, Republic of Armenia),
and an advisor at the Ministry of Defense of Argentina. He holds an MA
degree in International Relations from FLACSO/Argentina and did his
PhD studies at the University of Miami in International Studies. His
research projects have included arms transfer, gun control policies,
terrorism, organized crime and international conflict.

–Boundary_(ID_brM/ztrgMUPjrUEAOBpe9A)- –
From: Baghdasarian

http://www.harvardir.org/index.php?page=art

Greek/Armenian icon, auction

Auction Central News, NY
Jan 2 2009

Greek/Armenian icon, auction

Reappearance of Christ before the disciples, Thomas touching the wound
in Christ’s side, oil on panel, Greek or Armenian, late 17th/early
18th century, 19-5/8 x 12-1/2 in. Chips, panel slightly warped, four
holes at each corner, top and bottom possibly trimmed, minor pest
damage. Provenance: Victor Trad, Beirut, Lebanon Said to have been in
the collection of the family of Czar Nicolas and brought to Jerusalem
by the niece of the Czar who became an abbess of the Russian convent
on the Mount of Olives.

view image and terms/conditions at

From: Baghdasarian

http://www.liveauctioneers.com/item/6084815

ANKARA: 2008 busy for Turkish diplomacy, intensified peace efforts

Hürriyet, Turkey
Jan 1 2009

2008 busy for Turkish diplomacy amid intensified peace efforts

The Turkish government had its "golden age" in diplomacy in 2008
despite the difficulties it faced in the domestic policy.

Turkey had adopted a proactive approach, especially in regional
conflicts, while took important steps to increase its weight in the
international scene.

The most important XXX of the Turkish diplomacy in 2008 is securing a
seat at the United Nations. This would give Turkey more to say in the
international matters.

The year was very busy as the government adopted an approach of
mediating between the conflicted countries in the region. Turkish
diplomats and officials had paid visits to foreign countries from Asia
to Latin America, and hosted many counterparts from other countries.

Turkey has been acting as a mediator between Israel and Syria,
expressed its intent to mediate between Iran and the West over the
nuclear dispute and organized two summits between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.

Ankara has launched a diplomatic campaign alongside with the military

Despite these significant steps, however, the black sheep of Turkish
diplomacy for 2008 was the relations with the European Union. The main
reason for this is not the inertia of Turkish side but the EU’s
ongoing reluctance to accelerate the accession negotiations and
putting a concrete timetable forward.

Here are the major issues that occupied Turkish diplomacy in 2008:

IRAQ AND PKK: Turkey made an important and significant shift in its
PKK policy after the terror organization intensified its attacks on
the civillians as well as soldiers. Turkish government started to hold
direct contacts with the regional administration in northern Iraq,
overturning its long policy of rejecting dialogue with the autonom
region. Turkey long blamed the regional administration for providing
support to the terror organization.

Ahmet Davudoglu, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s top foreign policy
advisor, became the star of the Turkish diplomacy with acting a
leading role in the process. Davudoglu and Turkey’s Special Envoy to
Iraq, Murat Ozcelik, paid numerous visits to Irbil and eventualy met
with the leader of regional administration, Massood Barzani.

The sides agreed to tighten measures against PKK, while in December
the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani said Turkish government should
pardon the terrorists to encourage them to lay down their arms.

Talabani also revealed a staged plan to crack down the PKK, which
would from the backbone of the debates on the issue in 2009. Talabani
said if the life standards of the Kurds in Turkey are improved and the
Kurdish language is respected then PKK would laydown the
arms. Turkey’s Kurdish policy and its fight against PKK are likely
dominate the agenda in the next year.

RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA: Turkey took important steps towards
normalizing its relations with Armenia. Turkish President Abdullah Gul
paid a visit to Armenia in September to watch the game between two
countries’ teams, an event called as `football
diplomacy.’ The sides held a series of contacts to restore
dialogue through the year. Turkey does not have diplomatic relations
with Armenia.

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian paid a visit to
Istanbul. Although the sides yet to put the controversial issues, such
as Armenian claims regarding the 1915 incidents and Nagorno-Karabakh,
on table, restoring dialogue is seen as an important step.

CYPRUS: The victory of leftist Demetris Christofias in the
presidential elections in the Greek Cyprus provided hope to end the
44-year-old division of the island. The two leaders met for the first
time in March, eventually resulting in the comprehensive peace talks
in September.

The opening of the gate on the Ledra Street between two sides of the
island after 45 years was seen as the first signal of the higher hopes
but soon after proved that a rocky road ahead for the solution.

The negotiations of the leaders are still underway, extending to
2009. The initial optimism left its place to cautious messages and
warning from the sides as well as the United Nations who sponsors the
talks.

The UN sees 2009 as the last chance to cut a deal on the island, while
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots concerned over the slow peace in the
negotiations.

THE EUROPEN UNION: Brussels and Ankara failed to address the
other’s expectations in 2008. The EU continued its
criticism towards Turkey for the stalled reform process, while Ankara
complained on the slow pace of the negotiations and lack of a clear
accession prospect.

In 2008 the EU had opened the negotiations in four chapters. During
the Slovenian presidency in the first half of the year Company Law and
Intellectual Property Law chapters were opened, while the negotiations
began on the Free Movement of Capital as well as Information Society
and Media chapters during the French presidency in the second half.

The signals that the EU sent in 2008 showed Turkey’s
negotiation process would tougher than previously thought. France had
blocked the opening of five chapters that are directly related to the
accession, a term it worked hard to remove from all documents of the
EU.

On the other hand 2009 would be decisive for the relations. Turkey
stresses the EU should keep its promise as the EU set to review
Ankara’s progress in opening its ports to the Greek Cypriot
vessels. It is likely to have a tense year ahead which has the
possibility of a complete breakdown of the negotiations.

CAUCASUS: Turkey had extended its mediating efforts to Caucasus, a
hotspot of world politics in 2008. The war between Russia and Georgia
had occupied the agenda during the summer.

Turkey proposed the formation of a Caucasus stability platform to
discuss the regional issues. Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia as
well as Turkey are planned to take part in the establishment. In 2009
there might be some steps to realize the project.
From: Baghdasarian

NKR Leader Praises Combat Readiness Of Karabakh Army

NKR LEADER PRAISES COMBAT READINESS OF KARABAKH ARMY

Mediamax
Dec 29 2008
Armenia

Yerevan, 29 December: President of the Nagornyy Karabakh Republic
(NKR) Bako Sahakyan stated that "the Defence Army not only surely
defends the borders of our republic, not in case of necessity may
also take the military actions into the depth of the country, which
starts the aggression, and force it to peace".

Mediamax reports that NKR President said this on December 27, speaking
at the session of the Military Council of NKR Defence Army.

Bako Sahakyan noted that in 2008 "we managed not only to protect,
but also to greater extent consolidate the borders of our country,
increase the combatant efficiency of the Defence Army, improve the
social-living conditions of the military, solve a number of issues
related to security".

"The aggressive and anti-Armenian policy by Azerbaijani
authorities, the excessive increase of military expenses, the
frequent ceasefire violations oblige us to be more cautious and
consistent in consolidating the defence capacity of the country,"
NKR President stressed.

"NKR Defence Army is strong, combat-ready and always ready to stop
any infringement of the enemy. The best evidence to this was the
neutralization of the enemy’s provocations in March and November of
2008 by our military," Bako Sahakyan stated.

NKR President noted that the successful conclusion of the latest
attack exercise showed that "the Defence Army not only surely protects
the borders of our republic, but in case of necessity may also take
the military actions into the depth of the country, which starts
aggression, and force it to peace".

"However, we should continue being watchful and should not allow
the enemy even thinking about taking the initiative into its hands
or dictating us its will. Everyone should once and for all understand
that the independence and the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
is not subject to speculations," Bako Sahakyan stated.
From: Baghdasarian

An Interview With C.A.O.’s Tim Ozgener

AN INTERVIEW WITH C.A.O.’S TIM OZGENER
By David Savona

Cigar Aficionado
_Features/CA_Feature_Basic_Template/0,2344,2607,00 .html
Dec 29 2008

Tim Ozgener, the president of C.A.O. International Inc., is following
in the footsteps of his father, Cano, who founded the Nashville,
Tennessee, company in 1968. The 39-year-old Ozgener is a former
stand-up comedian with the eye of an artist, which is evident in
the visually arresting packaging and nontraditional blends that
make C.A.O. one of the world’s most innovative cigarmakers. Ozgener
recently sat down with senior editor David Savona to speak about the
40th anniversary of C.A.O., and the changes in the company since its
January 2007 acquisition by Holland’s ST Cigar Group, the maker of
Henri Wintermans cigars.

David Savona: Let’s start from the beginning, and talk about C.A.O. and
its origins. Tim Ozgener: This is our 40th year. My father started
the business in 1968 out of the basement of our home, and it was
really just a hobby. It was his love of meerschaum pipes. We started
shipping out of the garage of our home, and it was something that
developed organically into a family affair.

Q: It started as a pipe business, and you and your sister, Aylin, would
help your dad? A: Yeah. He is an Armenian who was born in Istanbul. He
was trained as an engineer, and he didn’t like the engineering of the
pipes [that he smoked]. He improved the engineering, and he went to
a retailer in North Carolina, and the guy said, "Where did you get
that pipe?" And my dad said, "Well, I made it." The guy wanted to
order some, and my dad said, "Listen, son, when you are Armenian,
you never say no to an order. How many do you want?" [Laughs.] This
retailer had some pull, and soon people started calling our house
phone, and people wanted to order my dad’s pipes. They wanted to make
sure the pipe had the same improved stem, and he started putting his
initials on the pipes, which are C.A.O. [for Cano A. Ozgener.] That’s
how the company started. He didn’t have any employees, so when my
sister and I were home, we would occasionally hear my dad say, "Are
you done with your homework? Come downstairs." Downstairs, it would
be a sea of pipes, and he would say, "This row of pipes–$45. Go." And
he would hand us the pricing gun.

Q: So it was a very modest beginning. A: Oh yeah. Looking back on it
now, there are some fantastic stories. He had a retailer that he would
do barter deals with–pipes for green coffee beans, and he would cook
the coffee beans in a pan. And I would wake up in the morning and I
thought there was a brush fire in our house because there was a haze
of smoke. I would say, "This smells horrible, Dad!" He said, "You do
not know what the hell you are talking about. This is quality! I am
roasting coffee–look how oily the beans are!" He was a mechanical
engineer. He used to analyze microfibers, so he was into the specifics
of everything.

Q: How did C.A.O. evolve from a company making pipes to a company
that’s best known for its cigars? A: When you’re going to the trade
show, it’s basically pipes, cigars and humidors. And it’s a small
circle of people. My father got to know everybody, and he saw a
trend of cigars having a resurgence, thanks in large part to Cigar
Aficionado, and celebrities smoking again. So he said people need
humidors. He was in London, found some beautiful antique boxes,
bought 30 of them, shipped them here and lined them with Spanish cedar.

They were all vintage pieces from the 1700s and they would sell
out each time we went to the trade show. They would retail around
$2,000, $3,000. So based on that demand, my father decided to make
humidors that were more reasonable. And we were pretty proud of the
fact that we were the first company to make humidors out of solid
cherry, mahogany and walnut here in the United States. We found two
woodworkers who were perfectionists like we were, I would help my dad
put them in the back of his hatchback, and we shipped them from our
home. Humidors quickly became a big part of our business–I remember
at one point it was 60 percent of our business.

Q: It quickly overtook pipes? A: Meerschaum pipes were really a
niche. It’s not like briar pipes. Right around 1993, ’94, there
was an opportunity to get into cigars. That’s when cigars were
red-hot. Everybody wanted them, and demand superseded quality and
supply. Most everybody told [my father] not to get into the cigar
business, but there was one man who told him yes, the late Peter
Stokkebye, who was buddies with my dad.

Q: The pipe guy. A: Yes, he and my dad had a very close personal
relationship, Peter said, "Cano, go for it. Don’t listen to
anybody else. They don’t want you in there anyway, you’re just
another competitor." So he went for it, and right around 1994,
’95, my father hooked up with Carlos Toraño, who introduced him to
Nestor Plasencia. And they made the first C.A.O. blend, which was
C.A.O. Black.

Q: The C.A.O. Black came out during a crazy time for cigars. Was it
a successful launch? A: There was a very specific blend and look
that it was supposed to have. I remember going down to Honduras
and seeing people I didn’t know lined up outside of Nestor’s door
hoping to get him to make a blend. The factory was just crazy. One
box would come in and [the cigars] would be chestnut brown–the shade
that we had agreed upon. But another box would come in and it would
be green. Another would be yellow. I was living in Los Angeles, and
California was everybody’s No. 1 market. I was visiting all the stores,
and I’ll be honest with you–it was easy to sell out there–retailers
were buying anything.

Q: The inconsistencies didn’t hurt? A: Initially, it didn’t hurt
it. People just needed a cigar to sell. But once things started
slowing down, which took a couple of years, then people said, "Tim,
I like you, but it’s really hard to sell this product. Customers want
something that’s consistent."

Q: So when cigar sales started to normalize, you heard that there were
some problems with these things. A: Humidors were still a bigger part
of our business. Cigars were ancillary at that time, but nonetheless,
we wanted to be successful with them. When you visit all these stores,
I like to connect with people, and when I said, "Help me out, what
will it take to be successful?" they said, "Try this, try that." You
smoke a lot of cigars and you start developing a palate for what the
consumer is asking for. That was an education for me. In 1998, we met
with Douglas Pueringer at Tabacalera Tambor in Costa Rica. He wanted
to diversify his business, he had some great wrappers in maduro,
and that’s when we came out with our L’Anniversaire Maduro. People
smoked it and said, "This is a great cigar."

Q: That was a big deal for you–I remember when that cigar came
out. What was the result at the trade show? A: The reaction was
immediate, and we got very good ratings in Cigar Aficionado and
Cigar Insider. That’s what got us in the game. I also had made a
friendship with Nick Perdomo, and later we decided to do L’Anniversaire
Cameroon. That got even more accolades, and that just exploded. People
are always looking for what’s new, what’s different. Look at the wine
industry–look at how many new wines come out. Every year, we try to
come up with [something new]. That’s been our m.o. since 1998.

Q: There are definitely two schools of thought in the industry on
this. Some say keep it the same, don’t change, and then there are
people who always want something new. You obviously believe in the
latter. A: If you’re not moving forward, you’re moving backwards. If
you’re releasing new stuff every year, if you have some stuff that’s
not performing, what do you do?

Q: You have to whittle some things out. Have you ever dropped a full
brand? A: Knock on wood, not that much. We’ve only phased out one full
brand, C.A.O. eXtreme, and that’s because there were inconsistencies
in the product, and we couldn’t tolerate it. That’s just a decision
we made on it. We did that in a very quiet manner.

Q: You’ve had some very bold product launches, and nontraditional
ones. When you came out with C.A.O. Brazilia, C.A.O. Italia, Italian
tobacco has been used in the industry, but you were the first to
brag about it. What were your thoughts about those launches? A:
Most everybody was going down the same path, playing it safe. Wooden
boxes. If you stain them, it’s chestnut brown or red. We had this blend
that everybody put their heads together and came up with, which had
a Brazilian wrapper. At the time the famous Brazilian wrapper was
Mata Fina. This was Arapiraca. I had noticed that in the humidor,
everything blended together. I said, why not roll the dice to have a
box that pops. People told me, "You’re crazy." Fortunately, it worked
out for us. Another reason we went with that packaging, whenever I
went down to Nicaragua and Honduras, there would be all these cigars
ready to go, but the boxes weren’t ready, for they had to be kiln
dried. Then I would see boxes–even famous Cuban boxes–they’re wood,
and they’re putting paper over them. What a waste. They’re chopping
down trees, and they’re going to cover the inside and outside lid
with paper. Why not get boxes that are very stiff and don’t use wood?

Q: What’s the Brazilia box made of? A: It was made from a very rigid,
stiff cardboard, and now it’s an MDF [medium density fiberboard]. Now
we don’t have to wait for the boxes, and we’re not contributing to this
wild deforestation. I don’t want people to think when they’re buying
C.A.O., they’re paying for the box. We can get boxes that are beautiful
and the price is the same. For example, our Sopranos box. Beautiful
box. That’s basically sawdust that’s been compressed. You’re not
paying for the box. We look at the cigar at the end of the day–but
we want it presented in an elegant manner.

Q: Was C.A.O. Italia a bigger risk than Brazilia? Italian tobacco
is obscure. I know people use it, but people don’t talk about using
it. Was that a more risky move? A: We’re interested in improving the
quality in whatever medium, but we’re also interested in breaking
down myths. We try to be fearless in that arena. Going back to
L’Anniversaire Maduro, there was a strip of Italian ligero used in
that blend, which we didn’t publicly market.

Q: You never told me. [Laughs.] A: [Laughs.] It was kind of our
secret–like a little dash of cayenne. When we didn’t have it
in there, it wasn’t the same. And it was amazing, it was just a
strip. So I remember my dad talking about how the Italian ligero is
key. And I noticed that people in different factories have it–kind
of an underdog kind of thing. Traditionally a lot of that Italian
tobacco was ground up for cheap cigars. I spoke to leaf suppliers,
and they said what Fidel [Olivas] and the guys were doing in the
factory was magic. Taking compressed tobacco with a crusted look,
moistening it–they’re finding diamonds in the rough.

Q: So it took a lot of work? A: Yeah. It took a lot of work. And that’s
the talent of our organization at the factory level, and I have to give
credit to Fidel Olivas and his sons. We used Italian tobacco in there
and the marketing of it was a bit of a risk. We blended around it by
adding some nice earthiness of Peruvian and some Jalapa [Nicaraguan]
to give it some sweetness. That was a big learning curve for me on
how much detail was spent on the preparation of the tobacco.

Q: What’s your No. 1-selling cigar? A: Right now C.A.O. Gold is our
No. 1 seller. It flip-flops between Brazilia and C.A.O. Gold.

Q: How many cigars do you make a year? A: Well, since we’re not a
public company, we don’t get in the numbers that much. Our focus with
the cigars is not quantity, but quality.

Q: But where do you fit in the cigar universe? You’re not a small
company anymore, you’re not a giant, you’re somewhere in the
middle. Where do you think you fit in? A: Well, define production
that would be big?

Q: Twenty million cigars a year. A: Then I would say your description
is accurate: middle trending toward more. We’ve had double-digit
growth every year since ’98. The only year we didn’t was the year
we introduced Mx2, and that cigar was much more difficult than we
anticipated in making. It has maduro as a binder, and maduro as a
wrapper. It held more moisture and took a longer time to dry. Once
the cigars were made, we found it had to spend three times at least
as long in the drying room. The Mx2 had to sit there for 90 days,
sometimes more. We had this supply issue with Mx2 for a good two
and a half years, maybe even three years. But now we’ve figured it
out–now the drying rooms are more ramped up for the Mx2.

Q: What’s your goal when you make a cigar? A: We try to innovate in
our blends, and also in our packaging, and we try to create a wide
palate for people, no matter what they like to smoke. And we like to
use Nicaragua as a base.

Q: Is Nicaraguan tobacco in all your cigars? A: Almost all our cigars.

Q: Can you rank your brands, from mildest to strongest? A: C.A.O. Gold
would be the mildest we have, followed by C.A.O. Cameroon, followed by
Cx2, followed by Criollo, which is more medium bodied, then I would
say Sopranos, then I would say L’Anniversaire Maduro, which is more
like a medium full, as well as Vision, Italia, America, same thing,
Mx2, and then Brazilia.

Q: Brazilia is your fullest blend? A: Yes. Now, we want to push the
envelope and get even fuller, and that’s where Lx2 comes in.

Q: Let’s talk about that–it’s your newest creation, it has a lot
of ligero. What inspired the cigar? A: After I left our trade show
last year, I was looking at all of our products, what people were
responding to. There’s a niche of cigar lovers that gravitates toward
cigars that are stronger. That was sort of a response to trying to
create a cigar that delivered a real full-bodied experience, for
that niche of smokers. But we don’t want to do a cigar just for the
strength of it–we want it to be complex and have rich flavor.

Q: How do you create new blends? How does it work? A: It’s a very
creative process. We had some Pueblo Nuevo [Nicaragua] ligero. If
it’s something I want to explore, and find out the true nature of
that tobacco, then I’ll smoke only that. I did a lot of improv comedy
when I was in L.A., so it’s an improvisational process, which is
what makes it fun. I’m down there, these guys at the factory are
busy, and they’re not sure what I’m going to do. But I think they
like that. I try to take them out of the comfort realm that they’re
used to being in. Most of our blends come from us trying to do a
creative convergence of things. That’s what drives it. We also like
doing things in threes, which I picked up from my father–we did
three country blends, Brazilia, Italia and America. We had Mx2, Cx2,
now we have Lx2, which is a nice completion of the three. Actually,
I wanted ligero wrapper, filler and binder. The factory said it won’t
burn. I said try it again–they said we can’t give you a cigar that
won’t burn! [Laughs.]

Q: So the wrapper from Pueblo Nuevo? What’s special about that farm? A:
It has to do with flavor. When we were down there, smoking and trying
these different cigar blends, I had all these cigars made that were 3
1/2 by 46 ring gauge. They were each made of one type of leaf from each
region of the country. We use 41 different types of tobaccos from 21
different countries in all of our blends–that’s some total. We looked
at the materials that we thought were quality ones, and when it came
down to Pueblo Nuevo ligero and Pueblo Nuevo viso, we found those to
be outstanding–great flavor, great strength but great sweetness. It’s
like eating barbecue–great barbecue isn’t just smoky. It has smoke
but it also has sweetness. With cigars, if it’s strong but doesn’t
have that sweetness, it’s not satisfying. I tell all of our leaf
suppliers–anything that’s interesting, bring it and let’s try it.

Q: Is that a standing order? A: Not order it, but get in a bale, let’s
try it out. I’m not saying all of our blends are to be a kaleidoscope
of different countries–Lx2 is almost pure Nicaragua. But we’re very
open-minded, and that’s part of our success.

Q: I was going to ask you that–what are the other secrets of
C.A.O.’s success? A: Whatever you do, you want to improve the smoking
pleasure. We did it with pipes, with better engineering. Humidors, same
thing. We’re doing the same thing with cigars. That means quality of
the product–do we have to add more people to draw-test our cigars? How
can we improve the manufacturing process? We’re about to invest money
to test the humidity level in each cigar. We’ve added Humidipaks. It
also has to do with the quality of our customer service. And because
I have a background in acting, the best actors listen and respond–so
we try to listen and respond. Quality of the packaging. We want to be
an exciting, innovative company. C.A.O. is a brand that is exciting,
contemporary, innovative, yet still has its roots in what it means
to make cigars. C.A.O. is a company that delivers quality, but is
also fresh and innovative without losing touch with its roots. It
all starts with the cigar.

Q: How have things changed since the acquisition by Henri Wintermans,
and what does that mean for the future of the company? What’s
different now? A: As far as here, nothing has changed. They’ve been
very hands-off with us. I’m excited about it–they’re excited by the
brand. They see us as this vibrant, creative company and they want to
be a part of that same mojo. Wintermans is very much into inventory of
tobacco, and they feel that inventory of tobacco will help deliver a
consistent product. I see the future as very exciting. Wintermans,
which is a division of ST Cigar Group, Scandinavian Tabak, just
sold their cigarette division and now want to have more focus on
the cigar industry. Hopefully, they will be investing more in the
American market. For our consumers that means the quality will remain
as excellent as it is now.

Q: Can you describe the relationship between C.A.O. and the
Toraños? A: It started in the very beginning with my dad and
Carlos Sr. We’ve known the Toraños for a very long time. Once
the Toraños invested in a factory with the Olivas [family], based
on our relationship we started getting more production from those
factories. Then we saw that Charlie was stretched a bit thin. We
said, "Why don’t you turn your eye toward more day-to-day quality
control?" When it comes to blending C.A.O., I do that, but we wanted
Charlie to be focused on day-to-day quality control. Plus, once we
selected a blend, he spearheads the relationship between the leaf
growers and the leaf buyers and the factory. Making a cigar is not
an easy thing. It’s not just about making the cigars, but people
trying them, getting them out there, distribution–those are big
jobs in and of themselves. At C.A.O. I have to stress that we like
to stress teamwork at C.A.O. We believe that the best team wins, so
we try to give everybody something to focus on that’s almost like a
field of specialty.

Q: When did that deal take place? A: The beginning of 2008. As far as
with the factory and how it’s set up, there’s a factory in Nicaragua
and Honduras. Most of what they’re producing in both factories, a large
percentage is C.A.O. In Honduras, it’s more tangible. One building is
just C.A.O. and one is Toraño. In Nicaragua, it’s one huge galleria.

Q: So they make the cigars and you sell them? Or is that too simple? A:
We’re very much involved in the whole process of blending. All of
the blends that we come up with, we have a hand in. We’re very detail
oriented. The blends are taking us a longer and longer amount of time
to do. It’s like a concert, everybody getting together and working to
deliver this blend. It’s a teamwork process. We’re very much into the
team concept–we’re inspired by that. I’m not motivated by money. I’m
motivated by delivering something that brings pleasure to people. I
used to do stand-up comedy because I like to hear laughter. I like
making people happy. These are products that deliver moments of
pleasure. That’s the ultimate goal for me.

Q: Forty years ago your father started this business. Your father is
retired now–you have two young sons. Do you ever look down the road
and hope one day they’ll follow you? A: I look upon it the same way
my dad did–whatever their heart desires, whatever they want to do,
I’m going to let them go down that road. I’m going to love them for
whatever they want to pursue. To me, this is not work. This is fun,
this is a pleasure. And that should be the same for them, whatever they
desire to do. You spend most of your day doing your vocation. It should
be something that you feel passionate about, and that you love. v

–Boundary_(ID_c0Q8jSMpGYKpQ07igLu8Jg)–
From: Baghdasarian

http://www.cigaraficionado.com/Cigar/CA

Tribute paid to the victims of Artsakh war

ARMENPRESS

TRIBUTE PAID TO THE VICTIMS OF ARTSAKH WAR

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 27, ARMENPRESS: Armenian high-ranking officials,
headed by the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, visited today
`Yerablur’ pantheon to pay tribute to those who died during the
Artsakh war. They put flowers on the tombs of founders of Armenian
Republican Party Ashot Navasardian, Commander Vazgen Sargsyan,
Commander Andranik Ozanian.
Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanian said that today on the eve
of New Year, headed by the leader of the country, they visited
Yerablur to express their gratitude to `all those fellows who were
killed during the Artsakh war’. `Thanks to their devotion and courage
we live in peaceful conditions, ensure the development of Armenia. We
must remember them. This place -`Yerablur’ has become a holy
place. Visiting it on the eve of New Year we congratulate the New Year
and Christmas of our killed heroes and their families and we remember
them as it is our duty,’ the defense minister said.
According to him, today soldier of the Armenian army serves in
secure conditions. `Our soldiers, divisions, and troops are able to
return to battle-worthy condition in short period of time, pass from
shift to real defense and in case of necessity confront any
encroachments,’ Ohanian assured.
NA Speaker Hovik Abrahamian, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan,
Chairman of the Armenian Constitutional Court Gagik Harutyunian,
Secretary of National Security Council Arthur Baghdasarian, director
of National Security Service Gorik Hakobian, Chief of the Police Alik
Sargsyan and other officials also paid tribute in Yerablur.
From: Baghdasarian

Armenian Parliament Gives First Reading To Bill On Yerevan

ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT GIVES FIRST READING TO BILL ON YEREVAN

ARKA
Dec 26, 2008

YEREVAN, December 26. /ARKA/. The RA National Assembly (NA) adopted the
first reading to the bill on Yerevan’s local government. According to
the RA Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration Vache Terteryan,
the parliament gave the first reading to the bill in December 2007,
but during parliamentary hearings many proposals were made concerning
the bill.

The bill will be given the second reading after adding new articles
to it, he added.

Among major amendments is the removal of the expression "on territorial
administration", Terteryan said, pointing out the amended document
is in line with the European Charter on Local Governments.

MPs have proposed changing principles of calling up standing committees
of the Deans’ Council of Yerevan. The law will be annexed with an
article on Yerevan Mayor’s functions and the protection of public
order.

The bill introduces a new system of local governments and changes the
status of Yerevan, the city changing from a region to municipality. The
document also provides for the principles, bases and authorities of
Yerevan’s local governments and territorial administration.

The bill regulates financial and legal issues related to the
functioning and establishment of local governments.

The city’s administrative division undergoes changes, with 12
administrative regions replacing the current 12 distr icts.

The Mayor appoints heads of administrative regions, with each region
having its Council of Deans. The number of the council’s members will
depend on the number of residential population.

The bill provides for the establishment of a 65-member Council of
Deans in Yerevan. After the adoption of the law, the Council of Deans
is to elect the Mayor.
From: Baghdasarian

BAKU: Alexander Iskandaryan: "The Relations Turkey-Armenia And Turke

ALEXANDER ISKANDARYAN: "THE RELATIONS TURKEY-ARMENIA AND TURKEY-AZERBAIJAN HAVE REALLY BROKEN APART"

Today.Az
itics/49805.html
Dec 25 2008
Azerbaijan

The current year was filled with events, important for Armenia in
the external political sphere, according to famous Armenian political
scientist Alexander Iskandaryan. He said paradoxically, in the sphere
of relations with Russia and the United States, these were mainly
the events, caused from beyond Armenia.

"I imply the so-called "five days war". The war has dramatically
changed the situation in the South Caucasus, which influenced the
dynamics of relations between Armenia and Russia and the United
States. The sharp worsening of image, as well as Georgia’s role
and weight for the West, raised importance of Armenia (as well as
Azerbaijan) which lead to the intensification of US policy in the
region.

On the contrary, the internal political events in Armenia (February
elections and the events following them) affected Armenia’s image on
the West and neutralization of this effect will take time, at least
in 2009.

As for Turkey, the changes are merely revolutionary. I think it would
be excessive to repeat facts, which are known to the reader, but it is
clear that the whole background of the Armenian-Turkish relations have
changed in the result of events in 2008. I do not support the idea
that the Armenian-Turkish relations will improve quickly and we are
looking forward the results of the spring local elections in Turkey.

But regardless of how the process moves forward, there have already
been revolutionary changes. "Armenia issue" has become an issue of
internal discourse in Turkey and the real breaking of Turkish-Armenian
and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations has occured", said Iskandaryan.

As for the influence of the global financial crisis on the geopolitical
situation in the region, he said it will affect all economies of the
region and reduce the regional weight of energy producing countries

Speaking about the Karabakh conflict, he said the resolution of this
conflict in the political perspective is impossible, it remained in
a frozen state. The parties have no real readiness for resolution,
military resolution is unserious, external powers are unable to force
the sides to make compromises. The quo status is maintained.

"The most important event of this year was the Meindorf declaration".

As for his expectations from the 2009 in the sense of the resolution
of the conflict and the overall development of the South Caucasus
countries, Iskandaryan said he still expects pseudo fights on pseudo
fields, and nothing real can occur on this scene.

"As for the overall development, two processes are important:
continuation of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue and cooperation with
Europe in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership program. I
also expect the replacement of powers in Georgia.

And, certainly, in this unstable situation, which is observed due
to the world financial crisis and the expected social programs,
emergency situations are possible in all the countries of the region",
concluded Iskandaryan.
From: Baghdasarian

http://www.today.az/news/pol