New Eastern Europe
Jan 16 2014
Railway Destinies
Magdalena DÄ…bek
For over 20 years, there has not been a railway connection between
Russia and Georgia. The route connecting the South Caucasus with the
southern regions of the Russian Federation was closed in August 1992
along with the start of the Abkhaz-Georgian War. During the past year,
the topic of renewing movement on this line returned to the table of
political discussion. Its opening would be, on the one hand, a chance
to improve Russo-Georgian and Georgian-Abkhaz relations and to
terminate the isolation of Armenia, and, on the other, an economic
failure. Yet above all in light of Armenia’s accession to the Customs
Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, it would be another strong
link in the Russo-Armenian relationship.
On September 6th 2013, the Secretary of the Council of National
Defence of Armenia Arthur Baghdasaryan announced that Russia, Abkhazia
and Georgia had agreed to once more open the rail lines connecting the
aforementioned countries with Armenia and, eventually, Iran. The
Georgian and Abkhaz governments, however, denied such a claim.
Although both countries continue to profess interest in inaugurating a
rail route, in their opinion the negotiations have not yet been
finished.
The Abkhaz internal world
Abkhazia is most opposed to inaugurating the railway connection, yet a
key fragment of the tracks runs through its territory. Renewing the
course of trains would facilitate Georgia and Armenia’s export of
grocery items, mostly fruits and vegetables, to the territory of the
Russian Federation, and this would create competition for the Abkhaz
export of citrus fruits. Abkhaz tourism ` the second branch of the
economy giving the country lucrative profits ` does not need this rail
line. Currently, trains travel to Suchumi and finish their route
there, while Russia regularly invests in the development of
connections with Abkhazia.
The second reason why Abkhazia consequently waters down the topic of
the rail route is its fear of a loss of independence. It is very
strongly linked economically with Russia, and so it is not eager to
come closer to Georgia, which according to the understanding of most
Abkhaz people would end with attempts to once again absorb Abkhazia
into its territory. Unsettling are, for example, common economic
projects seen as a threat to sovereignty. At the same time, fear may
awaken an excessive engagement of Russia in the region: one-quarter of
the republic’s budget is direct transfers from Russia, and the large
neighbour spends hefty amounts of money on the development of the
infrastructure, agriculture and also pensions, and evidently has great
influence over the situation in Abkhazia.
The third reason is the awareness that all the financial benefits of
transporting commodities across the territory of Abkhazia would
probably fall with the participation of Russia. The tracks belong to
Russian Railways, and Abkhazia’s Foreign Minister Irakli Khintba has
brought up this argument. In December 2012, when Georgian Prime
Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili brought up the topic, Russia and Armenia
became interested in the matter of the railway. He said that the
Abkhazians could participate in the negotiations if the tracks were to
fall in their hands. According to Khintba, the decision to initiate
the connection could be undertaken by Abkhazia if this were one of the
elements of a broader packet of negotiations including, for example,
an agreement to not apply violence from the Georgian side.
The rail also has symbolic significance in the Abkhaz imagination: it
is said that war came to the country through these tracks. And this
has its justification both from the perspective of 1992 and that of
2008.
Georgian vacillations
The idea to `reanimate’ the Caucasian railway route came from the
Georgian side already during the Shevardnadze government, but it did
not then find an answer, and the following events (the Rose
Revolution, the Russo-Georgian War) made this perspective more
distant. In October 2012, during the campaign to the parliamentary
elections, Bidzina Ivanishvili expressed a readiness to open a
Russo-Georgian railway connection running across the territory of
Abkhazia. Later, he brought up this topic several times: during a
visit to Armenia in January 2013 and during a session of the Council
of Europe in April of that year.
However, he always stuck to generalities and did not initiate any
official negotiations on the topic. Despite regular meetings and
negotiations, the Plenipotentiary of the Prime Minister of Georgia
Zubar Abashidze and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
Grigory Karasin did not discuss the railway connection. It could have
seemed that Georgia lost its interest in this matter: currently, more
important to its development is the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line,
and the export of goods to Russia accounts for only five per cent of
the trade balance.
The place of economics could be, however, taken by political benefits.
In accordance with the words of Paata Zakareishvili, the minister for
reintegration, the railway connection could serve to `renew trust’
between the Georgians and Abkhazians and also to create a certain
alternative for the development of the country. Also regarding the
question of improving Russo-Georgian relations, which the former prime
minister emphasized and whose policies will probably be continued by
his successor, initiating a Sochi-Yerevan connection would be received
well by Russia. Georgia must also solve the problem of recognizing
boundaries: today, driving into Abkhazia from the side of Psou is
illegal. The social response to this idea is interesting: according to
studies of the National Democratic Institute, 68 per cent of Georgian
respondents support the opening of such a connection.
Armenian hopes
>From Armenia’s perspective, a functioning
Russia-Abkhazia-Georgia-Armenia railway route is a dream come true. A
country that for 20 years has been in isolation and in conflict with
its neighbours, Turkey and Azerbaijan, can now breathe a sigh of
relief. Such a railway line would solve the transportation problem on
the Armenia-Russia line: trade exchange with the Russian Federation
accounts for 20 per cent of Armenia’s export and currently is done
through land routes through the pass in Larsi (South Ossetia) or by
sea in ports in Poti (Georgia) and Bender Abbas (Iran). The good state
of the tracks would not require investments from the authorities and
even if they would appear, Russia has already announced brotherly
help.
During a meeting of the Presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Vladimir Putin
on September 3rd in Moscow, the latter promised Armenia 15 billion
roubles for investments. In this regard, renewing railway connections
would even more strongly link Russia to Armenia, which is already
strongly dependent on the former. Freight trains also present a
possibility to transport heavy arms and missiles to the territory of
the republic where the troops of Russia are stationed ` and, from a
future perspective, Iran.
The strategic significance of the railway route for Russia’s interests
is unquestionable. This does not only mean an easier connection
between Georgia and Armenia, but also between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Russia has already once played the Azeri card in its relations with
Armenia: in June, the Russia Federation gave Azerbaijan arms whose
worth has been estimated to be 700,000 dollars. It is not impossible
that with easier communication, Russia could play this card more.
Economic realities
In October 2013, a group of independent experts of the International
Alert Organisation undertook research regarding the economic
possibilities of renewing travel on the Sochi-Yerevan line. The
results practically showed the absolute unprofitability of the
investment, especially on the part of Abkhazia. The sum that the
government of the republic not recognized by the international
community would have to invest in repairs is a not insignificant 251
American dollars. According to the experts’ calculations, with the
transport of 10 million tons annually the cost of the investment would
be returned after 16 years. The assumption of such a large trade
exchange with Russia is, however, unrealistic: if the whole transport
of Armenia, Georgia and Abkhazia were transferred to the rail, the
amount of commodities would be insufficient for the investment to be
profitable. Also, Georgia would have to invest certain resources, yet
dramatically smaller ones than Abkhazia. So far, none of the countries
has expressed interest in investing in the project, and none except
for Armenia has made specific decisions. The question of renewing the
Sochi-Yerevan connection is as of yet unresolved, but this idea also
has its economic benefits: the stimulation of production, the
decreasing of transportation costs and the creation of new jobs. The
only question is, is this not with too large a cost?
Translated by Filip Mazurczak
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/1107