Yerevan to host international photo exhibition
14:35 11/01/2014 » CULTURE
International photo exhibition titled `Window to the World’ will open
on January 15 at the Tekeyan Centre Fund in Yerevan, organizers say.
The exhibition will feature works of photographers from Armenia,
Australia, Germany, Georgia, the Netherlands, Russia, U.S. and
Ukraine.
The goal of the exhibition is to familiarize the Armenian society with
the works previously not exhibited in Armenia.
Source: Panorama.am
Russia, Serbia and the New Balkan Geopolitics
2014-01-07
Author:
Tony Rinna
A great deal of discussion regarding current European geopolitics
between Russia and the West has centred on recent events in Ukraine,
with warnings and forecasts about Georgia and Moldova as well. In the
strategically critical Balkan peninsula, however, Russia is quietly
but rapidly making headway in shoring up ties with a major regional
power ` Serbia. Throughout 2013, Serbia made a series of pivotal steps
towards closer integration with Russia in a variety of spheres, a fact
that has not garnered the attention that events in the other
aforementioned Eastern European states have.
Photo by Shutterstock: Kosovska Mitrovica, Serbia – Circa September 2011
One thing that distinguishes this geopolitics from the situation in
Ukraine is that Serbia is not being badgered or bullied into closer
ties with Russia. Russian overtures toward Serbia have been in many
ways more subtle and lacking the political divisiveness witnessed in
Ukraine. This is not to say that Serbia has been wholly willing and
compliant to Russia, but that Russian encroachment on Serbia has been
quieter and a lot less controversial.
This more favourable inclination toward Russia, however, should not
come as a surprise, given a shared Eastern Orthodox religious culture.
In addition to this, the Balkans, according to the late Samuel
Huntington, have been a staging ground where the West, Russia and the
Islamic World have converged in a clash for control of the region via
proxy countries. Russia had traditionally supported Orthodox Serbia,
while Bosnia and Croatia had tended to receive support from Catholic
Austria and the Muslim Ottoman Empire, respectively (Huntington points
to, in the more recent Balkan crisis in the 1990’s, German support for
Croatia and Turkish support for Bosnia, while Orthodox Russian and
Greek volunteers came to the aid of the Serbs).
Since the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serbia’s territory has slowly been
whittled away, to the point that it is not only a rump state of the
former Yugoslav Federation, but is even a much-reduced version of its
post-Yugoslavia self. Yet Serbia today remains an important power in
the Western Balkans, with the largest military and one of the
strongest economies in the region. The strengthening of Russian ties
with Serbia has occurred on three major fronts: military, economic and
political.
Militarily, Serbia has cast its defence lot with Russia. In early 2013
Serbia became a permanent observer at the Russia-led defence alliance,
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In November, 2013,
Russia and Serbia have signed a bilateral agreement on military
cooperation which was fifteen years in the making. NATO has expanded
its membership deeply into the Balkans, and has three more
countries’Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and the Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM)’as candidates. If these three countries end up
joining the Atlantic Alliance, Serbia will be completely surrounded on
all sides by NATO states. This means Serbia may become an Eastern
island surrounded by a Western defence alliance. The likelihood of
Serbia becoming a NATO member is rather remote, seeing as the alliance
will not allow members that have any types of territorial disputes,
and despite Åtefan Füle’s praise for the progress achieved between
Serbia and Kosovo, the disagreement is far from over.
Serbia’s economy is now predominantly a market economy (although the
state still controls much of the country’s economic activity), and is
presently the strongest in the region. The country’s Gini coefficient
has averaged at 28.9 since 2006. Although its real GDP growth for 2012
was 0.5 per cent (down 1.3 per cent from the year before), this is
still more than Bosnia and Croatia. Thus, Serbia is relatively healthy
and stable. In terms of trade, Serbia presently balances fairly well
between Europe and Russia. Serbia’s main trading partner for exports
is Italy, while Russia is Serbia’s main trading partner for imports,
although Germany is only slightly behind Russia in this regard. But
Russia has gained an edge over Europe vis-Ã-vis its ties with Serbia
on two fronts- the Serbian liberalisation of trade with the Russian
Customs Union and the construction of the South Stream pipeline.
The recent victory of the Russia-backed South Stream pipeline against
the EU-supported Nabucco pipeline represents the economic encroachment
by Russia on Serbia. According to Gazprom, the South Stream pipeline
will create 2.5 thousand jobs and lead to a direct investment of 0.5
billion euros in the country. The South Stream pipeline will indeed
continue into the heart of the EU ` Alexei Miller, Gazprom’s CEO,
stated that the next portion of the project will be undertaken in
Hungary, but seeing as Serbia is not already a member of the EU or
NATO it represents a major victory for Russia in this particular
aspect of new Balkan geopolitics.
While much of the Balkans has gravitated toward greater integration
with the West since the end of the Cold War, Serbia has been a notable
exception. To be sure, Serbia is set to begin talks with the EU on
accession starting January 21st 2014. But while Serbia is, at present,
a candidate for EU membership, the truth of the matter is that this
can be a rather hollow state of affairs. Turkey is also an EU
candidate but membership seems increasingly elusive. This has prompted
Turkey to search for alterative foreign policy orientations. Croatia
acceded to the EU in July 2013, but this should not be taken as a
reliable metric for gauging the possibility or likelihood of Serbian
accession to the EU. Croatia has had a notable history of closer ties
with the West as exemplified by its historic ties with
Austria-Hungary, and its Catholic religion which, in line with
Huntington’s thesis on the `Clash of Civilizations’, helped strengthen
its ties to the West. As many observers and analysts state, the EU is
experiencing `expansion fatigue’ with regard to its eastward candidate
states, Russia may continue to ramp up its efforts at courting Serbia
politically, which it has done thus far using methods of soft power.
Aside from this, Russia has fomented territorial divisions within
states on its periphery (namely Georgia and Moldova) as it hopes to
prevent them from joining the West militarily and politically. A great
deal of Serbia’s progress in relations with the EU has stemmed from
greater flexibility on the Kosovo issue. The West should therefore
take care to monitor any Russian attempts at undoing the progress and
rapprochement thus far achieved between Kosovo and Serbia to prevent
the latter from closer ties to the EU.
Serbia has been demonised to an extent in the West because of the
actions carried out by Serbs in the Homeland War in the early 1990’s.
According to Edward S. Herman of the University of Pennsylvania’s
Wharton School, the Western demonization of the Serbs has aided NATO’s
eastward expansion, and if the Serbs know that they have been
demonized by the Western media, it is not likely that they will want
to become integrated with the West, but rather sidle closer to their
traditional Russian protector. Russia has seized upon the traditional
ties and affinity Serbia has had with Russia and has invested in aid
for Serbia. In 2011, Russia opened an emergency centre in the city of
NiÅ?, a prime example of Russian soft power appeal.
Serbia’s increasing of its ties and integration with Russia has been
swift, relatively uncontroversial and seems to have been lost in the
West’s geopolitical conscientiousness. In some ways similar to
Armenia, which is a close ally of Russia surrounded by NATO member
Turkey and the generally more pro-Western states of Azerbaijan and
Georgia, Serbia appears to be becoming an important strategic lever
for Russia in the Balkans, one that does not border Russia directly,
but which nonetheless represents an access point for Russia in this
geopolitically critical region. The West should therefore not ignore
or discount the risks to its interests inherent in this grand
development.
Tony Rinna is a contributing geopolitical analyst at the US-based
Center for World Conflict and Peace. His areas of focus include
Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Protest march in support of Shant Harutyunyan (video, photos)
14:22 – 10.01.14
A crowd of activists gathered in Yerevan’s Liberty Square on Friday
for a protest march in support of Shant Harutyunyan, the
nationalistTseghakron party’s leader detained in the wake of an
anti-government protest in November.
The opposition Heritage party’s leader, Raffi Hovhanisian, who has
also recently returned from the United States, has joined the crowd.
Speaking to the journalists on the scene, he considered Harutyunyan a
political prisoner who needs support.
Artur Sakunts, the chairman of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly’s
Vanadzor Office, is also among the protesters.
Harutyunyan was detained on November 5 as he attempted to head to the
Presidential Office together with a group of supporters to `blow up
the building’ (as he had earlier stated). But the police later managed
to stop the procession. Subsequent clashes led to the arrest of 30
activists, including Harutyunyan.
The Tseghakron party’s leader now faces charges over using violence
against a policeman.
31% of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway’s Georgian section is built
January 10, 2014 | 12:39
TBILISI. – The Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of
Georgia hosted a meeting devoted to the ongoing construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the ministry informed.
The participants discussed the 2013 report on the railway
construction, and the measures to be taken this year.
The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project envisions the reconstruction of
a 153-kilometer stretch in Georgia, and the construction of a
27-kilometer railway between the Georgian City of Akhalkalaki and the
Turkish border.
At this point, 31 percent of the Georgian section of the railway is built.
The ministry also informed that the Georgian-Azerbaijani coordinating
council on the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project is slated to hold a
meeting in the near future, to discuss the financial and technical
matters, reports Gruzia Online news agency of Georgia.
Politkom (in Russian), Russia
Dec 16, 2013
Armenia Between Europe and Eurasia: Return to Policy of Balancing?
by Sergey Minasyan, leader of political studies department of
Yerevan’s Caucasus Institute
“The EU and Armenia are now working on a new juridical basis for their
relations, and it is possible that this will be a new association
agreement,” Zdzislaw Raczynski, Polish ambassador extraordinary and
plenipotentiary to Armenia, declared 13 December 2013 in an interview
for Radio Liberty’s Armenian editorial office. These words can, in
part, be described as the first public signal that, following the
virtual failure of the Eastern Partnership programme’s Vilnius summit,
Brussels may be displaying a somewhat more flexible approach to the
concept proposed by Armenia for combining its involvement in both the
Customs Union and the Association Agreement with the EU.
It should be pointed out that official Yerevan declared its readiness
to combine European association with membership of the Customs Union
back at the time of the celebrated meeting of Presidents Vladimir
Putin and Serzh Sargsyan 3 September 2013, when Armenia’s wish to join
the Customs Union was announced. This was aired in the Armenian
president’s speech in the presence of Putin, who declared that Armenia
would continue its cooperation with the EU in those spheres (primarily
economic policy) that would not run counter to the country’s future
membership of the Customs Union. It is possible to believe that this
was agreed by Sargsyan with the Russian president beforehand in the
course of previous complex Armenian-Russian negotiations and was one
element of Yerevan’s package decision to join the Customs Union.
In an interview with Armenian media the very next day, 4 September,
Vigen Sarkisyan, leader of the Armenian president’s administration,
stated Armenia’s readiness to initial the Association Agreement with
the EU at the upcoming Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership, but
without a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). It was
obvious to the Armenian side that this was a technically impossible
option ahead of the Vilnius summit (the DCFTA was an inalienable part
of Association). Nevertheless, official Yerevan advanced a kind of
proposal which at that time, quite predictably, was rejected by
European officials. However, it can also be assumed that this
statement was not only meant to show Yerevan’s readiness to retain at
least the level of agreements already reached with the EU. This may
have also been an attempt by the Armenian authorities partially to
shift the responsibility for the subsequent failure of the process of
initialing the Association Agreement onto the EU. Be that as it may,
at that moment Yerevan’s initiative was predictably doomed to failure.
On the one hand, the EU displayed a certain “grudge” against Yerevan,
manifested even in the statements of European officials at the highest
level. This was because the success of the Vilnius summit was a matter
of “personal prestige” for some of them -for example, for Stefan Fule,
European commissioner for enlargement issues. After the initial milder
statements regarding official Yerevan’s choice, in the second half of
September the EU beefed up its rhetoric. Brussels doggedly endeavoured
to ignore the circumstance that the process of initialing (and in the
case of Ukraine -also signing) the Association Agreement by the four
Eastern Partnership countries had, precisely because of the European
officials’ imprudent stance, turned from a purely technical process of
economic integration into a tough geopolitical struggle with Russia
(with Moscow’s perfectly predictable tough reaction in return).
Therefore the EU’s Brussels attempted to portray Yerevan’s refusal to
initial the Association Agreement as a result of the Armenian side’s
lack of steadfastness in its perception of the “European dream” and of
obvious pressure on Moscow’s part, and not as Armenia’s reluctance to
sacrifice its priorities in the security sphere in the geopolitical
confrontation in the post-Soviet area.
On the other hand, based precisely on the priorities of classic
“Realpolitik,” European officials had more serious and pragmatic
reasons to display inflexibility in the fall of 2013 with regard to
the choice made by Armenia. The EU needed to support Ukraine in its
resistance to Russia (with simultaneous pressure on Viktor
Yanukovych’s administration in the matter of releasing Yuliya
Tymoshenko), but since the “Ukrainian question” had to all intents and
purposes turned into a no-score draw between Brussels and Moscow,
under these conditions this required, a priori, a show of European
“principledness” with regard to Armenia. Therefore it was publicly
declared that it was not possible to sign the Association Agreement
because of Armenia’s possibly joining the Customs Union (which runs
counter to the terms of a free-trade zone with the EU).
However, after the end of the Vilnius summit with its well-known
results, one gets the impression that the EU became more flexible in
respect of the format of a possible new Association Agreement with
Armenia. Having realized that a geopolitical struggle in terms of
“either-or” is becoming too costly and complex a task even for the EU
itself (and too serious a choice for many post-Soviet countries),
Brussels may well reconsider its approaches. Particularly as the EU
must make haste on this issue so as not to lose what it is still left
with in the post-Soviet area, where Moscow is alternating its “carrots
and sticks.”
For example, when the main aim of Moscow’s pressuring the Armenian
leadership was not even so much Armenia’s joining the Customs Union as
preventing Yerevan’s initialing of the Association Agreement in
Vilnius, then the main tool for “persuading” Moscow was pressure on
Yerevan in matters of security (mainly connected with the Karabakh
conflict) and deliveries of energy resources. But after the virtual
torpedoing of the Vilnius summit, after the political decision adopted
by Yerevan to join the Customs Union and Kyiv’s decision to abandon
the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, Moscow somewhat
changed its approaches and its position on a number of aspects of
great importance to Yerevan.
The time came for “carrots” -not only addressed to Yerevan but also
capable, to a considerable degree, of serving as a “clear example” to
Kyiv as well. In particular, some signs of a correction of the Russian
position on matters of regional security and the Karabakh conflict and
also a galvanization of military-technical cooperation and
preferential deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia became apparent. A
reduction in the price of the Russian gas being delivered to the
republics, fixed through 2018 and tied to internal Russian prices, was
also announced during Putin’s visit to Armenia. Some other
Armenian-Russian accords in the economic and investment spheres were
also announced.
Accordingly, the EU must make haste, for the policy of robust pressure
on the Armenian leadership is now counterproductive and can only
prompt Yerevan still harder to turn once and for all towards Moscow.
As a result, quite a favourable situation can take shape for Armenia
to continue its traditional policy of balancing between the leading
foreign policy players in the post-Soviet area. At the same time
Armenia’s attempts effectively to combine two integration projects can
also serve as a good example to Moscow and Brussels themselves, whose
geopolitical confrontation in the Ukrainian political field at the
present time will, to all appearances, only intensify.
In his interview Ambassador Z. Raczynski described the political
realities that have taken shape around Armenia as follows: “My view of
the situation is as follows: Armenia’s security is guaranteed, first,
by its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and,
second, by special bilateral relations with Russia, and these
components are not at variance with association with the EU.
Admittedly, we do not yet have such examples, but why should Armenia
not be among the pioneers? That is, I mean that Armenia remains in the
security area guaranteed by Russia, but at the same time it enjoys the
privileges and the know-how that the EU can provide. This could have
been a very interesting and even historic political experiment.”
It has to be emphasized that Zdzislaw Raczynski is one of the most
professionally trained EU ambassadors presently accredited in Armenia
with a good grasp of the regional political realities. The ability to
have a clear understanding of the specific nature of the very complex
political context in the South Caucasus, as well as of the framework
and the limitations of Armenia’s traditional policy of balancing
between the most important geopolitical poles, was always
characteristic of the diplomats representing Warsaw in Yerevan. At the
same time it is possible to assert that the Polish ambassador’s
statement is not only a manifestation of his personal perspicacity but
also a symbol of some kind of trend in overall EU policy towards
Armenia. As long ago as 11 December, as a first step in implementing
the declaration on the development of cooperation, signed between
Armenia and the EU at the Vilnius summit 29 November, the European
Parliament adopted the decision to include the republic in a number of
internal European programmes, particularly in the spheres of
education, science, and culture.
The example of Armenia, where it is likely that the European
integration processes will return to the former, mainly technical
format of joint economic projects, of comprehensively promoting
reforms, of deepening democratic institutions, and defending
fundamental human rights, may also mean that the EU in its post-Soviet
policy may not intensify the struggle with Russia in the field where
Moscow “by default” is stronger and more confident -in the field of
“classic” geopolitics within the coordinates not even of the 20th
century but almost the 19th century. It must not be forgotten, in the
end, that the geopolitical ghosts of Bismarck and Metternich roam the
Kremlin’s dark corridors far more frequently than the glass stories of
the European Commission’s Brussels building.
[Translated from Russian]
US Official News
January 11, 2014 Saturday
Washington: SPEECH OF HON. JIM COSTA OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 2014
Washington
The Library of Congress, The Government of USA has issued the following Speech:
Mr. COSTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay to tribute to the life of
Ernest Armen Bedrosian who passed away on January 1, 2014 at the age
of 80. Ernie had a significant role in the raisin industry, and his
advocacy on behalf of farmers throughout California will undoubtedly
be missed.
Ernie grew up in Parlier, California with his two brothers; Krikor and
Kenneth, and his sister, Clara. His parents, Murad and Elizabeth, were
first generation immigrants who survived the Armenian Genocide.
Growing up in an immigrant family with strong parents, Ernie quickly
developed great values and principles.
In 1955, Ernie graduated from Fresno State College with a Bachelor’s
Degree in agriculture. Upon graduation, he joined the United States
Army and became a food specialist. A year into his service, Ernie
married the love of his life, Carlotta Ketchian. They raised two
children; Bryan and Tammy.
In 1958, Ernie completed his time with the Army and went back to work
on his family farm. Ernie and his brothers began a grape harvesting
business, and in his spare time, Ernie served on various raisin boards
and met stakeholders who farmed throughout the Valley. In 1966, he
formed the Raisin Bargaining Association (RBA). Ernie served as the
first president of the RBA and guided the association through its
early years. Today, the RBA is the most successful and largest raisin
bargaining association in the country.
While Ernie was establishing the RBA, he and his brothers were also
expanding their farming operation. In 1967, they decided to go into
the raisin packing business and opened National Raisin Company (NRC).
The Bedrosian brothers and their partner Harry Rustigian developed the
“Champion” brand. Ernie served as the president and was responsible
for sales and daily operations. The NRC had a strong beginning and
decades later, it still continues to prosper. It is the largest
independent raisin, prune, and dried fruit operation in the world.
It is obvious that Ernie was an extremely successful businessman, but
he never took full responsibility for his accomplishments. He
attributed his success to Carlotta and his sister in-laws; Katherine
and Jane, who served as a support system to the Bedrosian brothers
while they were forming their business. Ernie loved the raisin
industry, but family always came first. He was a loving and devoted
husband and a supportive father. He also enjoyed spending time with
his grandchildren; Corney, Tyler, Armen, and Lillian.
Mr. Speaker, it is with great respect that I ask my colleagues in the
House of Representatives to pay tribute to the life of Ernest Armen
Bedrosian. His presence will be greatly missed, but his legacy will
surely live on in the Central Valley.
For more information please visit:
Zhamanak: Non-coalition parliamentary factions may apply to Constitutional Court
12:05 11/01/2014 » DAILY PRESS
The four non-coalition parliamentary forces – Prosperous Armenia,
Armenian National Congress, ARF Dashnaktsutyun and Heritage – are
discussing the possibility of applying to the Constitutional Court of
Armenia. They intend to appeal the ratification of the Agreement on
Sales/Purchase of Shares of ArmRosGazprom CJSC between the Government
of Republic of Armenia and Russian Federation. They are also
considering the possibility of delaying the appeal, Zhamanak writes.
According to ARFD member Artsvik Minasyan, everything depends on the
outcome of the discussions. `Everything depends on the change of the
situation and political rearrangements.’
Source: Panorama.am
Aliyev is aware that new adventure will lead to new defeats: Shavarsh Kocharyan
21:30, 10 January, 2014
YEREVAN, JANUARY 10, ARMENPRESS. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Armenia Shavarsh Kocharyan responded the question of
`Armenpress’ on the statements made by the President of Azerbaijan
Ilham Aliyev at the course of his speech introduced at the session of
the Government.
– Mr. Kocharyan, how would you comment on the claims by the President
of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev made at his speech on January 9 that
according to the numbers Armenia yields Azerbaijan in all areas which
will play a decisive role in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.
– It has not been a secret for a long time that the main obstacle for
the negotiating process is the denial of the right to
self-determination by wangling the essence of issue by Azerbaijan,
anti-Armenian propaganda and threats for renewed war. This was once
again reflected in the latest speech of Azerbaijan’s President. He
could sound more impressive numbers comparing with the Republic of
Artsakh. But he avoids it as he did not forget that despite the
numbers they were defeated by Artsakh in the result of the aggression
unleashed by Azerbaijan and is well aware that new adventure will lead
to new defeats.
3 jailed Armenian activists declare hunger strike
January 11, 2014 | 11:48
YEREVAN. – Avetis Avetisyan, Alek Poghosyan, and Misak Arakelyan – who
are among those arrested during the events that occurred on November
5, 2013 in Armenia’s capital city Yerevan – declared a hunger strike
since Wednesday.
But they have not yet been moved to a separate cell, Avetisyan’s wife
told Armenian News-NEWS.am.
They demand that the ban on their relatives’ visits be lifted and the
psychological pressures and the persecutions against their families be
ended.
`The Justice Ministry informed that it is unaware of this hunger
strike, whereas a person from the Ombudsman’s Office already visited
them on this matter,’ the woman added.
The United National Initiative leader and activist Shant Harutyunyan
who heads a nationalist party, and who had announced about starting a
revolution, on November 5, 2013 – and with close to several dozen
supporters wearing Guy Fawkes `Anonymous masks’ – had started a march
toward the Presidential Palace, but the police had stopped the march.
As a result, there was a scuffle, and the police detained 38
activists, including Harutyunyan and his son. Subsequently, 20 of
them, including Harutyunyan, were arrested, charges were laid against
six of them and, consequently, they were incarcerated. As a result of
the melee, sixteen people, including police officers and the Armenian
News-NEWS.am reporter, were injured.
Shant Harutyunyan was charged with violence against a
representative – i.e., the police – of the authorities, and on Friday he
ended his sixteen-day hunger strike.
ARMENIE
Un leader de l’opposition hospitalisé
Shant Harutiunian, le dirigeant arrêté après des manifestations
anti-gouvernementales qui ont conduit à des affrontements avec la
police anti-émeute à Erevan en Novembre, a été hospitalisé jeudi soit
16e jour après le début de sa grève de la faim.
Harutiunian refuse toute nourriture pour protester contre le refus des
autorités répressives de permettre à ses parents de lui rendre visite
ou d’avoir des conversations téléphoniques. Treize autres hommes
arrêtés au cours des affrontements ont également été détenus au secret
sans une explication claire. Deux d’entre eux ont entamé une grève de
la faim plus tard en décembre.
Inessa Petrossian, l’avocat de Harutiunian, a dit au service arménien
de RFE / RL (Azatutyun.am) que le militant nationaliste et vétéran de
la guerre a été emmené à l’hôpital de la prison après une nouvelle
dégradation de son état de santé. Petrossian a déclaré que son client
avait l’air fragile et en difficulté, mais restait déterminé à
poursuivre la grève de la faim quand elle l’a vu lors de sa dernière
visite dans une prison d’Erevan mercredi.
L’avocat s’est plaint que les fonctionnaires de police enquêtant sur
les violences du 5 novembre dans le centre-ville n’ont toujours pas
répondu aux lettres datant de décembre d’Harutiunian exigeant une
explication pour l’interdiction des visites et des conversations
téléphoniques. Elle a qualifié l’interdiction de sans précédent, en
disant que même les membres de l’opposition arrêtés après les troubles
post-électoraux de 2008 à Erevan ont été autorisés à voir leurs
proches après avoir passé un mois en détention. Petrossian a dit que
c’est une autre indication que la procédure pénale est politiquement
motivée.
Artur Sakunts, un militant des droits de l’homme très critique des
autorités arméniennes a de même affirmé qu’Harutiunian et les autres
détenus sont victimes de « persécution politique ». Sakunts a été
autorisé à visiter et parler à Harutiunian le 6 Janvier.
Toutefois, le procureur général Gevorg Kostanian, a nié tout motif
politique derrière l’affaire. « Je ne peux que dire que tout individu,
y compris Shant Harutiunian, doit être tenu pour responsable de ses
actes s’il est reconnu coupable par le tribunal » a-t-il déclaré.
Kostanian a rejeté les appels pour la libération des 14 hommes en
attendant une enquête plus approfondie. Il a affirmé que les
enquêteurs de police avaient des raisons de les maintenir en détention
provisoire mais n’a pas donné plus de précisions.
La police antiémeute a utilisé la force contre des dizaines de
manifestants armés de btons et de grenades assourdissantes lorsque
ces derniers ont tenté de marcher vers le btiment de l’administration
présidentielle dans ce qu’Harutiunian a appelé une révolution
anti-gouvernement.
Les détenus risquent une peine d’emprisonnement de cinq à dix ans
s’ils sont reconnus coupables de voies de fait.
samedi 11 janvier 2014,
Stéphane ©armenews.com