DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 30, 2014 Wednesday
CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND CLUMSY POLICY
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 28, 2014, p. 11
by Vladimir Kazimirov
NEGOTIATIONS ON REGULATION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH WILL BE EFFICIENT ONLY
AFTER THE PARTIES GIVE UP COMBAT OPERATIONS; In September of 1991,
Russia became an intermediary in the most difficult armed
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the first in the USSR. By May 12 of 1994,
it helped Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to stop the mass
bloodshed. The bitter war of almost three years ended with a truce.
Half a month later, it will have its 20th jubilee.
The Minsk OSCE group (ambassadors of 11 countries) acted as
intermediaries since March of 1992 too. Moscow achieved ceasefire both
independently and in the Minsk group. The truce achieved by Russia
forced participants of the group to recognize its special role in
resolving of this conflict and to make it co-chair of the Minsk OSCE
group (since 1997, these are Russia, US and France).
Harsh mutual mistrust and maximalism of parties of the conflict do not
allow solving of the problems still. Periodical aggravations of the
situation pose a big danger for both nations, for neighboring
countries and for a very sensitive region. Confirmation of the truce
for promotion of peaceful regulation by political measures is the most
important task of parties of the conflict.
This is first but this is above all because all the rest depends on
it. The truce is drawn as infinite but this is insufficient. Decades
of negotiations have proven that as long as a risk of war is not ruled
out fully their success is not guaranteed and is even doubtful. By
their attitude the parties deprive themselves of flexibility and
readiness for search for compromise.
Consistency and sequence of the steps have huge importance in
regulation of conflicts at the peak of mistrust. Official Baku
addressing humanity struggles, first of all, for departure of Armenian
troops from the territories occupied by them and for return of
refugees and postpones achievement of peace and resolving of the main
dispute about status of Nagorno-Karabakh. It even threatens with a new
war. Why did those who did not wish stopping of combat operations
contrary to four resolutions of the UN Security Council forget about
humanism?
Having moved the frontline further from Nagorno-Karabakh and having
occupied the shortest positions (this is important for them) and
having fortified them thoroughly, Armenians do not hurry to leave
struggling for comprehensive resolving of the conflict: they wish to
confirm the truce reliable as a path to peace and, of course, to
determine status of Nagorno-Karabakh as soon as possible. How was the
problem of sequence formulated in resolutions of the UN Security
Council? They demanded immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of
occupation forces but the second was obviously impossible before
observance of the first demand.
However, not these resolutions ruined by those who tried to resolve
the conflict by force served as the basis of the truce. This was the
most important document of the mediation of Russia, namely the
statement of the council of the leaders of CIS countries of April 15
of 1994. In it leaders of the states with personal participation of
Geidar Aliyev and Levon Ter-Petrosyan outlined only two key statements
there: 1) not only to cease fire but also to confirm the truce
reliable; 2) determined the sequence of further actions. The parties
emphasized specifically that without reliable confirmation of
ceasefire “it is impossible to transit to liquidation of consequences
of the traffic confrontation” (withdrawal of troops and repatriation
of refugees).
Of course, this is not a legal document but the most important
political document adopted on the supreme level. For the purpose of
confirmation of this statement leaders of parliaments of all parties
of the conflict were gathered in Bishkek between May 4 and 5 of 1994.
They supported it and called on the parties to cease fire by May 8.
Delays and tricks of one of the parties forced legalization of the
truce in a very original way but by May 12 of 1994 the agreement
acquired full legal force.
But there is no reliable confirmation of the agreement still! Military
preparations and militarist rhetoric of Baku are well known, as well
as its refusal to sign an agreement on non-use of force, evasion of
separation of troops, a lot of incidents on the line of contact and
other manifestations of gross forceful clumsy policy. The motto of the
incumbent authorities of Azerbaijan is, “Not the war but just its
first stage is over.” The authorities hide that Geidar Aliyev has
advocated resolving of the conflict “by peaceful methods alone.”
Armenians act harshly sometimes too but not so often and, as a rule,
in response to the steps of Baku. Attempts of President Ilham Aliyev
to change the procedure of resolving of the conflict radically (to
regain the land lost in battles without confirmation of a truce before
this) are not connected with the realistic approach of his father
expressed on April 15 of 1994 anymore.
At first glance from outside, the parties seem to be equal: Armenians
are not praised for retention of occupied territories and Azerbaijanis
are not praised for demonstrative belligerence and threats. Along with
this, there is a difference. Problems of occupation and refugees were
born “the day before yesterday and yesterday” and already became
reality. They are a little soothed down by ‘today” and require
peaceful solution “tomorrow.” Promises to restart the slaughter
represent the “tomorrow” that makes the entire today harder because of
apprehensions. That is why it is quite naturally from the
psychological point of view that what s the most dangerous, that I the
policy of Baku, is criticized the biggest of all. There are also three
other reasons.
First, a new war about Nagorno-Karabakh is absolutely unnecessary and
dangerous for both nations, Armenian and Azerbaijani, for their
neighbors and, of course, for Russia.
Second, fulfillment of officially signed agreements between the
parties is extremely important. For states, especially the young ones,
this is a measurement of maturity and reliability as partners. The
list of non-observance cases and cases of evasion of peacekeeping
initiatives is obviously unfavorable for Azerbaijan: it ruined four
resolutions of the UN Security Council, four ceasefire initiatives,
more than 20 proposals of intermediaries (Armenians scored only four
cases in total), refusal to separate the troops, ignoring of the
agreement on strengthening of the ceasefire regime. Is this little?
Dos this increase confidence in Baku?
There is also the “third.” There the first is from the field of policy
the second is from the field of law, the third is rather from the
fouled of morality: unreliability and sometimes lie of propaganda.
Baku poses and condemns the occupation as problem number one. But it
is high time to study the reasons of its appearance then and not to
confine everything to aggressiveness of Armenians. Why there is not a
single word about obvious mistakes of Abulfaz Elchibey and Geidar
Aliyev on their stake at force, which resulted in spreading of
occupation to seven districts? Propaganda of Armenians has faults too
but authorities there are more accurate and avoid shady arguments. In
Baku it is possible to hear anything on the highest level: 20% of the
territory is allegedly occupied, there are reportedly more than 1
million refugees etc.
Thus, according to all these parameters official Baku is “beyond
competition” too. Why should we be surprised that critique is
addressed mostly to it (and not to Azerbaijani people contrary to what
Baku would like to show).
Drawn out negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh will stop skidding only
after full ruling out of combat operations. Peace for Nagorno-Karabakh
guaranteed seriously by Azerbaijan, as well as by great powers, would
change positions of Armenians. They would have to quit the occupied
land gradually but quicker. Meanwhile, Baku allegedly striving for
soonest regulation does everything on the opposite: it prolongs the
status quo contrary to the declared interests.
Another obstacle in negotiations is unwillingness of Azerbaijan to
recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as a party of the conflict and hence its
participant. Along with this, during the years of the war Baku
contacted Stepanakert more than ten times and signed various documents
with it (without participation of Yerevan). Nagorno-Karabakh also
signed three common documents with Azerbaijan and Armenia: the truce,
the statement of July 27 of 1994 and agreement of February 4 of 1995.
Without participation of Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations cannot reach
the final round because its status is the main disputable point of the
conflict.
[Translated from Russian]