STANCES ON THE REOPENING OF HEYBELIADA SEMINARY
Today’s Zaman
April 27 2009
Turkey
The debate over the potential opening up of the Heybeliada Seminary
is, while not these days at the top of the public agenda, a topic
which will clearly come up often in the near future. In fact, it
most recently came up during the visit to Turkey by US President
Barack Obama.
The subject of the Heybeliada Seminary is of a unique and special
importance. This is because this subject entails much more than simply
deciding whether or not this seminary-school should be reopened — and
within that question, the various hows and whys — but also provides
an example of some of the very basic preconceptions and ideas that
exist in Turkey. From this perspective then, the article by Hasan
Celal Guzel, "How should the Heybeliada Seminary be opened?" (Radikal,
April 10, 2009) is a great example. Let me say right away that my
aim with this article in not to enter into a polemic with Guzel,
but instead to display and offer criticism of some of the factors
from the "nationalist" viewpoints within the Turkish public that
are reflected in Guzel’s article. I believe that a critique of the
viewpoint represented in Guzel’s article is a precondition in order
to see the general change in public mentality necessary on the matter
of reopening the Heybeliada Seminary.
In terms of the more general matter at hand, everyone already
knows that the Heybeliada Seminary was founded in 1844 in order to
"provide religious leaders for the Fener Greek Orthodox Patriarchate
and the Ottoman Greek community." But what is not as well known or
examined is the question of why this school was actually closed. The
Heybeliada Seminary, which offered education both on the high school
and university levels, was, as the result of a 1971 Constitutional
Court decision — a decision not directly related to the seminary
itself — closed down when the court decision ruled that private
universities and institutions of higher learning in Turkey must be
formed directly by the government. The Heybeliada Seminary’s school
of higher learning declined to be linked with a Turkish state-formed
university and was thus shut down. (Allow me to clarify here that
the fact that the school was subject to such a ruling is in itself a
serious legal error, but that the narrowness of this space does not
allow me to touch on this topic here.)
An issue since 1971
In any case, since 1971, the debate over just how and when the school
might be reopened is one which has sprung up from time to time in
Turkey. Touching on the matter in the Taraf newspaper, journalist Ayhan
Aktar wrote on April 13, 2009 that he supported the views expressed by
Guzel, as opposed to the views expressed by the Patriarchate’s lawyer,
Kezban Hatemi, who, representing the Patriarchate view, insists that
the school be allowed to open with its "pre-1971 status." According
to Aktar’s viewpoint, the seminary could be opened as a so-called
"foundation university" in accordance with today’s Constitution and
legal order. Of course, for this, Parliament would be obliged to issue
a new law with regard to the creation of such a foundation university,
and this in turn would call for a very clear and resolute political
show of will.
The above being the case then, the real problem is then connected to
eliminating the barriers to this kind of political show of will. My
personal conviction is that the most significant barrier these days
in Turkey to reformist political steps being taken is the narrow
"nationalist" viewpoint that seems to have wrapped itself around our
political horizons. What I am referring to here is the analysis of
all problems and possible reforms which could solve these problems
through the lens of the very existence of our nation-state and what
its interests are. The views expressed in Guzel’s article "How should
the Heybeliada Seminary be opened?" are defining of this particular
approach.
To wit: First of all, the beginning of Guzel’s article, which notes
that the school’s "past files are full of criminal records" and which
then goes on to note that if it were reopened, it would pose many
risks for the state itself, refers later to another researcher on
this matter, Aytunc Altndal. Thus the reader’s "national awareness"
is prompted to be on alert, pushing the reader to think to him
or herself: "Well, I guess it would be fine if the seminary didn’t
reopen. In fact, it should not be reopened since those pushing to see
it reopened are people who are involved in all sorts of plans and
organizations to topple our state." So while Guzel is technically
"on the side" of seeing the seminary reopened, this stance he
takes actually still manages to spark and support this "national
awareness." He assures the reader not to be afraid, noting: "We,
as the descendants of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, are a people who show
respect and tolerance to other religions’ religious men, to their
beliefs and their traditions. What’s more, these kinds of activities
would never be enough to remove Istanbul from our hands anyway."
The problem’s with Guzel’s stance
Well, that is all wonderful, but not connected to the real
problem. After all, this is simply a stance, and various ideologies
really gain meaning within their own parameters and are thus
"understandable" within these same parameters. No, the real problem
lies with what comes after this because what comes after this is the
results of this "stance" I have just described.
1. Guzel places the seminary completely within the parameters of
schools referred to in Article 40 of the Treaty of Lausanne — a treaty
which some refer to as the "honor of our republic." But Guzel also
asserts that when it comes to the rights referred to in Articles 37-45
of the Treaty of Lausanne under the heading "Non-Muslim Minorities"
and when Article 45 is implemented, there must be reciprocity between
Turkey and Greece. I don’t know how many times this has already been
written about, but this subject simply has no connection to the
seminary. Reciprocity is a subject which can come up when you are
talking about two states’ relations and the right of the citizens
living in those states. What we are talking about here is non-Muslims
who are also citizens of the Turkish Republic and ethnic Turks who
are citizens of Greece — or, to use the expression in the Treaty of
Lausanne, the "Muslim minorities in Greece."
While some of the accords laid out in the Treaty of Lausanne in
reference to the "non-Muslim minorities" in Turkey are connected only
to non-Muslims, others refer to the citizens of the Turkish Republic
as a whole. At the same time, as is understood and known that it is
not the "Orthodox Greek" community in Turkey alone that is referred
to in the Treaty of Lausanne as a "non-Muslim minority" but also the
Armenians, the Jews, the Assyrians and various Christian sects. This
includes groups that don’t even have a state outside the borders of
Turkey with whom Ankara could even search out "terms of reciprocity"
even if it wished to. So this "incorrect" stance embraced not only by
Guzel but also by many "nationalist-leftist" circles is unfortunately
reflective of the same narrow nationalist mentality which has seen
the Greek Orthodox Patriarch himself — who is a Turkish citizen —
referred to in the past as a "foreigner." Likewise, this mentality has
prompted high court decisions that refer to non-Muslim foundations as
"foreign foundations." Yes, it is true that the Heybeliada Seminary
is an institution which falls within the rulings agreed upon in the
Treaty of Lausanne. The reciprocity aspect referred to in the Treaty
of Lausanne, however, is not possible. In other words, the reopening
of the Heybeliada Seminary would not in and of itself require the
opening of a similar school for Muslims in Greece.
2. And so now we come to another point that calls for some criticism
of Guzel’s articStances on the reopening of Heybeliada Seminary
le. Let us ask, in a style that has become fashionable recently:
"And so let’s say that this is a question of reciprocity. What kind
of school is it that would correspond with the Heybeliada Seminary
and could be opened for Muslim minorities living in Greece?" Here is
Guzel’s answer to this question: In response to Turkey allowing the
reopening of the Heybeliada Seminary, there should be an "Islamic
Institute of Learning" or "Islamic Institution of Higher Learning"
opened in Greece. But no doubt Guzel, in forming his vision of this
reciprocity, is not thinking of the future graduates of such institutes
as — God forbid! — "Muslim clerics." In the end, Guzel’s article
must be read — taking also into consideration his call for US and
EU help on this topic — as an example of an answer to the question,
"How can we not open the Heybeliada Seminary?"
My personal conviction is that the Seminary on Heybeliada, which was
formed in 1844 and placed under the security provided by Article 40
of the Treaty of Lausanne, was ultimately sacrificed to an atmosphere
defined by the 1974 Cypriot tensions and is even today being analyzed
through the same narrow-minded nationalist mentality. I also believe
that the Heybeliada Seminary should be opened as is appropriate to
the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne and the wishes of the Fener Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate. In this way, not only would the narrow-minded
nationalistic mentalities blocking the path of reforms in Turkey be
eliminated, but at the same time a significant step would have been
taken in terms of bringing Turkish democracy into harmony with modern
multicultural standards.