ALEPPO VIOLENCE HIGHLIGHTS BAATH REGIME’S VULNERABILITY
by Joseph Kechichian
Gulf News (United Arab Emirates)
May 13, 2012 Sunday
Beirut On May 3, four students were shot dead by Bashar Al Assad’s
forces at Aleppo University in Syria. Angry residents then held a
mass anti-regime demonstration in the city which has largely been a
bystander in the unrest in the country. When the military fired on
protesters it served to further alienate Aleppines.
Few expected the ongoing uprisings throughout Syria from spilling
over into Aleppo, but recent turmoil highlights the Baath regime’s
vulnerability. If Aleppines withdraw their support for the regime,
Syria will experience an epochal change.
Background
Aleppo is Syria’s largest city and the influential financial capital
of the country, threatens to unsettle the Baath regime’s hold onto
power. The first anti-regimes demonstrations in Aleppo were held on
August 12, 2011, in the city’s Sakhur district when two protesters
were shot dead. On October 19, 2011, in one of the largest rallies
ever held in Syria, more than 1.5 million Aleppines demonstrated in
support of the government of President Bashar Al Assad.
Indeed, as loyal supporters of the regime, the city’s estimated 2.5
million were caught between the proverbial hammer and the anvil:
for centuries, Aleppines remained dependable to various masters
precisely to protect distinct identities and culture, though events
beyond their control almost always extracted much heavier prices than
most were willing to pay.
Aleppo went to Syria at the end of the First World War and the infamous
Treaty of Sevres, which promised the creation of two independent
states, Kurdistan and Armenia. Neither saw the light of day as Turkish
nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal, later Ataturk, annexed most of the
Province of Aleppo as well as Anatolia to his nascent republic in the
1921-1922 War of Independence. While local Arabs supported Turkish
forces, the outcome was disastrous for Aleppo as a second treaty,
that of Lausanne, allocated most of the province to Turkey, which meant
that Aleppo was cut from its northern satellites and from the Anatolian
cities beyond, on which its inhabitants depended heavily for commerce.
Other secret accords, including the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that
carved the region between France and Britain separated Aleppo from
most of Mesopotamia, which also harmed its economy.
French Plots
Ironically, French General Henri Gouraud declared in September 1920 the
creation of the “State of Aleppo,” as part of a French scheme to divide
Syria into several smaller states, including an “Alawi Republic.”
Paris vehemently opposed a united Syria.
Gouraud sought to achieve a permanent wedge between Aleppo and Damascus
to benefit from the political division, believing that Aleppo deserved
to be chosen as the capital, given its wealthier status, though the
area’s fertile land essentially meant that no matter what occurred,
Aleppo would still retain pre-eminent spot.
Damascus was, for all its rich history, little more than a land-locked
oasis on the fringes of the vast Syrian Desert.
Clearly, the wily Gouraud wanted to grant the mixed
Sunni/Muslim-Christian/Armenian Aleppo, as well as Latakia in the
case of the Alawi community, the type of independence that would
never lure them into union with Damascus again. Still, that was not
to be, because Syrians held on to their quest for unity. Unyielding,
Paris orchestrated the 1923 federation between Aleppo, Latakia,
Damascus and Lebanon, though the latter was separated and a Syrian
Federation emerged under President Subhi Barakat. This federation
ended in December 1924, when France merged Aleppo and Damascus into
a single Syrian State and separated the Alawite State once again.
A series of coup d’etats beginning in the ’50s literally defined
contemporary Syrian history. The first was by Husni Zaim, an army
officer from Aleppo, though his pro-Egyptian, pro-Western orientation
sealed his fate.
Within four months, his Aleppo colleague, Sami Hinnawi, initiated a
takeover, ostensibly to revitalise union with Iraq.
Naturally, opposition to such union ushered in a third coup, this
time by Adib Shishakly in December 1949.
Ironically, Shishakly’s domination ended in 1954 when a half-baked
union was sealed with Egypt under the charismatic Jamal Abdul Nasser,
which was only implemented in 1958. By 1960, the union collapsed
after a junta of young Damascus officers carried out a separatist coup.
Aleppo resisted the coup, but recognised the new regime after the
military appointed Nazim Qudsi as President, and Maruf Dawalibi as
Prime Minister, both of whom hailed from Aleppo.
Coup d’etats returned in March 1963 when a coalition of Nasirists,
Socialists and Baathists wished to restore the union with Egypt
but failed.
Classic struggle
A classic internecine struggle followed with Aleppine Nasirists losing
the political battle.
An insurgency in July 1963 mobilised Aleppo and while the Baath tried
to appease northerners by appointing Ameen Hafiz, a Baathist military
officer from the city as President it didn’t work. When President
Hafez Al Assad took power in 1970, he relied on the Damascus business
class over those from Aleppo, which literally changed the country’s
economic balance of power.
It was worth highlighting that the Baath experience in Aleppo
accommodated the city’s powerful Chamber of Commerce by appointing
trustworthy Aleppines to sensitive positions, although Hafez Al Assad
never relied on northerners, even if he periodically needed them. In
fact, after 1970, it was increasingly difficult for Aleppines to
compete with their counterparts in Damascus, simply because the
president favoured the capital city’s business leaders in his divide
and conquer scheme. Aleppines supported the Baath, consequently,
largely out of fear rather than conviction, though leading families
benefited from arrangements that ensured a steady flow of income to
elite classes.
To his credit, Hafez Al Assad masterfully manipulated the two
Chambers of Commerce to benefit his own powerbase, which was why the
contemporary history of Syria is so skewed. Little actually occurred
on the domestic front during the past four decades precisely because
of the fear factor that literally immobilized Syrian society.
Of course, the state structure held because business leaders continued
to prop the regime, with “tributes” and “protection money” delivered
to party bosses, before and after the 2011 uprising.
Whether these practices contributed to the country’s overall corruption
was unclear, although unconfirmed reports from Aleppo hinted that
several local business leaders extended financial support to the
opposition, just to hedge their bets.
Still, Hassan Zaido, the powerful President of the Aleppo Chamber of
Commerce, is standing by Bashar Al Assad, but he is paying a high
price. Indeed, Syria’s economic collapse, with the currency losing
nearly half of its value in less than a year, threatened the profit
margins of most businesses still operating in the country.
Damascus was aware of the needs of this key constituency especially
when in September “Loyal Aleppo Traders” let the head of state know of
their disapproval. The regime was vigilant that its remaining allies
received necessary protection though this was not always possible.
Both ways
For example, opposition forces burned down a textile factory in Aleppo
in December 2012, allegedly because its owner provided financial
backing to the regime. The owner Bassam Al Olabi, a prominent Aleppine
financier, then died of a heart attack. But the attacks went both ways
as businesses were subjected to acts of arson, theft, or kidnapping
of their personnel if they stood with one side against the other.
Primarily composed of members of the Alawite community, the Damascus
nouveau riche enjoyed unprecedented privileges, which created a gulf
between them and traditional merchant families. Because the merchant
class worries about long-term instability, perhaps even a civil war,
which would further impoverish them, they have adopted a policy that
would see them gradually distance themselves from the regime.
Beirut Romans, Byzantines, Seljuks, Mamluks and Ottomans stopped
in Aleppo at one point or another throughout history. That is why
the old city today is still characterised with its large mansions,
narrow alleys and covered souqs, even if modernisation changed the
face of its architecture.
Old Aleppo is dominated by the Citadel that was erected during
the first millennium BC, a jewel of an acropolis that was rebuild
after several earthquakes. Because of repeated invasions, Aleppines
retreated into religiously and ethnically separated quarters that
were economically independent, and which account for the city’s
multi-ethnic composition.
A traditional Muslim town, today’s Aleppo is still primarily inhabited
by Sunni Arabs although Kurdish and Turkmen neighbourhoods emerged
during the past century. Importantly, the city is also home to one
of the largest Christian communities in the Middle East, chiefly
Armenians and Melkites.
In addition to established Catholic congregations, most of whom
arrived with French missionaries starting during the Crusades,
the city’s Orthodox Christians swelled with the influx of Armenian
survivors of the 1915 massacres in the Ottoman Empire.
Between 1915 and 1922, Aleppo welcomed nearly 25,000 survivors,
though a second wave of 50,000 settled in the city in 1923, after
French troops withdrew from Anatolia. By the end of 1925, Armenians
formed more than 25 per cent of the total population, and though their
numbers diminished due to emigration, a significant presence remained.
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