Author: Antonian Lara

WHILE PARTNERS ARE IN HIGH DEMAND:
RUSSIA’S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH CIS COUNTRIES IS PLAYING AN EVER INCREASING ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
by: Vladimir Semenchenko

Source: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 13, April 4 – 10, 2007, p. 2
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 11, 2007 Wednesday

The Shape And Prospects Of Military-Technical Cooperation In The Commonwealth;
Analysis of military-technical cooperation in the Commonwealth.

The Russian military-industrial complex is playing a major role in the
maintenance of the defense capability of the country and as a supplier
of military hardware to CIS states and distant foreign countries. As
a matter of fact, the military-technical cooperation is attaining
additional importance within the framework of international relations.

Russia’s military-technical cooperation with CIS countries is
particularly close.

Some experts say that without the cooperation of CIS countries,
Russia will be able to produce only 17% of what military hardware
and double purpose products it is currently making. In fact, this
is the best parameter in all of the Commonwealth. The preservation
and advancement of military-technical contacts with CIS countries is
therefore the best optimal solution.

Its Nagorno-Karabakh problem unsolved, Armenia is doing what it can
to advance its defense capabilities. Unfortunately for Yerevan, the
capacities of the practically nonexistent national military-industrial
complex and budget are quite limited. The role played by Russia
therefore cannot be overestimated. Armenia procures all military
hardware from Russia. The term "outsorting" applies here, the practice
of leaving fringe functions to another organization. The Armenian
military-industrial complex has been receiving Russian contracts
since 2006. In fact, all these exercises were turned over to Russia
completely, as payment for the Armenian state debt.

Military-technical cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan entered
a new phase on November 14, 2005, with the signing of the Treaty
on Relations of Allies. Article 10 of the Treaty states that
"the signatories pledge to actively interact in modernization
and reorganization of the armed forces and their rearmament with
modern hardware." According to official estimates, the Russian-Uzbek
military-technical cooperation amounted to dozens millions dollars by
2006. Russia is selling this former Soviet republic weapons, aircraft,
antiaircraft means, munitions, and spares. When Prime Minister Mikhail
Fradkov visited Uzbekistan in March 2007, Moscow and Tashkent agreed
to establish Uzrosavia, a joint venture where the Russian share in
the registered capital was to amount to at least 51%.

Azerbaijan established the Defense Industry Ministry. Its plans
include the production of light weapons and light artillery pieces.

Where it intends to find the personnel, however, remains to be seen.

The Azerbaijani regular army is using Russian military hardware
nowadays, which means services by the Russian military-industrial
complex. This country in the meantime is building up its military
potential and making an emphasis on NATO hardware. Negotiations are
under way with the United States over three patrol ships and the
construction of radars on the territory of Azerbaijan. In any case,
Azerbaijan remains a staunch promoter of a well-balanced policy with
regard to Russia, Iran, and the United States. The Azerbaijani-Russian
military-technical cooperation will probably remain unchanged.

Military-technical cooperation with Kyrgyzstan is in a decline.

Russia has been losing political clout with the region in general
and military-economic influence along with it. Pro-American moods
are taking root in Central Asia. The situation with Tajikistan is
more or less similar but will hopefully clarify soon.

The Ukraine’s position is somewhat controversial. The country of a
colossal scientific potential, envious geopolitical location, and a
broad spectrum of international contacts is at a loss over the choice
of political priorities. Some Ukrainian leaders would like to see
their country in NATO. What will it mean for the national economy?

First, membership in NATO is expensive. It will certainly require
additional investments in production (approximately 246.45 million
grivnas). Second, all of the military hardware will have to be
converted to NATO standards. Third, membership in NATO will leave
the Ukraine in the position of Poland. A country with a modern and
advanced military-industrial complex, it has nothing it could offer
its NATO partners. Compelled to stick to NATO standards, Warsaw is
buying weapons and military hardware elsewhere. It paid $1.1 million
for 690 armored personnel carriers from Finland.

It is common knowledge that the United States tolerates no rivals in
the sphere of military hardware. The Ukraine is a fine example. Not
even a NATO country yet, it is forced to abandon a whole assortment
of weapons including portable antiaircraft complexes like Strela-2
and others that are much more effective than the American Stingers.

In December 2005, Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister,
announced in no uncertain terms that entry into NATO would mean the
severance of industrial cooperation between Russian and Ukrainian
military-industrial complexes. Their existing symbiosis nowadays
is what keeps Ukraine on the list of five worldwide largest arms
exporters. Let Kiev think this over.

According to political scientists (including Stanislav Belkovsky),
all of that indicates that Ukraine cannot hope to create its
own military-industrial complex geared for NATO standards in the
foreseeable future and that cooperation with Russia will therefore
survive. And yet, Russia is gradually curtailing its economic contacts
with the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. Last May, Russia even
withdrew from the joint Russian-Ukrainian AN-70 project.

It is proof that Ukraine had better think twice.

Despite the somewhat souring political relations between Moscow
and Minsk, military-technical cooperation with Belarus is quite
impressive. Two regiments of S-300PS antiaircraft complexes were
delivered to Belarus in April 2006 within the framework of the joint
Russian-Belarussian antiaircraft defense system. The complexes will be
deployed in the western part of the republic. It will make the killing
zone 150 kilometers wider. Where Russia is concerned, deliveries of
the antiaircraft complexes offer an additional entry into the national
economy and better airspace security. As for Belarus, Minsk provides
Liga-S combined sights for PT-76 floating tanks modernized in Moscow
(by Special Mechanic Engineering and Metallurgy).

The state of affairs with military-technical cooperation with
Kazakhstan is fine too. Its regular army is using military hardware of
Soviet vintage as well as what is being bought from Russia nowadays. In
the meantime, Kazakhstan itself is in the position to offer to the
Third World somewhat outdated Soviet military hardware – aircraft,
helicopters, tanks, light weapons, haulers, and jammers. In other
words, it is a potential rival of Russia in the sphere of arms
export. Even worse, this export may mount tension in the already
problematic region.

Kazakhstan’s potential in the sphere of military hardware production
is quite impressive, particularly where Naval gear is concerned. This
particular segment is of particular interest to Russia. The Gidromash
factory in Alma-Ata makes APR-3 ASW missiles, Kuibyshev factory in
Petropavlovsk produces antiship mines (MTPK-2, Langust-Schuka, and
Krechet), Mechanical Engineering in Alma-Ata 65-75A torpedoes, Zenith
in Uralsk trawls and mine-seekers, Kirov factory in Petropavlovsk
radios for the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces… It may be mentioned
here that Naval gear accounts for a substantial part of arms export
from Russia. Kazakh enterprises are running at 25-30% their capacities
nowadays, and placement of Russian contracts there will benefit both
countries handsomely. Hence the conclusion: joint Russian-Kazakh work
on weapons and military hardware for their own safety and export is
better than rivalry in the world market in the sphere of sales of
outdated Soviet military hardware. Fradkov confirmed it on his visit
to Kazakhstan recently. Moscow and Astana agreed to activate the work
and prepare a number of accords for the signing by presidents.

Countries of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization may
retain the existing economic ties and establish new ones in weapons
and military hardware design and development. It stands to reason to
expect that military hardware will soon be mutually produced. It will
ease the financial burden on every individual participant, allow for
mass production, and facilitate export capacities.

Maintenance (the availability of spare parts) of the weapons and
military hardware is another problem. The matter concerns the gear
still produced in some nearby foreign countries or that of Soviet
vintage. The construction of new factories to produce spare parts
for the weapons that will be hopelessly outmoded in 5-10 years is of
course inexpedient. The preservation of the existing economic ties
is therefore the answer, at least for the politically loyal countries.

Belarus and Kazakhstan will certainly remain partners in the
foreseeable future.

In other words, an analysis of the shape and prospects of
military-technical cooperation in the Commonwealth in the near
future leads to the conclusion that Russia – potentially – remains
the nucleus of CIS military-industrial complex.

SHANT.TV AND KENTRON.TV WEB PORTALS FOR SALE

Panorama.am
20:17 11/04/2007

An electronic message disseminated today says that and
internet portals are for sale. Applications for the
competition are accepted until April 30, 18:00, the message says. The
applications are accepted at [email protected] e-mail and must have a
reference to price offer. The electronic letter says the offers with
unacceptable price offers will be rejected.

Panorama.am asked Shant and Kentron TV companies if they know about
the competition. Kentron told they know nothing about it. So did
Shant TV. Artak Arshakyan, Shant TV technical director, said they
already have two portals – և

Obviously, this is a very profitable business at the pre-election
period. If political parties decide to run the campaign in the
internet, the owners of the sites may gain good profits.

From: Mother See Foreign Press Office <[email protected]>
Subject: Feast of the Glorious Resurrection of Jesus Christ in Etchmiadzin

PRESS RELEASE
Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, Information Services
Address:  Vagharshapat, Republic of Armenia
Contact:  Rev. Fr. Ktrij Devejian
Tel:  +374-10-517163
Fax:  +374-10-517301
E-Mail:  [email protected]
Website: 
April 10, 2007

Feast of the Glorious Resurrection of Jesus Christ in Holy Etchmiadzin

"We are called by God and bound by the imperatives of the times
to unify our efforts for the sake of a free and happy life,
for the sake of philanthropic values which are the blessed gifts from God."
? His Holiness Karekin II

On Sunday, April 8, the Feast of the Glorious Resurrection of Jesus Christ
was celebrated with special joy and festivity in the headquarters of the
worldwide Armenian Church ? the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin.

In anticipation of the Pontifical Divine Liturgy, the Youth Centers of the
Armenian Church, co-sponsored by the Mother See and the Armenian General
Benevolent Union, had organized a parade which began early in the morning at
the Monastery of St. Hripsime.  With the singing of church hymns and the
beating of drums, hundreds of young boys and girls processed toward the
Mother See, where upon their arrival, they greeted the pontifical procession
leading His Holiness Karekin II, Catholicos of All Armenians, into the
Mother Cathedral for the commencement of the Easter Divine Liturgy.

As the bells of Holy Etchmiadzin tolled with enthusiasm, the Pontiff of All
Armenians entered the Cathedral of the Descent of the Only Begotten and was
greeted by state officials, diplomats, honored guests and thousands of
Armenian faithful waiting to hear the good news of Christ?s Resurrection.

His Holiness Karekin II celebrated the solemn Divine Liturgy and delivered
his message of hope and love to the Armenian people in Armenia, Artsakh and
throughout the world.  As every year, the Easter Divine Liturgy was again
broadcast live from Holy Etchmiadzin around the globe by Armenian Public
Television and the Shoghakat Television Company.

Assisting His Holiness at the Holy Altar were His Grace Bishop Anushavan
Jamgotchian, Dean of Yerevan State University?s Faculty of Theology; and His
Grace Bishop Markos Hovhannisian, Locum Tenens of the Diocese of
Gegharkunik.

In his message, His Holiness stated, "…The Son of God gave His life as
ransom for the salvation of the world, and Christ?s sacrifice became the
greatest evidence of Divine love for mankind.  Through His sacrifice and
resurrection, Christ granted mankind liberty from the power of evil, from
the bondage of sin and death.  Christ gave us freedom, which is beyond any
comprehendible human understanding; freedom which is the grace to walk
toward reborn life ? life renewed with justice and peace ? and the desired
and sought after eternity of life."

Reflecting on the current state of affairs in the world, His Holiness said,
"…(the) paths leading away from the light of Christ?s Resurrection fill
the world today with anxiety.  In these days as well, Judas? kisses and
materialism are spreading.  In the example of Pilate, many wash their hands,
trampling justice underfoot for their own personal prosperity.  Today as
well, men follow the example of denying the peace-bestowing Christ and
selecting the thief Barabbas with their cheating, violence, assassinations
and in their frenzy for stepping on others for their personal gain.  The
Mother of God grieving near the Cross today mourns with all lamenting
mothers who have lost their sons in wars, grieves for those who are
crucifying themselves through their evil acts, and for the many injustices,
pains, poverty and yearnings which fill the world with sorrow."

His Holiness also spoke specifically about the hardships that the Armenian
people continue to face:  "We remain obligated to struggle for the
God-granted right of the Armenians of Artsakh to live in liberty and
security; for the universal condemnation of the Armenian Genocide; and for
the preservation and salvation of Armenian spiritual and cultural treasures
? our holy shrines and monuments ? in our neighboring countries.

"The policy of denying the Genocide is the cause for new physical, cultural
and psychological-moral genocides.  Unpunished crimes unavoidably bear new
ones.  The Genocide of the Armenians was followed by the Holocaust, as well
as Rwanda, Darfur and other genocides.  The destruction of the giant Buddha
statues in Afghanistan was followed by the obliteration of thousands of
ancient Khatchkars (Stone-Crosses) in Nakhijevan by Azeri soldiers.  Only
days ago, while the wound on the soul of our people from Hrant Dink?s
assassination has not yet closed, the Turkish authorities, having completed
the renovation work on the Church of the Holy Cross on Aghtamar Island,
converted the centuries-old Armenian holy shrine into a museum.  From the
time of the Genocide, the church has been standing in silent prayer, yet
today prayer is prohibited in the renovated church.  Truly, in this new
century, this approach cannot be the spirit of dialogue between religions
and cultures, nor the aspirations for peaceful coexistence among peoples."

The Armenian Pontiff concluded his annual message with words of optimism and
encouragement:  "Relying on God, we have great hope in the triumph of
justice, freedom and peace.  Our faith is alive, through which we shall
create the new victories of our life, we shall erect new Khatchkars which
whisper their prayers, new sanctuaries of illuminated altars, new monuments
shall rise with that strength of the grace of the resurrection, which is
granted to us by our All-Provident Savior and Lord.

 "Our dear faithful sons and daughters, we once again bring the life-giving
tiding to you:  ‘Christ is Risen from the dead, He destroyed death with
death; and through His Resurrection, granted us life’.  He Who was crucified
by men has Risen, the gravestone has been rolled away by divine power, and
our hearts are filled with the joy of God-granted salvation.  Through the
countless graces of the Savior?s Resurrection, let our souls be strengthened
by labors established on the foundation of faith, to make prosperous and
brilliant the path of renaissance for our homeland, our people and our
Church? May our homeland, the entire world, and nations and people live free
of sorrow and pain, with love, brotherhood and peace toward one another
under the innumerable mercies of the Risen Christ."

Present for the Easter Divine Liturgy were President of the Republic of
Armenian Robert Kocharian, President of the Republic of Nagorno Karabagh
Arkady Ghukasian, Prime Minister of Armenia Serge Sargisian, Ministers of
the Republic of Armenia, Members of the National Assembly, Supreme Spiritual
Council members, ambassadors and leaders of diplomatic missions accredited
to Armenia, representatives of international organizations working in
Armenia, and thousands of faithful men, women and children.

Also in attendance for the Liturgy were more than 100 members of the AGBU
with their chapter representatives and members of the central board led by
its President, Mr. Berge Setrakian, who are in Yerevan to celebrate the
100th Anniversary of the benevolent organization.

At the conclusion of the Divine Liturgy, His Holiness Karekin II hosted a
reception in the Pontifical Residence for the two presidents, state
officials, ambassadors and AGBU guests.  During the reception, the
Catholicos once again greeted the faithful with the tiding of "Christ is
Risen from the dead!" to which the crowd replied, "Blessed is the
Resurrection of Christ".

April 10, 2007

PRESS RELEASE
Western Prelacy of the Armenian Apostolic Church of America
H.E. Archbishop Moushegh Mardirossian, Prelate
6252 Honolulu Avenue
La Crescenta, CA 91214
Tel: (818) 248-7737
Fax: (818) 248-7745
E-mail: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
Website: <;

WESTERN PRELACY GENOCIDE COMMEMORATION
HARUT SASSOUNIAN TO LECTURE ON
"NEW APPROACHES TO OUR LONG-STANDING DEMANDS"

In commemoration of the 92nd anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, the
Western Prelacy has organized a lecture under the auspices of H.E.
Archbishop Moushegh Mardirossian, Prelate, and organized by the Prelacy
Outreach Committee, featuring keynote speaker Mr. Harut Sassounian. The
event will take place on Sunday, April 15, at 6:00 p.m., at the Prelacy
"Dikran and Zarouhi Der Ghazarian" Hall (6252 Honolulu Ave., La Crescenta).

United Armenia Fund President and LINCY foundation Vice-Chair
Mr. Harut Sassounian will lecture on new approaches we must take to achieve
our long-standing demands in this new age.

This commemoration is the first public event to take place at
the new Prelacy building and the first of many cultural events planned at
the hall.

THE NATIONAL UNITY PARTY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE 30% OF VOTES

ArmRadio.am
09.04.2007 17:38

"The "National Unity" Party expects to get 28-30% of the votes at the
parliamentary elections scheduled for May 12," leader of the party
Artashes Geghamyan declared in Yerevan today.

In Geghamyan’s words, "external forces are impatiently waiting for
election frauds to apply sanctions and exert pressure on Armenia in
the process of resolution of the Karabakh conflict." For that very
reason he declared that " conduct of legal and fair elections is the
only and last opportunity of Armenia."

The leader of the "National Unity" presented his anti-crisis program,
which envisages implementation of a number of national programs in
the spheres of economy, education and health.

The first individual exhibition

Yerkir.am
April 06, 2007

Navasard Melikian’s first individual exhibition was opened at
Narekatsi Art Union on April 3. 24 works of the young painter were
presented at the exhibition.

`I started painting in the third grade. I graduated from Panos
Terlemezian Art College. My works of the last two years are presented
at the exhibition,’ Melikian says.

The paintings are the result of the young painter’s search for
self-realization. The first individual exhibition is the line after
which the painter looks back to analyze the past and visualize the
future.

`The paintings are done in oil, or mixed techniques. I do not follow
any specific style,’ Melikian says.

The bright colors on his paintings seem to be a door that opens the
way to the freedom and uniqueness of fine art. The intangible images
reveal the young painter’s spiritual connection with his close people
and the outer world.

Navasard Melikian has participated in group exhibitions and has won
prizes in student exhibition contests. Time will show what will happen
in the future, and the future always belongs to the young.

By Gohar STEPANIAN

SYRIA: IDENTITY CRISIS
by Robert D. Kaplan

Atlantic Online
April 5 2007

Hafez-al Assad has so far prevented the Balkanization of his country,
but he can’t last forever

On my first visit to Syria, in the 1970s, a tourist-information
official at Damascus airport handed me a map on which not only
the Israeli-held Golan Heights but also the Hatay region around the
ancient city of Antioch were depicted as part of the country. Wanting
to see Antioch, I asked the official about tours there. His reply
and apologetic tone gave me pause: "Unfortunately, sir, for the time
being it is not possible; maybe in a few months."

Located at the northeast corner of the Mediterranean Sea, the Hatay
is a 2,000-square-mile area where Arabs and Armenians once slightly
outnumbered Turks. In July of 1938 the Turkish army moved in, forcing
many of the Arabs and Armenians to flee, and preparing the way for
the Turkish government to annex the region. The French, who held the
mandate for Syria, did not protest, and the occupied population could
not. Thinking about this history in terms of the tourist official’s
sheepishness has since led me to wonder, How could the Syrians ever
acknowledge the 1967 loss of the Golan Heights when they don’t really
accept an older loss-one that, unlike the Golan Heights, has long
been officially recognized by the world community?

The answer is simply that they can’t. As the example of the Hatay
suggests, the loss of the Golan Heights was merely the latest of
several territorial truncations that underpin an explosive and
unmentionable historical reality: that Syria-whose population, like
Lebanon’s, is a hodgepodge of feuding Middle Eastern minorities-has
always been more identifiable as a region of the Ottoman Empire than as
a nation in the post-Ottoman era. The psychology of Syria’s internal
politics, a realm whose violence and austere perversity continue to
baffle the West, is bound up in the question of Syria’s national
identity. The identity question is important: events inside Syria
reverberate throughout the Middle East.

The word "SYRIA" is derived from the Semitic Siryon, which appears in
Deuteronomy in reference to Mount Hermon, which straddles the current
frontiers of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. From the early nineteenth
century until the end of the First World War, when the Ottoman
sultanate collapsed, the region that European travelers called Syria
stretched from the Taurus Mountains of Turkey in the north to Egypt
and the Arabian Desert in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea
in the west to Mesopotamia in the east. Present-day Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan, western Iraq, and southern Turkey were all part of this vast
area. Syria was not linked to any specific national sentiment.

What sentiment did exist was pan-Arab. Indeed, the nineteenth-century
Syrian cities of Damascus and Beirut, with their secret cultural
and political societies, engendered the First World War Arab revolt
against the Turks. But the revolt, although it freed Arabia from
outside control, only complicated matters for Syria, whose proximity
to Europe left it particularly vulnerable to foreign exploitation.

Anglo-French rivalry for spoils resulted in a division of Syria into
six zones. A sliver of northern Syria became part of a new Turkish
state, which was being carved out of the old Ottoman sultanate
by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. (This area was separate from the Hatay,
whose annexation would come later.) Syria’s eastern desert became
part of a new British mandate: Iraq. Southern Syria, too, was soon
controlled by the British, who created two additional territories:
a mandate in Palestine and a kingdom in Transjordan, the latter ruled
by Britain’s First World War ally Abdullah, a son of the Sharif of
Mecca. The French got the territory that was left over, which they
in turn subdivided into Lebanon and Syria.

Lebanon’s borders were drawn so as to bring a large population of
mainly Sunni Muslims under the domination of Maronite Christians,
who were allied with France, spoke French, and though not exactly
Catholic had a concordat with the Holy See in Rome. Syria, Lebanon’s
neighbor, was a writhing ghost of a would-be nation. Although territory
had been cut away on all sides, Syria still contained not only every
warring sect and religion and parochial tribal interest but also the
headquarters, in Damascus, of the pan-Arabist movement, whose aim was
to erase all the borders that the Europeans had just created. Thus,
although it was more compact than the sprawling pre-war region called
Syria, the new French mandate with that name had even fewer unifying
threads. Freya Stark, a British diplomat, said of the French mandate,
"I haven’t yet come across one spark of national feeling: it is all
sects and hatreds and religions."

Each of Syria’s sects and religions was-as it largely still
is-concentrated in a specific geographical area. In the center was
Damascus, which together with the cities of Homs and Hama constituted
the heartland of the Sunni Arab majority. In the south was Jabal Druze
("Druze Mountain"), where lived a remote community of heterodox Muslims
who were resistant to Damascene rule and had close links across the
border with Transjordan. In the north was Aleppo, a cosmopolitan bazaar
and trading center containing large numbers of Kurds, Arab Christians,
Armenians, Circassians, and Jews, all of whom felt allegiance more
to Mosul and Baghdad (both now in Iraq) than to Damascus. And in the
west, contiguous to Lebanon, was the mountain stronghold of Latakia,
dominated by the Alawites, the most oppressed and recalcitrant of
French Syria’s Arab minorities, who were destined to have a dramatic
effect on postcolonial Syria.

The Alawites, along with the Druzes and the Isma’ilis (still another
Muslim sect in Syria), are remnants of a wave of Shi’ism which
swept over the region a thousand years ago. The term "Alawite" means
"follower of Ali," the martyred son-in-law of Mohammed who is venerated
by millions of Shi’ites in Iran and elsewhere. Yet the Alawites’
resemblance to the Shi’ites constitutes the least of their heresies
in the eyes of Syria’s majority Sunni Arabs; far more serious is the
Alawite doctrine’s affinity with Phoenician paganism-and also with
Christianity. Alawites celebrate many Christian festivals, including
Christmas, Easter, and Palm Sunday, and their religious ceremonies
make use of bread and wine.

When the French took control of Syria after the First World War,
they were fresh from colonizing experiences in Algeria and Tunisia,
which had kindled hostility in them to Sunni Arab nationalism. In an
effort to forestall a rise in Arab nationalism, the French granted
autonomous status to Alawite-dominated Latakia and to Jabal Druze,
making their inhabitants completely independent from the Sunni Arabs in
Damascus, and answerable to the French only. The Alawites, the Druzes,
and the other minorities also paid lower taxes than the majority
Sunnis, while getting larger development subsidies from the French
government. What is more, the French encouraged the recruitment of
Alawites, Druzes, Kurds, and Circassians into their occupation force,
the Troupes Speciales du Levant. (From then on the military became a
popular career for poor rural Alawites bent on advancement in Syrian
society.) The majority Sunni Arabs, for their part, were severely
repressed. The Damascus region was treated as occupied territory
and patrolled by tough Senegalese troops, with help from Alawites,
Druzes, and Kurds. The Sunni Arabs felt besieged to a degree they
had never experienced under the Ottoman Turks.

Sunni paramilitary groups responded by organizing brawls and uprisings
against the French in the streets of Damascus. Arguably, not even
British Palestine, with its periodic outbursts of communal violence
between Arabs and Jews, was as tense and unstable a place as French
Syria, whose two colliding forces-minority self-determination and Sunni
pan-Arabism-were encouraged rather than restrained by French rule.

A myth persists about Syria, perpetuated in part by the American media,
which seem to lack historical memory, and in part by supporters of
Israel, who wish to distinguish starkly between the democracy of the
Jewish state and the nondemocracy of Arab states.

The myth is that Syria’s Arab inhabitants have experience neither
with democracy nor even with the rule of law. This is not true:
Syria gave democracy a try, against enormous odds.

Patrick Seale, a British specialist, chronicles the postwar period
in The Struggle for Syria. In July of 1947, soon after achieving
full independence, and with France’s divisive influence still strong,
Syria held elections. The results were predictable for a country that
had been created out of several rival political communities. The
National Party, led by Shukri al-Quwatli, got more votes than any
other group, but was able to form only a minority government. The
majority of the ballots went to various independents representing
sectarian interests. Beneath the surface the reality was even worse.

"I look around me," wrote Habib Kahaleh, in Memoirs of a Deputy,
"and see only a bundle of contradictions." Israel’s humiliation of
Arab armies in its 1948 War of Independence further weakened the
democratically elected government. When the Syrian chief of staff,
General Husni al-Za’im, staged a coup d’etat on March 30, 1949-the
first of many military takeovers in the postcolonial Arab world-crowds
danced in the streets of Damascus.

Za’im, like many Syrian leaders who were to follow him, was
exhibitionistic and extravagant, and lacked a coherent strategy for
reconciling the various local nationalisms of what used to be French
Syria. He was soon overthrown and summarily executed. The next military
regime held new national elections, but the vote was just as fractured
as it had been in 1947, and this democratic experiment, too, collapsed
into anarchy. The chaos ended in December of 1949, when Colonel Adib
al-Shishakli seized power. It was the third coup of the year.

Shishakli’s ability to restore order caused foreign observers to
hail him as the Arab world’s Ataturk, who would mold Syria into a
nation on the Turkish model. But it was not to be. Shishakli publicly
lamented in 1953 that Syria was merely "the current official name for
that country which lies within the artificial frontiers drawn up by
imperialism." Unfortunately for him, he was right. In 1954 Shishakli
was overthrown. Once again the dislodging force came from various
sectarian elements within and outside the military.

Meanwhile, an ideological solution to Syria’s contradictions began
to emerge. Ba’athism, from Ba’ath, Arabic for "renaissance," was
started by two Syrian Arabs, one Christian and one Muslim. The movement
appealed to a brand of patriotism both radical and secular, and sought
to replace religion with socialism. Whether Ba’athism was capable of
smoothing over sectarian divisions was tested in the fall of 1954,
a few months after Shishakli’s overthrow, when free parliamentary
elections were held. The results corroborated earlier evidence that
Western democracy was not necessarily the solution for the ills of
Arab societies. Although the largest number of parliamentary seats
again went to the tribal and sectarian independents, the biggest
gains relative to the 1949 ballot were registered by the Ba’ath Party,
which advocated a communist-style economic program and a pro-Soviet
foreign policy.

Syria teetered on, with Egypt, Iraq, the Soviet Union, and the United
States all interfering in its internal affairs. In January of 1958
the Syrians gave up. A delegation flew to Cairo and begged Egypt’s
leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, to annex Syria as part of a new union,
the United Arab Republic. Shukri al-Quwatli, the Syrian President,
reportedly complained thus to Nasser about the Syrian people: "Half
claim the vocation of leader, a quarter believe they are prophets,
and at least ten percent take themselves for gods."

The United Arab Republic collapsed in 1961, partly because non-Sunni
Syrians increasingly resented the rule of Egypt’s own Sunni Arabs. In
1963 the Ba’ath Party finally came to power in Damascus in a military
coup. But more significant than its ideology was the ethnic makeup
of the corps of officers now in control: because of the assiduous
French recruitment of minorities-especially Alawites-into the Troupes
Speciales du Levant, the Alawites had, without anyone’s noticing,
gradually taken over the military from within. Though Alawites
constituted just 12 percent of the Syrian population, they now
dominated the corps of young officers.

Another coup followed in 1966. But the coup of 1970, which brought
an Alawite air-force officer, Hafez al-Assad, to power, was what
finally ended the instability that had reigned in Syria since the
advent of independence.

Assad has now remained in power for twenty-two years. Considering that
Damascus saw twenty-one changes of government in the twenty-four years
preceding his coup, Assad’s permanence is impressive. It is still more
impressive when one realizes that he belongs to Syria’s most-hated
ethnic group-the group that has historically been suspected by other
Syrians of sympathizing with the French, the Christians, and even the
Jews. Daniel Pipes, a Middle East historian, writes in Greater Syria,
"An Alawi ruling Syria is like an untouchable becoming maharajah in
India or a Jew becoming tsar in Russia-an unprecedented development
shocking to the majority population which had monopolized power for
so many centuries."

One rarely stated reason for the longevity of Assad’s regime-which
also applies to other Arab dictators who arose around the same time,
like Muammar Qaddafi, in Libya, and Saddam Hussein, in Iraq-is his use
of state-of-the-art electronic surveillance techniques and Soviet-bloc
security advisers: powerful, sometimes lethal tools that had not
been available to earlier dictators. (American diplomats familiar
with Syria in the 1950s describe it as a charming banana republic,
where the government’s attempts at surveillance had an amateurish,
comic-opera quality to them.) Assad’s extraordinary skill as a leader
is another reason why he has survived. For example, by patient trial
and error over the past seventeen years, he has won for himself the
role of de facto military overlord in Lebanon, thus effectively undoing
the French crime of separating Lebanon from the Syrian motherland.

However, Assad’s leadership ability notwithstanding, historical
evidence suggests that the Assad era, like the rule of communists in
Eastern Europe, is more a historical intermission than an indication
of enduring national unity.

The city of Hama, a traditional bastion of Sunni Arab strength, is a
case in point. In 1964 a revolt in Hama almost toppled the then current
Ba’athist regime, top-heavy with Alawites. Finally, in February of
1982, the Sunni Arab Muslim Brotherhood took control of the city and
murdered its Alawite-appointed officials. Sunni renegades had earlier
massacred Alawite soldiers in Aleppo. The roots of this violence lay
in age-old ethnic distrust, aggravated by Assad’s support during the
late 1970s of Maronite Christian militias in Lebanon, which Sunnis
in Syria saw as yet another Alawite-Christian conspiracy against
them. Assad reacted by sending 12,000 Alawite soldiers into Hama. They
massacred as many as 30,000 Sunni Arab civilians and leveled much of
the town. Hama in 1982 was proof that beneath the carapace of Assad’s
stable rule lay a seething region that was no closer to nationhood
than it had been after the Turks left, or after the French left.

Assad, though only in his early sixties, has often been reported to be
in ill health. However long he survives, Syria faces a day of reckoning
when his control over the country weakens. Though the American media
occupy themselves with Assad’s current shift toward moderation-Syria’s
participation in the peace talks, its more civilized attitude toward
Syrian Jews, and its seeming abstinence from anti-Western terrorism-the
question remains: Given Syria’s history up to this moment, do any of
these policy changes really matter? Syria, it is to be remembered, is
part of the same world as Yugoslavia: a former Ottoman territory that
has yet to come to terms with the problems of post-Ottoman boundaries.

Future scenarios for Syria resemble those predicted for Yugoslavia
during the Cold War years. From the standpoint of the present,
the scenarios always seem implausible. But from the standpoint of
historical process and precedent, they seem inevitable.

Syria will not remain the same. It could become bigger or smaller, but
the chance that any territorial solution will prove truly workable is
slim indeed. Some Middle East specialists mutter about the possibility
that a future Alawite state will be carved out of Syria. Based in
mountainous Latakia, it would be a refuge for Alawites after Assad
passes from the scene and Muslim fundamentalists-Sunnis, that is-take
over the government. This state would be supported not only by Lebanese
Maronites but also by the Israeli Secret Service, which would see no
contradiction in aiding former members of Assad’s regime against a
Sunni Arab government in Damascus. Some Syrians, such as the Muslim
Brotherhood, look forward to the collapse of both Israel and Jordan
and their reintegration into Syria, as they waited in the 1940s for
the incorporation into Syria of the autonomous states in Latakia
and Jabal Druze. Should Assad’s death lead to chaos in Damascus,
it is not out of the question that the region of Jabal Druze would
break away from Syria and amalgamate itself with Jordan. Because
Lebanon’s current stability rests upon Syrian military domination
there, a weakening of government institutions in Syria could result
in a renewal of the Lebanese civil war.

What Syria deep down yearns for-what would assuage its insoluble
contradictions-is to duplicate the process now under way in the
Balkans. That is, it wishes to repeal the political results of the
twentieth century-in Syria’s case, the border arrangements made by
Great Britain and France after the First World War. In the Balkans,
of course, "repeal" means the fragmentation of a larger whole into
its constituent parts, and that fragmentation is proceeding apace. In
Syria it means the opposite: the reconstitution of the whole out of its
constituent parts. Indeed, Syria wishes to return to a world where,
as Daniel Pipes says, it could be subsumed into an even larger whole
and become "a region that exists outside politics." This, after all,
is what lies behind its calls for "Arab unity." And nothing of the
sort will happen.

For the moment, then, Assad staves off the future. It is Assad, not
Saddam Hussein or any other ruler, who defines the era in which the
Middle East now lives. And Assad’s passing may herald more chaos than
a chaotic region has seen in decades.

plan

CO-CHAIRS NOT TO VISIT THE REGION BY AZERBAIJANI AND ARMENIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS’ MEETING

Today, Azerbaijan
April 3 2007

The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group mediating in the settlement of
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict will not visit the region by the meeting
of Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers Elmar Mammadyarov and
Vartan Oskanian scheduled for April this year.

Russian co-chair Yuri Merzlyakov told the APA that the mediators will
possibly visit the region by summer.

Yuri Merzlyakov had a meeting with OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
president Goran Lennmarker, who was visiting Moscow along with the
delegation from Swedish parliament.

Swedish parliament told the APA that Lennmarker does his best to
discuss the Nagorno Karabakh.

Merzlyakov informed Goran Lennmarker about the meeting of Azerbaijani
and Armenian Foreign Ministers and previous two meetings of the
co-chairs. Lennmarker expressed hope that the conflict will soon
be settled.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov told journalists that
the co-chairs phoned him and offered him to meet with his Armenian
counterpart in one of European cities in late April or early in May.

Elmar Mammadyarov said that date of the meeting depends on the
ministers’ schedule and will be specified soon.

The minister noted that both Azerbaijan and Armenia expressed their
positions in Geneva. "As parliamentary elections will be held in
Armenia in mid May, the co-chairs are trying to arrange the meeting
by the elections," he said.

URL:

TURKISH EDUCATIONISTS SEEK REFORM TO CURB ‘BLIND’ NATIONALISM
Emma Ross-Thomas

The Brunei Times, Brunei Darussalam
April 3 2007

HAPPY is he who says he is a Turk, pipe hundreds of uniformed children
in unison, lined up in the playground before a golden statue of
Turkey’s revered father Ataturk, for a daily pledge of hard work
and sacrifice.

The enthusiastic chanting ends and the children file into school,
past an inscription saying their first duty is to defend Turkey
and another of the national anthem texts which appear again on the
classroom walls and preface of all their textbooks.

When they move up to high school, they will take a weekly class
from army officers about the military’s exploits. Their school books
will tell them European powers have their sights set on Anatolia and
Turkey’s geography makes it vulnerable "to all kinds of internal and
external threats".

Textbooks are peppered with the sayings of Kemal Ataturk, who founded
modern Turkey in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

"Homeland … we are all a sacrifice for you!" comes particularly
recommended by one textbook’s authors.

These are just some of the features of Turkey’s education system that
reformist teachers and activists want changed. They say it encourages
blind nationalism something Turkey is looking at more seriously since
the ultranationalist-inspired murder in January of Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink. Political rows with the European Union, which
Ankara hopes to join, have also fanned nationalism especially in an
election year but many experts say the seeds are first sown at school.

This government has reformed the curriculum in a way teachers say
makes students more active and reduces traditional rote learning,
but the emphasis on nationalism remains.

"There’s still some emphasis on militarism, the importance of being
martyred, the importance of going to war, dying in war and so on," said
Batuhan Aydagul, deputy coordinator of the Education Reform Initiative.

Teachers also say they feel pressure not to stray from the official
line or curriculum in class.

"If you present some arguments which are the opposite of the
established arguments … you might get reaction, absolutely, from
students, from other teachers, from directors negative reactions of
course," said one teacher who declined to be named.

His colleague, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, laughed at
the idea of criticising Ataturk in a history lesson, saying to do so
would spark investigation by prosecutors. "They think … if you do
such a thing you confuse their minds and confusion is not good for
young people," the first teacher said.

But the textbooks could be confusing for some: while foreign historians
say Ottoman forces massacred Armenians in 1915, high school history
books here say it was the other way around.

"It must not be forgotten that in eastern Anatolia the Armenians
carried out genocide," one 2005-dated book reads.

In its latest progress report the EU also criticised the portrayal
of minorities such as Armenians, saying further work was needed to
remove discriminatory language from textbooks.

Nationalism is not the only problem with schools in Turkey, which,
hemmed in by the budget restraints of an International Monetary Fund
accord, spends little on education.

With a population of 74 million, Turkey already struggles to find
jobs for its ever-growing army of young people.

But in terms of spending per head as a proportion of the economy,
Turkey spends least among OECD countries.

Primary school teacher Ayse Panus said parents at her public school
where there are 21 teachers for 680 pupils make contributions of
about 50 lira (US$35) a year to keep it going.

Turkey is also around the bottom of the OECD league in terms of
years spent at school, the proportion of the population with tertiary
education and the maths ability of 15-year-olds.

Teachers are low-paid and spend the first years of their career in
a state-assigned posting.

This government has increased spending, but experts say more is needed
to narrow the gap in Turkey’s two-tier system between high quality
selective academies and regular schools. Enrolment has also improved,
especially for girls helped by a high-profile government and Unicef-
backed campaign to persuade conservative rural parents to send their
daughters to school.

Citing such progress, the EU says Turkey is well prepared for accession
when it comes to education, but many disagree.

"On the one hand they want to be in Europe, and on the other … they
are encouraging the feeling that there are enemies all around,"
said Panus.

The Decatur Daily, AL
April 1 2007

`Skylark Farm’ illustrates genocide of Armenians

By William S. Allen
Special to THE DAILY

This book has been compared to `Schindler’s List.’ In the sense that
both books contain descriptions of genocide, that is true. In other
ways, they are not at all alike. `Skylark Farm’ is more personal,
and, if you can believe it possible, more intense.

Antonia Arslan, an ethnic Armenian, has lived her entire life in
Italy and this novel was originally written in Italian. The
translator has done a wonderful job of capturing the melding of
Armenian and Italian word imagery and thought patterns.

Even the voice of the narrator, which at first seems overly
intrusive, soon becomes more like that of your favorite aunt telling
stories of the old days.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was in
decline. It had become known as `The sick man of Europe.’ The
government, as is often the case, chose a scapegoat to divert
attention from its failings. Not for the first time, the scapegoats
were the Armenian citizens of Turkey. The Armenians had endured
violence and pillaging in the past, but had remained in the empire.
It was home.

In 1915, leaders of the empire began a new program, one of
`relocation.’ Armenian men and boys were rounded up and slaughtered.
Women, girls and the elderly were forced from their homes and sent on
long marches toward Syria with the false hope they would be safe
there. Thousands died on the way, many of starvation and exhaustion.

Kurdish bandits and the Turkish guards escorting the columns looted
the women’s belongings, practiced wholesale rape and killed
indiscriminately.

Story in two parts

In telling this story, Arslan has divided `Skylark Farm’ into two
main sections. In the first, the reader is introduced to Sempad, a
prosperous pharmacist, and his extended family. Sempad looks forward
to a planned visit by his brother, Yerwant, who left home forty years
earlier at the age of thirteen and has become a doctor in Italy.
Sempad spends much of his time making improvements to the family
homestead, Skylark Farm, in anticipation of this visit.

Like many Armenians of the time, Sempad chooses to downplay the
lessons of history. No one imagines the reality that they will soon
face. In vivid detail, the ending of part one reveals how wrong they
are.

The second section of the book describes the journey of the survivors
of Sempad’s family following the initial massacres.

Their goal is to escape to Italy and join Yerwant. Individual Turks,
Greeks and others assist the steadily dwindling family during their
ordeal and Arslan gives credit where it is due.

She does not engage in blanket condemnation of any group, although
the temptation to do so must surely have been great.

This is a novel, but one which is based on the real experiences of
members of the author’s family. It is well worth reading both for its
literary value and as a reminder that many peoples have suffered the
cruelties of genocide in the past. Sadly, that cruelty continues in
parts of the world today.