Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
June 15, 2005, Wednesday
GEORGIAN SEND-OFF
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 20, June 8 – 14, 2005, pp. 1,
3
by Aleksei Matveev
It took Russia and Georgia years of negotiations to finally reach an
agreement on the Russian military bases on the territory of Georgia.
The joint communique Russian and Georgian foreign ministers signed
last week specifies that withdrawal of the Russian military contingent
from Georgia should be completed in 2008. The bases in Batumi and
Akhalkalaki cease functioning as of the moment of signing of the
communique, i.e. as of May 30, 2005. All their activities are to be
dedicated to withdrawal only.
Russia pledged to withdraw heavy military hardware from Akhalkalaki
before the end of 2006, and the base as such before October 1, 2007.
The base in Batumi is to be withdrawn in practically the same period
– with a reservation, “to execute the withdrawal of the Batumi base
and command structures of the Russian Army Group in the Caucasus in
Tbilisi in 2008.”
“Withdrawal of Russian military bases will be executed only on
the condition of establishment on the territory of Russia of the
necessary infrastructure for the troops to be pulled out,” Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov said at an international security conference
in Munich in August 2004.
Two military bases with tenements for servicemen have to be built
in Russia prior to the withdrawal from Georgia, Ivanov said. “We
will act in accordance with financial capacities of the state,”
Ivanov said. “The necessary means may be allocated to the Defense
Ministry only when bilateral relations with Georgia have been signed
and ratified by the Duma.”
Ivanov pointed out that Moscow and Tbilisi were still in disagreement
over the periods of withdrawal from Georgia. “Statements like that will
be made by the very moment Russia and Georgia sign two agreements:
on the dates of withdrawal and mode of their functioning in Georgia
prior to the pullout,” the minister declared.
And what do we have now? There is no Russian-Georgian agreement on
the dates of withdrawal, there is only a joint communique released
by two foreign ministers. Instead of a separate document on the mode
of functioning we only have a couple of lines in the communique – to
the effect that activities of the bases will be dedicated solely to
the withdrawal. And even that in a document signed by Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov. Infrastructure for the military hardware or personnel is
not even mentioned. Here are the questions: why did Lavrov fail to take
into account the position of the Defense Ministry? Or did the stand
of the Defense Ministry on the matter changed since August 2004? In
any case, there are too many questions and not enough answers. Lavrov
pledged to turn over the 142nd Armored Vehicles Repair Facility of the
Russian Army Group in the Caucasus to the Georgians before June 15,
2005. Why such a hurry?
In the meantime, the 142nd Armored Vehicles Repair Facility is an
important strategic object. Tbilisi maintains that the facility
will allegedly be turned over to Georgia in accordance with the
1999 Istanbul Accords on withdrawal of Russian military bases and
hardware. It is not so, because Russia and Georgia agreed in the
capital of Turkey that Russia would withdraw its bases from Vaziani
and Gudauta and that Georgia would permit provisional deployment of
Russian troops in Akhalkalaki and Batumi. For some reason, Moscow
does not remind Georgia of its obligations but agrees to an express
transfer of military bases and other important military objects to
the Defense Ministry of Georgia (not only the 142nd Armored Vehicles
Repair Facility). Moscow will turn over all other objects not used by
the Russian Army Group in the Caucasus to Georgia before September
1, 2005. The matter concerns Zvezda Star reserve command post,
communications relay station in Kodjori, and Gonio testing site.
Would not it have been easier to render all of them inoperative? It
does not take a genius to see after all that transfer of all these
objects to Georgia will only boost its defense capacity which will
only strengthen its eagerness to solve its problems with runaway
autonomies by sheer strength of arms.
Observers are already aware of the negative consequences of this
thoughtless transfer. Consider the 142nd Armored Vehicles Repair
Facility. Until very recently it has repaired Russian and Georgian
tanks and armored vehicles of the Armenian national army. It is
because of this that official Baku accused Georgia of assistance
to hostile Yerevan several years ago. Georgia and command of the
Russian Army Group in the Caucasus suggested the use of the facility
to repair Azerbaijani tanks too but official Baku declined the offer.
What will it say now when the facility is Georgian? Nobody in Georgia
offered comment on that, saying that it as too early yet to say
anything definite. It is clear in any case that it will be much more
difficult for Yerevan to repair its tanks now.
Secondly, Academician, Vladimir Popov, of the Academy of Military
Sciences, is convinced that “transfer of the repair facility
of the Russian Army Group in the Caucasus to Georgia means that
Moscow indirectly supports preparation of military invasion of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia by the Georgians.” According to Popov, Moscow has
apparently forgotten that it already turned over to Georgia military
factories, objects, and armored vehicles including modern tanks of the
former Caucasus Military District in June 1992. They participated in
the fratricidal war on Sukhumi and Tskhinvali several weeks later.
The situation is different now, but the president of Georgia does
not rule out the possibility of the use of the national army to bow
the restive autonomies to his will. If it happens, specialists of
the tank repair facility will certainly find themselves busy.
Observers regard as Russia’s certain triumph the provisions of
the joint communique on establishment of the Russian-Georgian
counter-terrorism center in Batumi. It is supposed to become a
subject of a separate document (agreement) which will also specify
“personnel, material, and infrastructure of the Russian military base
in Batumi.” In other words, a part of the military contingent will be
left in Batumi. Judging by counter-terrorism center in Central Asia
within the framework of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation and
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, however, these small
structures will mostly operate as headquarters. Russia initially
suggested two counter-terrorism centers, in Akhalkalaki and Batumi,
but Georgia agreed on only one – on its Black Sea coast.
In other words, Russia may find itself in the position of Georgia’s
partner in the war on terrorism. It is difficult at this point to say
what tasks the counter-terrorism center will cope with. It is safe
to assume only that they will deal with restoration of order in the
Panki Gorge of Georgia where Russian secret services claim Chechen
gunmen hide even now.
All of that are but plans and forecasts, no more. Observers do not
rule out the possibility that the matter of signing of the document
on the counter-terrorism center may be postponed – under American
pressure or for some other reasons.
Where will the troops be withdrawn to? This is another question so far
without an answer. Azerbaijan’s loud protestations notwithstanding, the
joint communique states that the military hardware and personnel will
cross “legitimate crossing points including the one in the settlement
of Ninotsminda.” The settlement is located on the Georgian-Armenian
border. It means that military hardware, materiel, and servicemen
of the Russian Army Group in the Caucasus are to be pulled out to
Armenia. Ninotsminda is a transport crossing point, meaning that
the troops and military hardware will not be shipped to Armenia by
railroads. All of that are, however, plans. Baku is Georgia’s ally
in GUUAM. It may apply sufficient pressure on official Tbilisi to
force the latter to withhold permission to Russian military hardware
to make it to Armenia. What then?
Observers comment on the absence from the Russian-Georgian communique
of a pledge on the part of Georgia not to permit other countries and
particularly NATO members to deploy bases and objects on its territory
as the worst flaw from the Russian point of view. Moscow only has
President Mikhail Saakashvili’s verbal assurances on that score.
“Russia has insisted on putting it into the document until the last,
but Georgia would not accept that,” to quote a source in the Russian
military diplomatic circles. Lyubov Sliska of the Duma does not even
doubt that military bases will appear on the territory of Georgia
soon. “We do not want NATO forces to take up the objects the Russian
military withdrew from,” she said. “Georgian leaders claim that it
is not going to happen. Perhaps it is not indeed, tomorrow or the day
after tomorrow. On the other hand, any deterioration of the situation,
even in the wake of local conflicts that are still pretty possible,
will immediately provoke the decision on expediency of military
aid. From NATO of course, not from Russia… To tell you the truth,
the Georgian administration and the US Administration would dearly
like to see NATO settled in the Caucasus.”
It is clear that Georgia’s promises to take Russian interests into
account, the promises that are not backed by any official documents,
are nothing but a bluff. Saakashvili and his team long to be rid of
their dependence on Moscow. They do not even conceal the fact. State
Minister of Georgia, Georgy Baramidze, said the other day that “the
Alliance hopes to initiate membership procedures in 2007”, i.e. as
soon as the Russian military is out. “It is a mistake to believe that
someone may prevent Georgia’s membership in NATO” through the use of
the problems Georgia is facing, he said. As they say, no comment.
It is clear therefore that the Russian-Georgian accords on withdrawal
of Russian military bases from Georgia do not answer Russia’s
geopolitical interests. Moscow may lose ground in the region soon
unless it activates and specifies its demands in the matter of
promotion of its interests.
Translated by A. Ignatkin